Advancing the Concept of Democratic Public Ownership

Thomas Matthew Hanna, MA, BA

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Management

Adam Smith School of Business, College of Social Sciences
University of Glasgow

February 2025

Abstract

This thesis examines and refines the concept of Democratic Public Ownership, which has emerged in both theory and practice in recent years as neoliberalism continues to mutate and falter. While increasingly referenced and discussed in academic, policy, and movement settings, Democratic Public Ownership currently lacks conceptual clarity, coherence, and distinctiveness, and could benefit from heightened scrutiny and development. This thesis reviews the modern literature on Democratic Public Ownership, investigating its connections to, and impact on, political economic shifts and theorizing since the turn of the 21st century (such as the global remunicipalization movement); identifies and analyzes numerous relevant historical and contemporary theories, experiments, and prototypes ranging from the early days of the industrial revolution to the Great Financial Crisis of the late 2000s; locates the concept of Democratic Public Ownership historically and ideologically as part of the broader effort to advance and implement systemically transformative visions of economic democracy, especially as it relates to moving beyond historical and contemporary versions of capitalism; and presents a refined and coherent concept consisting of a novel definition, numerous revised and new principles, and a suggested theory of change. This thesis significantly advances the literature and discourse on Democratic Public Ownership, economic democracy, and democratic participation in the economy more broadly, opening new research directions and serving as an important theoretical steppingstone.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

Acknowledgments

Undertaking a PhD program while working full-time, raising two children, and dealing with the effects of a global pandemic was not an easy task. It truly took a village. First and foremost, I would like to thank and appreciate my partner, Caroline, for the unwavering emotional and physical support she provided while I took this journey. You shouldered many extra burdens as part of this process and always did so with grace and perseverance. I love you and am eternally grateful.

To my children Sebastian and Julian: you encouraged and motivated me to both continue forward and also make sure I was taking the time to enjoy life with you. I hope this adventure has demonstrated to you that education is a lifelong and enriching journey, and that through hard work you can achieve anything you set out to do.

To my parents, Karen and Andy: you set me up for success in life and have, without question, always given everything to ensure that I can reach my goals. Without you, nothing I have achieved, or will achieve, in my life or my studies would be possible.

To my friends and PhD supervisors, Andy and Bob: since the day we met, you have generously lent me your time, your expertise, your empathy, and your encouragement in this and many other endeavors. You stood with me through all the self-doubt, changes, and challenges that go into a PhD program, and I look forward to many fruitful collaborations with you in the future.

I would also like to thank my friends and former colleagues at The Democracy Collaborative, who encouraged me to undertake this project and supported it in so many ways, including Gar Alperovitz, Ted Howard, Joe Guinan, Sarah McKinley, Dana Brown, Neil McInroy, Allan Henderson, Marjory Kelly, John Duda, Stephanie McHenry, Johanna Bozuwa, and many others. Lastly, I would like to recognize and appreciate the countless friends, colleagues, and comrades I have met and worked with on issues related to Democratic Public Ownership and economic democracy over the past decade. Without the wisdom, energy, and dedication of this merry little band none of my work would have been possible. I appreciate and love you all immensely.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

BDS - Brahmagiri Development Society (India)
BOAL – Basic Organizations of Associated Labor (Yugoslavia)
CDC – Community Development Corporation (USA)
CLES – Center for Local Economic Strategies (UK)
CLT – Community Land Trust
CORE – Congress of Racial Equality (USA)
CRM – Civil Rights Movement (USA)
CSDA – Community Self-Determination Act (USA)
CW – Common Wealth (UK)
CWB – Community Wealth Building
CWU – Communications Workers Union (UK)
DPO – Democratic Public Ownership
GFC – Great Financial Crisis (of 2008-09)
GIC – Group of International Communists
DSA – Democratic Socialists of America (USA)
DPM – Democratic Public Management
ERAP – Economic Research and Action Project (USA)
ESOP – Employee Stock Ownership Plan
EZLN - Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Mexico)
FLN - Front de Libération Nationale (Algeria)
FLN - Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional (Mexico)
GJM – Global Justice Movement
GLC – Greater London Council (UK)
HRM – Historical Research Methodology
ICA – International Cooperative Alliance
IMF – International Monetary Fund
ISS - Intercollegiate Socialist Society (USA)
IWC – Institute for Workers' Control (UK)
IWW – Industrial Workers of the World
KOL - Knights of Labor (USA)
LDF – Left Democratic Front (India)
LIS – London Industrial Strategy (UK)
NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement
NEM – New Economic Mechanism (Hungary)
NEP – New Economic Policy (Soviet Union)
NHS – National Health Service (UK)
NPM – New Public Management
NPS – New Public Service
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONRA – Office National de Tourisme (Algeria)
PB – Participatory Budgeting
PFI – Private Finance Initiative (UK)
PSI – Public Services International

PSiiP - Public Service innovation and improvement Plan
RPM – Radical Public Management
SDGs – Sustainable Development Goals (UN)
SDS – Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
SNCC – Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (USA)
SOE – State-Owned Enterprise
SPD – Social Democratic Party (Germany)
TDC – The Democracy Collaborative (USA)
TNI – Transnational Institute (Netherlands)
TVA – Tennessee Valley Authority (USA)
UAW – United Auto Workers (USA)
UGTA - Union Générale du Travailleurs (Algeria)
WTO – World Trade Organization
WSF – World Social Forum

Author's Declaration

"I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution."

Printed Name: ___Thomas M. Hanna_____

Signature: ___________________________

Chapter 1 - Introduction: The Emergence of Democratic Public Ownership (DPO)

Neoliberalism, which seemed so dominant and unassailable in many parts of the world at the dawn of the 21st century, is experiencing a deep crisis (Fraser, 2019; Stiglitz, 2019; Lapavitsas, 2020; Rugitsky, 2020). In the space of a decade, two major economic and social upheavals – the Great Financial Crisis of the late 2000s and the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 – along with a host of other intersecting economic, social, and ecological challenges (especially climate change) has discredited, albeit not fatally or entirely, many of the principles commonly ascribed to the model, including privatization, marketization, liberalization, and globalization (Bonnano, 2017; Plehwe, Slobodian, and Mirowski, 2020). This, in turn, has sparked interest in, and opened up space for, a renewed discussion of alternative economic institutions, models of ownership, and systemic arrangements (Schweickart, 2011; Johanisova and Wolf, 2012; Malleson, 2014; Akuno and Nangwaya, 2017; Adler, 2019; Sunkara, 2019).

One of the institutional forms experiencing a resurgence and rebirth is public ownership, defined in this work as assets, services, and enterprises that are owned collectively by all people in a specific geographic area – regardless of age, citizenship status, race, gender, or other distinguishing characteristics – and governed/managed either directly (i.e. commons-based approaches) or, more usually, through representative structures (i.e. government at various scales). This includes renewed energy and activism around rejecting and defeating privatization and corporatization (Hall, Lobina, and de la Motte, 2005; Grant, 2013; Schroering, 2019; Ravitch, 2020); efforts to reverse privatization and bring services back under public control – a process commonly known as remunicipalization (Kishimoto and Petitjean, 2017; Cumbers and Becker, 2018; McDonald, 2018a; McDonald and Swyngedouw, 2019); advocacy around the use and disposal of assets and enterprises that are nationalized during times of economic crisis, including demands around "buyouts, not bailouts" when government interventions are being considered (Hanna, 2018a; Buller and Lawrence, 2020); and proposals to expand public ownership into new sectors and industries to deal with pressing social, economic, and ecological challenges – such as equitable internet access and mitigating climate change (Marois, 2017; Hanna, 2018b; Hanna et. al., 2020; Kishimoto, Steinfort, and Petitjean, 2020; Paul, Skandier, and Renzy, 2020).

However, there is little appetite amongst activists, theorists, and some policymakers to simply re-create traditional forms of public ownership or to go further down the road of the

corporatization of public enterprises and the New Public Management (NPM) approach to public sector governance that predominated in the neoliberal era (Hanna, 2018b; Labour Party, 2018). Rather, in recent years a new alternative known as "Democratic Public Ownership" (DPO) has emerged. It is rooted not only in a critique of privatization and neoliberalism, but also of traditional forms of public ownership and statism (Cumbers and Hanna, 2019; We Own It, 2019; Lawrence and Hanna, 2020). In particular, DPO conceptually rejects the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) model prevalent around the world today and common throughout the 20th century for being overly top-down, bureaucratic, managerial, centralized, and alienating (Cumbers, 2012; Hanna and Guinan, 2013; Hall, 2016; Labour Party, 2018; Cumbers and Hanna, 2019). It also opposes neoliberal inspired efforts to "reform" publicly owned enterprises by enshrining private sector aims and structures (such as profit maximization), as well as "pragmatic" approaches to (re)municipalizing private enterprises that focus on corporatization (e.g. organizing publicly owned companies like private sector corporations and removing them from public control and accountability) and market liberalization (Hanna, 2018b; Whitfield, 2020).

Theorists and activists responsible for developing and popularizing DPO come from diverse ideological, theoretical, and academic backgrounds, but generally align around three basic premises: 1) that neoliberalism in general, and privatization in particular, is at the root of, and or cannot adequately address, many contemporary social, economic, and ecological challenges; 2) that questions of ownership *and* control (i.e. power and rights) are central to how political economic systems function and are critical to understanding and confronting the challenges modern societies are facing; and 3) that the return to, and re-imagining of, public ownership is part of a larger program of economic democracy, political democratization, and a pluralist approach to ownership that includes other alternative institutional forms such as cooperatives, social enterprises, and employee share ownership schemes, as well as some small scale private ownership (Cumbers and McMaster, 2012; Alperovitz, 2013; Birley and Fortune, 2018; Cumbers and Hanna, 2018; Guinan and Hanna, 2018; Cumbers and Hanna, 2019; Wainwright, 2020a).

Being relatively new, DPO lacks theoretical and conceptual robustness and clarity, defined here as a set of key definitions, values, and principles, as well as an established ideological orientation, upon which the practice and implementation of DPO can be based. This includes the absence, often by tactical design, of a generally agreed upon or concrete

definition (Cumbers and Hanna, 2019; Labour Party, 2019). In other words, DPO has thus far been a relatively broad and amorphous concept that is open to a wide array of interpretations. While this ambiguity has its usefulness, especially with regards to socializing some of the basic underlying themes and ideas, it also presents certain limitations.

In particular, a lack of conceptual clarity makes it difficult to measure and analyze DPO, on the one hand, and build political and institutional momentum, on the other. DPO has also thus far not received significant attention from academic researchers, with much of the research and discourse on public ownership still focused on the role and performance of traditional SOEs, the comparative efficiency of traditional public and private enterprises, and the merits (or lack thereof) of privatization, corporatization, and other public enterprise "reforms" (Hanna, 2018b). More troublingly, DPO, and public ownership in general, is susceptible to being co-opted and distorted by the newly empowered "populist" right – some of whom are showing that they are unafraid to use (and misuse) the levers of state economic intervention (Otjes, et al, 2018; Enggist and Pinggera, 2021), as well as the rhetoric of democratic participation and popular will (Zaslove, et al, 2020), in the pursuit of their goals (especially attaining and retaining power). In particular, a focus solely on "democratic" processes and structures without corresponding attention to values, principles, ideology, and missions runs the risk (as is seen in many traditional SOEs) of DPO, for better or worse, simply replicating or reproducing the existing dominant political and ideological orientation of a given geographic area or population (Hanna and Simpson, 2019).

The primary goal of this thesis is to address these gaps, and in doing so significantly develop and refine the concept of DPO and advance the DPO literature. It asks a simple and intersecting set of research questions: 1) What is DPO? 2) Where does it come from ideologically and practically and how did it develop and emerge? And 3) what can be learned from its history? As a work of political economy, economic history, and institutionalism, this thesis is guided by the philosophical framework of critical realism and uses qualitative historical research methodology and methods with information derived from both primary and secondary sources to add definition and clarity to the concept of DPO and begin to build toward a more refined theory. While the majority of the information has been gathered from secondary sources (i.e. contemporary books and articles written about both the concept of DPO specifically, and the past and contemporary events that influence it, more generally), this is augmented by contemporary and historical material produced by participants in, or direct

observers of, experimentation and theorizing around more democratic approaches to enterprise governance and management (and political economic system change more broadly).

In congruence with the chosen methodological approach, an additional goal is to focus on demonstrating how this refined concept of DPO contributes to our understanding of democratic participation in the economy and how it can influence practical application in the current political economic context of faltering neoliberalism as well as the long-term pursuit of human emancipation. In other words, this thesis makes an original academic contribution by clarifying and developing the historical and ideological basis of DPO using a customized, yet established and appropriate methodological framework, as well as a practical contribution by providing actionable research and analysis to the growing global movement around anti-privatization, remunicipalization, and alternative models of ownership. The remainder of this introductory chapter serves three purposes. First, section 1.1 provides a basic introduction to public ownership and other important foundational terms and concepts. Section 1.2 provides further detail on the primary aim and anticipated contribution of my work. Finally, section 1.3 provides a short description of each of the subsequent chapters.

1.1 Definitions

For the purpose of refining the concept of DPO, defining the broader idea of public ownership is important. First and foremost, public ownership can be considered a distinct organizational and institutional form with certain immutable core characteristics – namely: 1) inclusive, broad-based, collective ownership; and 2) a governance and management structure that, at least theoretically, allows for some (albeit often limited or pro forma) forms of direct or indirect participation. These characteristics distinguish public ownership from other organizational and institutional forms in which ownership rights is held by some subset of a population and or the ability to participate is legally limited and exclusive (e.g. individual owners of a local, for-profit business, shareholders of a major corporation, or employees in a worker cooperative). While some modern scholars deploy a broader definition of public ownership that includes a variety of different organizational forms (including cooperatives, social enterprise, and sometimes small-scale local ownership), this work uses a narrower formulation drawing from the literature on more traditional forms of public ownership, such as SOEs, nationalized industry, and municipal services (e.g. Pryke, 1971; Pryke, 1981;

Vernon and Aharoni, 1981; Coleman, 1991; Toninelli, 2000; Millward, 2005; Amatori, Millward, and Toninelli, 2011; Bernier, Florio, and Bance, 2020). This allows for clear distinctions to be made between DPO, traditional forms of public ownership, and other more or less democratic models of ownership and or governance/management.

Beyond these basic, fixed characteristics, public ownership can also be recognized as being an organizational and institutional form that is inherently flexible and open to design. As Schumacher puts it, "public ownership gives complete freedom in the choice of objectives and can therefore be used for any purpose that may be chosen. While private ownership is an instrument that by itself largely determines the ends for which it can be employed, public ownership is an instrument the ends of which are undetermined and need to be consciously chosen" (1989, pp. 276-277). In other words, how a publicly owned enterprise is designed (and redesigned) plays a prominent role in both its internal operating processes and its external outcomes – a perspective that is supported by both historical and contemporary experience with SOEs and much of the academic literature on organizational design (Burton and Obel, 2018; Burton, Obel, and Håkonsson, 2020; Kenis and Raab, 2020). In turn, this understanding is central to the concept of DPO, which, as previously discussed, rejects both traditional public ownership design structures and neoliberal reform efforts; and instead proposes that publicly ownership be consciously designed, or redesigned, according to certain democratic and progressive ideas, principles, and rules in order to deliver superior, publicly benefitting internal and external outcomes.

In addition to public ownership, several other basic terms and concepts are particularly relevant to what I aim to accomplish in this work. The first is privatization, which in many ways is both the antithesis to DPO and a driving motivation for its development and proliferation. At its most basic level, privatization can be defined as the process of converting public or collective enterprises, assets, and services into for-profit and or individual ownership or control. However, in practice privatization is complex and can take many forms. While outright asset sales to the private sector often catch public and policymaker attention, they are just the tip of a larger iceberg (Cohen and Mikaelian, 2021). Privatization also includes various outsourcing arrangements where, for instance, a public enterprise contracts with a private entity to provide various supportive services or when government entities enter into contractual arrangements with private sector companies to deliver services or manage assets that were previously in the public realm (NRC, 2002; Weghmann, 2020).

The second term is system change, which is used frequently in modern discourse and often refers to large-scale and or long-lasting shifts in specific social sectors and approaches – like education, healthcare, and criminal justice (e.g. Carr-Chellman, 1998; Carey and Crammond, 2015; Mears, 2022). However, in this work system change refers primarily to the broader, yet more specific concept of comparative political economic systems – which can be defined as the particular mix of political and economic institutions, approaches, and relationships that dominate in particular societies, especially as they relate to ownership and control of property and production (Zimbalist and Sherman, 1984). As far as the history and conceptual development of DPO is concerned, two of the most relevant such political economic systems are capitalism and socialism; and in this work I investigate and discuss many variants of these, including state socialism, corporate capitalism, libertarian socialism (also known as anarchism), state capitalism, communism, neoliberalism, libertarian capitalism, fascism, and many others. More specifically, discussions around DPO, and economic democracy more generally, are often linked to debates concerning the transition from capitalism to some form of socialism, and particularly how ownership and property rights would be altered in such a process.

A useful definition of capitalism comes from David Harvey who writes that capitalism is "any social formation in which processes of capital circulation and accumulation are hegemonic and dominant in providing and shaping the material, social and intellectual bases for social life" (2014). What is notable about this definition, as opposed to many others, is that it does not mention either private ownership or markets, and this allows for the possibility of either to co-exist with post-capitalist or anti-capitalist perspectives on systemic change. In other words, when the term system change is used in this thesis, especially in the context of transitioning away from capitalism, it does not necessarily rule out a future system in which markets and some forms of private ownership play a role.

For its part, the term socialism has always had numerous different meanings and interpretations (Lamb and Docherty, 2006). In 1953, G.D.H. Cole, author of the five-volume series *A History of Socialist Thought*, provided a basic framework, writing that socialism includes a "belief in some sort of collective or co-operative action as a means of improving the condition of the many poor" (1953, p. 21). While short, this definition captures many larger concepts that are common to other descriptions of socialism, especially its dual focus on collectivity and inclusivity (over individualism and exclusiveness) and the desire to

improve human welfare and equality. Like with the aforementioned definition of capitalism, this interpretation makes no specific mention of markets or private forms of ownership, allowing for the possibility of both in a future socialist political economic system. It also makes no reference to the state which, as will be discussed extensively in the coming pages, opens the possibility of a form of socialism based on collective forms of ownership and action that are not necessarily statist in nature.

1.2 Primary Aim

As will be documented in chapter two, there is an expanding body of modern literature that engages with, or is adjacent to, the concept of DPO. However, in general DPO lacks conceptual clarity. Often, it is not considered or referred to as a distinct approach, rather it is thought of more as a relatively vague idea about why public organizations should be made more participatory and accountable. Relatedly, there is usually little discussion in the literature about what exactly DPO is, how it should be defined, and where it is situated ideologically, historically, and politically. Part of the reason for this is that DPO is a new concept and its ecosystem of theorists and advocates (many of them wearing both hats) is still relatively small and ideologically and strategically aligned with each other.

However, as previously mentioned, one of the contentions underlying this work is that as neoliberalism – with its emphasis on private ownership and private sector approaches to governance and management – continues to falter and mutate in the face of increasing economic, social, and ecological challenges in the coming decades, interest in, and scrutiny of, public ownership generally, and DPO specifically is likely to continue to increase and become more ideologically and strategically diverse. As such, a pressing challenge for DPO theorists is to subject the concept to detailed scrutiny, analysis, and critique in order to build theoretical substance and improve conceptual clarity and robustness.

A related issue is that currently much of the discussion and research related to DPO is contained in the "grey literature" produced by non-profit think tanks, political parties, and a small network of academics from various fields. While there is considerable research and debate around public enterprise (and public sector more broadly) governance and management across various fields and from different ontological, epistemological, and ideological orientations, by and large, modern academic research has not yet substantively engaged with DPO as a holistic concept (one than includes, but is not limited to, micro-

economic issues of enterprise governance and management). The primary aim of my work is to address both of these issues by using historical research methodology to establish the ideological and historical foundations of DPO, critically engage with insights from decades of theorizing and experimentation, and, ultimately, clarify and refine the concept and emerging theory of DPO.

To start, it is important to define how I understand the term *theory* in order to firmly establish what this thesis is trying to accomplish and why it will be an important contribution to both the literature on and practice of DPO. For the purposes of this thesis, theory is defined as: a "formal statement" of the ideas, rules, and principles – and specifically the relationships between them – that explain what DPO is (and is not), where it is situated ideologically and historically, how and why it is an advance on existing institutional arrangements and approaches, and how it could (or should) work or be implemented (Wacker, 1998; Williamson, 2002; Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.). Unsurprisingly, beliefs around what constitutes a fully-fledged social science theory vary greatly amongst academics (and across disciplines). For that reason, it is important to clarify that the primary aim of this thesis is to provide the conceptual advancement and refinement upon which a theory of DPO can ultimately be built. This orientation acknowledges that according to some perspectives, the outcome of this research may fall short of "a fully elaborated theory that covers all aspects, stages, consequences, and likelihood of a process or a phenomenon," and would be better thought of as adding "greater conceptual clarity, or a conceptual framework" to DPO (Timonen, Foley, and Conlon, 2018, p. 4). In other words, the ultimate goal of this thesis is to start bridging the gap between the current state of DPO research, which has thus far largely escaped academic scrutiny and lacks conceptual clarity and theoretical substance, and the longer-term goal of a fully established, substantiated, and accepted theory.

This thesis makes a highly original contribution – both in the academic and practical sense. Nothing like it currently exists in the DPO literature. While some publications suggest basic principles and identify a few historical and contemporary examples and theories, this thesis is, to date, the most comprehensive attempt to establish the historical and ideological basis of DPO and provide guiding principles for its future development and practical application. Moreover, it is the first to suggest a specific definition and potential theory of change. In addition to significantly advancing the DPO literature, this thesis also contributes to the discourse on economic democracy, both by firmly establishing DPO as part of this

broader tradition and by using the DPO lens to surface important insights into various associated historical and contemporary experiments and theories. Lastly, by engaging with a wide array of theorists, theories, and experiments across a range of academic fields of study, this thesis breaks down certain traditional silos of thinking, especially around complex issues related to the ownership and governance of public organizations (including the role of the state, markets, and planning), and reveals interesting points of intersection and divergence that can become the basis for future academic scrutiny across multiple disciplines.

1.3 Thesis Structure

The basic underlying structure of this thesis is as follows. It first compiles and reviews the existing DPO literature (chapter two). It then uses that analysis to both establish a guiding methodological framework (chapter three) and identify important concepts, theories, and historical experiments for more detailed research and analysis. In turn, that historical analysis (chapters four through six), combined with the literature review and guided by the methodological framework, informs the development and presentation of a refined concept of DPO (chapter seven).

In this structure, chapter two plays a particularly important and foundational role. First and foremost, it provides an important conceptual baseline by presenting a comprehensive introduction to the concept of DPO, including its modern origins, how it is presented and discussed in the contemporary literature, and how it relates to a variety of important concepts, areas of academic inquiry, and events. By providing this conceptual grounding, the chapter further helps explain the rationale for the thesis and for the need to develop and refine the concept of DPO. Secondly, the chapter helps inform the methodological framework, which is subsequently developed and presented in chapter three. Specifically, it illuminates how the DPO literature is informed by historical analysis, generative mechanisms over time, heterodox economics, a focus on institutions, and the interconnectedness of politics and economics. Additionally, it lays the foundation for the historical research and analysis process, conducted in chapters four through six, by establishing a set of basic parameters, guidelines, and signposts regarding relevant empirical, theoretical, and historical data. For instance, the literature review firmly establishes the modern concept of DPO as part of the larger and longer standing socioeconomic theory and tradition of economic democracy and identifies numerous historical experiments and theories relevant to its development. This helps to guide

and focus the historical research methodology, providing direction and justification for what historical and contemporary theories, experiments, and generative mechanisms were considered.

Third, chapter two also serves as an important data point which, combined with the analysis and narrative explanation chapters, informs the refined concept of DPO presented in chapter seven – which is one of the thesis' primary contributions. Specifically, it provides a baseline overview of the ideas, rules, and principles of DPO currently articulated in the modern literature, which form the "pre" state in the "pre-post" analytical process conducted in chapter seven. Lastly, by offering a comprehensive analysis of the modern literature on DPO and a basic mapping of the ecosystem of researchers, activists, policymakers, organizations, and networks advancing the concept, chapter two is, by itself, valuable to academics, policymakers, and activists as a basic primer on issues and debates around public ownership, remunicipalization, and democratization.

Building from the literature review, chapter three develops and presents a unique and customized methodological approach that is relevant and applicable not only to this thesis, but to studying the topic of DPO more generally. This approach first involves identifying where the thesis specifically, and the concept of DPO more generally, is situated scholastically and academically. Specifically, it introduces the overlapping fields of political economy, economic history, and institutionalism focusing on points of intersection, concepts, and schools/approaches that are relevant to the thesis' primary aims, guiding philosophical framework, and research methodology.

Second, it provides an overview of critical realism as it relates both to why it was chosen as the philosophical framework of the thesis and to its implications for the research methodology and methods. It pays specific attention to concepts such as epistemological relativism, causal mechanisms, and historical contingency that are particularly relevant both to this thesis and to the fields of study in which it is situated. Lastly, chapter three introduces historical research methodology and discusses its compatibility with both the overarching fields of study the thesis is located within and the guiding philosophical framework. In particular, it suggests that this methodology is a powerful way of linking the past to the present and illuminating future possibilities and directions. It is also a more flexible and accessible research methodology, which is relevant to both the relatively unique structure and

approach of this thesis and its goal of presenting its research and analysis in a clear and usable format. As it relates to research methods, the chapter describes in detail a qualitative approach primarily using data synthesis and triangulation.

Based on the signposts delineated and discussed in the literature review, and in accordance with the both the research methodology and methods, chapter four begins the analysis and narrative explanation process by locating the conceptual origin of DPO in the rise of industrial capitalism in Europe and the US during the nineteenth century and the ideological and political response – and opposition – to it. This includes an analysis of economic democracy generally, and public ownership more specifically, through the work of early theorists associated with radical liberalism, mutualism, cooperativism, and Marxism. It then generatively traces economic democracy and early DPO prototypes and formative experimentation through an early first wave of theorizing and activism rooted in the struggles of organized labor and the development of modern ideological alternatives to capitalism. This includes discussions of syndicalism, the early history of the cooperative movement in Britain and elsewhere, the impact and effect of the Russian Revolution, post-World War I factory council movements in Italy and Germany, and the theory of Guild Socialism; and how each of these influences and informs the conceptual development of DPO.

Chapter five continues the analysis and narrative explanation process, picking up where chapter four left off during the inter-war period. It begins by discussing how and why statist, top-down forms of public ownership rose to dominance in many parts of the world during the mid-20th century. It then investigates a second wave of economic democracy and prototypical DPO theorizing and experimentation that emerged in response to the various crises afflicting both capitalist and state socialist countries following World War II (particular during the 1960s and 70s). Based on the signposts constructed in chapter two, this includes the Yugoslav experiment with self-management as a systemic alternative to both capitalism and state socialism, the shorter-lived attempt to implement Autogestion in post-colonial Algeria, efforts to advance workers' control, both theoretically and politically, in Britain, community-based models of economic self-determination and empowerment advanced by elements of the US left, and various efforts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to move away from central planning and statist forms of public ownership. Across each of these experiments and theories, chapter five draws out and illuminates generative links to DPO, both directly, through prototypes and specific theorists and organizations, and indirectly,

through connections to one another (for instance, how Autogestion in Algeria forms an important bridge between Yugoslavia and earlier theorizing around economic democracy and the resurgence of interest in workers' control in Europe and elsewhere during the 1960s and 70s).

Chapter six brings the analysis and narrative explanation into the present day, thus concluding this portion of the thesis. It does so by analyzing the roots, ideological and political orientation, and development of neoliberalism, especially as it relates to the ownership, governance, and management structures of public enterprises in the neoliberal period of the 1980s-2000s. Specifically, it focuses on the proliferation of New Public Management (NPM), which emerged in conjunction with the rise of neoliberalism and in general seeks to import and translate private sector principles to publicly owned organizations, agencies, and services. In order to illuminate the distinction between NPM and more democratic approaches to public sector reform and operation, the chapter also briefly presents and analyzes several theoretical alternatives to NPM, including New Public Service (NPS), Democratic Public Management (DPM), and Radical Public Management (RPM). Lastly, chapter six analyzes how the experience of neoliberalism, and resistance to it, in parts of the Global South has contributed to the development of new and innovative approaches towards the ownership, governance, and management of publicly owned enterprises and services. This experience, along with specific experiments like the Cochabamba water wars (Bolivia), the Zapatistas in Mexico, and the state-supported cooperatives in Kerala (India), feature to varying degrees in the existing DPO literature and provide valuable insight and practical considerations as it relates to refining the concept.

Based on a detailed analysis of all the preceding material, chapter seven presents a refined concept of DPO. This includes a) combining the numerous definitional parameters, oppositional statements, and principles found in the existing DPO literature with this thesis' new research and analysis to suggest, for the first time, a formal definition of DPO; b) analyzing the principles of DPO outlined in the existing literature and re-evaluating them based on the historical and theoretical evidence reviewed in the thesis; c) proposing several potential new principles not included in the current DPO literature but that emerged during this thesis' research and analysis process; and d) offering a possible theory of change rooted in both established theory and contemporary political economic realities.

Finally, chapter eight concludes the thesis by summarizing its main arguments and contributions, developing some last critical reflections drawn from my observations of global political economic developments over the past five years, reviewing gaps and limitations in the research, and suggesting opportunities for additional research and analysis that may help further advance and refine the concept of DPO and, potentially, aid in its wider understanding and adoption.

Chapter 2 - DPO and its Modern History and Literature

While there is a long history of proposals for, and experiments with, more democratic, decentralized, and participatory forms of public ownership as part of alternative economic approaches and systems (much of which will be reviewed and analyzed in chapters four through six), the specific concept of DPO is relatively new and understudied. This chapter serves three primary purposes. First, it situates the origins of the modern concept of DPO in post-Great Financial Crisis (GFC) academic and public discourse. Second, it provides an overview of the modern DPO literature, establishing a conceptual baseline from which the revisions and additional elements presented in chapter seven can be compared. And lastly, it identifies some of the important historical and contemporary examples and theories, principles and values, and unresolved tensions and questions, that help guide the analysis and narrative explanation process conducted in chapters four through six.

One of the foundational texts of the modern DPO concept is Andrew Cumbers' 2012 book *Reclaiming Public Ownership: Making Space for Economic Democracy* (2012). In the book and subsequent articles, Cumbers reintroduced public ownership to a new generation of activists and theorists trying to make sense of the post-GFC world, and in particular the abrupt shattering of many of the carefully curated myths developed during the neoliberal era around the supremacy of markets and private enterprises (Cumbers, 2017). It also sought to re-embed public ownership in modern movements for economic and social transformation by centering the concept of economic democracy; a socioeconomic theory which, at its most basic level, suggests that the principles of democracy, equity, and justice must extend into the economic realm.

Originally a very amorphous concept (Macpherson, 1942), over the course of the last two centuries the literature on economic democracy has generally fallen into two categories: 1) narrow conceptions focusing on workers' rights, collective bargaining, and other employment relationships; or 2) broader visions of political economic transformation (Archer 1995; Dahl, 1985; Carnoy and Shearer, 1980; Vieira, 2018). Specifically, some theorists suggest that democratic changes at the workplace level can be sufficient to achieve certain goals (such as eliminating alienation and domination) without necessarily having to change ownership and control patterns in the economy more broadly (Frega, Herzog, and Neuhäuser, 2019). However, others reject this distinction and continue to refer to workplace

democratization as one component of a larger program of political economic transformation, particularly as it relates to moving beyond traditional capitalist and state socialist systemic arrangements (Malleson, 2014; Cumbers, et. al., 2019; Vrousalis, 2019; Cumbers, 2020).

In *Reclaiming Public Ownership* and other related texts, Cumbers firmly embraced the latter interpretation of economic democracy and established a two-part conceptual framework. First, he included an expanded schema of public ownership encompassing and incorporating cooperative and other "collective" ownership forms of ownership; and second, he critiqued traditional forms of public ownership and introduces some basic concepts around individual agency, decentralization, participation, distribution of economic power, and accountability (2012). It is from this latter part of Cumbers' analysis, as well as his centering of a systemically transformative vision of economic democracy, that much of the subsequent literature on DPO has developed. This is due, in part, to two major political economic developments during the mid-2010s – the emergence of an energetic global remunicipalization movement (and associated academic debate on the topic) and the surprise leftward shift of the British Labour Party. These events helped drive the larger conversation about public ownership (and how it relates to economic democracy) away from a focus on broadening the definition to include other collective ownership forms, and towards the democratic restructuring and reimagining of traditional publicly owned services, assets, and enterprises.

Reclaiming Public Ownership also established the importance of both the British experience with public ownership (due to its early adoption of a widespread nationalization program and its relatively unprecedented privatization program in the 1970s and 80s) and experimentation with forms of public ownership in the Global South as part of the resistance to neoliberalism. In turn, these focuses influenced much of the subsequent DPO literature and form two of the research signposts for this thesis. Additionally, the book referenced several other historical experiments and theories as being relevant to the discussion of more democratic forms of public enterprise. This includes the experience of public ownership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union generally, and Yugoslavia in particular, Guild Socialism, participatory democracy, workers' control, Marxism, social democracy, and cooperativism. Again, these examples, cross-referenced with those found in other DPO texts, help to inform which were selected in the historical analysis and narrative explanation chapters of this thesis.

2.1 Public Ownership Goes Local: The Remunicipalization Movement

With its roots in the anti-privatization struggles that existed throughout the neoliberal era, especially in the Global South (which will be discussed further in chapter six), interest in, and experimentation with, re-municipalization – commonly defined as taking services, enterprises, and assets into, or back into, public ownership at the local level – steadily grew over the first two decades of the 21st century (and especially following the GFC) (Kishimoto and Petitjean, 2017). For instance, regarding the water sector McDonald and Swyngedouw write that that "remunicipalisation is one of the most significant shifts in water services policy in a generation" (2019, p. 322).

While remunicipalizations have occurred in a broad range of local services and enterprises, much of the activist and academic interest in recent years has focused on basic services such as water and energy (Cumbers and Becker, 2018). Literature on remunicipalization in these sectors, and in general, can be roughly broken down into five overlapping and intersecting categories. That which: 1) defines and popularizes the concept of remunicipalization (e.g. Pigeon, et al., 2012; Kishimoto and Petitjean, 2017); 2) quantifies and maps remunicipalizations (including analyzing remunicipalizations by geographic area) (e.g. Kishimoto, Lobina, and Petitjean, 2015; Wagner and Berlo, 2015; Ulmer and Gerlak, 2019; Public Futures, 2021); 3) attempts to demonstrate that remunicipalization is, or is not, an identifiable trend (e.g. Warner and Hefetz, 2012; Bonker, Libbe, and Wollmann, 2016; Clifton, et al., 2019); 4) attempts to determine whether or not remunicipalization is political/ideological or pragmatic in nature (e.g. Becker, Beveridge, and Naumann, 2015; Warner and Aldag, 2019; Albalate and Bel, 2020; Gradus and Budding, 2020; Hanna and McDonald, 2021); or 5) attempts to measure the economic, social, and environmental effects (or lack thereof) of remunicipalization and or local public provision of services in general (e.g. Wait and Petrie, 2017; Homsy and Warner, 2020; Warner, Zhang, and Rivas, 2020).

Across these intersecting categories, there is an emerging subset of literature that is beginning to focus on the qualitative nature of remunicipalization as it relates to motivations, governance, and institutional design. Specifically, on the one hand, scholars associated with the neoinstitutional tradition have argued that remunicipalizations are generally pragmatic in nature and do not usually result in a rejection of market mechanisms and private sector approaches to governance, management, and service delivery (Lobina and Weghmann,

2020).[1] In fact, some remunicipalizations (especially those driven by pragmatic concerns around cost savings and service quality) are accompanied by a process of "corporatization" that puts management and control of the service or asset in the hands of a semi-autonomous public sector company that is often organized in similar ways to hierarchical, opaque private corporations (McDonald, 2016; Ferry et al., 2018; Voorn, van Thiel, and van Genugten, 2018; Andrews, et al., 2019). As Cumbers and Paul put it, these scholars respond to such evidence by cautioning "against over-hyping remunicipalisation as a progressive phenomenon" (Cumbers and Paul, 2022, p. 5).

On the other hand, various researchers and advocates associated with the "heterodox tradition" (in Lobina and Weghmann's formulation) suggest that remunicipalizations are not inherently pragmatic or inevitably going to lead to corporatized structures. Rather they argue that remunicipalizations are contestable processes that "offer the possibility for the building of progressive coalitions out of diverse pluralities and more radical democratic transformations" (Cumbers and Paul, 2022, p. 6. See also: Angel, 2017; Lobina, Weghmann, and Marwa, 2019). These include scholars associated with emerging radical and autonomist forms of municipalism (i.e. new municipalism) who are critical of "pragmatic" and corporatized remunicipalizations, also known as "financial municipal entrepreneurialism," that change ownership but do little to democratize power and control (Angel, 2021; Thompson, 2021). "New municipalism," Thompson writes, "stands apart from such contemporary municipalist mutations of urban entrepreneurialism and earlier socialist municipalism(s) by foregrounding democracy and the radical redistribution of decision-making" (Thompson, 2021, p. 324). Similar arguments and principles around power and control (or lack thereof) also form the basis of "pro-public" perspectives on remunicipalization (McDonald, 2018b; McDonald and Swyngedouw, 2019). Specifically, as Cumbers and Paul write, remunicipalization needs "to be located within the broader progressive pro-public movement for creating more democratic

[1] Often the neoinstitutional tradition is sharply critical of the heterodox tradition – defined by Lobina and Weghmann as being "composed of intellectual-activists (and activist-intellectuals) who share ontological concerns with critical realist microeconomics" (2020) – on both whether remunicipalization constitutes a trend and whether it is transformative in nature (e.g. Clifton, et al., 2019). However, Lobina and Weghmann argue that some of these critiques are misinterpreting the heterodox tradition, which: 1) is methodologically less concerned with large scale quantitative proof of national or global trends in favor of remunicipalization, and more focused on using qualitative methods to "shed new light on the unsustainability of privatisation and reassert public ownership as a credible option for public service reform"; and 2) stresses the *possibility* and potential of transformative and politicized remunicipalizations (rather than, as the neoinstitutionalists allege, that these are defining features of all remunicipalizations) (Lobina and Weghmann, 2020).

and accountable forms of public ownership in opposition both to privatisation and older hierarchical forms of statism" (2021, p. 7. See also: Paul, 2020).

In response, some advocates of remunicipalization (especially those more oriented towards "new municipalist" and "pro-public" positions) have started to interact with and advance the concept of DPO as an alternative to privatization and neoliberalism, the corporatization of remunicipalized public services, *and* the deficiencies of traditional statist models of municipalism. Often this is done through case study analysis of innovative remunicipalizations that have led to the development of more democratic and participatory governance arrangements and structures. For instance, in 2020 the Transnational Institute (TNI) – an organization identified by Thompson and others as being part of the international support network of innovative "new municipalist" networks like Fearless Cities – published *The Future is Public: Towards Democratic Ownership of Public Services*, which contains 15 chapters related to public ownership authored by leading researchers, academics, and activists from around the world. Part II of this book – titled "from (re)municipalisation to democratic public ownership" – is one of the first publications focusing on remunicipalization to specifically use the term DPO, and presents some important case studies and theoretical considerations. This includes an innovative and participatory model of a publicly owned water utility in Catalonia, Spain (Planas and Martínez, 2020), as well as an important contribution by Hilary Wainwright on the need to democratize the state in order to assure the viability of DPO (Wainwright, 2020b). This latter chapter suggests that rather than simply a new model of public service organization, DPO is inseparable from, and an important component of, the wider effort to develop a systemic political economic alternative to neoliberalism and corporate capitalism based on a radical democratization and decentralization of political and economic power and control.

In general, many of the emerging debates around types and purposes of remunicipalization – along with municipalist strategies writ large – are rooted in, and explicitly reference, longstanding ideological and strategic debates on the political left, particularly around ownership forms, scale, the role of the state, and the relationship between the governance and management of public enterprises and political institutions and goals. This, along with the ideological orientation, examples, and questions posed explicitly by DPO theorists elsewhere in the literature, establishes an important parameter, or guiding signpost, for the analysis and narrative explanation portion of this thesis. Namely, the importance of the

historical development, and global spread, of various leftist ideologies, including radical liberalism, anarchism/mutualism, cooperativism, and Marxism.

2.2. A Momentous Interregnum: The UK Labour Party, 2015-2019

The second major development was the 2015 election of Jeremy Corbyn to lead the UK Labour Party. For the first time in decades, the leadership of a major political party in one of the world's most developed economies was a strong proponent of public ownership. Reflecting the general orientation of the British trade union movement, the Labour Party under Corbyn and Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer John McDonnell focused on traditional conceptions of public ownership across a range of critical economic sectors, including transportation, energy, water, mail, and telecommunications, albeit within a broader approach that was supportive of a variety of alternative ownership models and approaches (Labour, 2017). However, scarred by the scope and scale of privatization that occurred in the UK economy since the 1980s (as well as the Party's move away from common ownership during the "New Labour" era), the Labour Party under Corbyn and McDonnell internalized conceptual critiques of the traditional SOE model as well as the need to articulate a more democratic and decentralized alternative (Guinan and Hanna, 2016; Hanna, 2018c).

In 2017, the party commissioned a groundbreaking report titled *Alternative Models of Ownership*, which looked at a wide spectrum of ownership models ranging from cooperatives and worker owned businesses to local and national level public ownership (Labour Party, 2017). While not using the term DPO directly, the report repeatedly made the case that new, more democratic and participatory models of public ownership were necessary. Building on this, in 2018 the Labour Party began a consultative process to develop a specific policy of DPO (Hanna, 2018c).[2] Launching the consultation, McDonnell and Rebecca Long-Bailey, then Shadow Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, wrote that "democratic public ownership is a chance for the biggest devolution of economic power the UK has ever seen – a way of putting people in control of their lives, not just after clocking off, but at work too" (Labour Party, 2018, p. 2).

In response to the consultation, numerous groups and individuals submitted comments. From the perspective of this thesis, two submissions are particularly relevant. The

[2] Along with Cumbers, and in conjunction with McDonnell and Long-Bailey's economic advisors, I was the main author of this consultation.

first is a report from the UK-based public ownership advocacy organization We Own It!. Titled *When We Own It: A Model for Public Ownership in the 21st Century*, it focuses on how future publicly owned services like water, energy, transport, and mail should be structured to ensure that they are "efficient, effective, accountable, caring, green, [and] innovative" (2019, p.1). In addition to making the case for public ownership, critiquing traditional models, and exploring the historical and contemporary political economic landscape (including experimentation with workers' control in Britain and participatory budgeting in Brazil), the report makes a number of proposals related to democratizing the governance and management of publicly owned services.

The second submission was a report by Cumbers and Hanna titled *Constructing the Democratic Public Enterprise* (Cumbers and Hanna, 2019). One of the first piece of modern literature that begins to explicitly outline a theory of DPO, the report introducing several principles of DPO grounded in historical and contemporary experience and literature, including: subsidiarity and decentralization; higher level coordination; affected interest; democratic and participatory planning; professional management and effective organization; transparency and accountability; and different values. The report then offers a detailed proposal of what a more democratic internal structure for publicly owned enterprises might look like. As it relates to this thesis, these principles and the proposed structure act as signposts and ideological and conceptual parameters that help guide the research and analysis – suggesting what elements of historical and contemporary theories and experiments are most important and relevant to analyze. They also form part of the conceptual baseline from which the conceptual revisions and refinements suggested in chapter seven can be compared.

The Labour Party's consultation on DPO was completed shortly before the snap general election in December 2019 and the party's manifesto for that election included several commitments to more democratic forms of public ownership. It even specifically used the term DPO, stating: "we will put people and planet before profit by bringing our energy and water systems into democratic public ownership" (Labour Party, 2019, p. 15). While the Labour Party lost the 2019 election and Corbyn resigned as leader, many of the party's policies, including DPO, were popular, both inside and outside of the party (although, parts of the party were, and still are, hostile to many of the policies developed during the Corbyn period) (Blakeley, 2020; Jones, 2020; Pogrund and Maguire, 2020). Reflecting on the election and prospects for public ownership in the UK, in 2020 Cat Hobbs, founder of We Own It!,

wrote that it is "important to remember how far our campaigning has already shifted the consensus on public ownership" (Hobbs, 2020).[3] Despite this popularity, however, the Labour Party under Corbyn's successor Keir Starmer has largely turned away from public ownership as part of its wider effort to shift the party back to a more centrist ideological orientation (Brown and Stewart, 2022; Allegretti, 2023).[4]

The Corbyn-McDonnell era, while brief, had a transformative impact on the concept of DPO. By shifting the orientation of a major political party in one of the world's more developed economies away from both neoliberal economic development models and traditional left approaches to nationalization and state ownership, and positing a pluralist and democratic alternative, it contributed to a large increase in DPO theorizing and development (Cumbers, 2024). It also helped spread the concept globally through political parties, organizations, and theorists who were inspired by, and sometimes affiliated with, the UK Labour Party. As it relates to this thesis, the era also reinforces the importance of the British experience, both historically and ideologically, in the development of DPO and how it has started to spread around the world.

2.3 The Return of Public Ownership in the United States

Similar shifts in popular opinion and thinking around public ownership have been happening in many other countries around the world in recent years, especially those which most wholeheartedly embraced neoliberal myths about the "superiority" of private enterprise and free markets. As will be discussed further in chapter six, this includes parts of the Global South where interest in public ownership has ebbed and flowed, often associated with

[3] In the UK, public satisfaction and support for the traditional model of public ownership (top-down, nationalized industries) began to slowly wane during the 1960s and 70s (Miller, 1997). As a result, the privatization policies of Margaret Thatcher were often supported and or not vehemently resisted (although not in all areas) (Studlar, McAllister, and Ascui, 1990). However, support for privatization peaked in the late 80s and early 90s as the public began to experience the reality of privatized services. While public displeasure grew during the 1990s and early 2000s, both Tory and New Labour policymakers remained wedded to the concept. In particular, "the second and third New Labour administrations pressed aggressively for further state down-sizing and privatisation," Seymour writes (2012). Even when, during the financial crisis of the late 2000s, the Labour government of Gordon Brown was forced to nationalize several major financial institutions, the goal was always re-privatization as quickly as possible.

[4] While very different in both scope and structure than the Corbyn and McDonnell approach to public ownership, the Labour Party under Starmer has endorsed traditional public services (such as the NHS) and offered some limited support for additional public ownership in areas such as rail and energy (Labour, 2024)

political shifts, throughout the neoliberal period. It also includes the US, where there has been a significant increase in interest and experimentation with public ownership at various scales since the GFC. These shifts are particularly important because for much of the past 80 years the US has played a hegemonic international role economically, politically, culturally, and academically – including being a heavy promoter of neoliberalism and privatization, which has had massive effects on societies around the world.

This includes hundreds of new publicly owned broadband internet networks, public bank campaigns in dozens of cities and states, dozens of water remunicipalizations, and efforts to take electric utilities into public ownership to effectuate a green energy transition (Hanna, 2018b; Hanna, 2018d; Moran, 2019; Hanna and McDonald, 2021; Public Futures, 2021). It also includes legislation, such as AB 857 in California (which passed in 2019), the New York State Build Public Renewables Act (which passed in 2023), and the unsuccessful federal-level Public Banking Act of 2023 and Bush-Bowman Public Power Resolution of 2021 (Aronoff, 2021; Uğurlu and Epstein, 2021). The introduction and development of such state and federal legislation, and the support these bills have received from relatively mainstream social movements and political formations, represents a significant shift from what would have been considered politically possible in the realm of public ownership during preceding decades.

As in the UK and elsewhere around the world, activists and policymakers leading this renewed interest in public ownership in the US are beginning to interact both with the underlying democratic and participatory principles of DPO, as well as with the specific concept itself. For instance, the Bush-Bowman Public Power Resolution included a commitment to "create transparent and equitable systems for public participation and cultivate processes for community governance over energy production, distribution, and procurement decisions" (Bush and Bowman, 2021). Similarly, in conjunction with the passage of AB 857, some public banking activists and groups in California have started to develop democratic governance designs as part of their work to set up local public banks. For instance, in 2018 the Friends of the Public Bank of Oakland, a non-profit activist group, published a proposed governance design that included a community controlled, multi-stakeholder board, open meetings and records, and a new set of community-centered values guiding the bank's operations and lending (Friends of the Public Bank of Oakland, 2018).

Later, in 2021, the Los Angeles Public Bank campaign partnered with researchers at The Democracy Collaborative (TDC), a national non-profit organization that (as will be discussed in chapter five) has long historical roots going back to economic democracy theorizing and organizing in the 1960s and 70s, to develop a proposed democratic governance structure for the LA Public Bank (Brennan, 2021).[5] The report was developed through around 30 local stakeholder interviews, a literature review, and discussions with public banking experts and campaigners. It directly engages with the concepts of DPO, Dynamic Public Banks (a concept advanced by public banking expert Thomas Marois), and Community Wealth Building (CWB) (Guinan and O'Neill, 2019; Marois, 2021; Marois, 2022).

In particular, the report builds from Cumbers and Hanna's *Constructing the Democratic Public Enterprise* (2019a) and suggests both a democratic governance structure for the bank and a set of community-serving mandates and missions that would guide its operation. With regards to the former, the report envisions the City of Los Angeles (via the City Council) retaining overarching authority and responsibility for the bank. However, governance would be radically democratized through the establishment of a General Assembly (with members drawn from the general public through a geographically equitable quasi-sortition process) and numerous other democratic boards and committees (Brennan, 2021). While, ultimately, the City Council and the General Assembly would be responsible for establishing, monitoring, and revising the bank's mandates and missions, the report makes some initial suggestions that could help ensure that the bank becomes (and remains) an important institutional driver of economic and political democracy and left visions of systemic change. This includes avoiding excess profit-seeking, prioritizing CWB approaches to economic and social development (specifically cooperatives, community land trusts, publicly owned enterprises, etc.), and becoming a vehicle to repair legacies of racism, exclusion, and extraction from Black, Indigenous, and immigrant communities and confront ongoing white supremacy (Brennan, 2021).

The mandates found in this and other reports and proposals are relatively common in the US public banking movement and link it to the historical development of the political left in the US generally. Specifically, these and other US publications on DPO draw heavily from the community-based experimentation and theorizing at the intersection of racial and

[5] I was formerly employed by The Democracy Collaborative and was involved in helping to develop and support this research project.

economic injustice and inequity of the Civil Rights Movement, the New Left, and their allies during the 1960s and 70s. Another unique and potentially systemically transformative feature of these mandates and proposals is the centrality of not-for-profit or profit limiting structures that usually appear alongside an ecological focus (Sgouros, 2022; HR&A, 2023). This suggests that democratic public banks could help localities break away from the endless, ecologically destructive growth dynamic of capitalism and begin to develop local ecological and economic sustainability. As it relates to this thesis, these insights – particularly around the relevance of 1960s and 70s theorizing and experimentation around community self-determination and the intersections of racial and economic justice – form additional research signposts.

In 2023, a second report was released relating to the possible structure and orientation of a public bank in Los Angeles. This one, from the Jain Family Institute and the Berggruen Institute, focuses on some of the specifics of how a public bank could be established and what it could do (Ahmad, Katz, and Feygin, 2023). In particular, it suggests that for expediency reasons the city could create or repurpose a traditional municipal finance corporation (MFC). This type of institution would be easier to establish than a full-service public bank since it would make loans and investments but would not receive deposits (Hanna, 2023). Another option would be for the city to purchase an existing private sector financial institution and convert it to a public bank. Like previous US public banking publications, the Jain/Berggruen report also contains a section on "Democratic Governance," and its contents and proposals establish it firmly as part of the emerging DPO literature. In particular, it suggests that traditional governance exclusively by public representatives is insufficient, and "active citizen deliberation" must be encouraged (Ahmad, Katz, and Feygin, 2023). Explicitly drawing from these reports, as well as the democratic assembly model used by Banco Popular in Costa Rica, in 2022 the San Francisco Public Bank Coalition published a governance plan that includes a 25-person, multi-stakeholder oversight commission as the highest level of governance for the bank, with members representing organized labor (including internal bank workers), environmental groups, worker-owned enterprises, community land trusts and housing cooperatives, credit unions and CDFIs, and women and minority owned businesses, among others (SFPBC, 2022).

Beyond their specific proposals and suggestions, these reports and proposals demonstrate that the concept and particulars of DPO are acceptable to, and popular with, a

diverse array of communities of interest. This is especially true on the US political left, where public ownership in general has become more accepted and acceptable in recent years. For instance, Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) – by far the largest and most ideologically diverse socialist group in the country with around 100,000 members – has explicitly endorsed public ownership (including forms of "community" and "commons" ownership) in a variety of sectors (including healthcare, utilities, communications, and finance) and has made a vaguer commitment to "social ownership" writ large across the economy (DSA, 2021). Moreover, various official DSA publications have engaged directly with some of the underlying concepts of DPO. For instance, in a 2019 article Hasan, Harrington, and Speck wrote that "democratization" is one of the four guiding principles (along with decommodification, decolonization, and decarbonization) of local DSA-led public power campaigns and discussed various options to implement this (including complete workers' control and worker representation on public enterprise boards) (2019).

2.4 An Emerging Paradigm

In conjunction with these multi-scalar and geographically variegated developments around DPO, a general literature has started to emerge on the subject. One of the first such texts was *Our Common Wealth: The Return of Public Ownership in the United States* (Hanna, 2018b). Published in 2018, this book documents the emerging interest and policy discussion around public ownership with a focus on the US. Unlike *Reclaiming Public Ownership*, it draws a distinction between public ownership and other democratic forms of ownership, concentrating primarily on the former. In addition to delving deeply into the empirical and theoretical literature on comparative efficiency and presenting a sectoral view of scaling public ownership, the book's concluding chapter – "Systemic Crisis and Democratic Public Ownership" – introduces the concept of DPO and begins to situate it historically by reviewing some of its principles, theoretical influences, and foundational texts (Hanna, 2018b). In particular, it investigates principles such as decentralization and participation, introduces complex issues such as the role of the state, and references certain historical examples, institutions, and theories that are further analyzed in this thesis, including the Yugoslav experience, participatory democracy, Marxism, mutualism, cooperatives, Guild Socialism, worker ownership and control, and the US role in the development and proliferation of neoliberalism.

Subsequently, theorists at a range of international organizations, including TDC, TNI, Public Services International (PSI), Common Wealth (CW), and many others, began to further develop the concept of DPO and apply it to specific sectors of the economy. For instance, just prior to the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, TDC published *Medicine for All: The Case for a Public Option in the Pharmaceutical Industry* (Brown, 2019). The report presented a public option model consisting of "democratic, publicly owned enterprises across the pharmaceutical supply chain" (Brown, 2019, p. 33). Several months later, as the pandemic was raging and the race to develop vaccines was underway across the world, a second report related to the industry was released. Titled *Democratising Knowledge: Transforming Intellectual Property and Research and Development*, the report focused primarily on applying DPO and specific policy proposals as it relates to the topics of intellectual property and research and development (Hanna, Brett, and Brown, 2020).

Democratising Knowledge was part of a larger series (called "Ownership Futures") that took an in depth look at how DPO could be applied in the context of emerging 21st century economic sectors. The first report in the series, *Democratic Digital Infrastructure*, looked at DPO in the context of fibre/broadband internet infrastructure, the wireless spectrum, and cloud computing (Hanna et al., 2020); and the third, *A Common Platform*, focused on DPO as it relates to data and platforms (Hanna, Lawrence, and Peters, 2020). Together, these three reports suggest several shared values that, collectively, constitute another important research signpost for this thesis and, like the Cumbers and Hanna (2019) principles, establish a baseline from which to evaluate the contribution of this thesis according to its main goal of adding conceptual clarity to the concept of DPO. These shared values include: 1) decommodification; 2) democratization; 3) challenging corporate power and concentration; 4) ecological sustainability; 5) reducing inequality; 6) anti-surveillance/privacy; and 7) multi-scalar approaches.

In addition to the Ownership Futures series, several other recent general publications have made significant contributions to the literature on DPO. The first is *Public Alternative to the Privatisation of Life* by Dexter Whitfield, Director of the European Services Strategy Unit (a UK-based think tank). The book is an extensive investigation into the practice and effects of privatization, as well as opportunities and considerations for advancing public alternatives. Of particular relevance to this thesis are chapters 14 (Democratisation for accountability and participation), 15 (Decommodification, public ownership and provision), and 16 (Radical

public management). For instance, while Whitfield doesn't specifically use the term DPO, in chapter 14 he writes that "achieving a radical improvement in democratic accountability, participation and transparency should be a key target of public ownership and remunicipalisation" (2020, p. 344). Additionally, in chapter 15, he states that "the demand for public ownership alone is inadequate. It must be accompanied by proposals to radically change the way public services are managed, held democratically accountable and have genuine participation of service users and public service employees in planning and delivery" (Whitfield, 2020, p. 363). And in chapter 16 he contends that "it is inconceivable that public ownership of state-owned companies, public infrastructure assets and local public services can be discussed and planned yet ignore how they are going to be provided and managed effectively, efficiently and equitably, with assets maintained and improved for future generations and held democratically accountable" (Whitfield, 2020, p. 395).

What makes these chapters particularly valuable are their detailed suggestions and proposals (backed with real world examples) for how principles like participation, accountability, transparency, and decommodification could be implemented. In particular, Whitfield presents a framework of "Radical Public Management" (RPM) for how democratic publicly owned enterprises, assets, and services should be run. This framework acts as an explicit alternative to the NPM approach to public service operation that has predominated over the past several decades (a form of management Whitfield calls "neoliberal public management"), and will be discussed further in chapter six.

A second recent publication is *Public Banks: Decarbonisation, Definancialization, and Democratisation* (Marois, 2021). While focused specifically on public banks, Marois' research and case studies are highly relevant to the wider discussion around public ownership. For instance, he contends that both existing and more democratic potential governance and management arrangements in public banks have been severely understudied and undertheorized to date – a deficiency that exists generally with regards to public ownership and one that this thesis aims to begin to rectify.

Marois explains that both the orthodox orientation to public banks and the heterodox alternatives to it have largely dismissed or ignored the question of democratization. Specifically, the orthodox or neoliberal view of public bank governance is that it should focus exclusively on "improving market-based financial performance and returns" and addressing

market-failures without "crowding out…private banks" – with democratization seen as detrimental to these goals and a distortion of "otherwise efficient markets and just allocations of resources" (2021, p. 188). The Keynesian perspective, on the other hand, has generally been that democratization of governance is unnecessary to achieve state-led development goals (such as economic growth and stability) and that hierarchical top-down arrangements and strategies can be as, or more, effective. For their part, with some exceptions (e.g. Lapavitsas, 2010), Marxian economists have also "mostly avoided the question of public bank democratization," Marois writes (2021, p. 191). As a result of failing to substantively engage with democratization, Marois contends that many heterodox economists and researchers either directly or indirectly (through omission) reinforce orthodox and neoliberal concepts and myths around the governance of public banks – including "the necessity of institutional independence, depoliticisation, and non-political appointments to boards of governors" (2021, p.190).[6]

Beyond reinforcing the rationale and need for greater research and theorizing around DPO, *Public Banks* makes two further important contributions. Firstly, it provides two detailed case studies of more democratic and participatory public enterprises – the German development bank KfW and the Costa Rican "universal" bank Banco Popular. The governance and management approaches and structures (along with values) of both of these publicly owned enterprises are important real-world exemplars that have influenced both theoretical discussions around DPO and local campaigns (such as the California public banking movement). Secondly, the book proposes a democratized governance structure for public banks. Similar to Brennan (2021) – and with both drawing primarily from the Banco Popular example – the structure includes a broad-based "People's Assembly" as the highest decision-making body, a set of permanent commissions to ensure compliance with the bank's mandates, and a multi-stakeholder Board of Directors to coordinate management and operations of the bank. While Marois largely leaves the question of values (or mandates) for each public bank open and subject to democratic contestation, he does contend that there are three key principles that should be implemented as part of any public bank's democratic structure: accountability, transparency, and the "right to collective action" (2021, p. 245).

[6] Marois does acknowledge that there are several heterodox scholars who have, to varying degrees, engaged with concepts of public bank democratization. These include: von Mettenheim and Del Tedesco Lins, 2008; von Mettenheim and Butzback, 2014; Romero, 2017; Scherrer, 2017; Mazzucato and Mikheeva, 2020.

A third publication is *Democratic and Collective Ownership of Public Goods and Services: Exploring Public-Community Collaborations*, authored by researchers affiliated with TNI. The goal of the report, the authors explain, is "to take a step forward to better understand democratic public ownership, identifying partnerships between public institutions and citizens as one of the key instruments in this process" (Hopman, et al., 2021, p. 4). It does this by presenting a theory of public-community collaboration, numerous case studies, and a hypothetical municipal level implementation plan. From the perspective of this thesis' goal of clarifying and refining the concept of DPO, the report makes several important contributions, Firstly, it reinforces the principle – found in other DPO publications – that DPO is more than simply worker and or citizen representation in the governance and management structures of publicly owned enterprises (and far more than traditional public sector consultative processes). Rather, the report emphasizes the importance and centrality of workers and communities "co-producing" and "co-managing" public goods, assets, and services. This can take several various forms, including co-ownership or co-governance, but the critical component is that there is a genuine partnership between stakeholder groups (with government being just "one participant amongst others" (Hopman, et al., 2021, p. 9).

Secondly, like Whitfield (2020), it suggests that for this to be effective, there should likely be autonomous vehicles for community and worker participation in (and partnership with) publicly owned enterprises (e.g. trade unions and community organizations). These organizations can enter into formal co-ownership arrangements with public enterprises (e.g. a local government and a membership-based community group could jointly own and operate a public service); or they can serve as the mechanism to provide genuine community and worker participation in the governance and management of a public enterprise, enhance transparency, and ensure democratic accountability (e.g. an autonomous, community-based organization can elect or appoint members to the board of a publicly owned enterprise, facilitate participatory planning processes, audit and monitor contracts and records, etc.). Having autonomous community and worker organizations enter into formal partnerships with governments regarding the ownership, governance, and management of public enterprises can mitigate against the co-optation or subversion of worker and community representatives by management, the report suggests. Related to this, it can also help nurture and build new centers of grassroots power and bottom-up decision making and, vice versa, help to start

decentering political and economic power and (re)build a culture of community (or a "politics of the commons" as the report puts it) (Hopman, et al., 2021, p. 10).

Lastly, *Democratic and Collective Ownership of Public Goods and Services* makes it clear that a core principle of DPO is that the involvement and inclusion of worker and community organizations in ownership and governance structures cannot and should not be in conjunction with, or in exchange for, a process of weakening, dismantling, or privatizing public enterprises. This is important because in some historical cases, cooperatives, codetermination, and or individual share ownership schemes have been deployed as a way to build public support for, or as an intermediary step towards, the privatization of publicly owned enterprises and services (Loftus and McDonald, 2001; Cumbers and Paul, 2022). One example of this was the 2013 privatization of Royal Mail in the UK by the then Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government. In an attempt to win support from postal workers, who were overwhelmingly opposed to privatization, around 10% of the new private company's shares were distributed to the workforce, and in 2014 an agreement was reached between the Communication Workers Union (CWU) and management of the privatized company that included a commitment to foster "a climate of sustainable trust with a can do culture based on the involvement of employees in decision making and approaches to consensual change in the workplace" (Guinan and Hanna, 2014; Mustchin, 2017; Crush, 2021).[7]

A fourth publication is the *Our Future is Public: Santiago Declaration for Public Services*. Published in December 2022, the document summarizes a November 2022 conference in Santiago, Chile attended by over 1,000 representatives from trade unions, social movements, and non-profit organizations in more than 100 countries. Signed by more than 200 organizations, the declaration explicitly calls for public services to be democratic and

[7] Somewhat predictably, however, these arrangements have not resulted in increased workers' control or improved employment relationships within Royal Mail. The small number of shares each individual employee owns conveys virtually no decision-making power and collectively the percentage of shares owned by employees had dropped to 8% by 2021 (Crush, 2021). If the history of other privatizations involving public share ownership schemes are any guide, this percentage will likely drop even further as individual employees sell their shares to pay bills, unexpected expenses, etc. And, according to Mustchin, "the management culture historically described as 'institutionalised authoritarianism' was exacerbated by liberalisation and privatisation, as managers strove to create the kind of lean organisation presumed desirable to a majority shareholder. The multiple sources of pressure driving authoritarian managerial relations and work intensification led to further weakening of (already low) trust relations between workforce and management" (Mustchin, 2017, p. 307).

transparent. More specifically, it states that "we need to take back control of decision-making processes and institutions from the current forms of corporate capture to be able to decide for what, for whom and how we provide, manage and collectively own resources and public services" (Santiago Declaration, 2022, p. 3).

2.5 Reflections: Signposts and Guardrails

While the conceptual literature on DPO is relatively new and remains somewhat underdeveloped, it has grown rapidly in recent years – especially if adjacent, but closely related, concepts such as remunicipalization are included. As discussed in this chapter, analyzing this literature serves two important functions for this thesis. First, it establishes a basic conceptual understanding of what DPO is and introduces certain key principles. Drawn from various DPO sources, these can be grouped into three larger categories: 1) structure, which includes subsidiarity and decentralization, higher level coordination, and co-production; 2) organization, which includes affected interest, democratic and participatory planning, professional management and effective organization, and transparency and accountability; and 3) purpose, which includes decommodification, challenging corporate power and concentration, ecological sustainability, reducing inequality, anti-privatization, and anti-surveillance/privacy. This conceptual framework provides some basic guardrails to guide the analysis and narrative explanation process conducted in chapters four through six. In other words, this literature review suggests certain approaches and principles that warrant further interrogation, especially from a historical and ideological perspective. Based on this research and analysis process, a more refined concept of DPO – including revised definitions and key principles – is then presented in chapter seven.

Relatedly, analyzing the DPO literature builds certain "signposts" that point to which historical experiments, theories, and ideas should be considered for the analysis and narrative explanation phase of the research. These include: the historical development and global spread of ideas, theories, and approaches associated with the political left (including Marxism, mutualism, anarchism, and cooperativism); the British and US experiences with public ownership and economic democracy, both ideologically and historically; alternative ownership and governance models in the Global South generally, and emanating from resistance to colonialism and neoliberalism specifically; alternative ownership and governance models in systems where public ownership was the dominant institutional form

(specifically Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union); worker ownership and workers' control theories and experiments (and the role of organized labor generally); and democratic theory, with a focus on participatory approaches. As discussed in the conclusion, while these signposts developed in the literature review are helpful in identifying specific historical and contemporary examples and theories to analyze, they do not reveal all such possibilities and the process of selecting which to evaluate in this thesis was influenced considerably by my own strengths and limitations as a researcher.

Chapter 3 - How to Uncover DPO's Rich History

This thesis is situated at the intersection of political economy, economic history, and institutionalism, three overlapping and intersecting fields of study that generally contest, or are skeptical of, neoclassical economics and its individualistic, mathematical, and hypothetical-deductive approach to research and inquiry. It is informed by the philosophical framework of critical realism and uses qualitative historical research methodology/methods and abductive reasoning with information derived from both primary and secondary sources. Together these form a customized, yet logical methodological approach appropriate to fulfil this thesis' primary goal of significantly advancing the conceptual development of DPO.[8]

This chapter has three main components. First, section 3.1 briefly introduces the fields of political economy, economic history, and institutionalism, focusing on points of intersection, concepts, and schools/approaches that are relevant to this thesis' primary aim, guiding philosophical framework, and research methodology. This includes, for instance, a shared focus across all three fields of study on the importance of history and historical context. Next, section 3.2 provides an overview of critical realism as it relates to both why it was chosen as the philosophical framework of this thesis and to its implications for this thesis' research methodology/methods. It pays specific attention to concepts such as epistemological relativism, causal mechanisms, and historical contingency that are particularly relevant both to this thesis and to the fields of study where it is situated. Lastly, section 3.3. discusses historical research methodology, with a focus on how it relates to critical realism and how it is appropriate for, and is applied in, this thesis. This includes a presentation of the specific research methods and approaches that have been utilized.

3.1 Political Economy, Economic History, and Institutionalism

To begin, political economy is a branch of social science that, at its core, has a very simple premise – that politics and economics cannot be meaningfully separated (Postell and Watson, 2011). Prior to the rise of neoclassical economics in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with its focus on consumers and markets, this was a conventional view of

[8] "Although the benefits of using methodological frameworks are increasingly recognised, to date, there is no formal definition of what constitutes a 'methodological framework', nor is there any published guidance on how to develop one," McMeekin, et al. write (2020). As it relates to this thesis, methodological framework can be thought of as a structured set of parameters, rules, and tools that guide the research and development process.

economics, one shared by Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx, to name but a few (Tabb, 1999; Wolff and Resnick, 2012). The modern field of political economy encompasses a wide spectrum of "schools of thought" but generally differentiates itself from mainstream economics by focusing on the relationships between economic and political processes, especially as they relate to questions of power and wealth distribution (Collinson, 2003). It is also particularly interested in changes in those relationships and distributions over time, and as such overlaps considerably with both economic history (discussed below).

For several reasons, the field of political economy is a logical home for research and theorizing around DPO. First and foremost, at its core, DPO combines economic and political elements in that it is primarily concerned with extending the concept of democracy, which is traditionally associated with politics, to economic organizations, assets, and services that are owned by all members of a given polity, usually through political structures (such as government agencies). More specifically, it seeks to increase representation, participation, agency, and voice within and around these enterprises – concepts that all have connections to, and roots in, political science generally, and democratic theory specifically.

Second, as will be discussed further below, many DPO theorists see economic organizations and processes – and publicly owned economic organizations especially – as being fundamentally "embedded" within society and its political and socio-economic institutions (i.e. the political economic system). In other words, the governance and management structures of publicly owned enterprises and services are linked to, and the result of, broader political and social decisions, norms, and customs (as well as their historical development and evolution). Lastly, as a concept with ideological roots in various strands of socialism, anarchism, and mutualism, DPO is primarily oriented around addressing and redressing inequitable distributions of wealth, power, and control in society, especially as it relates to the political system.

Like political economy, economic history is also a classic discipline that emerged as its own field of study due, in part, to the rise of neoclassical economics. "Having lost out in the struggle for the disciplinary identity of economics itself," Wright recalls, "the 'historical school of economics' emerged at [the turn of the twentieth century] as a reaction against the neoclassical paradigm and the laissez-faire program with which it was associated" (2015). As a distinct and broad field, economic history is concerned with a wide range of issues related to

the economic experience of humans and societies over time. It is also a methodologically diverse field, although as the twentieth century progressed it started to swing more towards "economic science" (also known as cliometrics, new economic history, or econometric history) and away from traditional qualitative historical research methods (Godden, 2015).

As discussed in the introduction, the primary aim of this thesis is to significantly develop the concept of DPO and advance the conceptual literature on the subject by adding definition and clarity, including concretizing where it is situated historically and ideologically. It does so primarily by using historical research methodology (discussed further below) to investigate and analyze historical and contemporary experiments, theories, and trends with, and around, more democratic forms of economic organization, operation, and systemic design, and then suggest how these interact with and inform the concept and practice of DPO. As such, this thesis fits firmly within the field of economic history, and, in particular, the more traditional qualitative form.

Lastly, institutionalism is a broad field of study that focuses on the role, function, and development of formal and informal organizations and customs (such as courts, labor unions, parliaments, religious and cultural organizations, etc.) (Bevir, 2009). While there are, and have been, many different, and sometimes, contrasting schools or variants of institutionalism – including institutional economics (also known as original institutionalism), new institutionalism, new institutional economics, and historical institutionalism – the field is generally known for the attention it pays to history and historical context (Bevir, 2009; Barkanov, 2013). As such it often overlaps with both economic history and political economy. Moreover, like political economy and economic history, institutionalism is often critical of neoclassical economics and its methods, in particular deductive reasoning (Barkanov, 2013).

This thesis fits within the field of institutionalism because it is concerned with both the history and role of economic and political organizations – including publicly owned enterprises themselves as well as the other social, cultural, and political institutions that interact with and influence them. In particular, this thesis is influenced both theoretically and methodologically by variants of institutionalism that are concerned with, and critical of, capitalism.[9] This includes the work of Thorstein Veblen and Karl Polanyi specifically.

[9] Some scholars suggest that such variants – and institutionalism in general – have a lot in common with Marxism and Marxian economics. See, for instance: Duggar and Sherman, 1994.

Both Veblen and Polanyi believed that the economy was "embedded" in social institutions or relationships. For instance, in *The Great Transformation*, Polanyi sought to demonstrate how the neoclassical interpretation of the economy as an autonomous (i.e. disembbedded) "interlocking system of markets that automatically adjusts supply and demand through the price mechanism" was both a fallacy and essentially reversed normal historical patterns – shifting from an understanding of the economy as being embedded in, and subordinate to, social, cultural, and political processes to one in which social relations are embedded in, and subordinate to, the economy and market processes (Block, 2001, pp. xxiii-xxiv; Polanyi, 2001). In later work, Polanyi elaborated on these concepts, eventually re-defining the concept of economy as deriving "from man's dependence for his living upon nature and his fellows" and referring to "the interchange with his natural and social environment…" (Polanyi, 1957, p. 243; Cangiani, 2011).[10] Similarly, Veblen – who is credited with coining the term "neoclassical economics" – wrote about how the "price system" is socially constructed and defined the economy as "community's methods of turning material things to account" (Veblen, 1994, p. 75; Dostatler, 2003; Cangiani, 2011).

Embeddedness is an important concept for DPO theorizing and research because it establishes that publicly owned enterprises and services are, and should be, subordinated to social and political relations. This allows for DPO to clearly be distinguished from other types of public enterprise "reforms" (often called SOE reforms) that are rooted in neoliberal economic beliefs and approaches such as corporatization, marketization, and autonomization. It also reinforces the central contention of DPO researchers and activists that the design and

[10] It should be noted that Polanyi has been regularly critiqued for a lack of conceptual clarity (Finnis, 1980; Hodgson, 2017). This extends to the topic of embeddedness, which Hodgson and others maintain is beset by inconsistencies deriving from the lack of a precise and consistent definition of the terms "economy" and "society." In Hodgson's analysis, Polanyi's concept of embeddedness is relatively conventional (in as much as "it is difficult to conceive of a society where this is not the case. All market economies rely vitally on social relations as much as other economies" and unoriginal (i.e. that if Polanyi only meant that "the economy was embedded in institutions," then "other historical school and institutionalist scholars had reached this point long before") (2017, pp. 11-12). Hodgson also writes that later efforts by Block (2003) to re-interpret Polanyi's argument into one in which the economy is *always* embedded in society are "more plausible" (2017, p. 12). As such, Hodgson's critique is less problematic for the concept of embeddedness than it is for disembeddedness (i.e. the idea that in market systems the relationship between economy and society is reversed). Moreover, even though disembeddedness may not actually occur in modern market systems (or any system), there is often a general public perception in capitalist countries – driven by 'free market' rhetoric from political, cultural, and social actors – that it does (albeit not necessarily using those precise terms). This, perhaps, at least partially explains the enduring popularity of Polanyi that Hodgson references at the beginning of his article.

functioning of economic organizations – and publicly owned enterprises especially – are the result of a series of conscious and unconscious political and social choices, and can be redesigned by revisiting and revising those choices. Lastly, related to both of these, it establishes that DPO research and experimentation cannot simply focus on the enterprise level, and must also take into account the interplay between publicly owned enterprises and wider political, social, and cultural organizations, customs, values, and norms (and how and why these developed over time).

While Veblen and Polanyi were both critical of capitalism and, to varying degrees, supportive of socialism or socialist ideas, they diverged and dissented from orthodox Marxism in important ways (Stabile, 1982; Kordik, 2017/2018). First and foremost, they both criticized economic determinism and the related belief that socialism would inherently develop from capitalism (Stabile, 1982; Block, 2001; Dostatler, 2003). Polanyi, for instance, wrote that "the market mechanism moreover created the delusion of economic determinism as a general law for all human society…To attempt to apply economic determinism to all human societies is little short of fantastic" (Polanyi, 1947). Related to this, he saw opportunities and possibilities beyond the binary of traditionally conceived free market capitalism and orthodox socialism. Specifically, Polanyi rejected free market capitalism as a utopian impossibility, redefined socialism such that it could allow for socially embedded markets, and suggested that various arrangements might be possible at different times in history (Block, 2001). As will be discussed further in chapter seven, all three of these insights are relevant to the conceptual development and refinement of DPO.

Polanyi also took a different view of ownership than traditional Marxists, suggesting that "since the economic order is constituted through political decisions, politics can effectively redefine the meaning of ownership" (Somers and Block, 2014; Block, 2016). In other words, rather than ownership being a fixed and singular concept, it is actually made up of a bundle of rights that are politically contestable and can vary according to time and place (e.g. the concept of ownership is different in Germany's codetermination system than it is in the US' collective bargaining system). This insight and orientation is relatively common in the existing DPO literature (e.g. Hanna, 2018b).

While this thesis draws in part from Marxism in that it focuses on ownership of the means of production as one of the central institutional concerns for the achievement of a more

equitable, democratic, and ecologically sustainable society, it does so through a Polanyian lens. In particular, following from the existing DPO literature, it accepts the "bundle of rights" interpretation of ownership and assumes that publicly owned enterprises can be designed in a multitude of different ways based on political and social choices about how those rights are allocated and to whom. Related to this, it appreciates that DPO can, and will, look different at various times and places based on a multitude of geographic, historical, legal, social, and cultural factors influencing and related to these rights (discussed further below related to research methodology and historical context). This thesis also operates under the assumption that publicly owned enterprises can and will operate in different systemic frameworks with various degrees and forms of embeddedness – from regulated market capitalism (e.g. most of the world presently. See: Hanna, 2018b), to market socialism (e.g. Yugoslavia and China at various stages in the 20th century. See: Estrin, 1991; Parker, 1995), to planned socialism (e.g. the Soviet Union. See: Heath, 1993), and beyond – and that this will impact the possibilities for, and design of, DPO.

Lastly, it rejects the deterministic notion that the current crisis of neoliberalism will inevitably lead to some form of enlightened next system (be it socialism, cooperativism, the solidarity economy, etc.) and that simply shifting from private ownership to public ownership, even DPO, will facilitate such a conversion. In Polanyian fashion, it accepts that the coming period will be one of struggle and conflict, advances and reversals, and that deepening economic democracy generally, and centering democratic public ownership specifically, will be a key part ensuring that any progressive or leftward movement can be sustained.

3.2 Critical Realism

Political economy, economic history, and institutionalism are all broad and diverse fields, and within each there is growing interest and debate around critical realism as an appropriate and usable philosophical framework.[11] Critical Realism is a philosophy of social

[11] For instance, in recent years there has been an active debate about the relationship of critical realism to the Marxian school of economic thought specifically, and heterodox economics generally. For instance, Nielsen states that "in relation to political economy, it is striking that the seminal account of critical realism by Bhaskar is basically Marxist" (2002, p. 728). Similarly, O'Boyle and McDonough contend that "while critical realist insights are important for heterodoxy" generally, the original "Bhaskarian" interpretation of critical realism is "more explicitly Marxian" and thus the most useful for engaging with, and critiquing, mainstream economics (2010, pp. 3-4). On the other hand, Fine suggests that although CRE (critical realism in economics) claims to be heavily influenced by Marxism, it does not adequately address economic theory or develop a "political economy rooted in

science associated with the work of philosopher Roy Bhaskar which began to emerge in the 1970s and 80s (Collier, 1994; Archer, et al. 1998; Bhaskar, 2016). Described by some of its most prominent adherents as a non-dogmatic "meta-theoretical position" (rather than a methodology, theory, or empirical program), critical realism can be seen as more of a "series of family resemblances" rather than a "unitary framework, set of beliefs, methodology, or dogma" (Archer et al., 2016).[12] Furthermore, in many texts, critical realism is referred to as a relatively middle of the road position between more extreme orientations like positivism and constructionism (Reed, 2009; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson, 2015). More specifically, Archer et al. write that "critical realism situates itself as an alternative paradigm both to scientistic forms of positivism concerned with regularities, regression-based variables models, and the quest for law-like forms; and also to the strong interpretivist or postmodern turn which denied explanation in favor of interpretation, with a focus on hermeneutics and description at the cost of causation" (2016).

As it relates to this thesis, critical realism was chosen over positivist orientations for two main reasons. First and foremost, positivism is strongly associated with mainstream, neoclassical economics – and in particular its much-criticized attempt to lay claim to "scientific" legitimacy and objectivity through quantitative and mathematical methods (Keita, 1997; Lawson, 2003b; Boland, 2012). Given that a critique of this claim, and the positivist orientation that underpins it, is at the root of the three aforementioned, intersecting fields of study that situate this thesis, it would be illogical to adopt a positivist orientation.[13] Secondly,

---

the categories of contemporary capitalism", and it is the responsibility of CRE scholars to explain precisely how and why CRE actually diverges from Marxist political economy (2006, p. 127). With regards to institutionalism, Wilson writes that that critical realism has gained traction in various fields of inquiry and will likely "play a larger role in institutionalism in the future" (2005, p. 217). And, as far as Polanyi is concerned, Little has suggested that his work shares many "affinities" with critical realism, including an affirmation "that the social world possesses real structures and relations, and that these structures wield influence on individuals and outcomes. In Bhaskar's terms, they possess causal powers. And, like Bhaskar, he gives credence to some of Marx's basic social categories" (2016).

[12] Hodgson, however, disputes this characterization of critical realism, stating that while critical realists sometimes claim that the philosophy is non-dogmatic when it comes to theory and politics, they often "deploy critical realism in support of specific 'policy implications', generally of a strong socialist, Marxist and anti-Fabian flavour" (1999, p. 2).

[13] More specifically, as Thielemann writes, "the overall thrust of orthodox economics, obfuscated by declarations of its own value freedom, is and has ever been to render the market principle as the true principle of practical (ethical) reason" and "a merely empirical oriented heterodoxy, if it is to be called heterodox economics at all, is not capable of refuting this normative validity claim, and, thus, overcoming orthodox economics" (2020, p. 154). More colloquially, it is worth remembering Marx's famous maxim that "in the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both" (1867).

related to this, while positivism's focus on deductive reasoning and inclusion of quantitative methods may be compatible with some economic history research methodologies, it is incompatible with the abductive, qualitative form of historical research methodology chosen for this thesis.

On the other hand, while this study rejects positivism and incorporates certain interpretivist principles and methods – such as use of secondary sources and qualitative data and the goal of elucidating greater understanding and clarity of the research topic – critical realism was chosen over strong interpretive approaches (such as social constructionism and phenomenology) due primarily to the latter's relativist ontology (i.e. reality is subjective and cannot be separated from personal or group understanding or interpretation) (Levers, 2013).[14] As will be discussed further below, critical realism retains a mild realist ontology but incorporates strands of relativism, which is arguably a more accurate way of explaining both the nature of being and the development, role, and structure of economics and institutions (which are the focus of this study).[15] Similarly, a commitment to ontological realism is the reason critical realism was chosen over other fallibilist post-positivist orientations such as pragmatism – some variations of which reject or have little use for the idea that social, environmental, or economic conditions have real effects regardless of whether they are observed or known (Allmark, and Machaczek, 2018; Elder-Vass, 2021).[16]

The relatively amorphous and moderate nature of critical realism is both a strength and limitation. On the one hand, critical realism is a "philosophical well" from which scholars

[14] For instance, phenomenology focuses primarily on the subjective (i.e. first-person) experiences and perceptions of participants (Smith, 2013). In the case of this thesis, that would entail either employees at publicly owned enterprises or DPO scholars/theorists. While the former is not considered, the latter is through the literature review conducted in chapter two. However, the perspectives generated from these scholars are not the only (or primary) way to understand what DPO is, as would be expected in a phenomenology guided study, and are instead used for triangulation with real historical and contemporary experiences with DPO and DPO principles.

[15] As Lawson and Morgan put it, critical realism commits to "accepting the general openness of reality, its depth, the existence of both internal and external relations, the processual nature of phenomena. For the social realm specifically, the latter involves acknowledging that social phenomena depend on always potentially transformative human agency. And there is a recognition of meaning and value, etc." (Lawson and Morgan, 2021, pp. 77-78).

[16] Allmark, and Machaczek write that "modern Pragmatism and Realism have apparently profound differences with regard to ontology. Realism positing and Pragmatism rejecting the notion of a mind-independent world" (2018, p. 1306). In a call for papers on the relationship between critical realism and pragmatism, Elder-Vass concurs but warns that the "the situation is complicated by the diversity of pragmatist perspectives and indeed the variety of interpretations of critical realism" (2021).

from a broad array of schools and traditions can drink and allows for a wide variety of methodologies and approaches (Archer et al., 2016). On the other hand, as Nielsen puts it, it does not help researchers "choose between different substantive theories or political practices" and leaves them with little guidance on how to navigate the vast array of possibilities when it comes to scientific practices (2002, p.727). As such, while critical realism is a useful philosophical guide (or "under-labourer," to use Lawson's term) for a research project such as this thesis, it is not prescriptive when it comes to either where the work is situated academically, or the research methodology and methods chosen (Lawson and Morgan, 2021).

Critical realism is often described as having a "structured" or "layered" ontology that acknowledges an objective, but difficult to access, reality (Fleetwood, 2005). This layered ontology has three levels: 1) the real domain, which are the structures and causal mechanisms that lead to actions or events; 2) the actual domain, which are actions or events that occur whether or not they are observed; and 3) the empirical domain, which can be defined as people's sensations, observations, perceptions, or experiences (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson, 2015; Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2019). Explaining how these interact, Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson write that critical realism "starts with a realist ontology, which recognizes social conditions (such as class or wealth) as having real consequences, whether or not they are observed. It then incorporates a relativist thread, which recognizes that social life both is generated by the actions of individuals, and has an external impact on them" (2015, p. 169).

From an ontological perspective, one of critical realism's strengths is that its structured approach allows for more nuance and the incorporation of elements of other approaches, as long as they don't completely contradict the underlying realist assumptions – as would, for instance, an extreme nominalist/anti-realist approach. Particularly relevant is relativism which many scholars suggest plays a role in critical realist ontology. For instance, O'Grady describes one way in which relativism can co-exist with forms of realism (such as critical realism), stating "there is a way things are, but there are multiple ways of theorizing about it, or describing it. Many defenders of realism hold that this is quite a sensible form of relativism and that it is totally compatible with realism" (2014, p. 57). As it relates to this thesis, critical realist ontology suggests that there are real structures and relationships (e.g. class, gender, race, culture, religion, ethnicity, location, etc.) that influence the design,

operation, and ownership structures of economic enterprises generally and historically, and the concept of DPO specifically (i.e. causal relationships). However, how these are experienced, understood, and described can differ based on the historical, political economic, geographical, and social context of the individual participant, observer, or researcher (e.g. workers, managers, residents, researchers, theorists, etc.), and the social structures and experiences that have influenced her.

Therefore, in a critical realism guided study, a major component of the research process is to begin to identify these causal mechanisms and structures and explain how they influence and impact the subject of study (Lee, 2016). More specifically, critical realism suggests that the research process should focus on "the complex 'points of intersection' between history, geography, and social structure" with the goal of developing "analytical histories of organizational emergence, elaboration, and transition in which the endemic tensions and contradictions between 'structure' and 'agency' become the focal point" (Reed, 2009, p. 431). Put more simply, Sturgiss and Clark explain that critical realism "is particularly useful for understanding how and why things happen, as well as unpacking the influence of context on the outcomes of a program" (2020, p. 144).

This thesis adapts and adopts these guidelines into its research approach in the following way. First, it identifies and analyzes numerous historical and contemporary experiments and theories around more democratic forms of enterprise and system design (especially as they relate to publicly owned enterprise). Second, it investigates specifically why and how these experiments and theories developed and evolved over time (i.e. historical and or political economic context), focusing on social and political structures and relationships. Third, it explores causal and generative links within and between these interactions and events (Grover et al., 2008) and connects them, via a narrative, to the concept of DPO. And fourth, it brings to the surface points of tension, conflict, and contradiction within and between these experiments and theories – especially related to questions of structure and agency.

In addition to a layered ontology, another key component of critical realism is epistemological relativism (Al-Amoudi and Willmott, 2011; Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill,

2019).[17] Epistemological relativism is defined by Lawson as expressing "the idea that our categories, frameworks of thinking, modes of analysis, ways of seeing things, habits of thought, dispositions of every kind, motivating concerns, interests, values and so forth, are affected by our life paths and socio-cultural situations and thereby make a difference in how we can and do 'see' or know or approach things, and indeed they bear on which we seek to know" (2003a, p. 162). In other words, knowledge is based on historical, social, and cultural context and social facts are, essentially, collectively agreed or understood constructions. As such, critical realism suggests that purely scientific research methods are incapable of capturing the true nature of causality and must be augmented or replaced with other methods (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2019). This latter point about critical realism's compatibility with a range of research methods is supported by Sturgiss and Clark – who state that "critical realism is…a set of philosophical tenets that can inform a wide variety of quantitative, qualitative or mixed-methods designs" (2020, p. 144) – and will be discussed further below with regards to historical research methodology.

One of the most important implications of epistemological relativism for this thesis is the concept of historical contingency, which, in this case, means that while there have been many historical experiments, theories, and ideas around more democratic forms of public ownership (and these are critical to explaining and understanding DPO), our understanding of these may change or differ based on the political, economic, cultural, social, and, indeed personal conditions present at the time of analysis (Al-Amoudi and Willmott, 2011). For example, as discussed briefly in chapters four and five, Carole Pateman's analysis of the earlier theory of Guild Socialism – conducted in the 1970s – is an important data source for multiple reasons (including demonstrating a generative process linking Guild Socialism to participatory democracy to DPO), however it is critically important to understand the historical and cultural context in which it was produced. Specifically, Pateman was writing at a time of intense change as the existing political economic and social order was coming under increased pressure, both structurally and from social movements for gender, racial, and economic equality. In this historical context, there was great hope and enthusiasm for strengthening democracy within important political economic institutions and this is

[17] Al-Amoudi and Willmott identify epistemological relativism as being "a central plank of the CR credo" and criticize those (particularly in management and organizational studies) who deny or disregard it (2011, p. 33).

important to understand in Pateman's analysis of Guild Socialism. Similarly, analyses of the Yugoslav economic model (see chapter five) may be very different based on whether they were conducted in 1955 (shortly after the break with Stalinism), 1985 (after 30 plus years of operation and various reforms), or 1995 (after the bloody breakup of Yugoslavia). However, each of these analyses is an important data point which acquires "its meaningfulness and value relative to the time, place, and position of the knower" (Bhaskar, 1989; Al-Amoudi and Willmott, 2011, p. 30).

Another important component of critical realism is its approach to axiology – which refers to the nature and role of values and, more specifically, how the values and beliefs of the researcher impact the research design, process, and results. Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill identify critical realism as having a "values-laden" axiology (which falls on the more subjectivist side of their spectrum). "A critical realist's axiological position," they explain, "follows from the recognition that our knowledge of reality is the result of social conditioning...and cannot be understood independently of the social actors involved" (2019, p. 148). Therefore, while the researcher in a critical realist informed study should strive to be as objective as possible, they should acknowledge the potential for (and existence of) subjectivity based on their socio-cultural background, experiences, and worldview.

The implications of this interpretation of critical realist axiology for this thesis are that, as a researcher, I must pay close attention to recognizing my own subjectivity and positionality. Specifically, I have spent the better part of my professional career advocating for the expansion, proliferation, and defense of publicly owned enterprises and services due to my political and ideological orientation, life experiences, study, and profound belief that they can contribute to improved social, economic, political, and environmental outcomes. While this study is not necessarily concerned with comparing the effectiveness and efficiency of public and private forms of enterprise, I nonetheless am aware of my preference towards public enterprise (e.g. Hanna, 2018b) and have tried to remain as objective as possible – especially when considering the historical causal mechanisms that led to shifts in ownership from private to public, or public to private.

Similarly, as a leading DPO researcher and advocate I have a strong belief that more democratic forms of public enterprise can deliver superior outcomes than traditional, managerial forms of public enterprise. However, again, I am aware of this and have tried to

critically interrogate and validate findings through robust research methods while at the same time maintaining an openness to findings and perspectives that challenge my preconceptions, especially when considering the record of traditional forms of public enterprise and the benefits and challenges of more democratic forms and approaches. Lastly, I am a white, male researcher raised and trained in Anglo-American cultural and academic traditions. One of the most obvious implications of this is that the sources for this thesis are almost exclusively in English and the narrative tends to skew towards European and US experiences. I have attempted to mitigate these issues by including the perspectives and experiences of non-white and non-European/Americans wherever possible, however imbalances remain and the overall analysis of the literature, examples, and theories is still filtered through my own personal cultural, social, and political experiences and understandings.

Related to this concept of values are the researcher's general assumptions about society and organizations and how it, and they, function (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2019, p. 140). In 1979, Burrell and Morgan proposed a distinction between "regulation" and "radical change" with the former primarily concerned with social cohesiveness and order, and the latter with conflict and domination (1979). When applied to organizations, Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson illustrate the tensions between the two approaches by stating that "the assumption that society needs institutions and organizations in order to regulate human behaviour does not compare well with the view that society and organizations are fundamentally designed to maintain, or increase, inequality, and that they can be changed for the better only through radical change" (2015, pp. 164-165).

As a "scholar activist" focused on DPO – which, as described in chapter two, is an effort to reimagine existing institutions and reduce inequality, alienation, and oppression within them, through them, and around them – my values are more in line with the radical perspective, and specifically with three aspects delineated by Morgan in 1980 that are common to both radical humanist and radical structuralist paradigms: 1) that society is "a potentially dominating force;" 2) that praxis (the connection of thought and action) is necessary to overcome domination; and 3) that organizations can be both alienating and oppressive (1980, p. 609). Added to this, two additional aspects of the radical perspective from Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill relevant to this thesis. The first is that the researcher should be concerned with changing traditional approaches and structures through their

research, and the second is that the researcher's "primary focus would concern the issues of power and politics, domination and oppression" (2019, p. 142).

3.3 Historical Research Methodology

Given that critical realism is a philosophical framework or "meta-theoretical position," it is often described as being somewhat ambivalent to specific research methodology and or methods. For instance, beyond a general acceptance of mixed methods (as discussed above), Fletcher explains that critical realism does not provide concrete direction of what research methods to choose (2017). While Fletcher used a "flexible deductive process of coding and data analysis" (2017, p. 181) in her study and other researchers have suggested methods associated with grounded theory methodology, this thesis uses a qualitative historical research methodology with information drawn from both primary and secondary sources and data synthesis and triangulation as its primary research methods.

Historical research methodology (from hereafter, also referred to as HRM) is appropriate for this thesis for three reasons. First, HRM can be a powerful way to identify and demonstrate relationships between the present and the past and to provide a better understanding of both current events and potential future developments (Rowlison, 2005; Berg and Lune, 2012; Johnson and Christenson, 2012). In this case improved understanding of historical experiments and theories around democratic and participatory forms of enterprise and organization – as well as the historical evolution and context of contemporary experiments and theories – can both directly influence (in a generative and causal way) the concept of DPO and provide a more complete picture of what it is, what it can do, and what its limitations are.

Second, HRM tends to be more accessible and actionable than some other academic research methodologies. "History is rather a craft like discipline," White observes, "which means that it tends to be governed by convention and custom rather than by methodology and theory and to utilize ordinary or natural languages for the description of its objects of study and representation of the historian's thought about those objects" (1995, p. 243). This is particularly relevant to one of the sub-aims of this thesis, which is a focus on linguistic and narrative clarity and accessibility with regards to both how the historical analysis and results are presented.

Third, HRM is a relatively flexible methodology that is fully congruent with the philosophical framework of critical realism. In fact, as Steinmetz writes, "most historical researchers, whatever their self-description, are critical realists," and "this stance is the most defensible one for the social sciences in general on ontological and epistemological grounds" (1998, p. 171). This is because critical realism holds that the type of "multi-causal, contingency-based" explanations common in historical research are not only methodologically acceptable (contrary to the view of other philosophical orientations that often view historical research as methodologically flawed), but actually more appropriate given the depth and complexity of social reality (Steinmetz, 1998, p. 174). Moreover, as a general rule, it is easier to identify causal mechanisms and impact in historical research than with other research methodologies since the past is "existentially intransitive and determined" (Bhaskar, 1994, p. 72). Although, as Steinmetz warns, it is important not to ignore historical contingency and the causal role of past actors' and researchers' beliefs (1998).

Much like critical realism, there is no universally accepted version of HRM and researchers using it often draw from other methodologies and approaches (Johnson and Christenson, p. 416). That being said, many sources suggest a relatively similar general approach or set of steps. This includes: 1) identifying a topic area and developing a research question; 2) collecting data; 3) evaluating sources; 4) synthesizing data; and 5) preparing the description and explanation of findings (narrative exposition) (Rowlinson, 2005; Johnson and Christenson, 2012). Added to these, Berg and Lune include conducting a background literature review, refining research questions, and determining which research methods will be used (Berg and Lune, 2012). The importance of this latter activity is echoed by Gunn and Faire, who lament that with some exceptions "research methods have all but disappeared as a component of historiography and a subject of debate among historians" (2012, p. 1).

The first step, identifying a topic area and developing a research question, is common to most research methodologies and is relatively straightforward. However, it is important to note that the topic does not necessarily have to be exclusively concerned with past events or people for HRM to be applicable. As is the case with this thesis, the topic can be a current issue or concern with the research questions focused on illuminating the relationship between the issue and historical events and ideas. Specifically, as discussed in the introduction, DPO is an emerging concept and subject of study that is gaining attention in academia and social movements around the world. The main goal of the thesis is to add significant conceptual

clarity to this concept and thus substantially advance the DPO literature and provide actionable information to DPO practitioners. It does so by mining the rich history of experimentation and theorizing around more democratic and participatory forms of enterprise governance and management and demonstrating the relationships and impact these have on the concept of DPO.

In Berg and Lune's formulation, the next step in HRM is conducting a background literature review. In Rowlinson (2005), which is based on Johnson and Christensen (2012), this activity is condensed into the broader step of data collection. This thesis draws from both approaches. A distinct literature review chapter is included (chapter two) in order to: 1) establish a current, baseline understanding of the concept of DPO and provide support for the case that additional conceptual clarity and refinement is needed; 2) provide an up-to-date snapshot of the DPO literature to demonstrate that the thesis substantially advances that literature; and 3) illuminate, through triangulation, some of the important historical and contemporary examples and theories, as well as unresolved tensions and questions, that are further interrogated as part of the analytical process in chapters four through six. However, the literature review chapter itself also constitutes one the main sources of data for the thesis. Specifically, it serves to guide and corroborate the historical research as well provide a wealth of direct information pertaining to the research topic (DPO), the research goal, and the research questions. This includes definitions, key components, analyses and perspectives on historical and contemporary examples, etc.

Like with most qualitative historical research, this thesis uses a mix of primary and secondary sources. Secondary sources include many historical and contemporary publications related to both the concept of DPO generally, and the historical and contemporary events that are analyzed to help clarify and refine the concept. Primary sources include written material by participants in, or direct observers of, the historical or contemporary experiments and theories being reviewed and analyzed (for example, Gramsci's direct observations on the Turin factory council from the 1920s or Cole's theory of Guild Socialism).

While not included in the Rowlinson/Johnson and Christensen methodology, the next two steps according to Berg and Lune are to: 1) refine the research topic and questions; and 2) confirm the applicability of HRM and establish which specific methods will be used. With regards to the first, in this thesis the process of revising and refining the topic and research

questions happened twice – first after the literature review was conducted and then again after this methodology chapter was completed. In particular, the literature review process suggested that the thesis should be primarily concerned with adding clarity and cohesion to the concept of DPO (rather than attempting to create an overarching grand theory) and that in order to do so, the research questions should be focused on constructing useful insights, lessons, and tensions from historical and contemporary experiences and theories. In turn, the methodology chapter reinforced the view that the thesis should focus on the historical and ideological development and background of DPO as a way to provide this conceptual clarity. As to the second step, regarding evaluating and articulating a research methodology and choosing research methods, this current chapter is designed to serve that purpose.

The Rowlinson/Johnson and Christensen and Berg and Lune methodologies reconverge at the next step: evaluation. Specifically, this refers to the process of scrutinizing the information to establish whether it is applicable, accurate, and authentic, primarily by focusing on the sources (Rowlinson, 2005; Berg and Lune, 2012). This is done through a range of methods, including corroboration, sourcing, and contextualization. The first, corroboration – also known as data source triangulation (Carter, et al., 2014) – involves comparing multiple sources with an eye towards revealing, elucidating, and confirming a particular fact or piece of information. In the case of this thesis, this involves comparing available primary sources with secondary sources (and vice versa) as well as comparing secondary sources with other secondary sources. Where disparities are found, comparisons with additional sources may be able to help identify which source is the outlier (and that source either discarded or the disparity explained).

The second method is sourcing, which refers to the process of judging the credibility of sources based on a range of factors. This includes: 1) whether they are primary or secondary sources, with a preference given for primary sources as long as they pass a series of tests (including positive and negative criticism); 2) publisher and mode of publication, with higher credibility given to peer-reviewed and fact checked books, journals, and reports, along with more established and reputable publishers (as opposed to self-published books or articles, for instance); and 3) author and date of publication, with consideration given to the cultural and historical proximity the author has to the events and information in question. Related to this is the method of contextualization, which, for this thesis, means evaluating the

validity of a source based on a nuanced understanding of its historical context, including when it was produced and the motivations and ideological background of the person producing it.

The final two steps in HRM – synthesis/analysis and narrative explanation – overlap with evaluation and all three often are done congruently. In other words, a historical researcher may often synthesize/analyze information and evaluate it at the same time as developing and refining the narrative. Data synthesis, Rowlinson explains, is the process of "selecting, organizing, and analyzing the materials collected into topical themes and central ideas or concepts" which are then integrated together through the narrative development process (2005, p. 298). In the case of this thesis, the synthesis/analysis process occurred in two phases. First, the literature review helped to develop central ideas, concepts, and questions related to DPO, as well as commonly referenced historical and contemporary examples, theories, and sources. This provided the basis for choosing which experiments, theories, etc. to further investigate and what questions would guide their interrogation. In turn, the second phase occurred during the process of evaluating these experiments and theories and developing a narrative around them (chapters four through six). Specifically, within and across each experiment, idea, or event analyzed, important concepts and themes are identified and highlighted with specific attention paid to historical context, causal mechanisms, and applicability to DPO. Finally, the information synthesized, analyzed, and presented in both of these phases was combined "to form a contiguous and meaningful whole" in the form of the refined and advanced concept of DPO found in chapter seven.

3.4 Summary and Reflections

As discussed in the introduction, this thesis is relatively unique. Its originality derives from the combination of an emerging and understudied subject (DPO) with a specifically tailored methodological approach designed to provide historical and ideological grounding and build towards conceptual advancement and clarity. This includes a scholarly orientation at the intersection of political economy, economic history, and institutionalism; critical realism as a guiding philosophical framework; and historical research methodology and methods.

While this methodological approach is customized specifically for this thesis, its underlying components are all relatively well-established academically and congruent with each other. Specifically, political economy, economic history, and institutionalism overlap and are interconnected in various ways, including as it relates to the importance of history and

historical analysis as well as their critique of traditional neoclassical economics and its dominant research methods. Moreover, within all three critical realism is an accepted and debated philosophical framework and historical research methodology and methods are appropriate and often used. In addition to guiding this thesis, the methodological approach developed and described in this chapter can be informative for future DPO studies. In particular, the scholarly orientation suggests important conceptual and methodological guardrails for DPO inquiry and research more generally.

Chapter 4 - The Complex Historical and Ideological Background of DPO

An apt metaphor for the current conceptual state of DPO is that of a child who has yet to fully grasp her long and storied family history, and what it may mean for her own destiny. Reviewing and analyzing the modern DPO literature reveals important guiding historical and ideological fragments in the form of examples, case studies, and references to historical actors and theories. However, like portraits of distant family members hanging on the wall, there is little in the way of a coherent historical narrative that ties these events together and explains their relationship to one another and to the aim of developing a refined concept of DPO. Expanding on and following the signposts developed in the literature review, the next three chapters aim to address this deficiency by investigating and analyzing the ideological background and history of DPO.

First and foremost, this chapter identifies several early theorists who, for various reasons, are important foundational figures in the ideological and conceptual development of DPO specifically, and economic democracy more broadly. While these theorists diverged on many important issues, they were united in their critique of the exploitative nature of capitalist economic and social relations. The chapter then proceeds by interrogating how their divergent views on how best to overcome, oppose, or transcend industrial capitalism influenced the many subsequent revolutionary, reformist, and utopian efforts, ideas, and approaches that emerged during the tumultuous period of economic and social unrest in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. By centering these early, mostly western theorists, and then mapping how their ideas and theories influenced future experimentation and thinking, this chapter firmly grounds the concept of DPO as part of the political left and suggests that it could be both a transformative tool to transition beyond capitalism and an institutional design which transcends and unifies some of the historical divisions in post-capitalist theorizing. It does the latter by using the benefit of historical experience to analyze what worked and did not work in subsequent practice once ideas around economic democracy moved out of theory and into the real world.

4.1 The Ideological Foundations of DPO

One guiding fragment that is relatively consistent across the modern literature is that DPO is inherently connected to, and entwined with, the historical struggle for economic democracy; and, more specifically, the search for political-economic alternatives to the

economic alienation and exploitation that is has long been identified as being prominent features of capitalism (Cumbers, 2012; Cumbers, 2016a; Kishimoto, Steinfort, and Petitjean, 2020). While economic democracy is a broad concept comprised of an interconnecting set of socio-economic philosophies, at its most basic level it suggests simply that the principle of democracy must extend into the economic realm. While the precise term arose in conjunction with the proliferation of various left-wing alternatives to industrial capitalism, the concepts and motivations behind it are broader and arguably as old as human civilization itself.

At economic democracy's heart is the age-old desire to enjoy the fruits of one's labor, have some degree of control over, or input into, the decisions that impact one's life, and to have wealth and power within society distributed more fairly. Such motivations have spurred revolts, revolutions, and utopian communities from time immemorial (Faulkner, 2018). In its modern, western incarnation, economic democracy sprung from the major political and economic shifts occurring in Europe and the US during the 18th and 19th centuries – specifically the rise of liberal political democracy on the one hand, and the industrial revolution on the other – and the inconsistencies and tensions they produced (Cumbers, 2020).

During this time period, four new and interconnected theories emerged that are particularly foundational to the historical and ideological development of both economic democracy and DPO: radical liberalism, mutualism and anarchism, cooperativism, and Marxism. The largely contemporaneous theorists associated with the emergence of these theories had many ideas in common, most notably a strong critique of the productive relations of industrial capitalism and the basic belief that working people should have greater ownership and control over the means of production. However, they also differed in many important ways, especially around issues related to institutional forms of ownership and control, strategies and tactics, the role and nature of democracy, and broader economic concepts. From their ideas, points of intersection and divergence, and impact and influence on subsequent generations of activists and theorists, it is possible to start tracing the historical and ideological development of DPO as a distinct concept.

4.1.1 Radical Liberalism

Radical liberalism is often associated with the work and theories of John Stuart Mill, one of the most prominent and pre-eminent English philosophers and political economists of the mid-19th century. Like many of his contemporaries, Mill was concerned with the effects of the industrial revolution on society and politics. However, unlike other liberal theorists of the time, he was critical of how capitalism reduced or restrained the economic freedom of individuals (Baum, 1999). Moreover, over time he became skeptical about the utility of certain core capitalist concepts. For instance, in his *Autobiography* Mill wrote that he had become convinced that classical political economy, which he defined as lauding private property, inheritance, and unfettered business activities, was only minimally useful (Claeys, 1987; Baum, 1999).

By the late 1840s, Mill was identifying his ideas as socialist – although he used the prefix "qualified" (Flaherty, 2021; McCabe, 2021). This "qualification" is due to the nature of Mill's political economic prescriptions to the ills of capitalism. Specifically, while he supported the formation of cooperatives and publicly owned enterprises, and endorsed forms of workplace democracy (Mill, 1994), he diverged from some other socialists (then and now) by defending competition and rejecting statist forms of revolutionary socialism in favor of more evolutionary, decentralized, and democratic approaches. Specifically, Mill suggested that complete economic, political, and social centralization would violate freedom regardless of whether there was a free press or democratic legislature (Mill, 1978). Instead, Mill preferred administrative decentralization combined with a version of subsidiarity, calling for "the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency; but the greatest possible centralization of information, and diffusion of it from the centre" (Mill, 1978). On this point, Mill's influence can be seen strongly in the DPO principle of decentralization and subsidiarity.

Mill is also important to the ideological and historical foundations of DPO because he explicitly made the connection between economic participation and political democracy, which is often referenced in modern economic democracy discourse. Specifically, Mill suggested that it was critically important for people to actively participate in the functioning and governance of local political, economic, and social institutions since this was essential to the political education needed to secure individual and collective freedom (Mill, 1978).

Moreover, he also made the connection between participation in local institutions and the strengthening of democratic processes in society more generally, writing that unless democracy was practiced at smaller scales people would struggle to learn how to implement it at scale (i.e. the nation-state) (Mill, 1962).

Mill's ideas and theories have influenced the work of generations of subsequent theorists. One of whom was the late 19th and early 20th century US philosopher John Dewey. Dewey believed that democracy was applicable and necessary in all areas of the human experience, writing that from a developmental perspective people needed to actively take part in managing common institutions and experiences. This included everything from families and churches to companies and governments (Dewey, 1920; Green, 1999). Moreover, like Mill, Dewey believed that democratic experience in the workplace (and other social institutions) was necessary to develop the "mental habits" required for genuine political democracy (Dewey, 2008; Ellerman, 2009). And Dewey went further, contending that unless, and until, democracy was extended into the economic and social realm, political democracy itself would be insecure (Dewey, 1987). Dewey also maintained that individualism and individual liberty needed to be augmented with collective approaches, especially when it came to the economic sphere. Specifically, he believed that people were capable of acting in the common interest, rather than simply out of self-interest (Kloppenberg, 2017), but in order to break free from the "old individualism" based on self-interest and "pecuniary gain" active discussion and engagement with the concept and prospect of public control of the economy would be necessary.[18]

On the relationship between economic participation, political democracy, and alternative ownership models, many historical and contemporary discussions around economic democracy directly reference Mill. This includes those associated with the concept of participatory democracy that emerged in the 1960s and 70s (discussed further in chapter five) – particularly variants of which that acknowledged the importance of extending participatory, deliberative, and other direct democratic approaches into the economic realm. It

[18] For instance, in *Individualism: Old and New*, Dewey wrote that "concentration of attention upon real and vital issues such as attend the public control of industry and finance for the sake of social values would have vast intellectual and emotional reverberations. No phase of our culture would remain unaffected. Politics is a means, not an end. But thought of it as a means will lead to thought of the ends it should serve. It will induce consideration of the ways in which a worthy and rich life for all may be achieved. In so doing, it will restore directive aims and be a significant step forward in the recovery of a unified individuality" (Dewey, 1931, pp. 110-111).

also includes modern discourse around theories of justice and property-owning democracy associated with the philosopher John Rawls. For instance, in making the argument that "there is a strong Rawlsian case for seeing economic democratization as a requirement of justice," O'Neill demonstrates that Rawls saw property owning democracy as congruent with Mill's perspective on worker managed enterprises (2008, p. 29). Moreover, he contends that there is a strong Rawlsian argument that "workplace participation and economic democracy can help to fashion the kind of democratic character that fits best with the stable maintenance of a just society over time" (2008, p. 42). On this latter point, O'Neill points out that this line of reasoning is part of a long tradition that draws heavily from Mill.

Following from Mill, Dewey, and many other theorists, the existing DPO literature often highlights the empowering and educating nature of democratic participation and control of economic enterprises (Cumbers and McMaster, 2012; Cumbers, 2016a; Cumbers and Hanna, 2019). It also cautiously accepts principles of decentralization on the grounds of enabling democratic participation and control (albeit balanced against certain economic and social benefits of centralization on an industry by industry, and case by case basis) and gradualism with regards to the transition to a new political economic system (Cumbers, 2016a; Cumbers and Hanna, 2019; Cibrario, 2021). However, DPO theorists often reject the exclusive or predominate focus on workers as the primary actors in democratically owned or governed enterprises in favor of broader, multi-stakeholder approaches (Cumbers and Hanna, 2019; Kishimoto, Steinfort, and Petitjean, 2020; Lawrence and Hanna, 2020; Brennan, 2021). And the DPO literature is often more ambivalent on the question of markets than some radical liberals, suggesting that democratic public enterprises could exist, and be part of, various market and non-market systems (O'Neill, 2003; Cumbers and McMaster, 2012).

4.1.2 Mutualism

In the 1850s, around the same time that Mill was active in Britain, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, a French philosopher and politician who is sometimes referred to as the father of anarchism, published a series of tracts articulating one of the first comprehensive visions of economic/industrial democracy (Graham, 2015). In Proudhon's vision, certain companies, especially large-scale enterprises and public works, would be owned and controlled by their workers via associations. This would include "participation in losses and gains" along with training, apprenticeships, and career development that would overcome the exploitation,

hierarchy, inequality, and prejudice associated with a division of labor (Dardot and Laval, 2019). Proudhon also proposed that the Bank of France be turned into a Bank of Exchange, governed by delegates from all sectors of the economy, that would provide free credit to the worker associations running enterprises and services.

Importantly, Proudhon's vision was systemic, linking the internal re-organization of workplaces and industries with a new horizontal and state-less society based on mutualism – a term and concept that predated Proudhon, but has subsequently become closely identified with him. Summing up Proudhon's model, George writes that he "envisage[d] a new industrial democracy wherein the laboring classes should reign and govern first in assemblies of beneficence, then in chambers of commerce, in corporations of arts and trades, in companies of workingmen, in exchanges, in markets, in academies, in schools, in agricultural groups, and finally in electoral convocations, in parliamentary assemblies and councils of state, in national guards, and even within churches and temples" (1922, p. 542).

However, unlike later syndicalist, anarchist, and Marxist approaches, Proudhon's approach to systemic change was evolutionary rather than revolutionary. In an 1846 letter to Karl Marx, Proudhon explained that resorting to the use of force to achieve emancipatory social change would be a contradiction, and that change should happen through the creation of new economic "combinations" that would peacefully replace the old, exploitive ones (Proudhon, 1846). As will be discussed further in chapter seven, this theory of change, which is also common to some early cooperative and revisionist Marxist approaches, is particularly relevant to DPO in the modern political economic context.

Proudhon's theory of change led him, at times, to oppose both participation in politics and labor actions (such as unions and mass strikes) (Graham, n.d.). In particular, Proudhon was critical of representative democracy. "If monarchy is the hammer which crushes the People, democracy is the axe which divides it," he wrote (Proudhon, 2011, p. 275). In short, Proudhon saw representative democracy as a charade (one which would only be bolstered by reforms such as universal suffrage) and a violation of actual democratic principles which required that all people participate in the governing of society (Proudhon, 2011; Graham, n.d.). The basis of this type of non-statist direct democracy would be economic institutions, including the bank of exchange and a network of voluntary associations. The political system

would also be radically decentralized, likely taking the form of a very strong federalist or confederal system (Proudhon, 1979).

Proudhon was, and still is, a very controversial figure. To conservatives of his time, he was a dangerous subversive intent on destroying bourgeois institutions and redistributing wealth; to Marxists, he was the opposite, a petty bourgeoisie who shied away from class conflict, opposed strikes, and sometimes defended private property. To French nationalists, he was an inspiration, blending leftist economic policies with conservative, patriarchal, and patriotic social values; and to more mainstream economists (such as Joseph Schumpeter) he was a substandard and inept theorist (Ritter, 1969). Regardless of these historically contingent interpretations, Proudhon's work and ideas, and those of mutualism and anarchism more generally, undoubtedly causally influenced the historical development of economic democracy and DPO theory and practice throughout the 20th century – particularly, as will be discussed further below, through the theory and practice of both syndicalism and workers' control.

4.1.3 Cooperativism

By the time Proudhon and Mill were writing in the mid-1800s, there had already been several decades of proto-economic democracy experimentation as the industrial revolution began to cause massive socio-economic changes. In fact, Proudhon's theories themselves were informed by nascent workers' associations that he observed and interacted with in France. In the UK, these early experiments are often associated with the utopian socialist and industrialist Robert Owen. Just as Proudhon is often called the father of anarchism, Owen is considered by many to be the father of British socialism and cooperativism (Booth, 1869). In the early 1800s, Owen took over a textile mill in New Lanark, Scotland and used it to test better pay and conditions for workers and their families – efforts that were highly progressive for their time. The success of this approach, and the failure of other industrial capitalists and the government to adopt similar measures, led Owen to start establishing hundreds of intentional cooperative communities and associations. While many of these efforts failed, they were inspirational to workers who were becoming increasingly assertive and organized.

Like Proudhon, Owen's vision was systemic in nature. Specifically, he envisioned the restructuring of the economy and society such that "co-operatives would spread and federate the whole of society, with this socialism replacing the 'old immoral world' with a new 'moral

world,' where all would be free and equal, and there would be 'true democracy'" (Patmore and Balnave, 2018, p. 31). As such, he is often referred to as early utopian socialist – a description most notably affixed to him by Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto* and Engels in *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (1901).[19] For Marx and Engels, there was much to admire in Owen's vision and in the *Communist Manifesto* they stated that utopian socialist publications were full of good ideas that could help educate and empower the working class (Marx and Engels, 1848). However, they were critical of the utopians' rejection of class antagonism and, by extension, revolutionary action. As it relates to Owen, this was a valid criticism given that he explicitly and consistently opposed actions that could "destabilize society" (Royle, 1998; Rogers, 2018, p. 259). Through this rejection of class conflict – and alongside Owen's double focus on cooperative production and exchange – it is possible to begin drawing ideological and historical links between Owen and the evolution of the cooperative movement; which, as will be discussed further below, began with strong connections to the political goals of organized labor and the working class, but which, overtime, began to shift more in the direction of amalgamating independent producers and consumers within existing capitalist economic frameworks.

Owen was also not favorably disposed to political democracy. However, whereas Proudhon rejected representative democracy (including universal suffrage and political participation) on the grounds that in practice it violated truly democratic principles of equality, liberty, and self-governance, Owen had a quite different, and decidedly paternalistic take. "Owen deemed the working classes incapable of governing themselves," Siméon writes. "They had to be taught to do so from above, that is by himself" (Siméon, 2012, p. 5). In fact, the traditional view is that Owen was either anti-democratic or unconcerned with politics (Claeys, 2002). However, other scholars disagree, with Gregory Claeys arguing that while Owen was undoubtedly paternalistic in his view of society, his economic vision and experimentation undoubtedly contained democratic elements (2002). Similarly, Ben Maw suggests that while Owen clearly rejected "protective democracy" (including reforms such as universal male suffrage), he supported elements of developmental democracy, which, in

[19] However, as Rogers points out, Marx and Engels pejorative labeling of Owen's vision as utopian (i.e. impossible or implausible) was based on certain tenets that have subsequently been proven highly contestable (Rogers, 2018). In particular, the idea that class antagonism within capitalism will inevitably lead, through revolution, to communism; and, by extension, that the communist system that emerges from such a revolution would, ultimately, be emancipatory, equitable, and prosperous.

addition to the more equitable distribution of incomes and wealth, refers to democratizing decision making in the workplace (2011).

Even the most cursory analysis of the DPO literature shows that the concept draws heavily from certain aspects of Owenite, cooperatavist, and mutualist theory and practice. Specifically, many DPO publications embrace a similar "developmental democracy" approach – with proponents often specifically articulating a rationale for DPO based on combining the larger distributional benefits of public enterprise (e.g. reducing inequality and poverty) with the individual and collective benefits of cooperatives and other worker owned enterprises as it relates to broader participation in workplace and economic decision-making (Cumbers, 2016a; Cumbers and Hanna, 2019). Moreover, many DPO publications situate the concept as both a systemic approach in that it is historically and ideologically connected to the larger effort to envision and create a post-capitalist political economic system (Cumbers, 2012; Lawrence and Hanna, 2020); and as part of an evolutionary approach in that it seeks a relatively peaceful, albeit not-necessarily non-confrontational, transition to that economic system (discussed further in chapter seven).

4.1.4 Marxism

Perhaps the most well-known of all the early foundational economic democracy theorists are Marx and Engels – the famous 19th century critics of capitalism and founders of communism. Ironically, Marx and Engels are now often associated with traditional forms of centralized and hierarchical state-ownership (D'Amato, 2009). However, this interpretation is due primarily to the actions of later individuals, movements, and governments that purported to act in their name (Kendall, 1972; Russell, 2002; Chattopadhyay, 2005). While Marx and Engels did, undoubtedly, oppose the gradualism, voluntarism, and anti-statism of anarchists and mutualists like Proudhon and Bakunin, their view of what would happen to the state – and, consequently, how economic enterprises should be owned and governed under communism – can be viewed as being more in-line with the principles of economic democracy and most their 19th century contemporaries on the left (regardless of sect and ideological orientation), than it is with many later Marxist-influenced approaches to state ownership (i.e. both the Soviet and European social democratic varieties).[20] Following from

[20] For instance, writing in 1930, the Group of International Communists (GIC) wrote that "with the single exception of Marx, we find in the case of virtually all writers who have concerned themselves with the organisation of economic life in a communist society the same principles being advocated as

this, DPO's rejection of this statist model of public ownership, and the approach to the state suggested in the refined principles articulated in chapter seven, can be seen as being in largely in congruence with Marx and Engel's original view on the issue.

Specifically, in the *Communist Manifesto* Marx and Engels laid out a basic blueprint for a communist revolution. First, the proletariat would overcome the ruling class and gain control of the state; next, the proletariat would use this control to "centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State" and rapidly increase productive forces; then, as a result, class distinctions would disappear and the state would wither away, leading to the ultimate goal of "a society of free and associated producers" (Marx and Engels, 1848, p. 26; Chattopadhyay, 1998, p. 2165). On this latter point, Engels later claimed that all socialists agreed that the political state would disappear after the revolution and be replaced by "simple administrative functions" (Engels, 1872).[21] Moreover, he also emphasized that simply asserting state ownership over the means of production did not equate to socialism, making the point that if it did Napoleon, Metternich, and Bismarck could all be considered founders of socialism since they took productive enterprises into state control (Engels, 1877).

Furthermore, Marx and Engels' concept of what the state was to be in this interregnum period is particularly important. Many detractors from both the left and the right focus on Marx's use of the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" to suggest that the Marxist state would be inherently authoritarian in nature. However, as Draper explains, when Marx was writing, the term "dictatorship" did not have the same negative meaning as it subsequently acquired. Specifically, for Marx and Engels it referred simply to rule by the working class and was not equated with despotism, tyranny, or a rejection of democracy (Draper, 1987). In fact, in his discussions of the Paris Commune, Marx expressed support for a variety of democratic methods, including regular elections, open meetings, universal suffrage, recallable delegates, and decentralized administration (Marx, 1871; Sowell, 1963). In sum, for Marx and Engels not only was political democracy important, but there was nothing to preclude public enterprises from being governed or managed more democratically or directly by workers.

---

those which the Russians have applied in practice" (GIC, 1930). The GIC were proponents of "Council Communism" and established strong links with Anton Pannekoek, one of the foremost council communist theorists of the era (Gerber, 1989; Bourrinet, 2017).

[21] The main difference between socialists and "anti-authoritarians" (i.e. anarchists), he went on, is that the latter "demand that the political state be abolished at one stroke, even before the social conditions that gave birth to it have been destroyed. They demand that the first act of the social revolution shall be the abolition of authority" (Engels, 1872).

"Thus," as Russell puts it, "although State Socialism might, in fact, be the outcome of the proposals of Marx and Engels, they cannot themselves be accused of any glorification of the State" (2002, p. 20).

Although Marx and Engels were not themselves state socialists, Marxism subsequently became generatively associated with conventional state ownership of the means of production through both the rise of "reformist" social democracy, on the one hand, and the "degenerative" aftermath of the Russian revolution, on the other. Regarding the former, Marx and Engels often stressed the need for "political action," which included building working class political parties and contesting elections for parliaments, believing that such activities would ultimately help lay the organizational groundwork for a working-class revolution (Marx and Engels, 1850; Engels, 1990). However, by the late 19th century, some socialist theorists went further and started to believe that these political actions and institutions could, peacefully and gradually, lead to socialism without the need for a violent revolution.

This tendency was especially strong in the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). From the outset, Marx and Engels tried to combat such re-interpretations of socialist strategy within the party (e.g. Marx's posthumous *Critique of the Gotha Programme*) (Marx, 1891). However, their efforts were largely unsuccessful and during the 1890s the SPD started to move in the direction of the "revisionist Marxism" of Eduard Bernstein, one of the party's leading theorists (Russell, 2002). Bernstein challenged Marx's belief in the imminent demise of capitalism, suggested that socialism could be developed via legislation and other incremental means, and defended supposedly humanistic and progressive forms of patriotism, nationalism, and colonialism (Fletcher, 1983; Ostrowski, 2018). In turn, many of Bernstein's revisionist tenets evolved into the basis of the social democratic paradigm that prospered in several European countries before and after World War II (Dorrien, 2019).

Writing in direct response to Bernstein, Rosa Luxemburg warned that this reformist interpretation of Marxism would fail and lead to the "suppression of the abuses of capitalism instead of suppression of capitalism itself" (Luxemburg, 1900). This ultimately proved prescient, with the social democratic successors of Bernstein moving further towards accommodation with capitalism as the 20th century progressed. In particular, Bernstein's approach to the core socialist concept of common ownership prefigures the economic program of many later social democratic parties and governments (including the SPD after

1959) (Dorrien, 2019). Specifically, Bernstein saw a role for various forms of public ownership (national, state, or municipal) but also stressed that "socialization…can also take place if the general public intervenes ever more strongly in support of economic life through laws and ordinances" (Ostrowski, 2021, p. 51). These included interventions such as minimum wage laws, occupational safety standards, price controls, and, importantly, industrial co-participation through works councils. In other words, Bernstein's approach mixed plural forms of ownership with both enhanced state regulation and some limited worker participation.

The second event that associated Marxism with conventional forms of state ownership was the aftermath of the Russian Revolution. As discussed further below, initially the Russian revolution involved the spontaneous creation of workers' committees in many factories and enterprises (included some public enterprises). Given subsequent events, a common perspective is that these early Soviet efforts in support of economic democracy were simply opportunistic and self-serving. However, they are largely in keeping with Vladamir Lenin's views on the state as articulated in his famous book *The State and Revolution*. Briefly, Lenin aligned himself with a traditional reading of Marx and Engels and against social democrats and other revisionists who thought that socialism could be achieved through a democratic state. "At this point the divergence between the Social Democratic and Communist interpretations of Marxism is widest," Cole wrote in 1934. "In this controversy, there can be not the smallest doubt which side can rightly claim to be 'orthodox'…Lenin, and not [Karl] Kautsky says what Marx said…For Kautsky, and the Social Democrats as a party, had come to think in terms of the capture and democratisation of the capitalist state and not, like Marx, in terms of its overthrow and destruction" (1934, p. 181).

For Lenin, the state was a tool of oppression for one class over another. Once the working class had used state power to overcome, suppress, and crush the capitalist class, then the state would disappear and be replaced by a set of cooperative social and economic rules and customs that would be observed without the need for state coercion (Lenin, 1918). Moreover, Lenin also believed that during the transitional period from capitalism to communism, democratic rights and participation would be extended to the vast majority of people that were disenfranchised under capitalism and withheld from "the exploiters and oppressors of the people," thus retaining a form of democracy, but reversing who benefits from it (Lenin, 1918, p. 62). Lastly, drawing from Marx's observations on the Paris

Commune, Lenin agreed that the working class could not simply seize the existing capitalist state machinery and repurpose it, rather they needed to destroy it (Lenin, 1918).

4.2 Building from the Foundation

Theorists associated with the early radical liberal, mutualist and anarchist, cooperativist, and Marxist traditions are important to the historical development of economic democracy in general, and DPO specifically, because they were among the first prominent modern western thinkers to suggest that working people should own, control, and or participate in the operations of economic enterprises and the economy writ large. This basic idea was relatively novel at the time and formed the basis for the subsequent development and proliferation of various strains of socialist, communist, anarchist, and communitarian ideology, experimentation, and economic policy. In turn, these theories and models spread across the world as the twentieth century progressed, mixing with indigenous traditions and approaches to form the ideological basis of countless revolutionary groups, anti-colonial and independence movements, trade unions, political parties, and local economic experiments.

In particular, it is possible to trace generative and causal links – in both affirmative and oppositional ways – from these early theorists to a broad range of subsequent economic democracy theories and experiments. For instance, as previously mentioned, interpretations of Marx's theories formed the basis of both the social democratic/capitalist model of state-ownership and the state socialist model of state-ownership; and, as will be investigated further in this section, syndicalists, guild socialists, and cooperativists all drew from the theories of Proudhon, Mill, Owen, and many others. In turn, during the re-emergence of interest in economic democracy during the mid-part of the 20th century, workers, theorists, and grassroots activists (sometimes roughly grouped together under the moniker of the "New Left") influenced by syndicalism, Guild Socialism, cooperativism, and early interpretations of Marxism pushed back against statist models of public ownership in both capitalist and socialist countries, often under the headings of participatory democracy, workers' control and/or self-management, and cooperation. These efforts, largely abrogated or driven underground by the rise and proliferation of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, were then again reinvigorated and rediscovered as neoliberalism began to falter in the early part of the 21st century; leading to modern experimentation with worker cooperatives, reclaimed

factories, democratized public services, commons-based approaches, and, ultimately, the emergence of the concept of DPO.

4.2.1 Syndicalism

Even though Proudhon himself was wary of trade unions and strikes, his vision of industrial democracy – particularly the role of worker associations in running industries – heavily influenced the syndicalist tendency (along with the ideas of Mikhail Bakunin and other anarchists) that emerged powerfully in the labor movement around the turn of the 20th century (Lu, 1922; Jones, 2002). However, strains of syndicalism, and certain syndicalist leaders, also drew from Marx and other early socialists (Sorel, 1901; Mott, 1922). For instance, Darlington writes that while syndicalists generally rejected the economic determinism associated with Marx and many early Marxist organizations, they did agree with Marx's emphasis on class struggle, his identification of the working class as the sole agent of revolutionary change, and his vision of socialism arising from direct worker action rather than the reformist efforts of political parties and trade union leaders (Darlington, 2009).[22]

Briefly, syndicalism suggested that through the establishment of industry-wide unions and the intensification of industrial action (strikes, boycotts, etc.), workers would gain control both over the means of production and the political economic system as a whole (Darlington, 2008). Key to syndicalism was the concept of workers' control and or self-management (Wilshire, 1913; van der Linden and Thorpe, 1990). One of the distinguishing features of syndicalism was its hostility towards the state (Mott, 1922). For instance, writing in 1913, Tom Mann explained that for syndicalists the state was an enemy standing in the way of direct worker ownership and control. Moreover, Mann and other syndicalists believed that the state could not, and would not, be the vehicle by which the working class emancipated themselves and gained power (something only a strike could achieve) (Mann, 1913).[23]

---

[22] The extent to which Marx influenced syndicalism is disputed. McKay, for one, rejects Darlington's assertion that Marxism was one of the "three core ideological elements" of syndicalism, contending that the concepts of class struggle, the working class as the sole revolutionary agent, and direct worker action were not unique to Marx. Rather, these were generally accepted concepts common to many anarchists and socialists at the time. McKay also suggests that Marx and Engels specifically rejected certain syndicalist ideas and concepts when they were raised in early forms during the First International. However, McKay does accept that there is a "well-established scholarly literature that… [admits] the affinities between some forms of Marxism and syndicalism" (McKay, 2010).

[23] In particular, Mann wrote that "the state is the enemy and the 'stateists,' (i.e. those who seek to bring about changes by means of the state machinery), are opponents of voluntary organisation,

While syndicalists opposed the state and statism, and were ultimately in favor of worker ownership and control (via trade unions) of "all industry," they were sometimes supportive of different, more direct forms of public ownership as an intermediary step. For instance, following the end of World War I, the French Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) – a trade union that had, up until that point, been syndicalist in its orientation – demanded that various critical sectors of the economy, including railroads, mines, banks, and transportation, be nationalized and administered jointly by workers, consumers, and "the collectivity" (Sturmthal, 1953), albeit with workers elected by trade unions always having numerical superiority on all boards or committees (Mott, 1922).[24] Through this "tripartite" governance proposal, and a similar one made by railroad unions in the US (discussed further below), it is possible to draw direct generative links from early 20th century syndicalism, through the resurgence of interest in workers' control in the 1960s and 70s (discussed in chapter five), to the modern literature on DPO, most of which usually includes multi-stakeholder governance models.

Syndicalism and syndicalist-associated concepts were extremely influential in both the labor and wider socialist movement in the years preceding World War I – and remained a powerful tendency in Spanish and French unions particularly into the 1930s (Hobsbawm, 1973). Even where there were not strong syndicalist trade unions, the basic idea of class struggle combined with workers' control of industry was relatively commonplace amongst socialists. However, the Russian revolution of 1917 changed the balance of power dramatically, and fundamentally altered the labor movement's perspective on, and relationship to, economic democracy for the rest of the century.

---

voluntary control and voluntary ownership. The state and with is [sic] parliament and all the governmental departments are opposed to direct control and ownership by the people engaged in the industries. The state caters directly for the ruling class. The ruling class is not the working class. The working class cannot become the ruling class by state action, nor can its members throw off the yoke of bondage imposed on them by the present ruling class by any means short of refusing to act as wealth producers for a ruling class or for any body or institution other than themselves" (1913).

[24] As Mott describes, for some of the more radical syndicalists such arrangements were a means to an end and they "look forward to the time when the public representatives may be dispensed with and the somewhat indefinite coordination of the congress of the Confederation may be substituted for it" (1922, p. 38).

4.2.2 The Russian Revolution

After the initial February revolution which overthrew the Tsar, workers' committees (also known as factory committees) were established in most sizeable industrial enterprises across Russia (Cliff, 2004). Importantly, while these workers' committees are remembered primarily as an initiative of industrial workers in privately owned factories, efforts to establish workers' control spread to many other sectors, including the public sector. Specifically, workers' committees were established in both the People's Commissariat of Posts and Telegraphs and the Admiralty (Brinton, 1970). As such, these particular committees represent one of the earliest direct examples of DPO modern history. However, they were short-lived and quickly abolished by the Bolsheviks in late 1917 (Carr, 1968).

In general, these early Russian workers' committees not only advocated for better working conditions and benefits, but in many cases worker involvement in management and decision-making. This included, in various instances, authority over the hiring and firing of workers, wages, internal company policies, and even what managers could be appointed. "In short," Cliff writes, "the workers' demands for better conditions of labor were accompanied by an equally pressing claim to a role in directing the operation of their enterprises" (2004, p. 223). The provisional government (which ruled until the Bolshevik revolution in October/November 1917) responded to the workers' committees by passing a decree that limited their activities and relegated them to a representative role in the administration of the enterprises (rather than control or self-management). As such, these efforts prefigure the codeterminationist approach to economic democracy that grew steadily in the labor movement throughout the 20th century, especially in western Europe. The Bolsheviks, for their part, initially enthusiastically supported the workers' committees with Lenin stating on May 17 that "the workers must demand the immediate establishment of *genuine* control, to be exercised by the *workers themselves*" (Harris, 2015, p. 137).

Over the next several months economic conditions in Russia deteriorated rapidly and factory output and employment fell. As the provisional government used the economic situation to redouble their efforts to crack down on the committees, Bolshevik influence grew. During the October Revolution, the workers' committees played a critical role (alongside the Soviets). Immediately following the revolution, Lenin published a "Draft Decree on Workers' Control" which called for comprehensive workers' control in all companies with more than

five workers (or with a certain amount of turnover) (Lenin, 1917). However, this proved to be the high-water mark for the workers' committees and workers' control in Russia more generally.

With the advent of the Russian Civil War the Bolsheviks turned against workers' control, and it is in the war communism period (1918-1921) that the foundations for state socialism were laid. Faced with the prospect of being overthrown by reactionary Russian forces backed by an array of foreign governments, the Bolsheviks focused their economic policies on providing their armies with the supplies and manpower needed to win the war. This involved massively extending state-ownership of production via nationalization (albeit with attempts to include trade unions in the management of SOEs), central planning and management of economic activities, restrictions on labor rights and power, and forced requisitioning of food from the countryside (Malle, 1985). Specifically, as it relates to workers' control, the Bolshevik government empowered trade unions to subsume or control the workers' committees. In turn, the unions were brought under control of the government and the government was brought under control of the party (Avrich, 1963). So, while workers' committees in various forms continued throughout the history of the Soviet Union (as will be discussed further in chapter five), they lost much of their autonomy and power, becoming merely "state institutions" in Avrich's analysis.

The abrogation of direct workers' control, and restrictions on labor and union rights, were unpopular with many segments of the industrial workforce (and many socialists), and during the War Communism period strikes and labor unrest increased, culminating in 1921 with the famous Kronstadt Rebellion (Malle, 1985; Brovkin, 1990). These uprisings (along with the successful defeat of opposition armies in the field) convinced Lenin and the Bolsheviks to change course, and in 1921 War Communism was succeeded by the New Economic Policy (NEP). The NEP reintroduced markets and allowed individuals and cooperatives to own and operate small-scale enterprises in the retail, agricultural, and light-industrial sectors. Large-scale enterprises, including heavy industry, banks and transportation, remained in public hands but bought and sold goods on an open market (Bean, 1997).

In this way, the NEP was one of the first of several attempts around the world to create a "third way" between capitalism and communism, although for Lenin it was merely a temporary step back towards capitalism in order to develop the economic conditions

necessary to move forward again to communism (Gregory, 1994). While the NEP did not necessarily introduce or reintroduce economic democracy into the Soviet economy (Bean, 1997), it is nonetheless an influential precursor to DPO. Specifically, while many DPO publications suggest that the concept can exist in market, planned, or mixed economic systems, as will be discussed further in chapter seven the most viable and likely theories of change leave markets and some capitalist institutions intact, at least in the short-term. In other words, there is a high degree of likelihood that the system DPO operates in for the foreseeable future may look similar in some regards to the NEP period, with various public enterprises and services (albeit democratically controlled) operating alongside smaller-scale private and cooperative businesses.

However, the NEP was relatively short-lived. While the market-based system did bring some economic stability and prosperity after years of war, it also re-introduced economic inequality and did little to ameliorate poor working conditions (Resnick and Wolff, 2002). Moreover, private production and market-based distribution of grain was unable to solve one of the biggest questions the Soviet state faced at the time, how to feed the growing urban population. Ultimately, state ownership of industry (including agriculture) was re-established, reinforced, and extended by Joseph Stalin when he was able to consolidate power in the late 1920s. By the 1930s, centralized state-ownership had become such a prominent feature of the Soviet model that it was being accepted by many around the world to be socialist orthodoxy, much to the chagrin of those still interested in direct forms of economic democracy (GIC, 1930).

The post-NEP Soviet approach to the socialist principle of "common ownership" was, in many ways, more similar to the social democratic model being developed in Western Europe than it was to previous conceptions of economic democracy.[25] While this description is somewhat simplistic, and there were real differences in the management and governance of

[25] "Whilst reformist Social Democracy conceived of realising communism through a continuous and gradual process of nationalisation, the revolutionary Bolshevik tendency considered that a revolution was necessary in order to complete the process of nationalisation," the GIC wrote in 1930. "*Thus the conception of the men from Moscow is based on fundamentally the same theoretical methods as that of the reformists*. During and after the revolution those industrial units which have become ripe for nationalisation will be operated through the state, whilst that part of the economy which is not yet sufficiently concentrated will remain in the hands of private capital" (1930). Similarly, in 1941 Raya Dunayevskaya, along with C.L.R. James and others, broke with Trotsky's description of the Soviet Union as a "degenerated workers state" and began to describe it as "state capitalist" (Dunayevskaya, 1941).

SOEs in Western Europe and Eastern Europe, state ownership remained a prominent feature of the Soviet model for its entire existence. As such, while the Soviet model was identified and self-identified as "Marxist," it undoubtedly fell far short of the communist system based on worker self-governance envisioned by Marx and Engels.

4.2.3 Factory Councils

Around the same time that the Bolshevik government in Russia was starting to reign in its workers' committees, the idea was spreading to other parts of Europe, most notably Italy and Germany. For instance, from 1919 to 1920, at the height of the tumultuous "Bienno Rosso" period following World War I, workers in Turin, Italy established a network of revolutionary factory councils. Championed by both socialists (such as Antonio Gramsci) and anarchists (such as Errico Malatesta), the factory councils built on existing arrangements of workplace participation (called internal commissions) and were intended to both give workers increased control over production and serve as the vehicles to overthrow the capitalist economic system.

Specifically, the Turin factory councils were the manifestation of a shift in the self-conceptualization of the labor movement in the city, from paid labor to empowered producers, on the one hand, and from solely economic to broader political concerns, on the other. This aligned them with the more systemically transformative interpretation of economic democracy that went beyond just workplace democracy. Consequently, it also put them in conflict not only with the capitalist owners of the factories, but with the labor unions and political parties that had traditionally represented working class interests and which were not interested in going much further than supporting internal commissions dominated by representatives elected by the labor unions themselves.

In 1919, as part of the growing radicalization of workers in the city generally, a debate began about these commissions – largely led and fueled by Gramsci and his colleagues at the newspaper L'Ordine Nuovo (New Order). Rather than simply focusing on administrative functions, Gramsci and his colleagues envisioned the commissions as centers of worker power that would replace traditional capitalist management and governance practices (Di Paola, 2011). As these debates were playing out, workers in certain factories began constituting new councils on their own and these spread across the city. For L'Ordine Nuovo, labor unions were critical working-class organizations within a capitalist system, but because they

remained wedded to wage labor rather than workers' control, they were not capable of providing the foundations of an alternative political economic system (Di Paolo, 2011). The factory councils, on the other hand, were based on workers as producers and the unity of the working class, and they represented the "nucleus" of a new form of organization. For their part, the syndicalists and anarchists, who were especially strong in the local iron and steel union (FIOM), held similar views on trade unions but differed from L'Ordine Nuovo in that they saw the factory councils as a means not of "assuming power, but of destroying it" (Lattarulo and Ambrosoli, 1971; Di Paolo, 2011, p. 135). In general, both the anarchists and L'Ordine Nuovo envisioned factory councils as not only providing a voice for workers over internal workplace matters (although this was important), but as the vehicle by which the working class as a whole would take control over the management and operation of economic enterprises.

In March and April 1920, matters came to a head when workers at several factories went on strike and occupied their workplaces amidst rising tensions with management over the existence and activities of the factory councils. Ultimately, a general strike was called in the whole Piedmont region, but the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) rejected calling for a national general strike to support the Turin workers and the national unions essentially conceded to most of the industrialists' demands, including as they related to role of the factory councils (Di Paolo, 2011). The failure of the strike essentially closed the window of opportunity for the factory council movement in Italy. However, as Di Paola and others recall, the experiment (and the ideas animating it) had a direct influence on, and causal relationship to, the resurgence of interest and activism around workers' control that re-emerged in Italy following World War II, when cooperatives were enshrined into the Italian constitution (Jensen, Patmore, and Tortia, 2015), during the 1970s as a new movement for workers' control and self-management swept Italy and other countries, and more recently in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis (Vieta, 2021). In turn, all of these – and the original factory councils – have influenced the conceptual development of DPO in various ways. In particular, the Italian factory council movement, and its successors, suggest that ideas around workers' control do not necessarily have to be confined to the enterprise level and can, in fact, be integrated into more systemically transformative visions of economic democracy. Additionally, as will be discussed further in chapter seven, it is one of numerous historical data points that demonstrate the need to socialize and embed ideas and concepts like economic democracy

and DPO more broadly in social and political institutions in order for them to both withstand counter attacks and prevent atrophy over time.

In Germany, disaffected workers and soldiers began to form into revolutionary councils towards the end of World War I. In 1918-1919, these councils played a prominent role in the overthrow of the German monarchy and the establishment of a republican form of government. For the most part, however, the councils were effectively neutralized by the SPD as a vehicle for more far-reaching systemic change. Mirroring events in Turin, the SPD and mainstream unions were opposed to the calls being made by the councils for direct workers' control over industry and the formation of a "Council Republic." In November 1918, Carl Legien, head of the social democratic General Commission of German Trade Unions, struck a deal with a group of industrialists led by Hugo Stinnes that established the parameters of labor-management relations in the post-war period. Among other provisions, including an 8-hour workday, the Stinnes-Legien Agreement recognized the unions as the only legitimate representative of workers and permitted a certain form of works councils to be formed in enterprises with more than 50 employees (Silvia, 2013). The works councils were both a longstanding union demand and a reformist effort to push back against the more revolutionary workers' councils. In 1924, the International Labour Organisation summarized how these legal works councils were oriented:

> 1. The Works Council was to be in no way [a] political body, its duties being purely economic. 2. In the economic sphere, it was not to serve as an instrument of class dictatorship, but merely as a new method put at the disposal of the workers to allow [sic] them to defend the rights which were granted to them by legislation and by the Constitution, and to supervise the practical working of labour conditions (GIC, 1938).

The Stinnes-Legien Agreement, and the accommodation of SPD to capitalism and parliamentary forms of democracy more generally during this revolutionary period, is a historically important event in the history of economic democracy. From this point on, the dominant tendency in Germany (as well as many other Western European countries) when it came to calls for greater worker participation, control, or democracy was reformist, rather than revolutionary. Specifically, social democracy (including its milder US variant) increasingly diverged from its socialist roots and became primarily oriented around ameliorating the worst excesses of capitalism through state regulation of private enterprise,

rather than large-order shifts in the ownership of those enterprises. This was combined with a strong social safety net supported by tax-and-spend policies and, in some places, a narrow definition of workplace democracy/participation whereby some workers were able to participate in delineated economic decisions through representative institutions (primarily trade unions).

However, against this dominant trend, there were repeated attempts to implement both more direct forms of participation, democracy, and control in enterprises and to broaden participation to include stakeholders other than specific groups of workers – most notably with the movement for workers' control that emerged in 1960s and 70s. As will be discussed further in chapter five, such efforts were heavily influenced by the experiences of the Italian and German factory councils (and variants of syndicalism more broadly), and specifically counterposed their ideas to both reformist social democratic and Soviet state socialist concepts of public ownership and workplace participation.

4.3 Parting Waters

Ultimately, the success of the Russian revolution – and the failure of a worldwide (or at least European) socialist revolution – sent syndicalism and the concept of revolutionary workers' councils into decline around the world. However, in the early years before, during, and immediately after the momentous events of 1917 it was often still taken for granted on the broad political left that workers would have some degree of direct participation or control of state owned enterprises (either at the firm level or through workers' control of the state).[26] For instance, in the aftermath of World War I, labor unions in the US proposed a plan to permanently nationalize all railroads in the country and run them through a multi-stakeholder board with equal representation from workers, officials, and the public (the "Plumb Plan") (Arnesen, 2007; Ross, 2017). Although this effort failed in Congress and the railroads were ultimately re-privatized, it represents one of the earliest and most relevant models of DPO in that it envisioned the involvement of multiple groups in the governance of a public enterprise

[26] "Socialists have ever coupled with their demand for collective ownership…a demand for the democratic management of industry," the US socialist politician and writer Henry Laidler wrote in 1920. (1920, p. 204).

(not just simply workers). Moreover, the Plumb Plan was generally popular and endorsed by various wings of the US socialist movement (Watkins, 1919; Laidler, 2020).[27]

As Soviet communism began to consolidate itself politically and economically in the 1920s and 1930s, it elevated and gave primacy to the strategy of centralized state ownership. In some capitalist countries, fear of a communist revolution sparked a wave of state repression against socialists and radical trade unionists along with the implementation of reformist accommodations such as work councils, profit sharing schemes, Whitley councils, and worker representation on boards.[28] And in Italy, syndicalism was co-opted by Benito Mussolini and the fascist movement. However, in many places, syndicalism and concepts of workers' control were simply eclipsed by Bolshevik inspired parties, movements, and approaches. As Hobsbawm puts it, "the answer is and must be: largely in the new communist or communist-led movements" (Hobsbawm, 1973). Still, concepts of economic democracy, and specifically worker participation, control, and self-management, survived in the labor movement (both in capitalist and socialist countries) – especially as the rise in Stalinism and the onset of the Cold War led many to increasingly reject Soviet-style communism and its centralized, bureaucratic, and top-down economic structure.

[27] Although, while the Socialist Party was in favor of the Plumb Plan model for ownership and governance, it disapproved of the method of nationalization, which involved purchasing the railroads from their private owners via a bond issue (Lawrence, 1919). "The party does not approve of the method by which the Plumb Plan proposes to acquire the railroads, but recognizes in such plan the first concrete evidence of the spread among American workers of the Soviet idea of proletarian control of industry," Watkins wrote (1919).

[28] Of these, Whitley councils in Britain – also known as joint industrial councils – are particularly relevant to the concept of DPO. During World War I, Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons J.H. Whitley was tasked with forming a commission to investigate and propose reforms to industrial labor relations in the UK. The effort was a direct, reformist response by the government to growing union strength and calls for workers' control, and a fear that after wartime controls were lifted, labor unrest would grow. Whitley specifically aimed to avoid a Soviet-style revolution by instituting a number of social reforms (Gill-McLure, 2017). The committee's reports (known as the Whitley Reports) proposed joint industrial committees comprised of workers and employers at various scales (enterprise, district, and national levels). While originally envisioned as a voluntarist and relatively conservative approach to improved labor-capital relations in the private sector, the approach was mostly taken up in the public sector, where the councils subsequently became a longstanding part of bargaining and industrial relations (Peberdy and Waller, 2021).

4.3.1 The Early Cooperative Movement

The origins of the modern cooperative movement can be traced back to the early days of the industrial revolution in the late 1700s.[29] In reaction to changing employment relations and deteriorating living conditions (including food scarcity), workers in the UK (as well as to a lesser extent, the US and continental Europe) began to form a variety of cooperative ventures and societies in areas such as milling and baking, home building, weaving, tailoring, shoemaking, and the buying and selling of goods (Patmore and Balnave, 2018). Some of these early cooperatives were production based (i.e. worker cooperatives), some were retail based (i.e. early consumer cooperatives), and some were a combination of both. Through the efforts of Owen, William King (a Brighton-based doctor), and others, the cooperative movement began to spread and expand throughout the UK and by 1831 it was estimated that there were around 60 cooperative societies with as many as 300,000 members operating throughout the country (Patmore and Balnave, 2018).

According to cooperative folklore, the modern movement in the western world was officially born in 1844 when 28 residents in the English town of Rochdale came together to form a cooperative organization called the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers. While some accounts describe these founders as a group of impoverished weavers, they were actually a mixed group that was heavily influenced by Owen, previous cooperative efforts in the town, and decades of labor organizing and conflict (Fairbairn 1994; Ratner 2013).[30] Importantly, while Rochdale is most often remembered for its cooperative retail operation, this was just one part of the original vision of its founders. The "Society" was envisioned as a multi-purpose cooperative that would, they hoped, ultimately transition to an Owenite-style "self-supporting home colony of united interests" (Fairbairn 1994, p. 6). In other words, Rochdale, like other early cooperative experiments, was systemically transformative in its orientation and vision. Rochdale is also important because it established and codified a workable cooperative structure and internal set of governance arrangements. These were adapted from a model set of cooperative rules established by the 1832 Owenite Co-operative

[29] In fact, one of the earliest known modern cooperatives – a flour and bread society – was formed by public sector workers at government-owned dockyards in Chatham and Kent in 1759 (Patmore, 2020). Potentially earning it the title of the first modern example of DPO.

[30] Of the original founders, Fairbarn writes, 15 were leading Owenite socialists from the area and ten were weavers. Moreover, they were generally reasonably well-paid artisans rather than starving workers (1994).

Congress, and subsequently formed the basis of many cooperative organizations around the world.[31] They also heavily influence the internal governance models and democratic principles found in many DPO publications.

There are at least two defining characteristics of the early cooperative movement that are important to illuminate with regards to both the causal relationships and ideological history of economic democracy (and the concept of DPO). The first is that the early cooperative movement was intimately connected to efforts and aspirations of organized labor (Patmore and Balnave, 2018). In the US, for instance, The Knights of Labor (KOL) – the first mass organization of the American working class, and the first that embraced Black workers and women – were important to the development and proliferation of cooperatives in the country (Fink, 1985). Founded in 1869, the KOL explicitly envisioned the creation of cooperatives that would, ultimately, "supersede" the capitalist system (Powderly, 1889; Curl, 2009).

In 1884, Henry Sharpe, secretary of the KOL's cooperative board, proposed establishing a "Cooperative Guild" which would "ultimately supplant the market economy with its own structure for buying, selling, and producing goods" (Leikin, 2005, p. 44). Although the proposal was ultimately rejected by the Knights General Assembly, systematic cooperation between a growing number of affiliated consumer and producer cooperatives continued until the late 1880s when the KOL cooperatives were ultimately undermined and destroyed by the forces of organized capital in the wake of the Haymarket Massacre and a marked economic downturn. Importantly from the perspective of DPO, the KOL did not see cooperatives and public ownership as being mutually exclusive. In particular, they advocated for public ownership of railroads and transportation networks, telephone and telegraph systems, and water and electric utilities alongside labor run cooperatives (Gourevitch, 2015). In Europe, a similar approach was advanced by the Austrian socialist Otto Neurath during the "Red Vienna" period of the 1920s.[32] Neurath proposed an interconnected mix of ownership

[31] For instance, the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) – an international organization supporting cooperatives that was founded in 1895 – states that the while the internationally recognized seven cooperative principles have been revised over the years, they "remain essentially the same as those practiced by the Pioneers in 1844" (ICA, n.d.).

[32] "Vienna achieved one of the most spectacular cultural triumphs of Western history," Polanyi wrote of Red Vienna. "1918 initiated an…unexampled moral and intellectual rise in the condition of a highly developed industrial working class which, protected by the Vienna system, withstood the degrading

forms including agricultural and retail cooperatives, communist collectives (i.e. community ownership), and public ownership of large-scale industry in order to achieve the "simultaneous realization of socialism, solidarism, and communism" (Neurath, 2005, p. 354).

A few years after the KOL began to decline, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) was founded in 1905 by 200 labor leaders, socialists and anarchists. The IWW was syndicalist in its orientation and believed, among other things, in a "strike-to-cooperative transition of early American workers" (Curl, p. 126). Specifically, it urged a system organized from below by the workers called the Co-operative Commonwealth. During strikes, IWW workers often formed their own production cooperatives and cooperative mutual aid programs would often be set up to support IWW migrant workers in industries such as mining, logging, and agriculture. However, reflecting the growing ideological and tactical divergence of the socialist movement following the factional demise of the First International in 1867, the IWW did not support public ownership like the KOL had done – a position that distinguished them from the Socialist Party, which was a strong proponent of public ownership with democratic participation (Dubofsky, 2000).[33] For its part, the Socialist Party continued to support cooperatives alongside publicly owned enterprises. For instance, the 1919 Socialist Party convention – which occurred shortly before a major split let to the founding of two new socialist organizations, the Communist Party and the Communist Labor Party – formally endorsed the establishment of cooperatives and popular education about them (Watkins, 1919; Colby, 1920).

The second, related characteristic is that the early cooperative movement was oriented towards systemic transformation and was connected to the emergence and proliferation of socialist and anti-capitalist ideas and theories. As previously discussed, Rochdale and many other cooperative efforts were part of, and influenced by, a larger utopian socialist vision of societal transformation. Because of this, many early cooperative experiments envisioned or experimented with a comprehensive approach consisting of different types of cooperatives, including retail stores, production, housing, and more. As Fairbarn describes, "these pieces

---

effects of grave economic dislocation and achieved a level never reached before by the masses of the people in any industrial society" (2001, p. 299).

[33] The IWW program," Curl recalls, "did not include government ownership of the industries; this was the basic difference with the Socialist Party…the administration of society's survival would be organized from below by the workers themselves through their own coordinated organizations" (2009, p. 95).

were not separate, for consumer co-operation had not yet become split from producer co-operation, nor one sector from another, to the degree that has become common in the twentieth century" (1994, p. 6). It was, as Luxemburg explained, this interconnectedness of production and consumption which gave cooperatives both their systemically transformative potential and ability to survive within capitalism (Luxemburg, 1900).[34]

However, as global socialism began to splinter in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the labor movement and the cooperative movement began to move in different directions. Labor affiliated cooperatives in the US and elsewhere had proven vulnerable to capitalist counter attacks, and the slow process of building autonomous cooperative economic institutions from the ground up was seen by many as less attractive and viable than either a general strike (syndicalism) or proletarian revolution (bolshevism) as the vehicle leading to socialism. For less revolutionary elements within the labor movement, cooperatives were rejected in favor of more mainstream methods of increasing worker participation and blunting the worst excesses of capitalism. This included both traditional trade union organizing and collective bargaining, on the one hand, and new approaches such as profit-sharing schemes, codetermination, and workers' committees (Dubofsky, 2013). For its part, the cooperative movement in the US and the UK in particular moved in more reformist directions as the 20th century progressed, focusing primarily on forming relatively apolitical consumer, retail, and independent producer cooperatives (e.g. in agriculture) within the existing capitalist system. As Luxemburg and others predicted, this only further marginalized cooperatives as a vehicle for systemic transformation.

As can be seen in the literature reviewed in chapter two, many DPO publications draw heavily from the principles and democratic internal governance arrangements of cooperatives that began during this early period – especially democratic member control, member economic participation, education, training, and information, and concern for community (ICA, no date). Moreover, like the early cooperative movement these publications usually connect the concept of DPO to the aspirations of workers and organized labor

[34] "Producers' co-operatives can survive within capitalist economy only if they manage to suppress, by means of some detour, the capitalist controlled contradictions between the mode of production and the mode of exchange," Luxemburg wrote. "And they can accomplish this only by removing themselves artificially from the influence of the laws of free competition. And they can succeed in doing the last only when they assure themselves beforehand of a constant circle of consumers, that is, when they assure themselves of a constant market" (1900).

(Cumbers and Hanna, 2019; Cibrario, 2021). They also often envision DPO as being part of and prefiguring post-capitalist economic and institutional arrangements, and, as will be discussed in chapter seven, many embrace an evolutionary theory of change (albeit while acknowledging the need and inevitability of confrontation). Lastly, from the theories and experiences of the early cooperative movement, DPO publications also identify the need to connect and represent the interests of both workers and consumers as a necessary condition for both minimizing the deleterious impacts of capitalism in the short term, and reconciling inherent social and economic conflicts of interest in the long term (Cumbers and Hanna, 2019; We Own It, 2019; Brennan, 2021).

4.3.2 Guild Socialism

In addition to the cooperative movement, DPO's concern for workers and consumers (as well as the public interest more broadly) generatively and substantively draws from Guild Socialism, a UK-specific variant of syndicalism that was developed before, during, and after the Russian revolution. As Vernon put it in 1980, "to a considerable extent…we may regard the Guild Socialist movement as the British echo, with native adaptations, of syndicalism…" (1980, p. vi). Similarly, Ostergaard explains that both syndicalism and Guild Socialism shared the same basic idea of economic democracy via union control of the economy and that both were opposed to the rise of state socialism in both its reformist and Soviet varieties (1961).[35]

In particular, Guild Socialism was established as an explicit challenge to the Fabian doctrine of state socialism that had become prevalent amongst British socialist intellectuals in the early 20th century. Briefly, Fabianism was a tendency that favored gradualism, democratic state socialism, and strong trade unions that drew from a diverse array of influences, including Mill.[36] In general it is associated with the development of a British version of social democracy – which subsequently spread to India and elsewhere – that involved a heavy emphasis on top-down, statist models of public ownership and voluntarist approaches to industrial relations (e.g. independent trade unions and collective bargaining), as opposed to

[35] "Nationalisation by itself, both the syndicalists and guildsmen declared would make no essential difference to the status of the worker," Ostergaard writes. "Under bureaucratic State ownership the worker would remain alienated from the means of production. He would be working for the State and not a private capitalist, but he would still be a wage-worker and, as such, treated essentially as a commodity, a factor of production, rather than as a human being with inalienable rights. In short, State Socialism was only another name for State Capitalism" (Ostergaard, 1961).

[36] Sidney Webb, one of the most prominent early Fabians, routinely drew a direct line between Mill and Fabian socialism (Persky, 2016; Feuer, 2017).

European variants of social democracy (that included co-determination approaches) and experiments in worker self-management (e.g. Yugoslavia and Algeria), both of which are discussed further in chapter five (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006; Dorrien, 2010; Morgan, 2019). Moreover, as Morgan describes, it was against this Fabian-influenced approach that the movement for workers' control explicitly set their ideas in the 1960s and 70s (which will also be discussed in chapter five).[37]

The Guild Socialist challenge was primarily oriented around the concept and nature of democracy, with guild socialists (and others) fearful that the Fabian state might have unintended negative consequences. Specifically, they worried that while Fabianism might achieve some measure of distributional justice, it would come at the cost of destroying active worker and citizen participation in the economy and society (Wright, 1978). That being said, however, Guild Socialism also drew from and was influenced by Fabianism in certain ways. Prominent among these was the Fabian concern that unchecked workers' control would inevitably lead to sectional self-interest and the exploitation of consumers by producers. Guild socialism accepted this critique and was always very careful to balance the interests and needs of producers and consumers, the latter of whom would be organized into various cooperative organizations. For its part, Fabianism and the British Labour Party also drew from and adapted to Guild Socialism in various ways, especially with regards to more specific references to democratic control alongside common or public ownership (Hodgson, 2023).

Guild Socialism was an early attempt to construct an alternative path between capitalism, on the one hand, and statist forms of socialism on the other. "In essence," Burkitt and Hutchinson write, "guild socialists opposed wage slavery. They sought an end to the commodification of labour, whether under the capitalist or collectivist state. Hence they sought economic democracy as a means to a classless society, rather than industrial democracy for the working class alone" (1997, p. 14). This latter aspect also differentiates Guild Socialism from many of the other theoretical and practical approaches to self-management and workers' control that emerged throughout the 20th century, which either focused only on the individual workplace or had the goal of shifting power and control to the

[37] During this resurgence in activism and theorizing around industrial democracy and workers' control, "[guild socialist] Cole once more was a key point of reference, and the Webbs the bureaucratic counterfoil whose 'worship of the given division of labour' contained the seeds of totalitarianism," Morgan writes (2019, p. 21).

working class as a whole. More recently, Hodgson has described Guild Socialism as a system in which "the worker, rather than the state, was the locus of human emancipation" (2023, p. 22). Moreover, the system would be achieved through working class organizing rather than revolutionary action and would lead to workers' control of production.[38]

The best well known, and most enduring, guild socialist theorist was Cole, who wrote several books on the topic, including *Self-Government in Industry*, *Social Theory*, and *Guild Socialism Restated*. The latter of which is one of the most fully articulated visions of what Guild Socialism might look like in practice. Described by Wright as "the intellectual maverick of British socialism" (1978, p. 225), Cole was both a self-proclaimed Marxist and utopian socialist, a member of the Fabian Society (albeit on its left wing), and an advocate for some forms of cooperatives.[39] Cole's diverse affiliations, and the theory of Guild Socialism more generally, demonstrates how novel and influential political economic and institutional approaches can draw from and potentially transcend longstanding and bitter ideological and tactical differences – which is particularly relevant to DPO, which in many ways attempts to do the same.

Also important to the conceptual development of DPO is Cole's belief that producers and consumers, who he saw as being "practically the same people, only ranged in the two cases in different formations," should both be afforded the right to participate in the economy and society (Cole, 1980, p. 39). As such, Cole's articulation of Guild Socialism is one of the

[38] Hodgson is critical of Guild Socialism, writing that it is "unfeasible, at least in its defining democratic and decentralist terms" (2023, p. 26). Specifically, he suggests that by not allowing the production guilds legal autonomy and instead opting for a system of wholesale national or municipal public ownership without independent legal institutions "much power would reside ultimately with national or municipal offices, rather than with local workplaces" (2023, p. 25). Additionally, he argues that without legal autonomy and markets, production guilds in large modern economies would be subjected to serious information and complexity issues that would lead to the creation of state-based bureaucracies, again undermining workers' control. Lastly, Hodgson points out that the Guild Socialism relies heavily on creating cooperative civic associations and a cooperative culture around decision-making, but that insufficient attention is paid to how this would work and be reinforced, especially as it relates to specific institutional structures and rules. Hodgson's critique of Guild Socialism is informative to the conceptual development of DPO, and some of his specific issues and recommendations related to autonomy, markets, social embeddedness, and training are taken up in chapter seven.

[39] In 1934, Cole wrote that "I am a Marxist, to the extent that I have found in certain of his doctrines, and above all in his methods of social analysis, clearer light than anywhere else by which to seek an understanding of the fundamental economic and political problems of to-day. In this sense alone, I claim, has anyone a sound Marxian title to call himself a Marxist…" (1934, p. 8). In 1951, he stated: "Converted by reading Morris's utopia, I became a Utopian Socialist, and I suppose that is what I have been all my life since" (Goodway, 2016, p. 247).

first theories to begin to move away from a purely labor-focused understanding of economic democracy and correct for some of the weaknesses that undermined the factory council movements in Italy and elsewhere – namely a disconnection between workers in particular economic enterprises and the wider community, including consumers and social and political organizations. Explaining the underlying principle in *Guild Socialism Restated*, Cole wrote that while the management and governance of each enterprise or industry would be in the hands of workers, consumers also needed to be represented and protected (Cole, 1980).

True to its syndicalist roots, workers' control of the means of production (the industrial guild organization, or producer association) remained at the heart of the guild socialist model. However, Cole moved away from a pure worker self-management by suggesting national and municipal public ownership alongside the continuation of management structures, albeit with workers democratically selecting or electing their managers (Persky and Madden, 2019) – a structure and process common to many modern cooperative and DPO models. In order to deal with issues of scale and coordination, each industry would have a national guild comprised of all the local guilds. This is similar to the network approach envisioned in some DPO publications as a way to balance decentralization with larger-scale coordination (Cumbers and Hanna, 2019; Hanna, Bozuwa, and Rao, 2021).

To protect and advance consumer interests, Cole envisioned a number of other organizations and associations that would interact with producer associations at various scales. Using the town as an example (in this case, Norwich) Cole proposed that there would be various industrial guilds organized by industry or service sector. Each guild would have representation on an overarching Guild Council. Additionally, there would be a Co-operative Council, a Collective Utilities Council, various Civic Guilds based around civic services, a Cultural Council, and a Health Council. All of these organizations and associations (along with the possibility of others) would then be represented on a communal body Cole called the Commune (Cole, 1980).

In addition to his detailed model, Cole's influence on both movements for workers' control and participatory democracy is important to note. Regarding the latter, Cole believed that Guild Socialism "satisfies the conditions of democracy in a way which neither State Socialism, nor Co-operativism, nor Syndicalism…is able to parallel" (1980, pp. 40-41). More specifically, he believed, like Mill and other radical liberals, that democracy required "active"

rather than "passive" involvement, and that a healthy society was predicated on the right of, and opportunity for, all citizens to "influence" policies and decision-making. For these reasons, among others, Cole and Guild Socialism were "rediscovered" by elements of the New Left in the 1960s and 70s that were interested in the connections between economic and political democracy. For instance, in her landmark 1970 book *Participation and Democratic Theory* Pateman devotes considerable attention to Cole's theories, especially his contention that democracy cannot apply "only or mainly to some special sphere of social action known as 'politics,' but to any and every form of social action, and, in especial, to industrial and economic fully as much to political affairs" (Pateman, p. 37; Vernon, 1980, p. 12). Moreover, Cole's views on democracy also influenced those of his American contemporary Dewey, and together they form the link between Mill, Pateman, and the participatory democratic tradition that began in the 1960s and 70s (Hodgson, 2023).

In retrospect, Cole's vision of Guild Socialism was one of the earliest theoretical efforts to try to re-synthesize the rapidly splintering and diverging socialist movement in the early part of the 20th century and navigate (and bridge) increasingly diverging conceptions of economic democracy. Moreover, despite its flaws and inconsistencies – many of which are accurately diagnosed by Hodgson (2023) – it has both directly and indirectly influenced the concept of DPO. For instance, regarding the former, Guild Socialism's emphasis on balancing the interests and needs of both consumers and workers, implementing direct forms of democracy, and networking or confederating decentralized institutions to address issues of scale are reflected in many DPO proposals and designs (Cumbers and Hanna, 2019; Hanna, Bozuwa, and Rao, 2021), and many DPO scholars and practitioners will often explicitly reference Cole (Cumbers, 2012; Hanna, 2018b).

Regarding the latter, while Guild Socialism was never seriously implemented in Britain (or elsewhere) it remained influential on the political left for generations (especially in Britain) due to the intellectual challenge it posed to both Soviet style communism and the state-centric social democratic paradigm.[40] As interest in workers' control re-emerged powerfully in British and European politics in the 1960s and 70s, many of Cole's ideas and

[40] "Despite its short life, the ideas of the guild socialist movement proved resilient and influential," Hodgson writes (2023, p. 22). In addition to some of the others already discussed, Hodgson lists the following as being influenced by Guild Socialism: Bertrand Russell, Clement Atlee, George Lansbury, Harold Laski, Richard H. Tawney, and Karl Polanyi.

writing around Guild Socialism (and other issues) were "re-interpreted" and disseminated to a new generation of labor and political activists; and it is perhaps no coincidence that the Prime Minister and leader of the Labour Party for much of this time period was Harold Wilson, a friend and former student of Cole's.[41] In turn, as will be discussed further in chapter five, the 1960s and 70s movements for workers' control and participatory democracy are critical to the concept of DPO as they were both part of a milieu of ideas and experiments that were interrupted by the advent and proliferation of neoliberalism and a breeding ground for theorists, activists, and policymakers who subsequently played important roles in the conceptual development of DPO.

4.4 Summary and Reflections

In response to the rise of industrial capitalism and the profound social and economic transformations it wrought, economic democracy experimentation and theorizing steadily grew during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Intricately linked and entwined with early socialist movements and ideas, for a time this movement threatened to subsume the established political economic order of autocrats and monarchs, captains of industry and corporations, and clerics and preachers. To paraphrase Marx and Engels' famous introduction to the *Communist Manifesto*, during this time the specter of revolutionary political economic change was a real and omnipresent threat throughout the capitalist heartlands of Europe and North America. However, this wave ultimately broke apart on the rocks of intense establishment opposition, internal division, and co-optation and reformism, and by the 1930s had started to recede.

As discussed in this chapter, this early period established the ideological foundations and character of both economic democracy and DPO, had direct and indirect generative and causal effects on later experimentation and theorizing, and introduced important questions and contradictions that remain pertinent to the concept of DPO. Regarding the first, going back to the ideas and actions of many of the early theorists discussed in this chapter, economic democracy – and by extension DPO – can be identified and understood as a project of the political left and in opposition to the inherently exploitive, alienating, and disempowering nature of capitalism. Moreover, several early precursor models and experiments of DPO were

[41] "It was G.D.H. Cole as much as any man who finally pointed me in the direction of the Labour Party," Wilson recalled (Harrison, 1994, p. 397).

developed or proposed during this time – including the Plumb Plan in the US, the CGT Railroad plan, and revolutionary factory committees in Russian public services – and these remain directly relevant to modern theorizing and practice.

Second, as left parties, movements, and theories developed and diverged from each other during this time period they began to establish the political economic terrain that subsequent generations of economic democracy theorists and practitioners interacted with – especially the ascendency of centralized, hierarchical, and bureaucratic forms of state ownership in both Western Europe and the Soviet Union, the retreat of syndicalism and workers' control models, and the marginalization and reformism of the cooperative movement. Relatedly, the theories, experiments, contradictions, and conflicts during this period introduced many critical questions that subsequent generations of economic democracy theorists and practitioners have continued to grapple with, and which remain relevant to refining the concept of DPO. Paramount among these is the relationship of economic democracy to the state – and the related question of how democracy at the level of the enterprise interacts or relates to political democracy (in a state or otherwise). While many on the left during this early period agreed that the state was an institution that ultimately had to be transcended, they disagreed vehemently on how best to achieve this goal with anarchists (and many syndicalists) arguing for the violent destruction of the state as part of any revolutionary project and socialists and communists suggesting that the revolutionary capture of state institutions would establish and entrench proletarian rule, leading ultimately to the state withering away.

Counterposed to both were social democrats who believed that the state could be used to either peacefully transition to a form of parliamentary socialism and/or ameliorate the worst excesses of capitalism through ownership shifts, regulation, and strong welfare policies; as well as cooperative advocates who increasingly focused on setting up market-based cooperative institutions that interacted with the state in a mostly transactional manner (i.e. they often encouraged supportive public policies, but remained as independent as possible from state economic management). In this growing split between revolutionary socialists and anarchists on the one hand, and reformist social democrats and cooperativists, on the other, was the germ of another critically important question that has subsequently vexed generations of economic democracy theorists and practitioners. Namely, should participation and democracy within economic institutions simply seek to provide greater voice and agency to

workers and others within existing systemic arrangements (e.g. capitalism), or become the basis for a thorough restructuring of the political economic system? And, if it is the latter, which theory of change is the most preferable?

Another important set of questions revolve around the composition of those represented in, and by, democratized economic institutions. Specifically, many early economic democracy experiments and theories – especially those influenced by syndicalism – were centered on industrial workers as the primary agents, actors, and beneficiaries. Moreover, alternative approaches that sought to widen this base to involve all people in society, such as the ideas put forward by Owen, were sometimes derided as "utopian." However, the failures of a worker-centric approach to systemic transformation during this period suggested to some that restricting ownership, participation, and democracy within enterprises and services to just the workers within those enterprises (or a specific group of workers within those enterprises) could be self-limiting, divisive and, ultimately, anti-democratic. Such concerns were a driving force behind the development of Guild Socialism – which sought to balance the needs of workers, consumers, and the public interest – and remain relevant to many modern DPO designs.

Lastly, the experience of factory councils in Italy, Germany, and Russia in particular raise the question of how worker interests or control should be exercised within economic institutions. In all three cases, established trade unions played a prominent role in blunting more direct forms of workers' control and participation and dismantling autonomous worker institutions. Similarly, as the cooperative movement evolved, it began to advocate for more direct worker and consumer control via individual ownership shares rather than through the involvement of trade unions, and some modern cooperatives (such as those involved with the Mondragon Corporation) have been antagonistic towards trade unions (Kasmir, 1996). All these questions, and others, were reinforced by further economic democracy experimentation and theorizing as the 20th century progressed, and as will be discussed in chapter seven, remain highly relevant to refining and clarifying the concept of DPO.

Chapter 5 - Experimentation and Opportunity during the Mid-20th Century

Following from both the signposts developed in the literature review and the ideological and experimental foundations analyzed in chapter four, this chapter focuses primarily on the post-World War II period when there were several large-scale attempts to build institutions and entire political economic systems based on economic democracy and early forms of DPO. This includes the Yugoslav experience with self-management, which is often referenced in DPO literature but usually not interrogated with any depth, as well as the less well-known Algerian experiment with autogestion. This latter example was analyzed both because it serves as one of the ideological and theoretical bridges between earlier experiments and theories around economic democracy and the renewed attention to the topic in many parts of the world during the 1960s and 70s, and because of its origination in, and connection to, anti-colonial theory and practice.

The chapter then follows this resurgence of interest through the turbulent decades of the mid-20th century, focusing on developments in the US, the UK, and Eastern Europe given the prominence usually given to these three regions during this time period in the DPO literature. In particular, this section focuses on efforts to advance workers' control (often in conjunction with public ownership) in Britain and how the ideas and institutions developed during this period generatively influenced the development of DPO. Similarly, it also investigates how the community-based ideological and practical orientation of parts of the US left during this period contributed to the DPO concept, both theoretically and through specific individuals and organizations. Lastly, it reviews the wider Eastern European effort to implement components of economic democracy within communist political economic contexts given the particular relevance of such efforts to the stated DPO goal of creating democratic forms of public ownership within a post-capitalist framework.

This chapter does not, and cannot, cover the full sweep of economic democracy experimentation around the world during the post-World War II period. In particular, as discussed further in the conclusion, it does not address theories and experiments in Asia, where several countries in the post-war period deployed publicly owned enterprises within either state capitalist or communist political economic contexts (Cumbers, 2012). While this choice reflects a general silence (with some exceptions) in the modern DPO literature related to these historical examples, it is – as will be discussed further in chapter seven – a prominent

gap that needs to be addressed with future research. It also, by and large, does not cover theories and experiments around economic democracy in the post-colonial African context (with the exception of Algeria).[42]And again, this is an area where future DPO researchers can, and should, focus their scholarship.

5.1 The Rise of Social Democracy and State Ownership

By the mid-1930s, the "first wave" of economic democracy theorizing and experimentation in the Global North had largely started to recede – and along with it the early generation of DPO experiments and models.[43] In the Soviet Union, centralized state ownership had been combined with an authoritarian political system to produce a model that provided workers, residents, and communities few opportunities to genuinely control their own destiny or meaningfully participate in economic decision-making (Shearer, 1996). Moreover, due to a combination of factors – including material and developmental successes, fear of the rising tide of fascism, and the active role the Comintern played in spreading and maintaining Soviet orthodoxy overseas – this Soviet model became highly influential in many socialist parties and movements around the world (Bergin, 2015).

For their part, during the 1930s many western capitalist countries were mired in a deep economic crisis that was causing seismic economic and political realignments (Caughey, Dougal, and Schickler, 2020). In several areas, governments responded to this crisis with increased state-led economic stabilization and development policies. In the US, for instance, President Franklin D. Roosevelt responded to the Great Depression with an unprecedented program of government-led economic centralization, intervention, and development known as

[42] Additionally, in chapter eight a brief reference is made to the Ujamaa model advanced by Julius Nyerere in Tanzania during the 1960s and 70s.

[43] One notable exception is Spain, where syndicalism and concepts of workers' control remained popular with trade unions and socialist and anarchist organizations in the build up to, and during, the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 (Payne, 1987). Another important exception is the Depression-era theorizing of W.E.B. Du Bois in the US. At this point in his life, Du Bois believed that racism and segregation in the US both required, and provided an opportunity for, Black Americans to organize and develop their own economic institutions (Nembhard, 2015; Haynes, Jr., 2018). Specifically, Du Bois supported the creation of cooperatives and specifically recognized the influence of both early Black cooperatives in the US and the work of theorists such as Owen and Charles Fourier (Du Bois, 1933) As such, Du Bois represents an important historical link between the early cooperative movement and later community-based efforts, especially in Black communities in the US, during the 1960s and 70s. In 1940, DuBois introduced the "Co-operative Commonwealth" model in his autobiography *Dusk of Dawn*. In addition to production and consumer cooperatives, Du Bois urged that Black communities should collectively run professional services such as education, banking, insurance, and law (Du Bois, 2007).

the New Deal. Featuring enhanced trade union rights, large public employment and works programs, new public and cooperative enterprises, the creation of a social safety net, and increased regulation on corporations (especially banks), the New Deal was a quintessential social democratic program in that it sought to ameliorate the worst excesses of capitalism via top-down reforms enacted by and through the democratic state (Katznelson, 2013).[44] In Britain, a national unity government formed in 1931 made several attempted interventions to stabilize and reinvigorate the economy. This included price fixing schemes, loans to industry, and the centralization of electricity services. However, it wasn't until after World War II that the full British welfare state model started to be developed.

As it relates to DPO, the effect of the depression, World War II, and the anti-communism of the immediate post-war period in many western countries was to further weaken approaches and efforts seeking to create post-capitalist systems based around economic democracy, while at the same time strengthening the appetite for both social democracy and conventional, top-down forms of public ownership that would co-exist with capitalist institutions.[45] In 1945, for instance, the UK Labour Party manifesto explicitly called for a wide-ranging program of public ownership, albeit with the understanding and acceptance that private ownership would continue in smaller enterprises and many industries and sectors that were "not ready" to be brought into public ownership (Labour Party, 1945). It also made no mention of operating these new public enterprises more democratically, stating only that they would be run in the interests of consumers "coupled with proper status and conditions for the workers employed in them" (Labour Party, 1945). This can be directly compared with the party's 1918 manifesto, which contained a specific section on "industrial democracy" and called for the immediate nationalization of vital public services *with democratic control* (Labour Party, 1918).[46]

---

[44] Although most New Deal programs and institutions had some degree of administrative decentralization (often out of necessity given the sheer geographic size of the US) and rhetorical concern for community participation and agency, they largely fell far short of what could meaningfully be described as economic democracy. For instance, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) – a large publicly owned energy company established during the New Deal – has often been criticized for failing to live up to its own promises of "grassroots democracy" (Selznick, 1953; Derthick, 1974).

[45] For examples on anti-communism in the post-war period in various countries, see: Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin, 2003; Hanley and Chang, 2008; Brogi, 2011; Luff, 2018; and Gerth, 2023.

[46] In 1918, the Labour Party also enshrined its support for public ownership through the addition of the famous "Clause IV" to its constitution. Reflecting the diversity of opinion in the labour movement, the clause was ambiguous on the issue of governance and control, stating vaguely that the Labour Party

This change in Labour's orientation towards public ownership and economic democracy was reflected in how many of the new public enterprises were set up after the party's stunning electoral victory in 1945. As Cumbers and many others point out, once in government the Labour Party largely opted for what has come to be called the "Morrisonian Model" – large-scale, centralized public corporations with relative managerial autonomy (Millward, 1995; Cumbers, 2012). While trade unions often had representation on the new public enterprise boards, there was little in the way of direct worker or consumer voice or participation in firm level or wider economic decision making (Cliff and Gluckstein, 2019). "The government was deeply suspicious of anything remotely 'syndicalist' that might provide more grassroots or shop-floor representation and influence on the councils of the nationalized industries," Cumbers writes (2012, p. 15).

Public ownership took this form in post-war Britain for several reasons. First, it built on earlier models. This includes 19th and early 20th century municipal level public ownership, where a service or enterprise was run directly by a local government department, as well as several larger-scale ad-hoc boards and authorities that were established in the pre-World War II years (including the British Broadcasting Corporation, the Metropolitan Water Board, the Central Electricity Board, and the Port of London Authority). Second, it was the result of the ideological triumph of one faction of the party over others. "The 1918 Labour manifesto had promised democratic control of the nationalised industries, but this idea did not appeal to all sides within the Party," Singleton writes (1995, pp. 16-17). Specifically, the faction led by Herbert Morrison believed that workers were generally uninterested with participating in economic decision making and advocated for the "arms-length" public corporation model. On the other side, the faction led by Ernest Bevin of the Transport and General Workers Union supported nationalisation with worker participation. "Morrison's public corporation model won the day," Singleton recalls, "although the issue of worker control and participation returned to the surface from time to time" (1995, p. 17).

The UK was not alone. Most European countries coming out of the war in both the east and the west adopted some version of a top-down, statist approach to public ownership. In France, the war had discredited many of the country's capitalist elite (who had either colluded with the Nazi occupation and/or supported the puppet Vichy regime) and

---

sought "the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service" (Singleton, 1995, p. 14).

emboldened socialists and communists, who had played a leading role in the resistance. Reflecting both the strength of the Communist Party and the labor movement, along with the latter's traditional syndicalist orientation, the post-war nationalization program in France initially was more oriented towards economic democracy than in Britain. In particular, workers and consumers were to be represented on enterprise boards. However, by the late 1940s this had begun to change. First and foremost, initially some of the trade unions ignored or actively subverted the concept of multi-stakeholder governance by having their members elected as "consumer representatives" (Sturmthal, 1953). Secondly, the power and influence of the Communist Party waned following their US-backed expulsion and exclusion from government in 1947 and they were eclipsed by more reformist social democratic parties. This was accompanied by an effort to "depoliticize" enterprise boards, which ended up strengthening the role of the state (Sturmthal, 1953). Ultimately, as Cumbers puts it, the "democratic character of the French nationalization programme turned out to be rather superficial" (Cumbers 2012, p. 24; Cumbers, 2019).

In West Germany, a post-war political consensus in favor of socializing the economy quickly fell apart due to a combination of opposition from the Allied occupying authorities, the onset of Cold War hostilities, and divisions within trade unions and left parties. More radical proposals centered around public ownership and economic democracy failed (Cumbers, 2012) and, as mentioned in chapter four, in 1959 the SPD fully embraced the social democratic approach to ameliorating rather than replacing capitalism. At the same time, it also accepted private ownership of the means of production and relegated public ownership (and particularly nationalization) to just one of many options, and the least desirable one at that (SPD, 1959). However, the SPD also reconfirmed its support of worker participation and the basic labor framework of legalized works councils that was set up in the aftermath of World War I.[47] In the mid-part of the 20th century, this approach to industrial relations came to be known around the world as codetermination and was promoted and critiqued from the perspective of economic democracy. While exact details and arrangements looked different in

[47] Importantly, the SPD's Godesberg program also proposed a somewhat vague early model of DPO, specifically with regards to multi-stakeholder boards and decentralization. "Every concentration of economic power, even in the hands of the state, harbours dangers," the program stated. "This is why the principles of self-government and decentralisation must be applied to the public sector. The interests of wage and salary earners as well as the public interest and the interests of the consumer must be represented on the management boards of public enterprises. Not centralised bureaucracy but responsible co-operation between all concerned serves the interests of the community best" (1959).

every country, the general systemic arrangement adopted throughout much of the Western world during the post-World War II period can be described as a form of regulated capitalism, also known as social democracy (Malleson, 2014), consisting of private enterprise operating alongside some public enterprises and, to a lesser extent, member-based cooperatives.

In the communist sphere – consisting primarily of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China (after 1949) – publicly owned enterprises predominated as part of an overall system based primarily on planning rather than market exchange (although in many communist countries, cooperatives and/or small private businesses existed at various points) (Harnecker, 2013; Hedlund, 2021). Again, while there were significant differences from country to country (and sometimes sector to sector) public enterprises in both communist and capitalist countries were usually governed through state institutions or agencies and were relatively top-down, bureaucratic, and lacking genuine worker or community participation or control (when compared to earlier theoretical models and prototypes). Because of this, DPO publications often refer to these organizations as traditional SOEs to differentiate them from democratic publicly owned enterprises in both theory and practice.

5.2 The Collapse of Colonialism and Experimentation with Economic Democracy in Developing Systems

Due in part to the legacies of colonialism, the onset of the Cold War, and the general influence of the US, the Soviet Union, and their respective European allies on international political economic development during the post-war period, variants of the traditional SOE model spread throughout the world during the 20th century (Toninelli, 2000; Bałtowski and Kwiatkowski, 2022). For instance, India – which had been deliberately underdeveloped during British colonial rule – embarked upon a rapid post-independence industrialization program that featured widespread nationalizations and the creation of numerous new SOEs (Sarkar, 2019). And many other countries in South America, Asia, and Africa followed a similar path, often with great deals of success with regards to enabling economic development and independence, but with little concern for democratization (Toninelli, 2000; Cumbers, 2012).

While left parties and governments were involved in many of these nationalization programs, it is important to note again that the top-down, statist model of enterprise deployed in this era was, in general, very different from the vision of economic democracy that many

leftist theorists and parties had advanced prior to World War II. However, as the SOE model spread around the world, some leftist parties and governments, mostly on the political economic periphery, did begin to experiment with alternatives rooted in cooperativism, syndicalism, and early interpretations of Marxism. These initial efforts in places like Algeria and Yugoslavia were then "discovered" and reimported to Western Europe and the US during the 1960s and 70s as part of the effort to find a more democratic alternative to both western capitalism and Soviet communism during a period of increasing economic, political, and social turmoil.

5.2.1 A Third Way: Worker Self-management in Yugoslavia

For decades, Yugoslavia was regularly highlighted as a potential "third way" between capitalism and state socialism due both to its overt break with Soviet-style central planning and its heavy emphasis on worker self-management (Rusinow, 1978; Seibel and Damachi, 1982; Barrat Brown, 1996; Zaccharia, 2018). It is still often referenced in modern economic democracy literature, but its impact on, and applicability to, DPO is understudied. In particular, many modern DPO theorists and practitioners mention or reference Yugoslavia, often in the context of more participatory and democratic internal labor-management relations. However, few have directly addressed the specificities and complexities of the Yugoslav social ownership model or engaged with what the larger Yugoslav experience suggests with regards to the prospects and structure of a wider political economic system based around DPO.

The scale and longevity (around 40 years) of the Yugoslav effort is what sets it apart from most economic democracy efforts, both past and present (Lynn, Mulej, and Jurse, 2002). Even some of the largest modern-day models, such as the Mondragon cooperative network in the Basque region of Spain, pale in comparison to the size of the Yugoslav experiment. A key reason that the Yugoslav model reached the scale that it did was because it was explicitly linked to state and elite power, rather than outside or in opposition to it (Musić, 2011). This linkage allowed the self-management experiment to thrive, but also led to significant confusion – then and now – around who, ultimately, exercised control and authority over enterprises and economic decision-making in the Yugoslav system.

Post-World War II Yugoslavia – which was a federation of several constituent republics – was governed by the Communist Party under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, the

successful partisan commander who had helped defeat Nazi Germany and their local allies. During the post-war period, relations between Tito and Stalin deteriorated and this led directly to the development of a nationwide system of worker self-management (Lane, 2004). In particular, the break forced Yugoslav communists to quickly develop an economic program that would be distinguishable from Stalinism and was applicable to the unique Yugoslav context (Jakopovich, 2012). Drawing heavily from early versions of Marxism (prior to Stalinism), especially its approach to the state, "the Yugoslav Communists came to the conclusion that state ownership of the means of production was simply the lowest form of social ownership, which, if not transcended soon after the revolution, would lead inevitably to centralized control by the state bureaucracy of the produced surplus value and thus to the establishment of state capitalism," Musić writes (2011). To mitigate against this, and begin the state "withering away" process, they suggested a macro (statewide) program of decentralization combined with micro (enterprise) level democratization (Musić, 2011).

The first workers' council was established in Solin (Croatia) in 1949 and this was followed in 1950 by formal legislation that "socialized" many of the previously nationalized industries – with the exception of "primary infrastructure" that remained under direct state control (Jakopovich, 2012, p. 63). Under socialization, firms were technically owned by society as a whole (a direct form of public ownership), with management and governance effectively placed in the hands of workers' councils. These councils were given various powers, including related to choosing managers, personnel recruitment, pay and compensation, and, most crucially, how to allocate the surplus between investment and pay (Estrin 1991; Musić, 2011). At the larger, macro-economic level, Yugoslavia swung in the direction of market socialism. Reforms included the introduction of a market for finished goods, consumer demand, decentralization of investment capital, price liberalization, and the enhancement of decision-making authority for worker self-managed firms (Musić, 2011).

The Yugoslav system of worker self-management during this initial period (roughly 1950 to 1974) has been both praised and critiqued extensively. With regards to the former, the system has been credited with contributing to high rates of economic growth and worker rights as the country transformed from a poor, rural, and semi-colonized region to a developing, industrialized, and fiercely independent country. In particular, there were large order increases in living standards, healthcare, education, housing, workers' rights, and social welfare (Jakopovich, 2012). These results suggest that social ownership and workplace

democracy can be effective models of economic organization and perceived economic success, combined with Yugoslavia becoming a leader of the non-aligned movement and opening itself up to Western trade, cultural exchange, and aid, led to significant interest in the Yugoslav model, both then and now (Robertson, 2017).

On the other hand, the system was plagued by numerous contradictions, inconsistencies, and deficiencies, several of which are particularly relevant to refining the concept of DPO. Traditionally, one of the main critiques of the Yugoslav system of worker self-management was that it operated within a wider political economic system that was, at best, not truly democratic; and at worst, was authoritarian. Accompanying the move towards worker self-management, Yugoslavia officially separated the state from the Communist Party with the intention that the former would "wither away" (Robertson, 2017). However, this political decentralization had at least two unintended consequences. First and foremost, it left the Communist Party (later renamed the League of Communists) as the sole institution responsible for national (and international) coordination and decision-making. Second, over time this form of decentralization became nationalistic and bureaucratic in nature, entrenching (rather than displacing) the power of political elites, especially at the local and regional level (Jakopovich, 2012). Moreover, as Robert Dahl pointed out in the 1980s, the concept of social ownership did not negate the rights and responsibilities of ownership. It simply relocated them to different institutions within Yugoslav society, of which the Communist Party was predominant (Dahl, 1985).

Thus, despite decentralization and self-management, the Communist Party played a prominent role in the direction and management of enterprises and the economy – especially at higher levels of decision making. Moreover, both decentralization and self-management were top-down, paternalistic processes unaccompanied by robust cultural, educational, or social reforms. At least partially because of this, many scholars agree that participation and control by workers (as opposed to managers) was limited and relatively weak (Musić, 2011; Jakopovich, 2012).[48]

[48] "Surveys at the time showed the actual practice of self-management lagged far behind the normative standards, with low participation from the shop-floor workers and a high degree of influence by technical staff and the director. The workers did not feel they had the necessary time, competence, or information to make increasingly complex market decisions, so they let management formulate the options and present them to the workers' council," Musić writes (2011, p. 178. See also: Prout 1985). Similarly, Jakopovich suggests that "the underdeveloped character of material, ideological and cultural

Drawing in part from this experience, along with lessons learned from the history and contemporary operations of the cooperative movement, the DPO literature often places an emphasis on training and education around both technical matters (budgeting, accounting, logistics, etc.) and participatory governance/management – especially for worker and community representatives who are elected or appointed to leadership positions (Cumbers and Hanna, 2019; We Own It, 2019; Brennan, 2021; Cibrario, 2021). However, thus far the DPO literature has paid less attention to the question of extending this education and training to the wider society. As will be discussed further in chapter seven, the Yugoslav experience suggests that in order to both genuinely live up to the goals of economic democracy and be socially reproduced across generations, the concept and practice of DPO must be embedded, taught, and portrayed in a variety of social and cultural institutions – including schools and universities, trade unions, and television and film. It also demonstrates that this process will likely require active higher-level coordination and support, especially as it relates to ensuring that DPO is taught in the public education system.

Another issue was the overall macro-economic orientation of the Yugoslav system. As previously mentioned, as part of their rejection of the Soviet system of planning, the architects of the worker self-management system introduced various market mechanisms and approaches to deal with coordination, allocation, and distribution issues. This led to numerous problems at both the firm level and in the wider economy. On the former, it essentially established firms as autonomous units focused primarily on profit and market share – with workers as collective entrepreneurs and "property-owning producer(s) receiving a share of the company's income" (Musić, 2011, p. 177). This weakened both working class solidarity across enterprises and industries and instead increased solidarity between workers and managers within individual enterprises. It also loosened the connection workers had to larger social aims and objectives and contributed to the bureaucratization of the firms and the decline or lack of genuine participation from rank-and-file workers. As Robertson puts it,

---

productive forces strengthened the position of bureaucrats and directors in companies, who *de facto* led companies, instead of workers' councils, which nominally had a controlling function. This state of affairs was reinforced by a situation in which specialists were more closely connected with stable, technocratic managerial layers – often strongly supported by the party and, especially, state bureaucracy – and these specialists were not really controlled by the rotating, often changing workers' councils" (2012, pp. 59-60).

while “workers had a vested interest in their company’s success,” they were also “pitted…against other enterprises in both the federation and foreign markets” (Robertson, 2017).

In terms of the economy as a whole, market mechanisms combined with rapid political decentralization undercut national coordination and planning efforts, leading to rising inequality and geographic imbalances (Musić, 2011; Robertson, 2017). Similarly, decentralization and localization made it difficult, if not impossible, to formulate any national economic consensus or plan. For a while, these conflicting positions were navigated at least partially through a centralized tax and investment system which allowed for some regional rebalancing as well as the personal intermediation (or interference, depending on perspective) of Tito as the ultimate source of authority. However, by the 1960s this was becoming untenable and pro-market reforms were deepened. In turn, this contributed to the republics (regions) beginning to develop relatively independently of one another with their own specializations and trading partners (Unkovski-Korica, 2016). In addition to regional imbalances, by the late 1960s the market system was producing rising economic inequality, insecurity, and unemployment – outcomes that were ostensibly antithetical to a socialist system (Musić, 2011; Robertson, 2017). These dynamics (along with other national and world events) contributed to protests and agitation against the Tito government from various sides (Musić, 2011; Morrison, 2018; Olujić, 2018), and in the 1970 worker self-directed enterprises were broken up into smaller parts (Estrin, 1991). Essentially, each enterprise was turned into a federation of self-managed units called BOALs (Basic Organizations of Associated labor). Ultimately, however, these reforms were unsuccessful. They were not applied to the highest levels of power and decision making and were overshadowed by other reforms that strengthened the power of the various regional governments. Furthermore, the reforms were not embraced by the workers, who saw them as an unnecessary destruction of previously effective methods of production, an expansion of bureaucracy, or a series of empty promises (Musić, 2011).

One of the major problems of the Yugoslav system of worker self-management was that it was never sufficiently institutionalized and integrated into Yugoslav society and politics. For instance, Jakopovic writes that “the Yugoslav ‘self-managing’ experiment was neither sufficiently deeprooted and integral nor sufficiently organically tied to the masses” (2012, p. 62) and Musić writes that “the Yugoslav working class never managed to capture

the institutional opportunities presented by self-management that could have transformed worker-managed enterprises from instruments of the ruling bureaucracy into authentic vehicles for democratic control from below" (2011, p. 189).

Another problem is that the system was never able to resolve or navigate the tensions between markets and planning. In the absence of a process for democratic planning, the system was caught between market forces, which exacerbated enterprise and regional self-interest and drove inequality and precarity; and the undemocratic decision making of a cadre of political and party elite which resulted in clientelism at various scales, contributed to regional imbalances, and weakened the ability to embed democratic practices and support for economic democracy throughout Yugoslav society. Reflecting on this debate between markets and planning, Jakopovich writes that while in Yugoslavia a "third way between central planning and conventionally understood 'market socialism' remained only an abstract possibility, as did the prospect for democratic socialism in general," the country's experience suggests that "decentralised forms of planning could offer many of the advantages that the market system holds over bureaucratic, central planning, but minus the frequent slaps on the face that the economy and society are given by its 'invisible hand'" (Jakopovich, 2012, p. 62).

In general, the existing DPO literature usually recognizes that democratic public enterprises will be embedded within a larger political economic framework, and that the concept cannot simply focus on the internal structure and governance design of firms and must tackle larger macro-economic questions (Cumbers, 2012; Cumbers and Hanna, 2019; Cumbers, 2024). However, the literature has, to date, largely avoided complex questions like balances of power within multistakeholder structures, social embeddedness and reproduction, and how various mixes of markets and planning would interact with democratic publicly owned enterprises. As will be discussed further in chapter seven, the specific successes and problems of the Yugoslav model – and self-management within market-based systems more generally – can help inform and refine the DPO concept as it relates to the structure and approach of larger political economic frameworks and approaches.

5.2.2 Anti-colonialism and Economic Democracy: Autogestion in Algeria

Due in part to its much shorter duration, the Algerian post-independence experiment with "autogestion" is less referenced than Yugoslavia in modern economic democracy and

DPO literature.[49] However, since it was the product of one of the earliest, most publicized, and geographically closest (to Europe) anti-colonial independence struggles, it had considerable causal and generative influence on the revival of interest in economic democracy during the 1960s and 70s (Nellis, 1977; Corpet and Pluet, 1992; Porter, 2011). Moreover, like Yugoslavia, the Algerian experience raises several important theoretical questions that are particularly relevant to the concept of DPO – in this case, around the role of the state (especially in the context of economic independence, recovery, and development), the relationship to politics (especially as it relates to building or rebuilding political institutions and navigating intense political division and stalemate), and the economic, social, and political ramifications of operating within a larger political economic system based on mixed or plural forms of ownership.

In 1962, the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and the French government signed the Évian Accords, ending a long and bloody anti-colonial independence struggle (Byrne, 2009). Following the cessation of hostilities, hundreds of thousands of French and other European colonists (known as colons or pied noir) fled the newly independent Algeria, abandoning large colonial estates, businesses, and other property. In order to keep the economy running, in many cases Algerian workers spontaneously took over and began collectively running these enterprises (Ottaway and Ottaway, 1970).[50]

The FLN, which was an ideologically fractious coalition of various groups and individuals united by the desire to see an independent Algeria, had never conceived of self-management being a cornerstone of their post-independence economic program, instead favoring land redistribution to individuals alongside state-owned farms and the nationalization of large enterprises. However, faced with the prospect of a collapsing economy due to underdevelopment, capital flight, and the loss of most of the country's professional and managerial class, the government of Ahmed Ben Bella quickly warmed to the idea of self-management – so much so that it became something of a founding myth of the Algerian state, Southgate writes (2011). In particular, Ben Bella assembled a group of socialist advisors from

[49] The term "autogestion" can be used interchangeably with worker self-management and is defined by Merriam-Webster as "control and management of an enterprise (such as a factory) by representatives of the workers" (MW, no date).

[50] In urban areas, this process was supported by the Union Générale du Travailleurs (UGTA) trade union which had, in the months immediately prior to independence, articulated a vision of socializing property in the country rather than simply nationalizing it.

Europe and the Arab world and began designing an Algerian model of socialism that borrowed heavily from early Marxism, syndicalism, and the contemporary Yugoslav model (Byrne, 2009).

During the Fall of 1962, the government issued a series of decrees recognizing worker self-management of the abandoned enterprises and formalizing the concept as an integral part of the FLN's attempt to build "Algerian socialism" (Southgate, 2011). The decrees super-charged the movement, and thousands more enterprises throughout the country were put under worker self-management. Early in 1963, a further set of decrees were issued. These officially nationalized abandoned property and aimed at regularizing the self-management sector.[51] Announcing the decrees, Ben Bella articulated the government's basic vision of publicly owned, worker self-managed firms (Southgate, 2011). As such, the Algerian autogestion model represents an important prototype of DPO, and its structure, strengths and limitations, and ultimate fate are important to refining and clarifying the concept.

In particular, the early1963 decrees established a basic model for the self-managed enterprises which consisted of a general assembly comprised of all the enterprise's full-time workers, a workers' council, a management committee, a government appointed director, and a president (appointed by the management committee) (Clegg, 1971; Southgate, 2011). Importantly, the decrees also created a profit-sharing formula of 1/3rd to the workers, 1/3rd to the enterprise, and 1/3rd to the state (Southgate, 2011). This was the result of a growing understanding that while ownership should ultimately be held by the public in some form, workers needed some connection to the economic success of the enterprise in order for the model to work (Clegg, 1971). Lastly, the decrees also created a new national agency (ONRA) to supervise and coordinate the self-managed sector (Clegg, 1971; Southgate, 2011).

While inspiring domestically and internationally, the Algerian model had a number of structural flaws which, combined with political and economic instability in the new state, proved fatal. Internally, the proposed enterprise structure had duplicative and contradictory roles (Hermassi, 1972; Bennoune, 1976). For instance, there was no clear demarcation between the responsibilities of the workers' council and the management committee. Similarly, the roles and responsibilities of the president and the director overlapped. This was

[51] While the nationalization program began with abandoned property, by the end of 1963 all European-owned land had been nationalized (Clegg, 1971).

most problematic since it immediately created conflicting authority within the enterprise (Clegg, 1971). Furthermore, the internal enterprise structure was in large part theoretical. In practice, the self-managed enterprises used an assortment of different approaches and in some enterprises, elections did not happen on schedule (or at all), and/or directors and presidents assumed hierarchical control.

Externally, there were two major, interrelated problems that hindered the autogestion experiment. First and foremost, the self-managed sector was only a small fraction of a larger economy that also included both privately owned enterprises and traditional SOEs. Despite a commitment from the FLN at its 1964 congress that autogestion would gradually be extended, including to the public sector, and supported by economic planning, the reality was that in the first few years, the worker self-managed companies were in direct competition with other parts of the economy for scarce capital and technical experts. Secondly, the relationship between ONRA and the self-managed sector was ill-defined, with the latter accusing the former of over-bureaucratization, neglect, and ineffectiveness (Southgate, 2011). Making matters worse, the worker self-managed sector had no direct representation in ONRA and could not participate in running the agency.

The government recognized that there were deficiencies in the program, and in 1963 and 1964 convened two congresses of workers from the self-managed sector to recommend reforms. The suggestions included: full implementation of the 1963 decrees regarding internal organization, the establishment of a state-owned bank to provide capital, creation of a marketing cooperative, prioritization of self-managed firms for public procurement contracts, prompt government payment of salaries and contracts, and distribution of profits according to the 1/3rd formula. From the benefit of historical analysis, many of these reforms would likely have been impactful in strengthening the autogestion model. In particular, connecting democratic enterprises to a public source of capital (e.g. a public bank) and public procurement contracts have been successful elsewhere historically and are prominent features of modern DPO discourse (Brennan, 2021; Hanna, Bozuwa, and Rao, 2022). And if the government had actually distributed profits to the self-managed enterprises, it may have had the desired effect of strengthening both the effectiveness and culture of self-management, as has happened in the worker ownership movement in the US and elsewhere (Kruse, 2022).

However, these reforms were only partially and half-heartedly enacted in Algeria.[52] Despite being a strong proponent of autogestion, Ben Bella was wary of alternative power centers in the country and the FLN as a whole was riddled with factionalism and disagreement, especially around the role of the self-managed sector. In June 1965, Ben Bella was overthrown in a military coup by his defense secretary Houari Boumédiène, signaling the beginning of the end for autogestion. While remaining rhetorically committed to the concept for a time, Boumédiène and his advisors pursued a state capitalism economic model based on nationalizing strategic industries and foreign owned firms and operating them alongside private enterprises in a market economy (Nellis, 1977). This was combined with denationalizing many self-managed enterprises (often on narrow, neoclassical economic grounds), especially in the retail and tourism sectors, and dismantling ONRA in 1967. As an economic paradigm, worker self-management eventually gave way to a much weaker form of worker "consultation."

Even though the Algerian autogestion experiment was relatively short-lived – only around three years in its most developed form – it remains relevant to the theory and practice of economic democracy generally, and DPO specifically. In particular, the Algerian experience demonstrates that design and intentionality are critical, both when it comes to the internal structure of a democratic publicly owned enterprise and how that enterprise fits into the larger political economic system. This point is often made in the DPO literature, usually in the context of asserting that public ownership is not inherently good or bad, rather it is a contestable ownership form. While it is possible that the internal structure of Algerian self-managed firms would have been reformed and rationalized given more time, their initial structure was overly complex, ill defined, and ineffective, both theoretically and in practice. In particular, while having central state representation was logical both in terms of ensuring alignment with macro-economic planning decisions and mitigating against parochial worker self-interest, the appointment of a state director with strong rights and responsibilities into an otherwise worker-controlled enterprise created an unworkable conflict of interest and dual centers of power.

[52] The marketing cooperative, for instance, was created but put under the control of ONRA. And the public bank did not become operational until 1967 – well after autogestion had largely been dismantled.

Secondly, the Algerian and Yugoslav models both suggest that it is important for workers and other stakeholders to both share in the success of democratic publicly owned enterprises (economically or otherwise) and have a voice in budget and profit allocation decisions. In cases where the enterprise is permitted to generate a surplus, this profit-sharing could be established by statute – as with the 1/3rd Algerian model – or involve a percentage-based fee or tax returned to the community (via the state, a public bank, or some other means, such as a democratically governed community-controlled investment fund) with the remainder at the disposal of the internal stakeholders to allocate. The latter approach is the foundation of some prominent modern economic democracy models, most notably that of David Schweickart, who proposes a public ownership/self-management model with worker-controlled firms leasing their assets from the state (2011). In cases where the enterprise or service is not permitted to generate a surplus, workers and other stakeholders should still retain some democratic control over internal budgeting decisions – especially around pay, benefits, and investment. To date, the DPO literature has only occasionally addressed this issue, most often with regards to the latter circumstance (services that do not generate a surplus).

Externally, the Algerian experience supports the contention often made in the DPO literature that democratic publicly owned enterprises need clear lines of oversight, accountability, and support from larger entities. In particular, the lack of a public bank (or other public funding source) to provide capital to the self-managed enterprises and the over bureaucratization and undemocratic nature of the government entity responsible for overseeing and coordinating the self-managed sector were critical flaws in the Algerian design that were identified at the time, but corrected too late (or not at all). Drawing from this experience, the DPO literature often suggests the need for both public sources of funding and support from democratic oversight bodies. One example of the latter is We Own It!'s model, which calls for oversight and accountability to be split between two institutions – a democratic, multi-stakeholder organization comprised of representatives from public service users, environmental groups, local residents, and others, and a government Office for Public Ownership (We Own It!, 2019).

The Algerian experience is particularly relevant to DPO because the wider Algerian political economic system was, in some ways, similar to that in which DPO is likely to operate within, especially in the short-term. Specifically, the Algerian experiment consisted of

plural forms of ownership (private, traditional SOEs, and self-managed public enterprises) within a market-based system with heavy doses of state intervention and attempted planning. However, as described above, the lack of supportive public institutions, regulations, and rational long-term planning forced the self-managed enterprises to destructively compete with these other ownership forms for scarce resources. While DPO theorists often recognize potential benefits (i.e. effectiveness) of competition within pluralist systems (Cumbers, 2012), the historical experience of most cooperative and self-managed efforts, including Algeria, suggest that new democratic institutions need support and time to incubate before being exposed to competition from older, more established enterprises with traditional ownership structures (private or state). Lastly, the Algerian experience also suggests that effective macro-economic planning is likely needed to ensure that competition is restricted to areas where it is beneficial and necessary, rather than destructive and unnecessary. Related to this, it demonstrates that in pluralist systems, a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of effectiveness must be introduced to replace purely economistic approaches that often consciously and unconsciously privilege traditional private and public forms of ownership (Hanna, 2018b; Cumbers and Hanna, 2019).

5.3 The Emerging Crisis and the Path Not Taken

Beginning in the late 1960s, the social and economic contract that had defined many western political economic systems since World War II started to break down. Socially, the Vietnam War unmasked continued Western imperialism and colonialism internationally; and the US Civil Rights Movement, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, and various other anti-colonial movements in the Global South inspired many people to look, often for the first time, at racial, gender, and other inequities both abroad and at home. Economically, there were early warning signs that the great post-World War II capitalist expansion (known in French as the Trente Glorieuses) was coming to an end, with growth rates in some countries slowing and economic instability starting to rise (Wallerstein and Zukin, 1989). Politically, there was also growing frustration, especially amongst younger people, about the democratic deficit – namely the gap between democratic rhetoric (especially used to justify foreign wars and interventions) and the undemocratic nature of domestic institutions (SDS, 1980; Williams, 2018).

These currents came together in the tumultuous year of 1968, when protests, uprisings, and violent confrontations broke out around the world (Singer, 2002). However, rather than the culmination of years of rising tension, as it is often portrayed, 1968 was the beginning of a long crisis that fundamentally reshaped – and is still reshaping – the economic, social, and political order of most countries around the world. While ultimately capitalism would emerge triumphant and emboldened, the twenty-year period from roughly 1965 to 1985 can be seen historically as a period of ideological and tactical contestation in which an alternative path based on economic democracy was revealed, but ultimately not taken. Around the world, many within both the labor and student movements began resurrecting, re-imagining, and implementing proposals for workers' control and self-management, often based on experiments in Algeria and other post-colonial countries. In Sweden, the Meidner Plan proposed to incrementally socialize ownership of the means of production and put it in the hands of workers. [53] And in Eastern Europe, several communist countries experimented with various macro and micro economic reforms designed to increase worker participation. As it relates to the generative development of the concept and practice of DPO, three cases, all of which feature prominently in the DPO literature, are particularly instructive: the workers' control movement in Britain, the community self-determination orientation of parts of the US left, and workplace democratization efforts in Eastern Europe.

5.3.1 The Movement for Workers' Control in Britain

In 1964, the Labour Party returned to power in the UK for the first time in more than a decade. In order to fulfil some of its electoral commitments, the government of Harold Wilson – who, as discussed in chapter four, was influenced by Cole – began investigating ways to enhance the power and involvement of workers (via trade unions) in the economic system. This included the possibility of German-style codetermination approaches as well as opening the books of companies to trade union oversight. At the same time, major economic shifts were beginning, starting with a wave of corporate mergers and factory closings (Barratt Brown, 2016).

A few years later, the Institute for Workers' Control (IWC) was formed in Nottingham by Michael Barratt Brown, Ken Coates, and Tony Topham, among others. The IWC began

[53] The Meidner Plan was an ambitious effort in the mid-1970s to gradually socialize the economy through the creation of democratically owned and governed wage earner funds that would receive profit-related voting shares of companies each year (Guinan, 2019).

publishing pamphlets and articles on a variety of topics, including the Turin Factory Councils and worker self-management in Yugoslavia, and started to work with and educate some of the more radical elements of the trade union movement around the basic goal of establishing democratic control over both individual workplaces and the economy as a whole. As a wave of strikes, work-ins, and sit-ins swept Britain in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the IWC played an instrumental role in injecting ideas around worker participation and control into the movement and public debate. This led to several important developments including the Lucas Plan, which originated from grassroots workers in Lucas Aerospace during the 1970s, and a commitment by Wilson during the 1974 General Election to increase economic democracy and workers voice in a new round of nationalisations (Wilson, 1974).

In terms of the first, among other innovations (including converting defence production to areas of social need), the Lucas Plan laid out principles about how work could be re-organised along more cooperative and less hierarchical lines and detailed plans for training and skills enhancement of the workforce. The result was a plan described by the *Financial Times* in 1976 as "one of the most radical alternative plans ever drawn up by workers for their company" (Smith, 2014, p. 1). With regards to the latter, the party's manifesto stated that Labour would "socialise existing nationalised industries" and "make the management of existing nationalised industries more responsible to the workers in the industry and more responsive to their consumer's needs" (Wilson, 1974). Wilson subsequently formed a Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy, to which the IWC and others submitted recommendations. The Bullock Commission, as it was known, eventually proposed a company governance structure similar to that of the German codetermination system with three groups represented: workers, shareholders, and technical experts. However, there was no consensus in favour of this approach, with both industry and many unions opposed, and the effort collapsed (Williamson, 2016). In Coates' recollection, this was part of a general backsliding on the Labour Party's commitments to economic democracy (Coates, 1981).

From the perspective of DPO, there are three important aspects of the IWC approach to consider. First, the IWC viewed forms of worker power, participation, and ownership (such as collective bargaining, codetermination, sit-ins, occupations, and cooperatives) not necessarily as antagonistic to the ultimate goal of workers' control but rather as "stages in the inexorable rise of labor" (Tuckman, 2011). More specifically, these approaches encroached

upon the power and decision-making rights of capitalist managers (Goodrich, 1975; Guinan, 2015). In particular, the IWC supported the creation of worker (producer) cooperatives, especially in workplaces that were slated for closure and or were being occupied by workers. In the early 1970s, Tony Benn, who was a supporter and close ally of the IWC and Secretary of State for Industry, was able to direct government financial assistance to form worker cooperatives in three enterprises (Coates, 1981; Tuckman, 2011). Thus, the IWC approach was inclusive of multiple forms of worker participation as long as it displaced traditional capitalist management structures and empowered workers and trade unions to think more creatively about their role in the operations of enterprises and services. This is similar to, and a precursor of, the pluralist approach that is common in much of the DPO literature.

Second, the IWC ultimately believed that workers' control required public or common ownership. "Coates and Topham," Kerans, Drover, and Williams write, "develop[ed] the thesis that nationalization of industry is an essential component of workers' control and provides a link between the workplace and larger economic planning processes" (1988, p. 49). This firmly establishes the IWC approach as one of the direct precursors to DPO in that they established public ownership as vital to workers' control and workplace democracy, especially as it relates to balancing decentralization with higher-level coordination and planning. Moreover, as various writers associated with the IWC maintained, public or common ownership needed to be different from traditional, bureaucratic forms of state ownership (Rooney, 1968) – which, again, is a common animating theme in DPO literature. For instance, in 1981 Coates wrote that "there is no a priori reason why crudely centralised state ownership must predominate in a common ownership economy" (1981, p. 159).

Lastly, the IWC approach differentiated between "workers' control" and both "worker participation" and "worker self-management." As Guinan puts it, workers' control "should thus be distinguished from *co-determination* and related corporatist arrangements whereby workers' representatives are co-opted into responsibility for the continuing operation of capitalist enterprises, as well as from *workers' self-management*, a term more often used to describe the future goal of democratic administration of enterprises under socialism (Coates, 1971; Coates and Topham, 1973; Guinan, 2015). This differentiation in terminology is not merely semantic and is important to the conceptual development of DPO. Specifically, DPO publications often suggest that one of the strengths of the approach is that it can be immediately applicable in current political economic systems (i.e. capitalism), a transitional

vehicle towards a post-capitalist political economic system, *and* a critical organizational form within post-capitalist systems. The IWC formulation reinforces this basic orientation but suggests that the exact internal and external governance and management arrangements of democratic publicly owned enterprises must shift over time depending on positionality within this continuum of change.

With the Labour Party's election defeat to Margaret Thatcher's conservatives in 1979, the opportunity to pursue economic democracy at the national level ended in Britain. However, for a time energy and possibility remained at the local level. In particular, the Greater London Council (GLC) implemented a radical economic effort – known as the London Industrial Strategy (LIS) – that included democratizing enterprises, empowering workers in conjunction with labor unions, democratic planning in partnership with communities, and attempting to displace private corporations through incubating alternative models of ownership (GLC, 1985; Jacobs, 1986; London, 2022).

As it relates to the concept of DPO, the GLC is an important historical case for both theoretical and generative reasons. Regarding the former, the GLC's failure demonstrates the importance of ownership as well as the limitations of decentralized approaches that are not embedded or networked into larger political economic systems. In particular, the GLC's lack or resources and open conflict with the Conservative national government limited its ability to significantly impact the large London economy – and Thatcher was able to kill off the experiment, and the GLC entirely, after only a few years.[54] Additionally, the strategy of trying to use public capital to incentivize or mandate shifts in internal business governance and management left a lot to be desired. "If there was one great lesson from the experience of the Greater London Enterprise Board," one of the LIS architects Robin Murray later wrote, "it was that trying to encourage the social aims of public ownership without equity control was like operating through a gauze (1987, pp. 102-103). For this reason, Murray remained convinced that ultimately nationalization and social ownership remained critical. However, like modern DPO theorists, he explicitly rejected the traditional, Morrisonian model of public ownership in favor of an approach that would "unite the interests of users and workers against the capitalist pressures that bear down on a public enterprise" (Murray, 1987, p. 103).

[54] The 1985, the Thatcher government passed the Local Government Act, which abolished the GLC and other metropolitan county councils.

Regarding the latter, the GLC experience directly influenced several important modern DPO theorists and policymakers. Most notably, McDonnell and Wainwright. McDonnell was elected to the GLC in 1981 and soon became the Chair of Finance and Deputy leader to Mayor Livingstone (Kogan, 2019). In 2015, McDonnell became Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer for the Labor Party under the leadership of Corbyn. As discussed in chapter two, in this role he was partly responsible for helping to reinvigorate ideas around economic democracy and alternative models of ownership within the Labour Party (and the wider British left); and, in particular, he helped to advance and popularize the concept of DPO. In 1982, Wainwright became Deputy Chief Economic Advisor to the GLC and head of its Popular Planning Unit (Palmer, 1986). Following Thatcher's dismantling of the GLC, Wainwright went on to publish numerous books and articles around issues related to DPO. As co-editor of Red Pepper, a fellow at the Transnational Institute, and a supporter of the Corbyn and McDonnell project, Wainwright has played a prominent linking role between the GLC experience and the modern DPO movement.

5.3.2 Community Self-Determination: The United States in the 1960s and 70s

In the US, the revival of interest in forms of economic democracy during the 1960s was driven primarily by the student movement and elements of the Civil Rights Movement (CRM), both of which radicalized leftwards as the 60s progressed and who acted in concert with certain allies and sympathizers within academia, government, and the labor movement. For its part, the CRM of the early 1960s was initially concerned mostly with social and political equality, rather than economic justice or economic democracy, making an intentional effort to distinguish itself from previous generations of civil rights activists in the US who had been animated by Black nationalist, Marxist, and other perspectives on liberation (Ward and Badger, 1996; Schiller, 2018). However, starting with the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom – which was co-planned by A. Phillip Randolph, a longtime socialist trade union leader and supported by several unions, including the United Auto Workers (UAW) – this began to change.

By 1967, Martin Luther King Jr., and much of the CRM were not only firmly concerned with economic justice, but also were developing a nuanced critique of the interconnectedness of racism, capitalism, and US imperialism. For instance, in 1967 King famously stated that "the problem of racism, the problem of economic exploitation, and the

problem of war are all tied together. These are the triple evils that are interrelated" (King, Jr., 1967). At the time of his assassination in 1968, King was actively supporting striking sanitation workers in Memphis, planning a multi-racial "Poor People's Campaign that would focus on economic issues, and in dialogue with academics and policymakers around a new approach to poverty alleviation centered on community ownership and control (discussed further below).

The student movement followed a similar, leftward trajectory through the 1960s, although from somewhat of a different baseline. The most prominent organization in the movement, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), was directly descended from an old left socialist organization called the Student League for Industrial Democracy (and its parent group, the League for Industrial Democracy).[55] In part reflecting these roots, from the outset SDS articulated a broad, yet intentionally vague vision of economic democracy. For instance, in the Port Huron Statement – the organization's foundational document – SDS called for "increased worker participation in management decision-making" alongside "balances of partial and/or complete public ownership" (1990, p. 60).

SDS initially articulated a macro economic framework based on democratic or publicly controlled national economic planning, which would be enabled by groupings of mini-publics at various scales (including in business enterprises through worker participation), along with public job creation (Frost, 2001). This approach was influenced by World War I era socialist theorizing and sought to establish a democratic and participatory alternative to the top-down, managerial form of New Deal planning that emerged in the 1930s and 40s. While radical in both its ideological roots and ultimate decentralist implications, this social democratic, mixed economy approach was not a large departure from the macro-economic mainstream of the time. Reflecting this, it was supported by more moderate elements within both the CRM and trade unions, providing SDS with both allies and resources to advance its work.

However, in order to implement this economic approach in accordance with the organization's commitment to participatory democracy, SDS's Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP) developed a "community organization" approach, with 13 efforts in

[55] Which itself was the successor to the Intercollegiate Socialist Society (ISS), founded in 1905 by Upton Sinclair, Walter Lippmann, Jack London, and others.

low-income neighborhoods across the country (Frost, 2001). The goal of these projects was to bring local residents together into community-based organizations that would, in turn, form the basis of interracial, working class, mass movement. While these projects largely failed, and SDS shifted away from the ERAP strategy as the decade progressed, they were both theoretically and generatively influential on the US left – establishing the importance of local communities, alongside workers, as a critical stakeholder groups and the principle of community self-determination.

The ERAP approach had a symbiotic relationship with, and influence on, the CRM. The project was endorsed by Kwame Ture (then known as Stokely Carmichael), who was a prominent leader of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and, according to Carson, SDS "encouraged the shift in the focus of SNCC's activities from civil rights to economic issues" (1995, p. 176). Reflecting this shift, in 1968 elements of the CRM articulated and advanced a community-based plan for economic democracy that drew from a number of sources, including both a legacy of Black cooperative development and theorizing in the US (e.g. the work of Du Bois), SDS's early community development efforts and theories around participatory democracy, and the broader global experience with cooperatives and cooperative theory. Specifically, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) – one of the oldest civil rights groups in the country – joined with policymakers and academics to develop the Community Self-Determination Act (CSDA) (Shanahan, 1968). The CSDA envisioned the development of place-based, community-controlled organizations that would directly own and operate their own businesses (Nelson, 1968) – essentially a local form of DPO.

Two other features were critical to the CSDA model. The first was the creation of "Community Development Banks," which would be an important source of capital for the community owned organizations; and the second was the use of tax credits to incentivize private businesses to locate to disinvested neighborhoods and eventually transfer ownership to the local organization (Desiderio and Sanchez, 1969). From the perspective of governance, the CSDA included a prominent focus on democratic control and participation. "The 'community corporation,'" Gar Alperovitz, one of the academics helping to develop the model, explained in 1968, "recalls the spirit of the New England town meeting – the people closest to a problem are responsible for solving it; local leadership is recognized and in control" (1968, p. 4). This combination of local forms of public ownership plus robust and

genuine democratic governance makes the CSDA another early prototype of DPO, and one of the first which centered the concepts of community and decentralization.[56]

In addition to community-based economic institutions, the CRM also began to turn its attention towards land and housing issues. This led to the creation of yet another DPO prototype, the Community Land Trust (CLT), the first of which was created by a group of Black farmers and activists in Georgia in the late 1960s (Davis, 2010; Davis, 2014). CLTs are local nonprofit organizations that own and control land with the express goal of community stewardship and, usually, the development of permanently affordable housing. These community owned organizations usually operate with a multi-stakeholder governance structure comprised of community residents, local public officials, and other stakeholders (Green and Hanna, 2018). Since the 1960s, CLTs have grown both in scope and scale in the US and there are now more than 200 currently in existence in a wide range of communities (Grounded Solutions, no date).

Like the CSDA's community owned organizations, CLT's are local, decentralized models of public ownership that have both theoretically and generatively influenced the conceptual development of DPO – in particular through the work of Alperovitz. From the late 1960s onwards, Alperovitz created, ran, and was associated with a series of US-based organizations focused on economic democracy, institution building, and systemic alternatives to capitalism (including the Cambridge Institute, the Institute for Policy Studies, the National Center for Economic and Security Alternatives, and TDC). In turn, these organizations helped develop the modern DPO concept and were home to several theorists and researchers interested in DPO (including myself, who worked at TDC from 2010 to 2022 and was a close collaborator with Alperovitz).

From the late 1960s onwards, these organizations, and many others, also forged an important generative link between on the ground experimentation with economic democracy and growing academic interest in the concept of participatory democracy – both in general,

[56] The CSDA had the backing of 33 Senators and President Nixon but was never brought to a vote due to opposition from business groups. However, a less radical version of the community organizations envisioned in the CSDA did ultimately take root in the US. Today there are around 4,500 "Community Development Corporations" (CDCs) in existence, most of which focus on providing affordable housing in disinvested areas (Erekaini, 2014).

and more specifically regarding how it applied to the economic sphere.[57] Participatory democracy was the rallying cry of the New Left in the 1960s, and one of the decade's most popular and enduring slogans (Hanson, 1985; Kloppenberg, 1998). In the Port Huron statement, SDS defined it as "a democracy of individual participation, governed by two central aims: that the individual share in those social decisions determining the quality and direction of his life; that society be organized to encourage independence in men and provide the media for their common participation" (1990, pp. 12-13).

While participatory democracy was not a new concept, and was heavily influenced by Dewey and radical liberalism, it began to spread throughout academia as the 1960s progressed – especially in the US and the UK.[58] Recognizing that the political realm cannot be meaningfully separated from the economic realm, some academics began to apply the concept of participatory democracy to workplace arrangements and micro and macro-economic decision making. In doing so, they started connecting with (and "discovering") historical and contemporaneous concepts of, and experimentation with, economic democracy. For instance, as discussed in chapter four, in her landmark 1970 book *Participation and Democratic Theory*, Pateman devoted considerable attention to Cole's theories, especially his contention that democracy cannot apply "only or mainly to some special sphere of social action known as 'politics,' but to any and every form of social action, and, in especial, to industrial and economic fully as much to political affairs" (1970, p. 37; Vernon, 1980). Similarly, in 1985 Dahl wrote that "*if* democracy is justified in governing the state, then it must *also* be justified in governing economic enterprises" (1985, p. 111). In addition to making connections to Mill and other historical theorists, Dahl looked at Yugoslavia, the Meidner Plan in Sweden, the Mondragon cooperatives in the Basque region of Spain, and numerous other economic democracy experiments around the world.

Along with making the general case for more participatory employment and economic relationships, participatory democracy scholars also started to make specific connections between economic and political democracy similar to those made by Mill, Dewey, and others

[57] For instance, editors of the Cambridge Institute's publication *Working Papers for a New Society*, included numerous academics interested in, or working on, issues related to participatory democracy. This included Richard Flacks (also a founding member of SDS), Joseph Featherstone, Frances Fox Piven, Christopher Jencks, Noam Chomsky, and others.

[58] According to Gilcher-Holtey, the term was coined by Walter Arnold Kaufmann, a philosopher who taught SDS leader Tom Hayden and others at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (2018). Kaufmann, in turn, had adapted the concept from the work of Dewey.

decades earlier. For instance, in 1983 Jane Mansbridge, a future president of the American Political Science Association, wrote that "without an extensive program of decentralization and workplace democracy, few people are likely to have the political experiences necessary for understanding their interests" (1983, p. 289).

The growing US-UK academic interest in the intersections between participatory democracy and economic democracy during this period often focused on cooperatives, employee ownership, management-labor relations within private enterprises, and, to a lesser extent, issues related to community participation and control. Specific areas of academic study included: the plywood cooperatives of the Pacific Northwest (Dahl, 1985; Greenberg, 1986; Pencavel, 2001); Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) following their establishment in the US in 1974 (Hansmann, 1990); and companies with varying degrees of worker participation, such as the John Lewis Partnership and Scott Bader Commonwealth in the UK (Pateman, 1970).

Amidst deteriorating macro-economic conditions (Kochan, 2007; Piketty, 2014) and a concerted conservative counter-offensive (Powell, Jr., 1971), by the mid-1970s both the student movement and CRM had collapsed and splintered under the weight of state repression, internal division and incoherence, and cultural pressure. However, in addition to achieving many social and economic successes, their efforts had helped shape the contours of a potential political economic alternative to the emerging neoliberal variant of capitalism, one based on decentralization, community control, democratic planning, and the unique strengths and limitations of US society, culture, and history. Now often called Community Wealth Building (CWB), this approach – articulated by Alperovitz, Jeff Faux, and several other theorist-practitioners – involved creating alternative economic institutions like CDCs, cooperatives, ESOPs, CLTS, and municipal enterprises cooperatives and then deploying supportive interventions at various scales in order to network and develop these institutions in such a way that they could, over time, displace capitalist institutions and form the institutional basis of a new political economic system (Alperovitz, Gillies, and Hunter, 1972).

One early effort to put this approach into practice occurred in the late 1970s in Youngstown, Ohio after around 5,000 workers were laid off by a large steel corporation. At the behest of a local coalition of rank-and-file steelworkers, religious leaders, and community groups, Alperovitz and others developed a plan to re-open the factory using a worker-

community ownership structure. Crucially, however, they sought to integrate the new democratically owned facility into a local economic plan that included producing solar technology, light rail equipment, and housing (Alperovitz, 1978; Wilkins, 1979; Lynd, 1982). Like the Lucas Plan, the Meidner Plan, and the GLC, the Youngstown effort demonstrated the potential and possibility of institutional alternatives based on economic democracy and DPO linked to systemically transformative goals. However, like those other efforts, the Youngstown effort failed, mainly due to its inability to overcome larger political and economic impediments. Specifically, the plan relied on federal loan guarantees to re-open and modernize the plant. Initially, the Carter Administration indicated their support, but after the 1978 mid-term elections, that support disappeared (Wilkins, 1979).

5.3.3 The Crisis in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

The political economic and institutional arrangements of the Soviet Union and the various other Eastern European communist countries were not monolithic and varied both between geographic areas and over time. While Yugoslavia is by far the most extensive and well-known experiment with economic democracy within a socialist system (and, indeed, within any system), similar efforts were undertaken at various points in other communist countries during the Cold War – including in the Soviet Union itself. "In socialist systems," Slider wrote in 1986, "the emphasis placed on the working class by Marxist ideology has helped to insure that the issue of worker participation in management appears on the political agenda. Virtually every leader in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe since the 1950s has proclaimed this as a goal. The theory of 'developed socialism,' now applied in all socialist countries within the Soviet sphere of influence, includes workplace democratization as an essential element" (1986, p. 401).

One of the earliest examples was in Poland, where workers' councils emerged as the country was liberated from Nazi rule and, in 1945, the new communist government formalized a system of basic workplace democracy (Kolaja, 1960). In 1956, with worker discontent growing and liberalizing sentiments increasing in the wake of Stalin's death, a new effort was launched through the Central Council of Labor Unions to make state owned enterprises more democratic (Kolaja, 1960). Just a few months after this attempt, a large-scale worker uprising broke out in Poznan and then spread through the country. During the uprising, workers in several factories organized autonomous workers' councils and as part of

the government response (alongside the physical repression and killing of demonstrators and strikers), such councils were legalized. While these workers' councils were quite successful in gaining control over decision making in many enterprises, they eventually became dominated by managerial interests (Hyclak, 1987).

The Polish workers' councils were different from those in Yugoslavia in several ways. First, they were tasked with implementing the production goals set out by the national economic plan. Second, unlike in Yugoslavia, which moved to a form of social ownership (albeit ill-defined), Poland retained traditional state ownership. "In Yugoslavia the conflict [between the rights of workers and the state] was theoretically reduced by defining the means of production as social, not state, property," Kolaja writes. "Nothing like that was conceived in Poland. The workers, in all definitions of their role, were entitled merely to comanagement (współzarządzenie), that is, to supervise and control the administration of the enterprise, as defined by [First Secretary] Gomułka" (1960, pp. 7-8). In this sense, the Polish system was a sort of socialist mirror of the codetermination system that developed in capitalist West Germany following the war. The Polish workers' councils slowly disappeared or were eliminated during the 1970s as industries were consolidated and trade unions bolstered as the only legitimate voice of workers within enterprises. However, at the same time, austerity measures generated greater labor militancy and strikes broke out several times. This included increasing demands by workers in several industries (including the national airline, LOT) to have power over the hiring or firing of the enterprise director. These demands, and worker self-management more generally, ultimately became part of the "Solidarity" movement's economic reform strategy in the 1980s (Hyclak, 1987).

In Hungary, workers' councils and worker participation had a long history dating back to the short-lived Socialist Federative Republic of Councils in Hungary (also known as the Hungarian Soviet Republic) in the aftermath of World War I. In 1956, following the denunciation of Stalinism by the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, workers' councils were formed throughout Hungary during a period of general unrest. The councils were established in a variety of workplaces and replaced the previous Rákosian management system that was comprised of the factory director, party secretary, and trade union representative. In general, the councils supported the new reformist government of Imre Nagy, opposed Soviet interference in the country, and "campaigned for the end of centralized economy, direct control of the companies, reform of the trade unions, and better labor

conditions" (Gutiérrez, 2003, p. 442). Internally, the councils generally adopted a strong and autonomous structure. First and foremost, while the factories remained publicly owned, the workers had full control of the surplus after paying a tax and profit-share to the government. Second, the workers' council was the primary source of authority within the enterprise. In turn, the council would elect a management committee and chief manager from within its ranks. And third, the workers' council had the right to make final decisions on a wide spectrum of business activity, including: enterprise plans, wages, contracts, credit decisions, employment status, workplace conditions, and profit allocation (Krausz, 2006).

Following the Soviet invasion in late 1956 and the arrest (and subsequent execution) of Nagy, the new government under János Kádár cracked down on the workers' councils and gradually re-established state control over workplaces (Haynes, 2006). However, Kádár, who had been a member of Nagy's short-lived government before breaking with him over the decision to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, did introduce a variety of economic reform measures, most notably the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in January 1968. NEM retained state-ownership of enterprises but rejected Soviet style central planning (where the state would set output targets for each enterprise) in favor of a national planning system based on financial means and economic incentives. Firms were to act autonomously, and certain prices were opened up to market forces while others remained fixed by the state (Bockman, 2011). Accompanying this, significant decision-making authority was decentralized to the enterprise level. According to Slider, this increased the potential for worker participation with "the principal channel for worker input [being] the official trade unions. Significant new powers gradually accrued to the unions in the 1970s, including the right to veto certain management decisions" (1986, p. 402).

While less well known than the experiments with workers' councils and worker self-management in Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Soviet experience is no less significant. In particular, it illustrates how worker participation and elements of economic democracy were integrated, over the long-term, into a system that retained an adherence to both central planning and one-party political control (and the limitations and contradictions of this approach). As discussed in chapter four, workers' councils and ideas around worker self-management played a prominent role in both the February and October revolutions in Russia. However, in the wake of the revolution the workers' councils were neutered by the Bolshevik government and the idea generally fell out

of favor in official policy as the Soviet Union went through the War Communism, NEP, and Great Break phases of its economic development. The Stalinist era, in particular, saw the entrenchment of managerial power and the top-down organization of workplaces based on one-man-rule (edinonachalie) (Slider, 1986).

This began to change following Stalin's death. Coinciding with the emergence of workers' councils in Poland and Hungary in the late 1950s, the Khrushchev government began recommitting the Soviet Union to worker participation. For instance, the 1961 Party program called for workers' collectives to participate in enterprise management. Later, in 1977, the Soviet Constitution (promulgated under the Brezhnev government) emphasized the democratization of decision making and worker participation in various aspects of the political economic system through various institutions, including trade unions, work councils, local soviets, and more (Ziegler, 1983). In 1983, Ziegler described the move towards more workplace participation as part of an "inclusionary strategy" that sought to align Soviet practice with "the Marxist-Leninist ideal of workers' rule" and, potentially, forestall the possibility that autonomous or independent worker organizations would emerge and challenge the "Party's monopoly of political power" (1983, pp. 236-237).

Among others, these factors led to the development of a workplace participation system that was at the same time extensive and relatively toothless. In some enterprises there could be up to 40 participatory bodies, with most of these acting as voluntary organs that assisted management with minor workplace matters and standards (Slider, 1986). Other than these, the two most important vehicles were the Production Conferences and the Trade Union Committee. The former was comprised of elected members representing the factory's management, the Communist Party, the trade union, Komsomol (a youth wing of the Party), and various other organizations. Its function was mostly a forum for workers to discuss grievances and plans (Slider, 1986). The latter, at least on paper, was the primary vehicle by which workers could influence enterprise level decision making. According to Slider, "on some issues the enterprise administration must merely consult the union before it makes a decision; on other issues the administration must obtain the agreement of the factory union committee. According to one official source, over seventy managerial functions cannot be performed without the agreement of the trade union committee" (1986, p. 407). However, actual worker representation on the Trade Union Committee tended to be low, and there was

often significant disagreement between Trade Union Committees and factory administrators about what issues needed union committee approval.

Moreover, in general despite the plethora of participatory bodies and mechanisms, workers were underrepresented vis-à-vis managers, union leaders, and technical experts. Additionally, participation rates and enthusiasm for participation amongst workers was often low and ultimately top managers held decision-making responsibility and power. In particular, the Party was extremely wary of the potential consequences that increased worker participation would have on national economic planning. For instance, in 1985 the president of the Soviet Association of Political Sciences, Georgii Shakhnazarov, warned that moves toward increased worker participation needed to be accompanied by an increased role for the Party because "the extremely harmful tendency" of "localism, attempts to separate the interests of one's collective or community from the interests of one's neighbors or from common national interests" (Slider, 1986, pp. 415-416). From the perspective of refining the concept of DPO, this concern is particularly interesting given the ultimate fate of the Yugoslav system, which foundered at least partially along these very same lines.

While it is relatively easy to be cynical about worker participation in the Soviet Union, it is important not to make the mistake of either dismissing it entirely or portraying it as a static and unchanging institution. In fact, at various points Soviet researchers and policymakers themselves identified deficiencies with the approach to worker participation and suggested reforms. For instance, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, several Soviet enterprises began experimenting with direct elections for various management positions, and the aforementioned 1977 Soviet Constitution both rhetorically supported worker participation and enabled the subsequent creation of new labor collectives (comprised of all the workers in a particular enterprise) that would, proponents hoped, provide a vehicle by which workers could influence decision making outside of the traditional trade union structure.

In general, the late 1970s and early 1980s saw an escalating series of reforms as successive leaders (Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko) tried to confront various challenges to the Soviet economy. This culminated in the "Perestroika" period of the late 1980s under Mikhail Gorbachev which was intended to fundamentally reform elements of the socialist economic system. Gorbachev and his allies came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union's economic difficulties were linked to excessive bureaucracy, alienation of workers, and

failures related to central planning, among others (Goldman, 1988). In conjunction with introducing market elements to the Soviet economy, Gorbachev focused on increasing the autonomy of enterprises and worker participation within them. This included more robust versions of traditional approaches, such as establishing workers' councils with the power to elect all managers and directors in the enterprise and the creation of autonomous self-managed production units within enterprises (Shlapentokh, 1988). However, it also included more extensive proposals, such as moves towards worker stock ownership in firms and the establishment of fully independent worker cooperatives.

On this latter point, in 1988 the Soviet parliament (Supreme Soviet) passed the Law on Cooperatives, a major economic reform package that legalized and incentivized the development of cooperatives that would exist alongside traditional SOEs in a variety of sectors (Pravda, 1988; Frenkel, 1989). These production and consumer cooperatives were allowed to own their own property and enter into relationships with other economic entities (including foreign companies). However, these enterprises were also intended to be more democratic and participatory than traditional (non-cooperative) forms of private enterprise that existed in capitalist countries. This included direct member participation in governance and management (Pravda, 1988). And while autonomous and self-managed, they were also intended to retain certain connections to the state and Party. For instance, the cooperatives were expected to draw up their plans utilizing planning norms and coordinate with local and regional planning authorities.

The early results from these reforms were somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, by the late 1980s, the direct election of managers in enterprises appeared to be on the rise, with famous cases reported regularly in the Soviet press. However, on the other, there were numerous accounts of election rigging and a lack of enthusiasm for glasnost (openness/transparency), although as contemporary commentators noted, the reporting of such criticism was, in itself, an advance on previous norms (Shlapentokh, 1988). With regards to cooperatives, their numbers also were increasing, and they were seen as potentially less susceptible to interference than workplace participation mechanisms within the SOEs.

These economic reforms were implemented during a period of increasing domestic and international tension that, within a few years, led to the total dissolution of the Soviet Union and the transition of its successor nation-states to market capitalist economic systems

(of different varieties). As such, they raise a number of tantalizing but unanswerable questions that are nonetheless relevant to the concept of DPO. First and foremost, it is unclear whether these efforts would have become a permanent feature of a reformed version of socialism with some form of DPO at its core (as in Yugoslavia), or if they would have ultimately stalled or degenerated after the initial impetus for reform had subsided (like similar previous efforts in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European socialist countries during the earlier part of the 20th century).

Second, it is possible that the introduction of market mechanisms and stronger forms of decentralization and enterprise autonomy would have led to similar problems that the Yugoslav system experienced (such as rising social and geographic inequality and economic volatility). However, on the other hand, the significantly larger Soviet economy, with its longer history of economic planning, may have been able to overcome such difficulties and find the equilibrium between planning and market mechanisms that eluded the Yugoslavs. Third, the Soviet model was prone to the problem of widespread "pilfering" that resulted from workplace alienation combined with a rhetorical adherence to the concept of "socialist property" – resulting in decreased effectiveness throughout the economic system in general, and in state owned enterprises specifically. It is conceivable that some of the proposed reforms related to worker participation, if fully enacted, could have had a positive impact on this problem. However, experience from Yugoslavia and elsewhere suggests that unless those reforms were paired with incentives for workers, increases in effectiveness may have been limited.

5.4 Summary and Reflections

In several regions of the world, a window of opportunity for reconstituting local, regional, and national economies on the basis of economic democracy briefly opened during the 1960s and 1970s as the post-World War II political economic framework began to crack. Building from historical theories and efforts developed in the late 19th and early 20th century, as well as contemporary models in places like Yugoslavia and Algeria, a new generation experimented with a variety of alternative forms of ownership and economic organization – including some of the direct precursors to modern DPO models.

As discussed in this chapter, these activists, theorists, and policymakers began to re-consider the managerial, statist, and worker/trade union-centric (when democracy was

considered at all) versions of public ownership that had proliferated globally in the post-war period. Influenced by socialist theory and history, anti-colonial independence struggles in the Global South (along with post-colonial economic experimentation), domestic social movements for racial, gender, and economic equity, and emerging theories like participatory democracy, they began to advance models and theories around public and social ownership that centered forms of decentralization, democratization, and community participation. As such, these models and theories represent a generative bridge between old left syndicalist, cooperativist, radical liberal, and early Marxist theories and experiments, which also included some or all of these elements, and the modern concept of DPO. They also had a causal effect on the concept of DPO in that that some of the individuals and organizations responsible for their creation or advancement are directly involved with, or influential to, the modern DPO movement.

By the end of the 1970s, however, this window of opportunity was shutting quickly – especially in the capitalist west. Politically and ideologically, the US, the UK, and various European countries reacted to the social and economic crises of the 1960s and 70s not by pursuing economic democracy, but by embracing neoliberalism, a variant of capitalism defined by marketization, privatization, liberalization, financialization, and globalization. In many ways it was an attempt to address the crisis by once again hitting the accelerator and reconfiguring capitalism "on new and enlarged foundations" (Arrighi, 1994, p. 1). In addition to restructuring their own economies, these countries (especially the US and UK) used their control of international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), and World Bank to impose the "Washington Consensus" (supporting the neoliberal model) on countries around the world throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Chomsky, 1999). Following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, this was extended to Eastern Europe and Russia through a disastrous "shock therapy" program that massively increased poverty and inequality, reduced life expectancy, health outcomes, and living standards, and resulted in an unprecedented transfer of wealth and assets from the public to a small handful of wealthy oligarchs (Goldman, 2003; Ghodsee and Orenstein, 2021; Weber, 2021).

However, below the permafrost of neoliberalism, the seeds that were sown during the middle part of the 20th century continued to germinate. In the US, for instance, community ownership models with democratic governance features like CDCs and CLTs grew in both

scope and scale (TDC, 2005) and participatory democracy spread through academia. Organizations like the National Center for Economic Alternatives (a direct precursor to TDC continued to conduct research into alternative models of ownership and economic organization, including surveys of local forms of public ownership (Shavelson, 1990). In the UK, as discussed in this chapter, the GLC kept ideas around community control, democratic governance, and alternative models of ownership alive and in the literal face of one of neoliberalism's chief proponents.[59] After the fall of the GLC, some of these ideas found a home with organizations like the Center for Local Economic Strategies (CLES), which later became the leading UK proponent of CWB. And, as will be discussed further in the next chapter, elsewhere in the world, local, regional, and national efforts to resist the encroachment of neoliberalism often integrated indigenous traditions and concepts around ownership and governance with versions of Marxist, anarchism, and cooperativism to create powerful new theories and experiments around public ownership and economic democracy.

[59] Famously, the GLC hung giant banners on County Hall, directly across the Thames River from the Houses of Parliament, confronting the Thatcher government on London's rising unemployment numbers (Thomas, 1984).

Chapter 6 - Public Ownership in the Neoliberal Era

In some parts of the world, the brief window of opportunity to restructure political economic systems that opened in the 1960s and 70s took the form of a revolutionary moment, often in the form of an anti-colonial struggle. In others, it was enabled by a period of economic and social turmoil that upended traditional political and social relations. And in still others, it was a combination of both. In certain places and at certain moments, an array of social movements, theorists, and policymakers – often influenced and guided by earlier left experiments, theories, and ideas around economic democracy – used this opportunity to create and experiment with more democratic and equitable institutions and approaches.

However, beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s this window started to close as a social, economic, and political reaction that began in certain western capitalist countries, particularly the US, the UK, and Chile spread rapidly throughout the world – including to many former communist countries following the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s (Harvey, 2005). Known commonly as neoliberalism, this movement not only impeded further efforts to build political economic systems based on economic democracy but also had considerable impact on both the scope, scale, and governance of publicly owned enterprises and services around the world generally; and it is causally linked, in oppositional ways, to the emergence and development of the DPO concept.

This chapter begins with a brief description and history of neoliberalism, and how it was consciously spread around the world by multinational organizations working in concert with political and non-governmental actors in both the Global North and South. This is not intended to be a comprehensive treatment of this complex and contested topic, rather a snapshot of the global political economic context from which the concept of DPO directly arose. In other words, given that most DPO publications suggest that the concept emerged and developed in opposition to certain neoliberal tenets and practices, this section pays particular attention to neoliberalism's approach to publicly owned enterprises and services, both rhetorically and in practice.

The chapter then investigates the concept of NPM as it relates to the governance and management of publicly owned enterprises. Emerging in conjunction with the rise of neoliberalism, NPM is often referenced in the DPO literature as an antagonistic governance paradigm, but the precise reasons for this are often not adequately explained. In order to

inform this thesis' goal of refining the concept of DPO, the chapter investigates the theoretical and ideological underpinnings of NPM and also briefly analyzes several proposed alternatives, including NPS, DPM, and RPM.

Lastly, the chapter discusses how resistance to neoliberalism in parts of the Global South – which itself was rooted in earlier waves of anti-colonial and economic democracy theorizing and movement building – led to the development of innovative new approaches to the ownership, governance, and management of publicly owned enterprises and services. In particular, it focuses on the Latin American experience due to its prominence both in the Global South resistance to neoliberalism and the DPO literature. Specifically, as discussed in chapter two, Latin American experiments and theories are often referenced by DPO theorists and practitioners as directly and generatively influencing the emergence and development of the DPO concept. This focus on Latin America is intended to be illustrative of broader developments throughout the Global South that cannot be covered in this thesis due to formatting limitations, rather than exclusive of them.

6.1 Closing the Window with a Sledgehammer: A Brief History of Neoliberalism

Beginning in the late 1970s, theorists and commentators – especially those on the political left – began to use the term "neoliberalism" to refer, often pejoratively, to the sweeping set of "free market" structural changes, including privatization, marketization, liberalization, and globalization, that were increasingly being imposed on economies around the world by both domestic political leaders and multinational organizations (Monbiot, 2016; Peters, 2023). Today, the term is commonly used to explain such a wide variety of economic and social phenomena and ills that some scholars believe that it has lost much of its specificity and coherence (Collier, 2012; Venugopal, 2015).

For the purposes of this thesis, however, it remains useful as a way of periodizing modern economic history, illustrating a clear break with the more state-centric economic models predominant in many countries following World War II – including Keynesianism, state capitalism, and state socialism. Additionally, forms of ownership and governance were a central concern to many of the theorists and practitioners associated with the rise of neoliberalism and shifts in ownership from collective to private hands were one of the most defining and impactful economic changes that occurred during this era. As such the term helps to illustrate that there was a conscious political economic effort and movement to

redefine and reshape property relations that stands at odds with efforts to advance economic democracy generally, and the concept of DPO specifically. As Hall writes, "naming neo-liberalism is politically necessary to give the resistance to its onward march content, focus and a cutting edge" (2011, p. 706).

Neoliberalism can be considered both a political philosophy theory and a political economic project (Jones, 2012). As a theory, it generally holds that a capitalist market economy – defined by competition, individual rights, and a limited role for government – is necessary to ensure freedom and deliver prosperity (Vallier, 2021). Writing in 1951, Milton Friedman explained that "Neo-liberalism would accept the nineteenth century liberal emphasis on the fundamental importance of the individual, but it would substitute for the nineteenth century goal of laissez faire as a means to this end, the goal of the competitive order. It would seek to use competition among producers to protect consumers from exploitation, competition among employers to protect workers and owners of property, and competition among consumers to protect the enterprises themselves" (p. 3).

However, the basic theoretical contours of neoliberalism are relatively broad and can encompass a multitude of variants and adjacent theories – especially as the concept has developed and mutated over time. One of these is ordoliberalism, which alternatively can be seen as a German-originated variant of neoliberalism or an adjacent theory with some shared historical and ideological roots. Briefly, ordoliberalism is often defined as a system which establishes and enforces a rules-based order governing market-based economic activity (Kolev, 2021). While it diverges from the Anglo-American version of neoliberalism on certain issues, including its much stronger emphasis on the role of the state in enforcing competition (Bonefeld, 2012), it shares several important features including, as it relates to DPO, support for marketization (Cerny, 2016) and private property (Bonefeld, 2012).[60] In other words, common across most, if not all, of the variants of neoliberalism is an emphasis on private forms of ownership operating in market-based systems.

As a political economic project, neoliberalism began in the years between the first and second world wars as a conservative reaction to both the breakdown of the pre-war imperial

[60] The fortunes of ordoliberalism within Germany ebbed and flowed throughout the 20th century and it is a matter of debate exactly how much the theory influenced the development of the post-World War II German political economic system and, by extension, the European Union following its creation in the early 1990s. See: Hien, 2023; Krieger and Nientiedt, 2023.

order and the increasing appeal of various forms of socialism and collectivism that challenged traditional private property rights (Slobodian, 2018; Peters, 2021). These early neoliberals attempted to influence policy debates and push back against collectivist economic policies, various forms of socialism, as well as statist responses to the Great Depression such as some of those contained in Roosevelt's New Deal (e.g. Simons, 1934).

Following World War II, groups of neoliberal theorists began coming together to discuss and plan how they might influence the direction of post-war society. One of the most well-known of these groups was the Mont Pelerin Society, which emerged from a 1947 meeting in Switzerland organized by Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek – who in 1944 had published the influential book *The Road to Serfdom* (2005), which forcefully denounced key socialist goals, aims, and policies. The strategy these groups employed was to slowly build capacity and power by both developing institutions and transnational networks and breaking open the policy debate through the presentation of relatively utopian visions of systemic change (Bjerre-Poulson, 2014; Tooze, 2018).

In the US, the UK, and other capitalist countries (especially in South America), this included forming or influencing a range of "free market" think tanks whose explicit purpose was to influence public policy and public institutions (such as government and the judiciary), as well as establishing centers or departments at universities (Jones, 2012; Fisher and Plehwe, 2017). Funded in part by businesspeople and wealthy elites, many of whom were repulsed and stirred to action by the social, cultural, and economic changes of the 1960s, these think tanks, centers, and networks were able to begin effectively influencing politics and public policy around the world by the late 1970s – most notable through the administrations of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US (Jones, 2012; Fisher and Plehwe, 2017). For instance, during Reagan's first term in the early 1980s neoliberal think tanks provided more than half of his presidential appointments (Wallison, 2004; Ward, 2012). Over the next two decades, these organizations played a prominent role in moving neoliberalism from a fringe position to a dominant ideological paradigm in both countries, one that was supported not only by the political right but also by parties that had traditionally been associated with the center left (the Labour Party in the UK and the Democratic Party in the US) (Steger and Roy, 2021). Reflecting on the rapid spread and entrenchment of the model once it was able to establish a foothold, the Social Democratic Prime Minister of Sweden Ingvar Carlsson once

remarked, “we made a serious mistake: we underestimated the political strength of neoliberalism” (Kuttner, 2021).

This paradigm shift occurred not only at the political level, but also involved changes to whole fields of academic study – most notable economics. In many of the English-speaking western capitalist countries variants of Keynesianism had come to dominate economic thought from the 1930s onwards. This includes the US, where the mainstream economics profession largely accepted the neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis (neo-Keynesianism) in the post-World War II era. This variant brought together brought together traditional Keynesian macroeconomics – including its belief in the interventionist role of the state – with neoclassical microeconomics (Palley, 2017). However, by the 1980s, the rise of neoliberalism and its affiliated academic institutes, especially the Chicago School, had decisively shifted mainstream economics away from this approach (Campbell, 2004; Saith, 2022) to alternatives such as New Keynesian and New Classical economics that, among other things, placed much less of an emphasis on the role of government. Specifically, the Chicago School challenged neo-Keynesianism, and in response to this challenge, the neo-Keynesians adopted New Keynesianism with “the end result,” Palley writes, being “the dilution of Keynesian thinking and the eventual capture of mainstream Keynesian economics by a modernized version of classical macroeconomics” (2017, p. 98).

Neoliberals were not content with simply restructuring the academic, economic, and political order in the US and the UK. Many saw it as a global movement, one that in both organization and effect transcended and superseded national boundaries (Slobodian, 2018; Tooze, 2018). In 1981, for instance, Mont Pelerin Society member Anthony Fisher (who was also founder of the Institute for Economic Affairs, a British neoliberal think tank) created the Atlas Economic Research Foundation (Fisher and Plehwe, 2017). The goal of the organization was to seed and support neoliberal organizations around the world, which it did to great effect. Today, the Atlas Network counts more than 500 organizations in 100 countries as members (Atlas, 2023).

However, the rapid spread of neoliberalism around the world during the 1980s and 1990s cannot solely be attributed to private organizations and international networks. While in theory neoliberalism supported a vastly limited role for the state, as a political economic project neoliberals had little problem using the power and vast resources of the state

(particularly the US) to spread neoliberal ideas and structural changes around the world. In particular, during the 1980s neoliberal ideas permeated and became dominant in many governmental departments (such as the US Department of Treasury) and multi-national organizations (such as the IMF and World Bank) responsible for international development (Lévy, et al., 2022).

Later coined the "Washington Consensus" by British World Bank economist John Williamson, these entities began to impose a set of neoliberal ideas on countries in the Global South (and then Russia and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union), often through loan conditions (so-called structural adjustment programs) and trade agreements. These ideas centered around the neoliberal goal of shrinking the role of the state and maximizing the role of markets, and included reducing public spending, cutting taxes, enshrining private property rights, deregulation, permitting foreign investment, liberalizing trade, and, crucially as it relates to the subsequent emergence of the concept of DPO, privatizing publicly owned enterprises, services, and assets (Irwin and Ward, 2021). However, the adoption and spread of neoliberalism in the Global South cannot be solely attributed to outside imposition. Theorists and policymakers from the Global South played a prominent role in its development and proliferation and their agency should not be dismissed (Connell and Dados, 2014).

As a political philosophy theory, neoliberalism was, and is, relatively hostile to public ownership. Hayek, in particular, believed in the centrality of private property rights and rejected collectivism (Hayek, 2005; Cumbers, 2012). Writing in *The Road to Serfdom*, he suggested that while a certain degree of public or common ownership could be acceptable if it was guided by a voluntary agreement, once it exceeded a certain proportion of the economy as a whole it would automatically infringe on the freedom of individuals regardless of whether society consented to those ownership arrangements (Hayek, 2005). Similarly, Friedman wrote that while neoliberals would accept some basic economic and social role for the state, they would leave "the ownership and operation of economic resources predominantly in private hands" in order to "preserve a maximum of individual freedom and liberty" (1951). Such judgements are generally reversed in the DPO and adjacent literature which sees the accumulation and concentration of wealth and property in a small group of private hands as being an impediment to the freedom and liberty of the majority (including the workers in those privately held enterprises) and envisions no artificial limits being imposed on

the scope and scale of public ownership assuming that it is democratic in both implementation and structure.

As a political economic project, neoliberal hostility towards public ownership translated into a global program of privatization (Feigenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett, 1998; Cumbers, 2012). This included both the outright sale of public assets and enterprises to the private sector as well as various contracting and outsourcing arrangements that turned control of public services over to private companies and individuals (Parker, 2021). One of the most prominent examples was in the UK. Between 1980 and 1996 it is estimated that the country accounted for 40 percent of the total value of all the assets privatized across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states (HM Treasury, no date). Starting with Thatcher's administration, the country sold off dozens of services and enterprises in a variety of sectors, including water, electricity, gas, transportation, telecommunications, energy, manufacturing, and many more. The British experience with privatization is particularly foundational to the concept of DPO for two interconnected reasons. First, because of the scope of privatization in the country and its relatively early implementation, Britain served as test case for this aspect of the neoliberal model. And for many, it left a lot to be desired. In particular, privatization in Britain – especially as it relates to railroads, water utilities, the energy sector, healthcare, and private finance initiative (PFI) schemes – has been widely critiqued on social, economic, and political grounds (Cumbers, 2012). Second, at least partially because of the limitations and failures of privatization in the country, British universities and institutions (including trade unions and think tanks) became an epicenter for theorists and practitioners responsible for, or associated with, the development of the DPO concept. Similarly, the spread of neoliberalism internationally and the wholesale privatization of public enterprises and services that accompanied it generated considerable resistance wherever it went, especially in South America. As will be discussed later in this chapter, this resistance fused traditional leftist ideologies and strategies with indigenous concepts and ideas to imagine and envision new, more democratic models of public ownership. In turn, these models and experiences generatively and causally influenced the emergence and development of DPO as a concept.

Where privatization wasn't possible, or wasn't expedient for tactical reasons, neoliberal organizations often promoted "reforms" to the governance and management structure of public enterprises and services (e.g. OECD, 2005). Often, as will be discussed

below in relation to NPM, this took the form of installing private sector principles and approaches and insulating governance and management structures from more democratic forms of public accountability and oversight. In order to understand the neoliberal approach to the governance and management of publicly owned enterprises and services, it is important to briefly discuss the relationship between neoliberalism and democracy. In theory, many important neoliberals expressed support for democracy, often suggesting that free markets and democratic politics were mutually self-reinforcing. However, they also believed that democracy should be limited. In fact, Vallier writes, "neoliberals spend far more time arguing for limits on democracy than arguing for democracy itself" (2021). Hayek, in particular, believed that democratic entities might try to impose certain political or normative objectives that would threaten private ownership rights, and thus undermine liberalism which, for him, was "inseparable from the institution of private property" (Selwyn, 2015). This led Hayek to theoretically support the possibility that an authoritarian government and or dictator could be compatible with liberalism (Gamble, 2018). Moreover, Hayek took this beyond mere theory with his active support for the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in Chile following a military coup that overthrew the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende in 1973.

More specifically, many neoliberals advocated an individualistic understanding of democracy whereby "sovereign consumers" would be the lynchpin of economic and political activity (Zamora, 2019). In this narrow model, consumer choice replaces traditional mechanisms and institutions for democratic participation in the economy and politics (such as trade unions, social movements, public deliberation, and majority voting). This market-based consumer democracy model was explicitly developed to counter the socialist concept of economic democracy by suggesting that through consumer choice and the price mechanism, individuals would indirectly share in economic decision-making and political power (Zamora, 2019). Given that its ideological and theoretical roots are anchored in the historical tradition of economic democracy, most DPO publications naturally reject this narrow, consumer-based model of democracy. While consumer representation and participation in political economic decision-making is important to the DPO concept, it is usually envisioned (alongside other stakeholder representation and participation) in a much more direct way than market-oriented consumer choice.

As a political economic project, neoliberalism has also had a complex relationship to democracy, with many of its theorists and practitioners having little problem associating with

or supporting authoritarian regimes. For instance, the Pinochet regime itself was run economically by a group of neoliberal Chilean economists (nicknamed the "Chicago Boys") who had been trained by Friedman and others at the University of Chicago. And the Chilean regime and its economic policies were, at times, supported by Thatcher, Reagan, and various "free market" think tanks and pundits in the US, UK, and elsewhere. Beyond Chile, prominent neoliberals (including members of the Mont Pelerin Society) were enthusiastic defenders of white supremacy, Apartheid, and minority rule in South Africa (Tooze, 2018). And prior to that, early neoliberals (including Ludwig von Mises, Hayek's mentor and teacher) had expressed admiration for Mussolini and the fascist movement for supposedly "saving European civilization" from communism (von Mises, 1985) and some German neoliberals had been supportive of the Nazis (Zamora, 2019).

6.2 Neoliberalism Meets the Public Sector: New Public Management and its Discontents

The concept and practice of NPM emerged in the UK and the US in the late 1970s in early 1980s and then spread rapidly around the world (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000). In general, NPM attempts to impart private sector strategies and approaches to the management of public sector organizations and can be considered a market-based approach that emphasizes citizens as consumers (Hood, 1995; Bryson, Crosby, and Bloomberg, 2014). Other aspects of NPM include privatization and outsourcing, cost cutting, user charges and vouchers, competition, performance measurement, auditing and accountability, strategic planning, and the separation of production from provision (among others) (Mathiasen, 1999; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000; Gruening, 2001; McLaughlin, Osborne, and Ferlie, 2002). In general, NPM rejected the classical public administration model that was prevalent during the middle part of the 20th century which was based on centralization, hierarchical organizations, and defined rules (Osborne, 2006; Robinson, 2015). Specifically, this "old" model, was accused by NPM proponents of being "sluggish" (especially with regards to innovation) and unresponsive to citizen needs (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000).

NPM is connected to the rise of neoliberalism in various ways. Like neoliberalism it was grounded in a fundamental ideological belief that the post-World War II public sector had grown too large, especially in western capitalist countries (Lapuente and Van de Walle, 2020). From a generative and causal perspective, NPM has roots, at least partially, in the public choice perspective within public administration. Public choice theory emerged during

the post-World War II era and was highly critical of the scope, scale, and nature of the modern welfare state generally, and the public sector specifically (Gruening, 2001; Amadae, 2003). It rose to prominence through the work and efforts of James Buchanan and Warren Nutter, who established the Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy at the University of Virginia in 1957.[61]

Buchanan, in particular, was intimately connected to the neoliberal networks that were developing in the post-World War II era and was inaugurated into the Mont Pelerin Society by Hayek himself, ultimately serving as its president in the 1980s when neoliberalism was becoming unassailable around the world (Tanenhaus, 2017). For his part, Nutter, who also was associated with the Mont Pelerin Society (Chamberlain, 1983), was heavily involved with neoliberalism both as a theory and as a political economic project. Regarding the latter, he was an advisor to the arch-conservative US politician Barry Goldwater in the 1960s before becoming Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during the Nixon Administration. In this role, he played a prominent role in the overthrown of Salvador Allende in Chile, leading to the subsequent rise of the Pinochet dictatorship (Kuehn, 2021).[62]

Public choice theory, as articulated by Buchanan, Nutter, and their acolytes, suggests that state actors are motivated by their own "rational" self-interest (rather than in the public interest). One of the public choice theorists who prominently made this argument was William Niskanen, a student of Friedman at the University of Chicago and member of Reagan's Council of Economic Advisors. In short, Niskanen articulated a model of public administration in which government bureaucrats would seek to increase their budget for self-interested reasons related to power, public reputation, salary, etc.[63] As a result, services operated by public bureaucracies would be beset by inefficiencies related to both oversupply and production (Dollery and Hamburger, 1995). While Niskanen's model is no longer fully

[61] The center was re-launched as the Center for the Study of Public Choice at Virginia Tech University in 1969 and then moved to George Mason University in 1983. As such, the school of thought associated with Buchanan and Nutter is often referred to as the "Virginia School of Political Economy."

[62] According to Kuehn, this included recommending a coup against Allende, being part of a committee that approved covert action against the Allende government, advising on how to prevent Chile from attaining credit, and managing arms sales to Chile and neighboring countries with the goal of fermenting opposition to Allende in the ranks of the Chilean military (2021).

[63] "Bureaucrats maximise the total budget of their bureau during their tenure, subject to the constraint that the budget must be equal to or greater than the minimum total costs of supplying the output expected by the bureau's sponsor," Niskanen wrote (1971, p. 42).

accepted, even within public choice theory (Shughart II, n.d.), it was nonetheless highly influential in shaping policy in the US and the UK in the 1980s.

In the rational self-interest scenario, private sector provision of goods and services and or private sector governance and management approaches are suggested to be often superior to public sector provision because of the existence of market competition and incentives, which are supposed to improve efficiency and effectiveness. “This, public choice theorists argued, explains why governments should be limited in what they do, or at least, subjected to the same logic as the private sector by introducing market competition,” Knafo writes (2020, p. 784). As such, public choice theory is often strongly associated with privatization (Wright, 1993), both in terms of direct asset sales and, when that is not possible, the creation of polycentric administration systems in which the production and provision of services are separated, and private entities compete for contracts (Gruening, 2001). This is also known as private sector contracting, outsourcing, and/or public-private partnerships and became a prominent component of NPM (Lapuente and Van de Walle, 2020).

In practice, NPM reforms can be roughly grouped into three categories: incentivization, competition, and disaggregation (Dunleavy, et al., 2006; Lapuente and Van de Walle, 2020). The first refers to the implementation of performance-based pay and contracting by public sector organizations, as well as hiring managers from the private sector; the second refers to the use of either internal markets or private sector contracting to enhance efficiency and deliver cost savings; and the third refers to the separation of certain functions (like production and provision) that were formerly integrated in the same enterprise or agency. In recent years, many theorists have begun to interrogate the record of NPM in practice and re-evaluate its purported effectiveness and benefits, both in general and across all three of these specific categories (Minogue, Polidano, and Hulme, 1998; Moynihan 2006; Leland and Smirnova, 2009; Robinson, 2015).

With regards to incentivization, several studies have shown NPM to have either failed or led to adverse outcomes, or both (Lapuente and Van de Walle, 2020). As it relates to the concept of DPO, some of the most important findings from these studies are related to goals and values. Specifically, they suggest that public organizations usually have a variety of goals and requirements (often related to equitable provision and access) that are not as simple as private sector goals (primarily pursuit of profit) (Daley and Vasu, 2005). As such, it is harder

to both measure and incentivize "performance" (Rainey and Jung, 2010), especially when performance is viewed primarily through a private sector lens (i.e. financial metrics, growth, etc.). Relatedly, since public sector organizations often have different goals, they may attract employees whose values and employment desires are more socially focused. In such situations, private sector incentivization mechanisms focused on self-interest (such as performance related bonuses and pay) may not be effective (Perry, Mesch, and Paarlberg, 2006; Weibel, Rost, and Osterloh, 2010). This issue is even more acute when it comes to DPO, since most publications envision democratic publicly owned enterprises as embracing alternative social, environmental, and economic values that go beyond those implanted both by many private, for-profit companies and traditional SOEs.

With competition, contrary to NPM assertions, studies are actually relatively ambiguous on whether it improves service quality. For instance, recent research on marketization of Swedish elderly care services found that increasing competition had no discernable impact on improving service quality (Broms, Dahlström, and Nistotskaya, 2020). Moreover, other studies have shown that competition creates incentives for fraud and abuse as private contractors bid on public sector contracts (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Additionally, since financial metrics are more easily measurable than other outcomes, competition can potentially deteriorate the quality of public services as private sector companies prioritize lowering costs to win and maintain contracts (Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Lapuente and Van de Walle, 2020). These findings generally support the contention of many DPO and adjacent theorists that insourcing and various alternative contracting arrangements (such as public-public and public-commons partnerships) are preferable to private sector contracting (which is often seen as, and referred to, in the literature as form of privatization) (e.g. Kishimoto, Steinfort, and Petitjean, 2020; Hopman, et al., 2021).

Unlike incentivization and competition, the evidence on disaggregation – and DPO's relationship to the concept – is more complex. One of the most common, and most studied, forms of disaggregation is "agencification" – which can be defined as the process of streamlining (and often shrinking) public organizations so that they focus on a smaller number of discrete tasks and objectives. This process is supposed to improve performance and accountability. Often, an additional layer is added to agencification whereby the new agency is given a certain degree of managerial autonomy or independence from active government involvement. Evidence suggests that agencification can have a positive impact on various

performance measures (such as value for money and lower costs for contracting) (Cingolani and Fazekas, 2020). However, it has also been criticized for removing or insulating public organizations from democratic control (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007). As will be discussed in chapter seven, DPO can potentially address these conflicting outcomes by combining decentralization and subsidiarity with both networks and heightened democratic accountability and participation.

While NPM undoubtedly remains prevalent around the world (Osborne, Radnor, and Nasi, 2013), its limitations and failings have sparked a search for alternatives. Many of these seek minor modifications to the NPM approach to curb some of its worst and most obvious problems. These can loosely be grouped under the heading of "post-NPM" approaches, which, according to Lapuente and Van de Walle, generally attempt to integrate "the specialization, fragmentation, and marketization characteristic of NPM reforms with more coordination, centralization and collaborative capacity" (2020, p. 463). However, beyond these, several more comprehensive alternatives have been suggested that place an emphasis on citizens (rather than consumers), democracy, and the public good/interest (Bryson, Crosby, and Bloomberg, 2014). These include approaches such as new public governance (e.g. Osborne, 2010), public value management (e.g. Stoker, 2006), managing publicness (e.g. Bozeman, 2007), and new civic politics (e.g. Boyte, 2011).

Among these, three alternative approaches that are particularly relevant to the conceptual development and practical application of DPO are NPS, DPM, and RPM. In short, NPS suggests that public sector organizations should be run like democracies – rather than like businesses – with active participation from citizens (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2007). It has its roots in democratic theory (as opposed to NPM which has its roots in economic theory and, particularly, positivist social science) and is guided by ideas around robust and active democratic practice, rebuilding community, and alternatives to hierarchy and authority (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000). NPS is not necessarily a novel theory, but rather a way of rescuing or resurrecting traditional concepts of democracy in and around public organizations that has been lost as NPM swept the planet (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2015). As such, NPS has a shared historical lineage with the concept of DPO (especially through the work of mid-20th century democratic theorists such as Pateman, Mansbridge, Dahl, and others).

Proponents of NPS suggest that while the classical public administration model and NPM envisioned different approaches to public sector management ("rowing" in the former vs. "steering" in the latter), they had the same basic understanding of who should be involved and who is in the driver's seat, namely public officials. NPS, on the other hand, focuses on how public organizations should empower and serve residents. "In our rush to steer, perhaps we are forgetting who owns the boat," Denhart and Denhart write (2007, p. 23). This focus on who actually does, and should, "own" and participate in public sector organizations – and broadening that ownership – is a central feature in the DPO literature. In practice, NPS covers a wide range of activities and processes ranging from more conventional citizen engagement and consultative processes to more direct forms of citizen participation in, and control over, governing or management structures (Denhart and Denhart, 2007). As such, it has considerable overlap with many of the practical examples highlighted in the DPO literature, although the latter usually emphasizes multi-stakeholder representation and participation with an emphasis on the internal workforce alongside residents, while the former (NPS) often focuses exclusively on "citizens."

Like NPS, DPM is a relatively broad concept. In general, it envisions more robust and comprehensive democratic practices within public organizations, including more horizontal forms of management and the empowerment of workers and citizens (DeLeon and DeLeon, 2002). It also has similar historical roots in democratic theory – and, in particular, workplace democracy. As such, DPM also shares a strong historical lineage with DPO, one that causally and generatively stretches back to the mid-19th century. What makes DPM particularly relevant to the concept of DPO is that it often includes both "external" and "internal" elements of democratization. Externally, it suggests that there are various ways in which public organizations can become more democratically accountable to the general population. These range from establishing diverse workforces that are representative of the social characteristics of the general population, to empowering both the users of public services and the frontline workers who administer them, to more formal mechanisms for resident participation (DeLeon, 2007) – all of which, to varying degrees, are also important themes in the DPO literature. In DPM, this is then paired with a focus on internal democratization. Like with external mechanisms, this can take a number of different forms along a spectrum of less to more empowerment. This includes worker participation in processes and decisions that were formerly the prerogative of managers (also called participative decision making), self-

directed work teams, and more formal workplace democracy models (like those that were experimented with in Yugoslavia and Algeria).

Lastly, a third emerging alternative is RPM. As briefly discussed in chapter two, RPM is important because, unlike other approaches that are vaguer and more pluralistic, it is a detailed model with a set of key criteria. These are: 1) public provision with in-house integrated services; 2) strategic city planning, especially with regards to climate change and sustainability; 3) Public Service innovation and improvement Plans (PSiiPs) with service user and public employee participation; 4) management of public resources and increasing capacity; 5) economic/social cost benefit analysis and social, economic, health, equality and environmental impact assessments; 6) effective democratic accountability and citizen/user/public employee participation; 7) quality jobs, training, and labor standards; 8) social justice and equality; 9) new design/construction models for publicly financed infrastructure; and 10) research and investigation of local economy and sectors, along with regulation and intervention to maintain standards and monitor performance (Whitfield, 2020, pp. 395-432).

According to Whitfield, one of the major differences between RPM and neoliberal forms of management is a focus on the centering of a new set of principles and values (2020, p. 398). When these values and principles – as well as the key practices of RPM – are compared to the values and key components of DPO many important similarities and overlaps emerge. First and foremost, is the concept of genuine worker, community, and user participation in the governance, management, and design of public services and enterprises – along with other democratic principles such as transparency and accountability. Other important intersections include: decommodification and or universal public provision, reducing social and economic inequality, environmental sustainability, democratic and strategic planning, balancing decentralization with higher level policies and imperatives, and worker rights and standards.

Over the past decades, the trajectory of neoliberalism and NPM have largely mirrored each other. Rising together in the late 1970s and 1980s they seemingly conquered the world, before being called into question and starting to falter and mutate in the early 21st century. As it relates to the organization, structure, role, governance, and management of public organizations, there are now numerous alternatives to the NPM model, and it is argued by some theorists that these are in the ascendancy. DPO can be considered one of the newer

additions to this list of alternatives. As discussed in this section, DPO shares much with the public organization management and governance approaches found in NPS, DPM, RPM. However, as will be discussed further in chapter seven, what makes it relatively unique is that it transcends the narrower debate about forms of public management or administration by including a larger macro-economic perspective about the role public enterprises should play in the economy and society and how they can interact with other political economic institutions.

6.3 Resistance and Alternatives to Neoliberalism in the Global South

While neoliberalism has reshaped political economic and institutional relations around the world, its impacts have been especially felt in the Global South. As previously discussed, Chile is often referenced as one of the first "testing grounds" for neoliberalism as a political economic project, and as the 1980s and 1990s progressed, the economic, political, and social systems of many Global South countries were transformed by exposure to, and adoption of, the neoliberal model. However, there has been growing criticism of the effects neoliberalism has had in the Global South. "Even among its advocates, there has been an increasing recognition that 30 years…of neoliberalization and structural adjustments have produced at least dubious and at worst catastrophic effects on the majority of people's lives," Rodríguez writes (2021, p. 2). This includes exacerbated inequality, entrenched political and social exclusion, employment instability, and environmental destruction, among others (Boden, 2011; Rodríguez, 2021).

Latin America, in particular, is important both to the re-appraisal of neoliberalism generally, and the concept of DPO specifically.[64] Due to the region's early and relatively intense exposure to neoliberalism (including, as discussed below, privatization), and its negative effects, Latin America was, and still is, an epicenter of experimentation around alternative models and approaches – including those related to various forms of public ownership and public enterprise management and governance. As a result, Latin American examples feature prominently in the DPO literature (see chapter two), and Latin American theorists and practitioners play prominent roles in DPO networks.

[64] For the purposes of this thesis, Latin America refers to all countries in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean.

In keeping with neoliberal theory, privatization played a prominent part of the neoliberal model that was, in many cases, foisted on the Global South through the structural adjustment programs of the IMF and World Bank, "free trade" agreements with Global North countries, and local officials and intellectuals who had been "trained" by neoliberal think tanks and university networks. In general, there were at least two ways privatization occurred in the Global South during the neoliberal era, both of which are antithetical to the concept and goals of DPO. The first was a traditional process of selling SOEs and services to the private sector – including to Global North companies and investors who, in many cases, had the capital and political connections to take advantage of asset sales. Over the 20-year period between the late 1970s and the late 1990s, the economic activity of SOEs as a percent of GDP fell from around 11% to 5% in middle income countries and 15% to 3% in low-income countries – with the biggest decreases occurring in Latin America (Sheshinski and López-Calva, 2003; Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2005).[65] Between 1990 and 1999, the proceeds from privatizations in Latin America were more than double that of the next closest region, Eastern Europe, which was in the process of transitioning from communism to capitalism (Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2005).

During the neoliberal period, thousands of SOEs were privatized or partially privatized across Latin America. In Argentina, for instance, around 150 privatizations occurred during the 1990s (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky, 2005). This included railroads, banks, energy companies, airlines, roads, and much more (Clairmont, 2002). While supporters of the neoliberal model, then and now, contend that privatization improved the economic efficiency of many former SOEs in Latin America (e.g. Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2005), in many places the process was rife with corruption (Saba and Manzetti, 1996) and deeply unpopular (Shirley, 2005). This scope and scale of privatization – and, as will be discussed further below, the resistance it generated – is a major reason why Latin America theorists and examples play a prominent role in the theory and practice of DPO.

A second method of privatization deployed in Latin America and other places in the Global South involved enclosing and privately commercializing services or assets that had previously been owned and controlled by local communities in informal or semi-formal

[65] By contrast, privatization in industrialized Global North countries during this period was relatively flat (Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2005), reinforcing the contention amongst critics that neoliberalism generally, and privatization specifically, is neo-colonialist (e.g. Kotzé, 2019).

communal ways. While not unique to the neoliberal period, this process sparked fierce resistance to the neoliberal project in some parts of Latin America. One prominent example concerns the ownership and control of land in Mexico. Under pressure from international development organizations and in order to become compliant with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Mexican government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari implemented a raft of neoliberal policies in the early 1990s. Prominent among these were amendments to Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, which had permitted the Ejido system of communal land ownership that was common in certain indigenous communities (Fernández-Kelly and Massey, 2007; Cumbers, 2012). The change opened up these lands to privatization and contributed to the Zapatista uprising that occurred in Chiapas on January 1, 1994 (the day that NAFTA took effect).

This uprising was not only inspirational across Latin America and the world, it also subsequently resulted in a new ownership paradigm in the autonomous Zapatista controlled areas that can be considered a form of DPO. Specifically, in many cases land was owned communally by all people in an area (i.e. a village) and access was provided to individuals, families, and cooperatives (Mora, 2017). Additionally, Municipios Autónomos Rebeldes Zapatistas, which were autonomous and democratic local governance entities, operated public services such as education and universal healthcare (Rebrii, 2020). And in some areas, the Zapatistas also set up communal water systems, public transportations services, and public banks to support economic activity (Forbis, 2014).

Even before the Zapatista uprising, resistance to neoliberalism had been brewing throughout Latin America. In 1989, for instance, protests broke out in Venezuela after the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez implemented a series of neoliberal economic reforms recommended by the IMF – including privatization of SOEs. In the ensuing government crackdown, as many as 2,000 people were killed. A few years after the so-called Caracazo protests, future Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez stated on TV that there needed to be an alternative to both the "savage neoliberalism" being implemented in the region and traditional alternative of "communist statism" (Rodríguez, 2021). This desire for new models and approaches that transcended old binaries and approaches, especially as it relates to the state, became a prominent feature of Latin American resistance to neoliberalism and heavily

influenced the DPO concept.[66] Over the last 30 plus years, resistance to neoliberalism in general, and privatization in particular, has been a recurring feature in the region, both at the community and national level (Sader, 2008; Hall, Lobina, and de la Motte, 2005). Regarding the former, many local communities began to actively organize against the privatization of local services – particularly water and energy. One of the most famous examples, and one that is often referenced in DPO literature (e.g. Cumbers, 2012), concerns the so-called "water war" in Cochabamba, Bolivia (Olivera and Lewis, 2004).

In 1998, the Bolivian government – in conjunction with staff from the IMF and World Bank – published an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility policy framework paper in which it announced intentions to privatize all remaining SOEs in the country, including the publicly owned utility SEMAPA which ran Cochabamba's water system (IMF, 1998). A year later, the government followed through on this promise by privatizing SEMAPA and selling the concession to run the city's water system to Aguas del Tunari, a consortium led by the global corporation Bechtel, which was the only bidder (de la Fuente, 2003). Not only did the government agree to extortionate contract terms (including a guaranteed 15% annual return, pegged to inflation) it also promulgated a new law (Law 2029) that codified water privatization generally, ratified the sale to Aguas del Tunari, and gave the new company wide latitude and authority over water resources in the region (Assies, 2003).

Of particular concern to many residents and activists was the fact that Law 2029 gave Aguas del Tunari exclusive rights in its service area, an arrangement that would require existing community based organizations – which had developed to fill service gaps and provide water to vulnerable parts of the population – to enter into a contractual relationship with the company, thus commercializing a service that had previously been organized primarily in a collective manner and operated outside of pure market principles (Assies, 2003). An additional issue was that the law created a relatively autonomous agency that would have control over the contracting and licensing process for water resources, thus insulating the process from democratic participation and accountability. "As the concessionaires and licensees would be directly contracted by the [agency], local

[66] "Beginning in the 1970s, the Latin American left reinvented itself, turning away from armed struggle and bureaucratic state socialism toward something much more plural and fluid," Gianpaolo Baiocchi writes. "Movements and parties have variously emphasized national parliamentary struggle, local governance, or autonomous arenas. But one of the enduring lessons—if not the lesson—is that occupying the state is not enough" (2024).

governments and users would have little recourse against this closed system," Assies writes (2003, p. 18).

Immediately upon taking control of the system, Aguas del Tunari announced a 35% rate hike (which rose to as much as 150% for some residents) fueling further resistance and anger in the city. To respond, residents and workers in the city formed Coordinadora por la Defensa del Agua y la Vida (Coordination for the Defense of Water and Life). The organization brought together rural farmers, urban workers, and consumers around a shared set of demands, including reversing the privatization of SEMAPA. The organization and its allies began to organize protests, strikes, and road barricades, leading to a total shutdown of the city in early 2000. During this period, negotiations were being held regularly between the government and reformist forces in the city (organized through a group called the Civic Committee) around possible changes to both the water privatization contract and Law 2029.

This dynamic of a popular movement organizing for, or demanding, radical democratic shifts in ownership being either intentionally or unintentionally undercut by more moderate organizations willing to accept modest reforms is a consistent theme in many of the historical examples analyzed in this thesis (for instance the German and Italian council movements) and is an important consideration for DPO theorists and practitioners. More specifically, as will be discussed further in chapter seven, an evolutionary theory of change that seek to build new institutions and approaches from the cracks in existing systemic arrangements is likely the most viable for scaling the concept and practice of DPO in the existing political economic context. However, historical evidence, including from Cochabamba, suggests that this does not mean that there should be an absence of conflict with existing approaches and that to genuinely build lasting alternatives there should remain a clear distinction between the concept of DPO and reformist attempts to increase worker and community engagement within otherwise traditionally structured private or public economic organizations. This distinction hinges on a clear articulation of both the principles, goals, and ideological orientation of DPO – including genuine public ownership combined with democratic control, a commitment to economic democracy, and the implementation of non-market-based values and approaches.

In April 2000, the crisis in Cochabamba reached a pivotal moment as rural workers again began to blockade roads around the city and, after large protests and street clashes, the

government capitulated, agreeing to reverse the privatization, reinstate SEMAPA, and revise Law 2029. Importantly, the government also agreed to democratize the governance structure of SEMAPA, putting it under the temporary authority of a board comprised of representatives from the municipality and independents who had strong links to the Coordinador (thus giving the urban trade unions, rural workers associations, and resident associations a voice in the governance structure). This highlights an important aspect of the Cochabamba fight specifically, and anti-privatization struggles in Latin America during the neoliberal period more generally – and illustrates why both are causally and generatively important to the emergence and development of DPO. Namely, local organizations and social movements often did not want to return to traditional forms of bureaucratic and hierarchical state ownership, rather they were in favor of new institutional forms and arrangements that would decentralize power and increase democratic participation and accountability.

In Cochabamba, the traditional public utility model was ultimately retained (as opposed to conversion to a cooperative or other institutional structure), but with a conscious effort to assert "social control." This approach shared many features with the DPO concept, and thus it is an important case to analyze in detail. The concept of social control was centered around the idea of democratizing the utility's management, decision-making processes, and goals by enhancing community participation (Spronk, 2007; Driessen, 2008; Razavi, 2019). In practice, this primarily consisted of creating a multi-stakeholder governing board with elected citizen representatives alongside union and municipal representatives. Other ideas proposed included creating multi-stakeholder "technical committees" that would increase community participation in, and oversight of, service expansion projects and "Basic Sanitation Committees" organized at the neighborhood level to collect and transmit local demands up to the utility and review water service plans received from the utility (Driessen, 2008). These proposed changes mirror those suggested in certain DPO publications, especially with regard to representation on governing boards and internal decentralization that would allow for multiple participatory opportunities (e.g. Cumbers and Hanna, 2019; Brennan, 2021).

However, ultimately the attempt to democratize SEMAPA can be considered a mostly failed experiment, one that contains many lessons for both the practice and theory of DPO. From the beginning, many of these democratic and participatory reforms were resisted by the local government and SEMAPA's management, and the social movements were forced to

make drastic concessions. The technical and basic sanitation committees were rejected, and the ultimate makeup of the multi-stakeholder board was far less participatory than the social movements had wanted. In particular, rather than holding a majority, the elected citizen representatives collectively held a minority of seats (Razavi, 2019). While numerous factors played a role in the inability to truly embed democratic governance with SEMAPA, one important one was that the social movements that had propelled the anti-privatization fight demobilized and were unable to maintain pressure on the utility to embed and embrace genuine social control (Sánchez Gómez and Terhorst, 2005).

From this relatively low baseline, social control then deteriorated over time. Restrictions were placed on who could vote for the citizen representatives, and further electoral impediments ensured extremely low levels of turnout. Once elected, the citizen representatives were given virtually no training and were often bribed or intimidated into voting in favor of board proposals. This furthered popular disinterest in the role, and by 2010 the citizen representatives were abolished, and no further elections were held (Razavi, 2019). As will be discussed further in chapter seven, this suggests that in order for DPO to have a chance at being successful there can be no substitute for the initial establishment of genuine democratic control, including the subordination of management personnel and entities to democratic governance bodies. In other words, democratic control and participation is unlikely to grow or increase over time if initial compromises are made that limit or weaken democratic elements of the institution's structure and approach.[67]

If anything, as the SEMAPA example demonstrates, democratic control and participation would likely decrease over time in such a scenario, especially if those initial compromises leave degrees of autonomous power in the hands of management entities and other institutions that might be hostile to the project of democratization. In order to establish and maintain genuine democratic control, SEMAPA's experience also supports the contention in some of the existing DPO literature that there likely needs to be regulation of, and accountability for, democratic processes coming from outside the enterprise itself – especially from social movements and institutions. For instance, as discussed in chapter two, this could

[67] This is also supported by evidence from the private sector. For instance, discussing the work of Jeffrey Kerr, Harrison and Freedman write that "Kerr argues that it is much harder for an organization to implement democratic processes if they are not in place early in the history of the organization. He also expresses the opinion that piecemeal efforts tend not to succeed" (2004, p. 52).

include the creation of autonomous resident "observatories" connected to the public enterprise that are empowered by law to perform certain oversight, regulatory, and participatory functions.

An additional, and related, problem concerned the role of SEMAPA's trade union. The union, which has been accused of being corrupt and internally undemocratic (Spronk, 2007), was able to parlay its role in the governance structure of SEMAPA to its own benefit. Specifically, it sided against proposals to increase social control, opting to retain more traditional management structures (Sánchez Gómez and Terhorst, 2005). This dynamic was not unique to SEMAPA and has emerged in several of the examples reviewed in this work thus far (for instance, the factory councils in Italy, the French railways, and the Soviet experience). At a basic level, these historical experiences reinforce that DPO is not, and should not, be a pure worker ownership or control approach. Rather, workers and trade unions are one component – albeit an important one – of a larger democratic model of how an enterprise is structured and how it interacts with the wider economic system. At a deeper level, these examples suggest that it is critically important to attain worker and trade union support for the implementation of DPO, including an accepted articulation of how it will support worker rights, living standards, and decision-making power. In other words, if workers and trade unions are not bought into the DPO concept, or if they feel it is being imposed by external actors (e.g. the state) without their participation in the process, the effort is likely to fail.

While social control is still preached in SEMAPA, it appears to be largely rhetorical. According to Razavi, social control now mostly takes the form of bi-annual accountability hearings in which a handful of audience members listen to prepared presentations from management and have 15 minutes to ask questions (2019). This dynamic of participatory and democratic processes atrophying over time, devolving into relatively pro forma rituals, and or being un-replicable outside of specific contexts is not unique to SEMAPA and has been extensively documented across a wide range of social, economic, and political organizations including cooperatives, private companies, government agencies, and social organizations (Putnam, 2000; Heller, et al., 2004; Cook, et al., 2007; Kaswan, 2014; Holyoke, 2021). What is less studied, especially in the context of publicly owned enterprises, is how democratic and participatory approaches can be maintained, and renewed, over time. While some suggestions on how this could be done can be gleaned from the historical examples reviewed in this thesis,

this is an area of DPO where future investigation and analysis is needed – including in depth research into some of the most often referenced contemporary experiments (such as the Paris water observatory model and Banco Popular in Costa Rica).[68]

Despite the subsequent challenges, the "water war" in Cochabamba inspired additional anti-privatization struggles in Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin America and the world. Moreover, it is sometimes referenced as one of the first major sparks of the modern global remunicipalization movement that has numerous generative and causal connections to the concept of DPO (as discussed in chapter two) (Cumbers, 2016b; Bel, 2020). In Bolivia, the struggle also generated momentum for larger political economic shifts as the country, and the region more generally, started to turn away from neoliberalism in the 2000s. Specifically, the anti-privatization struggle in Cochabamba is often credited with sparking a national struggle that led to the 2005 election of Bolivia's first indigenous president, Evo Morales, and his el Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism) party (Spronk, 2007; Dawson and Olivera, 2011).

Morales was part of a first wave of leftist national leaders in Latin America that, to varying degrees, critiqued neoliberalism and privatization (the so-called initial "Pink Tide") (Loureiro, 2018). While the record of the "Pink Tide" governments as it relates to reversing or perpetuating neoliberalism is decidedly mixed (Plehwe and Fischer, 2019) – both geographically and with regards to certain sectors and activities, such resource extraction and relations with indigenous communities (Salgado and Sandrin, 2021) – in many countries they were able to largely halt the privatization wave that had swept the region in the 1980s and 1990s (Lobina and Hall, 2007; Flores-Macías, 2012). Writing in a 2005 pro-privatization book (published by The World Bank) Shleifer noted that the privatization process in Latin America had "reached a standstill" and that "the initial hope and optimism" had given way "to doubt, disappointment, and a widely shared belief that privatization had failed" (2005, p. xvii).

As part of this anti-privatization movement, there have been numerous efforts to create more democratic and participatory services and enterprises across the region (especially in the

[68] For instance, recent reports suggest that that the activities of, and interest in, the Paris water observatory has declined over time. Paradoxically, this may be at least partially attributable to improved performance of the water system after it was brought back into public ownership (Cumbers, et al., 2024).

water sector). For instance, one 2012 survey by Spronk, Crespo, and Olivera discovered 26 alternative ownership/governance models in the water sector alone. This included publicly owned services, non-profit, non-state services (such as cooperatives), public-public partnerships, non-profit – non-profit partnerships, and public-commons partnerships (2012, pp. 421-452). These experiments are directly linked to the development of the DPO concept through international organizations like TNI and PSI. Specifically, these organizations have played an active role in supporting the development of alternatives in Latin America (Spronk, Crespo, and Olivera, 2012) and linking them to international networks of advocates and researchers who are committed to reversing privatization and advancing more democratic forms of public organization. For their part, most DPO theorists are active members of these networks, appearing regularly in their publications and at their conferences. One recent example was a 2022 conference in Santiago, Chile hosted by TNI, PSI, and dozens of other organizations interested in alternative models of public ownership and public services, which included a specific track on DPO (Santiago Declaration, 2022).

The prevalence and popularity of democratic, participatory, and community-based alternatives to both privatization and traditional forms of state-ownership in Latin America – and their subsequent generative influence on DPO – reflects both contextual and ideological considerations. Regarding the former, as the Cochabamba example demonstrates, in many Latin American countries state institutions are sometimes relatively weak and susceptible to corruption, elite capture, and clientelism (Millet, Holmes, and Pérez, 2015). This is particularly true of local government, which in many cases doesn't have the power, resources, or autonomy to pursue goals and objectives independent of regional or national government institutions (Arpini, et al., 2023). Moreover, traditional SOEs and economic agencies (such as central banks) have often at best been antagonistic to genuine worker and community participation, and at worst been important institutional cogs in repressive dictatorial and military regimes (Basualdo, Berghoff, and Bucheli, 2021).[69] For these reasons, Latin American activists and theorists have often advanced approaches that either transcend

[69] Summing up the Latin American context in the 1980s and 1990s, much of which remains applicable, Baiocchi writes that activists and movements faced "sharply increasing inequalities, a lack of credible institutional outlets for political expression, uncertainty about rights and freedoms, a precarious and splintered job market, the hollowing of public provision—alongside radical resistance and real hope in local arenas" (2024).

traditional state structures entirely or mediate their influence by elevating and empowering additional stakeholder groups.

Ideologically, many Latin American social movements and organizations involved in anti-privatization and pro-public struggles fuse traditional leftist theories and perspectives (such as those discussed in chapters four and five and which also form the basis of DPO) with longer standing indigenous traditions and approaches that stress various forms of communal stewardship of assets and resources. For instance, the Zapatistas – who instituted a form of direct democratic public (community) ownership and participatory planning in the areas they liberated in 1994 (Hesketh, 2017; Mora, 2017; Vargas, 2019/20) – created a new blended ideology referred to as Zapatismo. Discussing Zapatismo's influences, Subcomandante Marcos states that it "was not Marxism-Leninism, but it also was Marxism-Leninism, it wasn't the Marxism of the university, it wasn't the Marxism of concrete analysis, it wasn't the history of Mexico, it wasn't fundamentalist and millennialist indigenous thought, it wasn't indigenous resistance: it was a mix of all this, a cocktail that was mixed in the mountains and that crystalized in the fighting force of the EZLN" (LeBot, 1997, pp. 198-201; Henck, 2017). Marcos, also known as Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente, himself is a former college professor who was active in the Mexican left during the 1970s and 80s. Marcos wrote a dissertation on the work of Althusser and Foucault before joining the Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional (FLN), an insurgent group that was a precursor to the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) (Henck, 2017). Such a background is not uncommon amongst Latin American activists and theorists, many of whom have at least some interest in, or ideological affinity with, traditional, European-based leftist theorists.

Similarly, in Cochabamba the social movements in the city and surrounding region reflected a mix of ideological perspectives. This included various forms of socialism, anarchism, syndicalism, and cooperativism (Webber, 2011) alongside traditional local and indigenous customs, including a concept called Usos y Costumbres. Translated as "uses and customs," in the Cochabamba water context it referred to a system of "people-centered governance" of resources (especially water) that was based in indigenous Andean practices around reciprocity and equitable distribution (Perreault, 2008; Razavi, 2019). Specifically, the concept empowered local community members to participate in decision making in various ways. After the water war, Usos y Costumbres was codified into the legal system governing Bolivia's water resources and usage through amendments to Law 2029.

This ideological synthesis, and the Latin American experience generally, represents both a challenge and opportunity for DPO theorists and practitioners. First and foremost, it cautions against the traditional practice of exclusively locating DPO, and economic democracy more broadly, within Anglo-European originated leftist ideological traditions. In other words it reinforces the need to decolonize these theories and the discourse around alternative economic organizations and systems more generally. At the same time, however, it also suggests that such ideologies and theories cannot be erased, ignored, or simply replaced by pre-colonial and or indigenous ideas around property ownership, economic organization, and democracy. The opportunity, therefore, is to continue to build on this synthesis and further develop and refine DPO as a novel concept that is rooted in, but also transcends established ideological traditions and organizational approaches. This includes by acknowledging and drawing from Eurocentric "old left" ideas, but moving decisively beyond them by analyzing and incorporating certain indigenous approaches to democracy, participation, ecology, culture, and gender.

While Latin America has played, and continues to play, a prominent role in the global resistance to neoliberalism and the search for alternative approaches, it is not the only region of the Global South where this dynamic has occurred. Another important example comes from Kerala in India, a state that is home to around 35 million people. Beginning in the early 1990s, India began introducing various neoliberal economic reforms, such as trade liberalization and a reduced role for the state (including less public procurement, privatization of SOEs, and the abolition of subsidies). These changes hurt the agricultural sector in particular, with increased price volatility and indebtedness deepening rural poverty and despair (Kuruvilla, 2019; Ali T and Sarma, 2021). In response, a variety of local social, economic, and political organizations in Kerala came together to forge an alternative path. This includes creating the Brahmagiri Development Society (BDS), a large cooperative formed in 1999 that processes and markets agricultural products (Kuruvilla, 2020; Ali T and Sarma, 2021). The cooperative consciously guards against co-optation by political and social elites and employs horizontal and democratic decision-making processes, including around allocation of the cooperative's surplus. It also includes Kudumbashree, a women's empowerment organization consisting of around 300,000 neighborhood groups with 4.5 million members, which was started in the late 1990s as part of a state-wide program called the People's Plan Campaign for Democratic Decentralisation. In turn, the Kudumbashree have

formed tens of thousands of women's' farming collectives and have helped thousands of women access political offices across the state (Kuruvilla, 2019; Zaina, 2022). Another important institutional feature is a network of nearly 1,000 cooperative banks (in addition to another nearly 1,500 agricultural credit societies) and the Kerala State Cooperative Bank (Kuruvilla, 2019).

What makes the Kerala model particularly relevant to DPO is the role of the local government and the relationship between left political formations, social movements, and democratic economic and social institutions. Specifically, Kerala has a strong political left which, since independence, has routinely governed the state. Led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), the Left Democratic Front (LDF) alliance in the state has won 6 out of the 10 regional elections since 1980. The LDF in particular, and the Kerala government more generally, has provided significant state support for the creation of alternative economic models and institutions, including the BDS, Kudumbashree, the Kerala Cooperative Bank, and the Uralungal Labour Contract Cooperative Society (an older cooperative owned and controlled by around 3,000 workers in the state) (Kuruvilla, 2019; Ali T and Sarma, 2021). Discussing the BDS in particular, Ali T and Sarma write that "a key component of the cooperative's success has been the support it received from the left-wing state government in its initial stage" (2021). In addition to supporting the cooperative sector, the Kerala government also directly owns and operates dozens of economic enterprises and public services across a wide range of sectors, including agriculture, tourism, utilities, and transportation.

In sum, Kerala provides a model of economic democracy, and resistance to neoliberalism, that is rooted in multiple organizational forms, co-production with state institutions, a commitment to democracy (both at the enterprise and political level), left ideology and tradition, and a mix of decentralization and higher-level coordination, on the one hand, and markets and planning, on the other. All of which are, as will be discussed in the next chapter, important principles of DPO. Undoubtedly, Kerala's approach is not without its challenges and limitations, not least of which is the region's constitutional and legal place in the Indian political economic system and subordination to the central government on many important issues, especially as it relates to trade and economic development policies. Given how Kerala's model influences and aligns with many aspects of DPO, more detailed analysis

of these and other challenges, and the model more generally, will be an important area for future DPO research and analysis, especially as neoliberalism continues to mutate.

6.4 Summary and Reflections

The resistance and alternative models emanating from Latin America and elsewhere in the Global South around the turn of the 21st century marked a turning point in the history and development of neoliberalism. At the local and national levels, it led to the emergence of movements and leaders who were, to varying degrees, interested in alternatives to the neoliberal model as well as the reversal of certain neoliberal policies and approaches (such as largely halting the privatization wave of the preceding two decades and advancing more democratic alternatives). At the international level, veteran activists and policymakers from the Global South began joining with each other in regional groupings and with supportive organizations and movements in other regions to begin challenging some of the international institutions that had played a prominent role in the spread and entrenchment of neoliberalism. For instance, Oscar Olivera, one of the leaders of the Cochabamba social movement travelled to Washington, D.C. in the Spring of 2000 to join Global Justice Movement (GJM) protests targeting meetings of the IMF and World Bank (Assies, 2003).

They also joined international academic and activist networks to advance alternatives and connect with contemporaries facing similar or related challenges in other parts of the world. Alongside more niche anti-privatization networks (like those enabled by TNI and PSI), this included larger and more publicized efforts like the World Social Forum (WSF), which held its first meeting in Brazil in 2001. The WSF in particular has been identified as both an important venue and milestone as it relates to the discussion and development of alternatives to neoliberalism, especially concerning ideas and approaches around ownership, governance, and economic democracy (De Sousa Santos, 2008; Routledge and Cumbers, 2009). As part of this "internationalization" process, many ideas and models also began to spread around the world. This includes participatory budgeting (PB), which emerged in Porto Alegre, Brazil in the late 1980s. Originally championed by the local branch of the leftist Workers' Party as a way to increase participation in municipal economic decision-making, PB quickly spread throughout Brazil and then to much of the rest of the world, especially Europe and North America (Marquetti, Schonerwald da Silva, and Campbell, 2012).

In general, these local, national, and international development helped call into question many neoliberal tenants and concepts that had been considered sacrosanct for much of the preceding two decades – such as the supposed benefits of private ownership models and NPM approaches to public sector governance. They also challenged conventional alternatives and ideological paradigms, such as traditional forms of state ownership and leftist theory, by advancing and incorporating indigenous and de-colonial concepts and approaches. Together, this had a significant and transformative impact on global left discourse and activities in the early decades of the 21st century, including specifically with regards to both the remunicipalization movement and the concept of DPO, both of which, as discussed in this chapter, can trace their modern roots to the breaking of the neoliberal consensus that resistance in the Global South helped bring to pass.

Chapter 7 - Revising and Refining the Concept of DPO

The analysis and narrative presented in the preceding three chapters covers numerous historical theories and experiments relevant to the concept of DPO spanning a roughly 200-year period from the dawn of the industrial revolution to the aftermath of the GFC. Having outlined the various historical trends and relevant cases, this chapter seeks to build upon this analysis, and the literature review conducted in chapter two, to more firmly establish DPO as a distinct concept and advance its development through the presentation of a refined concept. This takes the form of a suggested definition, a new set of principles (some revised and some original), and a theory of change.

First and foremost, this chapter proposes a formal definition of DPO. As previously discussed, DPO is a relatively new concept that has, up to this point, been un- or ill-defined, either consciously or unconsciously. For instance, neither the UK Labour Party's consultation on DPO (Labour Party, 2018) nor *Constructing the Democratic Public Enterprise* (Cumbers and Hanna, 2019) contains a formal definition of DPO. Rather these, and other, pieces of foundational DPO literature often rely on a basic set of definitional parameters and oppositional statements. While such an approach has certain benefits, especially during the early stages of a concept's development, both the scientific and practitioner communities attach high importance to clearly explaining and communicating the intended meaning of words and terms. As such, proposing a concrete, although not unchangeable, definition is an important next step in the conceptual development of DPO. Second, this chapter reviews the principles of DPO outlined in the existing literature and re-evaluates them based on the historical and theoretical evidence analyzed in this thesis. The purpose of this "pre-post" analytical process is to provide a more thorough explanation of these principles and their relative importance to the concept of DPO. This includes revealing tensions, potential trade-offs, and unanswered questions within and between principles. Related to this, the chapter also suggests several potential new principles not included in the current DPO literature. Third, the chapter offers a theory of change for DPO, defined here as a description of how change occurs. In other words, based on the historical analysis, this chapter discusses possible ways to move from the current systemic state, where DPO remains extremely marginal, to one in which it becomes a major or dominant paradigm; and, how to do it in a way that is both feasible and in accordance with the core values of DPO emanating from both its principles and history.

As explained in the introduction, the goal of this thesis is not to present a fully-fledged theory of DPO. Rather it is to begin to move the concept out of its early conceptual development phase and set a new baseline for further study and advancement. As such, the definition, refined principles, and theory of change presented in this chapter are not intended to be definitive and unchangeable. To the contrary, they are intended to provide the basis for further debate, critique, and development, especially from the academic community.

7.1 Defining DPO

Part of the reason that DPO lacks a commonly agreed upon formal definition is because of the importance and centrality of democratic choice and deliberation to the basic concept. In particular, DPO publications are often careful to point out that DPO is, to a certain degree, context dependent. In other words, it will likely look different based on the needs, culture, and democratic decisions of local populations, Moreover, democratic public enterprises should be legally autonomous (meaning they have the right, within boundaries, to determine their own business practices). For instance, Cumbers and Hanna write that "the forms taken by democratic public ownership will diverge according to the social needs and technical requirements of different places, activities, and sectors" (2019, p. 2). However, the DPO literature also establishes numerous definitional parameters, oppositional statements, and principles that establish conceptual guardrails and limit the extensiveness or absoluteness of local democracy and legal autonomy. For instance, if a community establishes a democratically governed public enterprise, but directs or allows it to implement racist hiring policies or abusive business practices, most DPO publications would not consider it to be a form or example of DPO. Collectively, then, these guardrails amount to something of a de-facto definition and the challenge is to develop a formal definition that encompasses them but is broad and flexible enough to preserve the centrality of democratic choice and allow local experimentation and development. Accordingly, and based on the ideological and theoretical history analyzed in this thesis, I propose the following definition of DPO:

> **Democratic Public Ownership is a form of economic democracy that reimagines publicly owned enterprises, services, and assets, and how they intersect with political economic system change, on the basis of broad-based public participation and control, justice, equitably shared prosperity, and social and ecological progress.**

Through both the literature review and subsequent historical analysis chapters, this thesis has established DPO as part of the socio-economic philosophy known as economic

democracy. As such, the first part of the definition makes this orientation explicit – codifying a common theme in the existing DPO literature. Moreover, the later phrase concerning "political economic system change" further associates DPO with the broader original interpretation of economic democracy which, as was discussed in chapter four, is ideologically rooted in the political left and seeks the creation of a more economically and politically equitable alternative to modern capitalism. However, as will be covered in greater detail below, this does not mean that DPO must be aligned with one particular view or approach regarding how exactly such a system based on economic democracy should be organized, especially as it relates to complex issues such as the appropriate mix of markets and planning, the role of the state, and the existence of other ownership forms. It also does not mean that DPO cannot or should not be implemented within existing systemic arrangements, even if those experiments do not ultimately lead to systemic change (in fact, such an approach is fully in congruence with the theory of change suggested for DPO in the last part of this chapter).

Again, these added details are often explicit or implicit in the DPO literature and historical analysis. Through the inclusion of these phrases, this new definition establishes certain basic historical and ideological parameters for DPO that can prevent the concept from being either weakened to the point of irrelevance or co-opted by the political right. However, it also preserves democratic choice by refraining from sectarianism or elevating one ideological perspective over others. Specifically, as discussed extensively in chapter four, both economic democracy and the goal moving beyond capitalism are broad concepts that historically have incorporated a wide range of ideological viewpoints from radical liberalism, to mutualism and anarchism, to cooperativism, to Marxism, and beyond; and this definition retains that pluralist approach.

Combined with the immediately preceding phrase about "reimagining publicly owned enterprises," the words concerning "political economic system change" also concretize an important duality reinforced by the historical analysis in this thesis. Namely, that – in accordance with the orientation towards a broad and systemically transformative interpretation of economic democracy – any internal, firm-level re-imagining of public enterprises cannot be separated from the wider goal of restructuring economic, political, and social relations. This is further reinforced by the inclusion of the term "justice," which can include economic, social, and political dimensions (Fraser, 2013).

The vast majority of examples and DPO prototypes analyzed in chapters four through six embraced this duality, at least theoretically and conceptually. This includes the early cooperative movement, which often paired shifts in the ownership and management of workplaces with utopian socialist, mutualist, and cooperativist systemic visions; the post-World War I council movements in Italy, Germany, and Russia that were consciously linked to left wing revolutionary efforts to overthrow or supplant the capitalist political economic system; the early French and US railway democratization models that were advanced by syndicalists, trade unionists, and socialists; Guild Socialism, which sought a systemic alternative to capitalism and state socialism based on democratization of both the firm and inclusion of the wider society; the post-World War II Yugoslav model which sought to embed worker self-management and social ownership within a wider socialist political economic system; the Algerian experiment with autogestion that attempted to pair workplace democracy and public ownership with the overthrow and wholesale restructuring of a former colonial political economic system; the workers' control movement in Britain in the 1970s, which combined trade union empowerment, public ownership, and worker self-management in service of the transition towards a socialist political economic system; and many others.

Lastly, the phrase "on the basis of broad-based democratic participation and control, justice, equitably shared prosperity, and social progress" attempts to translate the principles (discussed further below) of DPO, and the historical and theoretical analysis that underpins them, into as broad terms as possible in order to provide guardrails while preserving as much latitude for democratic practice. These terms also further align the DPO concept with the political left and insulate it from potential co-optation and ideological misinterpretation. Specifically, "broad-based democratic participation and control" encompasses many of the DPO principles related to structure and organization. While "equitably shared prosperity" and "social and ecological progress" cover many of the principles related to purpose. Following from Fraser's theories, justice encompasses and intersects with all the DPO principles and the other clauses in this part of the definition.

By their nature, definitions not only explain what something is but also provide insight into what it is not. In this case, by explicitly aligning DPO with the more systematically transformative interpretation of economic democracy, the proposed definition establishes that the concept is not merely a narrow form of "workplace democracy" and does not simply seek to improve internal firm-level participation within existing systemic arrangements. That being

said, the definition does not necessarily exclude approaches that seek to increase firm level participation and democracy, such as codetermination, profit sharing, works councils, public hearings and comment, and joint consultation. Nor does it rule out democratic, voluntary membership models of ownership like cooperatives and employee stock ownership. However, it does suggest that these efforts should be transitional towards larger goals of systemic change and social progress, rather than the end goal in and of themselves.

A useful example of this orientation revealed in the historical analysis is the theoretical positioning of the IWC in Britain in the 1960s and 70s. As discussed in chapter five, theorists associated with IWC identified efforts to increase workers' control as a "central motor of the transition to socialism" (Ackers, 2010, p. 65) and differentiated between this and "self-management," which referred to how publicly owned enterprises would operate after a transition to socialism had been achieved. In other words, for these theorists, efforts to increase workers' control needed to be explicitly aimed at, and aligned with, the goal of replacing capitalism. Accordingly, simply increasing worker (and union) participation in, and participation with, management structures was at best insufficient, and at worse, damaging to the long-term prospects of systemic change. This perspective was echoed by other theorists of the time, including the Belgian Marxist Ernest Mandel who argued that codetermination had weakened the strength of trade unions and the militancy of its members by giving them the "illusion" of rights and power in the workplace (Mandel, 1968).[70]

However, the definition of DPO proposed here also establishes that the concept is neither pre-workers' control nor worker self-management in the classic sense. Specifically, the phrase "broad-based democratic participation and control" indicates that while workers are an important stakeholder group, they are not the only group that should be represented in, or have control over, the governance and management of democratic public enterprises. This principle of multi-stakeholder governance that includes, but is not limited to, workers is

[70] While Mandel derided forms of worker participation and codetermination within capitalist enterprises, like some of the theorists associated with IWC he believed that efforts to enhance workers' control within enterprises and industries were an important transitional step towards socialism. In 1973, he wrote: "If, however, starting with the immediate concerns of the workers, we formulate demands which *cannot* be assimilated by the regime, and if the workers become convinced of the need to fight for those demands, then we shall have made a decisive step towards welding together the struggle for immediate demands and the long-term struggle to overthrow Capital. For in such a situation, the struggle for transitional demands is bound to become a struggle which shakes the very foundations of capitalism, and Capital will be forced to contest it fiercely. The most typical example of the struggle for transitional demands is the struggle for workers' control" (Mandel, 1973).

firmly established in the DPO literature (Lapavitsas, 2010; Cumbers and Hanna, 2019; We Own It, 2019; Brennan, 2021) and, as discussed throughout this thesis, has numerous historical precedents, including, for instance, post-World War I railroad reform efforts in both France and the US.

Lastly, by centering economic democracy, political economic system change, and certain social and democratic values, the definition also establishes that DPO is not a form of pragmatic municipalism – an orientation that, as discussed in chapter two, suggests governments (at various levels) pursue or abandon public ownership based on a narrow set of primarily economic considerations. Rather, DPO is inherently political in nature. While economic issues like cost savings, revenue generation, and service quality should undoubtedly play a role in decision-making around the deployment and role of DPO, the definition indicates that these should be both complimentary and subordinated to social and political objectives.

7.2 Revisiting the Principles of DPO

As discussed in chapter two, several contributions to the existing DPO literature either explicitly or implicitly outline key conceptual principles of DPO, and these can be grouped together into three broad categories – structure, organization, and purpose. For each of these principles, the literature often provides some basic definitional and explanatory information along with references to historical and contemporary examples and theories, many of which were investigated in some detail in chapters four through six. In this section, each of the existing principles of DPO are reviewed using a "pre-post" analytical process, with the "pre" state being what is contained in the existing DPO literature and the "post" state being what has been learned, surfaced, or unanswered by this thesis. In several instances, refinements to an existing principle or potential new principles are suggested as a result of this process and these are presented in bold in Table 1-7 at the end of this section.

7.2.1 Decentralization and Subsidiarity

The first category of principles is structure, which can be loosely defined as a set of arrangements and relationships. In the context of DPO, this refers to how democratic public enterprises interact with and impact broader political, social, and economic systems and approaches. Within this category are three established and interlinked principles: subsidiarity and decentralization, higher level coordination, and co-production. As defined by Cumbers

and Hanna (2019), subsidiarity and decentralization are interconnected and refer to the relationship between organizations, organizational decision-making, people, and communities within democratic systems. More specifically, they both refer to the idea that "as much as possible decisions should be taken at the lowest level of governance and enterprises organised at smaller scales (both internally and externally)" (Cumbers and Hanna 2019, p. 2). However, these principles are generally under-analyzed and under-explained in the existing DPO literature. In particular, while the literature often discusses elements of democratic theory (especially participatory democracy) and the importance of democratizing organizations and organizational decision-making, the connection between democratization and decentralization/subsidiarity is usually only suggested or assumed (e.g. Cumbers 2012; Cumbers and Hanna 2019). Furthermore, additional potential benefits of, or rationales for, decentralization are usually not included. Chapters four through six correct for this, establishing the importance of decentralization/subsidiarity in the ideological foundations of economic democracy as well as historical and theoretical basis of the link between it and democratization.

In particular, chapter four demonstrates that many of the early theorists who are foundational to economic democracy generally, and DPO specifically, embraced decentralization in one form or another. For instance, Mill paired support for workplace democracy and socialism with a rejection of centralization and a belief in the importance of democratic practice at smaller scales – specifically advocating for a form of subsidiarity. Marx and Engels envisioned the state withering away and being replaced by the free association of producers, rejected bureaucracy, and supported democratic local organizations similar to the Paris Commune.[71] And Proudhon and other mutualists and anarchists often

[71] There remains considerable debate as to whether Marx and Engels leaned more towards centralization or decentralization. Famously, Bernstein claimed that Marx's writings on the Paris Commune displayed commonalities with Proudhon and anarchist federalism. Lenin rejected this, maintaining that Marx was always a centralist (Lenin, 1918). Writing in 1885, however, Engels repudiated an earlier statement (from 1850) that had been strongly supportive of centralization. Claiming it had been based on a misunderstanding of the history of the French revolution, Engels wrote that until Napoleon had taken power "provincial and local self-government, similar to the American, became the most powerful lever of the revolution" (Tucker, 1978, p. 510). Summarizing the debate in 1997, J.H. Kautsky wrote that Marx and Engels' view of what would and should happen to the state and class distinctions in communism creates a "concept of centralization that is at best quite vague and may even be self-contradictory as it may imply decentralization" (p. 388).

proposed decentralized and federated structures combined with direct democracy and workers' control as the means to maximize liberty and minimize authoritarianism.

Mill's perspective on decentralization and subsidiarity – echoed by Dewey, Cole, Proudhon, and others – is particularly relevant because it suggests the need for an important additional refinement to the principle that is not often discussed in the existing DPO literature specifically, and wider discourse on the political left more generally. Namely, that decentralization is important not only to enhance democracy but also to preserve political, economic, and social freedom, which can be imperiled by over-centralization. This concern was an animating force behind the theoretical development of Guild Socialism, and analysis of the Soviet and Eastern European experience (chapter five) suggests it remains a valid consideration.[72] More specifically, the centralized and statist political economic model that came to dominate the Soviet Union during the Stalinist era, and which was adopted in much of Eastern Europe after World War II, has been extensively critiqued for limiting economic, social, and political freedom and, thus, diverging from the original theories of Marx, Engels, and other early communist theorists. In particular, it reimposed coercive social relations, hierarchy, and managerial control both within industry and across the wider society.

Following from this is an additional refinement related to legal autonomy. As Hodgson suggests in his critique of Guild Socialism (2023), in order to genuinely guard against centralization, and prevent democratic organizations and structures from being subsumed by, and subordinated to, larger entities, they must have some degree of legal codification and autonomy. In other words, democratic public enterprises cannot simply be subdivisions or units of the state, rather they should be relatively autonomous and legally codified organizations that can, and likely should, include representatives from state institutions alongside other stakeholders in their ownership and governance structure. However, as discussed in chapter six in relation to NPM and disaggregation, while there are benefits to decentralization (especially with regards to proximity to stakeholders) and to creating organizations with clear, defined missions and day-to-day managerial autonomy,

[72] However, despite explicitly rejecting the Soviet model of centralization, Hodgson suggests that Guild Socialism would have inevitable resulted in centralization due to its rejection of most market mechanisms and the autonomy of firms from the state, among other political and economic issues (2023).

these need to be balanced with enhanced democratic governance and oversight that goes beyond traditional state-led approaches.

7.2.2 Higher-level Coordination

In the DPO literature, decentralization/subsidiarity is often presented alongside a second principle: higher-level coordination. The pairing of these seemingly contrasting principles reflects a wider appreciation of issues related to scale, both geographically and economically; and in particular a concern that decentralization/subsidiarity, taken to its localist or individualist extreme, may hinder the ability to address broader societal needs and goals and limit the effectiveness of economic organizations. As Chalmers puts it, the scope for "democratic collective action" must be preserved since we are entering "an epoch where radical, highly-coordinated activities will be required to solve macro-level grand challenges such as ecological collapse and other existential problems" (2022, p. 1050).[73] The evidence and arguments developed in this thesis confirm the legitimacy of these concerns and reinforce the importance of finding an appropriate balance between these principles.

First and foremost, a maximalist approach to decentralization is unsupported in the ideological foundations of economic democracy and DPO. Even theorists closely associated with early anarchism and mutualism saw the need for larger organizations that could play a coordinating economic and political role. Proudhon, for instance, proposed that the Bank of France be converted into a national "Bank of Exchange" that would be democratically governed by delegates from various economic sectors and would allocate credit to worker-controlled enterprises. Moreover, rather than individual communities and local organizations operating totally independent of one another, many early mutualists and anarchists believed in creating a bottom-up and voluntary system of federated institutions that would be organized at

[73] In his critique of the deregulatory, "free market" approach to addressing the problem of "cronyism" in contemporary capitalist systems (e.g. Klein, et al.), Chalmers suggests two alternatives. The first is a decentralized version of economic democracy based on worker cooperatives, CWB, and other institutions and processes that draw from mutualist and anarchist ideological traditions. The second is an approach whereby the state would be empowered "to be more instrumental in coordinating some areas of economic activity," especially as it relates to redirecting economic activity away from financially speculative and ecologically destructive sectors (Chalmers, 2022, p. 1054). The combination of these two models is one illustration of how the principles of subsidiarity/decentralization and higher-level coordination can be balanced in practice to deliver superior outcomes to both "crony" capitalism and the hypothetical free market alternative.

the regional, national, and international level (Ward, 2004).[74] Similarly, syndicalists often envisioned the creation of a bottom up system of federated worker controlled organizations that would be linked together at different scales by planning entities (sometimes called labor exchanges) responsible for making production and allocation decisions (Brown, 1943).

The importance of higher-level coordination, especially around issues of economic development, capital allocation, and industrial policy is reinforced throughout the historical examples analyzed in this thesis. As discussed in chapter five, in Yugoslavia, for instance, political and economic decentralization, combined with the introduction of market mechanisms to deal with coordination issues and other issues, contributed to rising social and geographic inequality, undermined the connection between firms (and their workers) and larger social objectives, increased bureaucratization of enterprises, and weakened participation. Moreover, these problems worsened over time as the power of decentralized regions increased, efforts to reform self-managed enterprises failed, and centralized approaches (including redistributive tax and investment policies) were weakened or abolished. Ultimately, the imbalance between decentralization and higher-level coordination contributed to the breakup of the Yugoslav federation and the abolition of the self-management system – although many other factors also played a role.

Analysis of the Yugoslav experience adds an additional important detail to the principle of higher-level coordination, namely that the entities responsible for such coordination should be both genuinely democratic and connected, from the bottom-up, to the enterprises they seek to coordinate. In Yugoslavia, the lack of genuinely democratic planning and participation contributed to exacerbated regional inequities, entrenched clientelism in the self-managed system, and depressed participation and enthusiasm for the system amongst rank-and-file workers (Musić, 2011; Robertson, 2017).

In Algeria, a lack of higher-level coordination hindered the expansion and effectiveness of decentralized, self-managed economic organizations after the anti-colonial

[74] "This federation…will not be a nation organized from the top down, or from the center to the circumference," Bakunin wrote. "Rejecting the principle of imposed and regimented unity, it will be directed from the bottom up, from the circumference to the center, according to the principles of free federation. Its free individuals will form voluntary associations. Its associations will form autonomous communes, its communes will form autonomous provinces, its provinces will form the regions, and the regions will freely federate into countries which, in turn. will sooner or later create the universal world federation" (1866).

independence struggle against the French. Specifically, the emerging self-managed sector was forced to compete for capital and resources (including technical experts) against both for-profit companies and SOEs. In other words, despite the government's rhetorical support for self-management, the higher-level economic coordination needed to ensure its institutionalization and survival was lacking. This was recognized at the time, with proposals made to create a public bank that would allocate capital to the self-managed enterprises, to establish a national marketing cooperative that would help them sell goods, and to provide priority access to government procurement contracts – all of which constitute, or require, elements of higher-level coordination, including larger organizations and the embedding of decentralized institutions within broader, multi-scalar relations.

Additionally, like Yugoslavia, the Algerian example makes the case that the principle of higher-level coordination should be refined to ensure that such entities and approaches are democratic and have appropriate representation from the decentralized enterprises they seek to coordinate. Specifically, while a national agency was created to supervise and coordinate the Algerian self-managed sector, it was accused by the self-managed enterprises it was supposed to be supporting of being overly bureaucratic, disconnected , and, ultimately, ineffective (Southgate, 2011).

In the Chiapas region of Mexico, the Zapatistas successfully developed a system that combines decentralization and alternative models of ownership and production with higher-level coordination at a regional level. However, that coordination largely does not extend past their region given their break with the Mexican state and rejection of neoliberal state-centric international networks. As discussed in chapter six, in recent years, this has hindered the ability of the Zapatistas to effectively deal with threats to their community driven by wider world events, namely the rise of powerful transnational drug cartels and gangs, and has led to the dismantling of some of its decentralized administrative units.

What higher level coordination might look like in practice is underdiscussed and undertheorized in the existing DPO literature. That is likely because it directly relates to one of the most contentious issues on the political left historically, that of markets and planning. Briefly, many theorists and activists, including some of those associated with economic democracy and DPO, have historically been critical of markets – and especially the financialized market capitalism that defined the neoliberal era – suggesting that they play a

central role in driving inequality, exploitation, alienation, commodification, and unemployment, amongst other issues (Cumbers, 2012). However, as chapters four through six show, the traditional alternative of central planning, which was deployed in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, has also been widely critiqued and discredited. As such, many socialist theorists and reformers (including those in Yugoslavia, China, and other communist countries) have, for decades, discussed, developed, and attempted to implement various alternatives to centralized planning, including forms of market socialism, negotiated coordination, and participatory planning.

As it relates to higher level coordination, the fundamental issue – identified by Hayek (2005) and many others – is that central planning cannot hope to collect, process, and act on the massive quantities of information needed to run an economy, nor can it replicate the distributed collective knowledge about how economic organizations and systems operate. While some on the political left have argued that these planning hurdles can be overcome, often through technological advancements and or participatory methods for iterating information (e.g. Adaman and Devine 1996; Cockshott and Cottrell, 1999; Devine, 2002; Albert, 2003; Saros, 2014; Samothrakis, 2021; Sorg, 2022), others, including some of the theorists associated with DPO, suggest the potential for a mixture of markets and planning.[75] For instance, in discussing Hodgson's preference for market exchange and private enterprise to address these issues, Cumbers writes "while I am not fully endorsing Hodgson's enthusiastic embrace of the market in resolving these issues, the underlying point he makes here is inescapable. A system of completely centralized planning contains serious flaws…" (2012, pp. 68-69). At the same time, Cumbers makes it clear that in no way does this mean that planning should be excluded from the process of higher-level coordination and decision-making (2012).[76] For his part, Hodgson also opens the door for such a mixed approach,

[75] One of the most prominent of these is Theodore Burczak, who notes that even Hayek argued in favor of government support for those who "fall through the cracks of a market economy" (1996, p. 11) and proposes a market economy comprised of worker-controlled enterprises paired with "a government that is responsible for realizing social justice" (1996, p. 3). While these could be fully distinct entities, many DPO theorists (e.g. Cumbers and Hanna, 2019) would suggest that Burczak's dual goals of "democratically appropriating surplus labor" and advancing social justice could be integrated into a single organizational form, the democratic publicly owned enterprise (1996, p. 3).

[76] Citing Polanyi and others, Cumbers goes on to caution that "accepting a role for markets in a socialist economy, however, is a different thing to allowing the market to become dominant" (2012, p. 75). Furthermore, Cumbers maintains that market approaches are compatible with public and common forms of ownership, and the meshing of these two institutional features together has a long intellectual precedent on the political left.

writing that "some central coordination and supervision are possible – and even desirable – but they cannot bring together all the knowledge in the system" (2023, p. 38).

The historical analysis conducted in this thesis suggests that this mixed approach to markets and planning is appropriate for DPO, especially in the short term. As Cumbers explains, most modern economies already involve a mix of planning and markets (2012); and this is true for many of the historical experiments analyzed herein.[77] Moreover, in line with Hodgson's findings (1999, 2023), the analysis did not uncover any large-scale examples of centrally planned, or non-market systems that were able to achieve and maintain decentralization and democratic enterprise. That being said, how DPO interacts with, and is affected by, any particular mixture of markets and planning is likely to be contextually dependent, variable, and contested; and is an area where more research and conceptual development is needed, especially as it relates to the potentialities and pitfalls of big data, artificial intelligence, and advanced computing power.

7.2.3 Institutionalization and Embeddedness

While the DPO literature explicitly suggests that higher-level coordination is needed to address a range of social goals, the emphasis is often only put on economic considerations and, to a lesser extent, environmental and political issues. The examples and theories analyzed in this thesis suggests two other important goals that can be combined into a potential new principle of DPO: institutionalization and embeddedness. Regarding the former, a common theme throughout many of the examples analyzed in this thesis is that alternative modes of production and political economic approaches that break with traditional systems are often subjected to physical, legal, or political pressure or subversion by both external forces and entrenched stakeholder groups, especially in their formative stages. This can be seen with the factory councils in Italy and Germany after World War I, which were opposed by both the capitalist state and traditional institutions representing the working class (e.g. mainstream unions and center-left political formations); the post-revolution Bolshevik government in Russia, which faced both a civil war and invasion by a host of foreign adversaries; attempts to implement workers' control in Britain in the 1970s, which were resisted by businesses,

[77] Additionally, Cumbers points out that markets were in use long before the advent of capitalism, and the problem is "with particular forms of actively deregulated markets under capitalism which have become hegemonic under neoliberalism policy doctrine" (2012, p. 75).

conservative politicians, and some unions; and the opposition of unions and others to more radical participatory approaches in the reformed Cochabamba water utility in Bolivia.

Institutionalization refers to the process of confronting this opposition and firmly establishing democratic public enterprises as part of, or the defining feature of, the prevailing or emerging political economic system. How this can occur will be discussed further as part of the conversation on theory of change, but the historical analysis suggest that higher level coordination is important. Specifically, decentralized organizations and or localities operating independently of one another and of wider social movements will likely be more vulnerable to reactionary pressure. For instance, the failure of the Turin factory council movement to secure the backing of the Italian Socialist Party and national unions, and to convince workers nationwide to declare a general strike in support of their efforts, contributed to their inability to institutionalize factory councils. Similarly, the limited success in institutionalizing and scaling up community-based alternative economic models and approaches in the US during the early neoliberal period is at least partially attributable to their inability to secure sufficient backing from mainstream political parties, unions, and social movements. And, as discussed above, the Algerian experiment failed in part because self-managed enterprises were not able to secure either the necessary levels of support within the state and bureaucratic apparatus to compete with other, more established economic organizations or build an independent power base in the country's social movements (especially unions) that would have allowed them to overcome reactionary pressure once political regimes shifted. Going further, institutionalization also means attaining and retaining legal codification within the wider political economic system. As Hodgson puts it, "if substantial powers are to be devolved to local organisations, then these bodies must have some legal recognition" (2023, p. 25). This includes formalizing the rules around internal governance and management structure, participation and democracy, firm autonomy, dispute resolution processes (e.g. courts or arbitration), purpose (e.g. for-profit vs. not-for-profit), capitalization, subsidization, etc.

Embeddedness is a related concept that describes the need to actively install DPO concepts and principles in economic and social institutions, such as labor unions, schools, and political parties, in order to build support, minimize opposition over time, and develop a more cooperative culture that can replace the hyper-individualism endemic to capitalism. It draws from the Marxian theory of social reproduction, namely that modes of production and social practices (both good or bad) are self-replicating (Vidal, et al., 2019), as well as the Gramscian

theory of hegemony, which holds that a process of transforming ideas and redefining institutions is needed create a new hegemony ("predominance by consent") that can overcome and replace the existing hegemonic order (Gramsci, 2010). It also builds from the liberation and empowerment movements of the mid-20th century which, as Murray describes, have "contributed to a shift of focus towards the social relations of socialism" (1987, p. 102). As discussed in chapter five, a lack of embeddedness in, and ideological and democratic development of, social institutions (particularly the education system, trade unions, and the media) has been identified by some experts (e.g. Jakopovich, 2012) as one of the reasons that the worker self-managed system in Yugoslavia was unable to fully realize its democratic and transformative potential (especially as it relates to both employment and political relations) and eventually broke down over time amidst shifting economic and political conditions.

Embeddedness can also be applied to implementing, adapting, and reinforcing democratic processes and equity within enterprises themselves, both so that they don't whither and atrophy over time and so that they build and maintain internal and external support. As Murray puts it, "to maintain popular support, the new order must be a palpable improvement on the old" (1987, p. 103). This can occur through reinforcement, training, incentivization, increased rights and responsibilities, and equity audits and structures. Evidence for the necessity of such an approach can be seen throughout the history of the cooperative movement, where democratic structures and participation often ossified as cooperatives matured; Yugoslavia, where worker participation and enthusiasm was low due to a number of internal and external factors (Musić, 2011; Jakopovich, 2012); Cochabamba, where more democratic internal processes were subverted by powerful interest groups and then were gradually abolished (Sánchez Gómez and Terhorst, 2005; Razavi, 2019); and the post-war "Morrisonian" state owned enterprises in Britain, which empowered managers and weakened and divided workers, consumers, and public representatives, ultimately fatally undermining public support (Murray, 1987). As discussed in chapters two and five, while the DPO literature has, to a degree, addressed the firm level variant of embeddedness through calls for robust internal training processes and codified democratic structures, it has not yet adequately addressed the question of social embeddedness. Adding this new principle is a first step to addressing this, but more research and development is needed to suggest what this might look like in practice and in different socio-economic contexts.

Similar to institutionalization, at both the macro and micro levels the historical analysis suggests that embeddedness requires a degree of higher-level coordination. For instance, instilling DPO concepts in education systems and unions will require the active participation of stakeholders inside and outside of such institutions. Similarly, ensuring democratic practices are implemented and maintained within enterprises likely cannot be left up to the management of individual firms and may require the involvement of community or state-based regulatory and accountability structures outside of the firm – such as the "observatories" that have been set up alongside some water utilities in France, Spain, and elsewhere (Petitjean, 2015; Planas and Martínez, 2020) – as well as codified legal frameworks.

7.2.4 The State and Co-production

The related questions of how to implement institutionalization and embeddedness, and what higher-level coordination looks like in practice, raise one of the most important and complicated issues surfaced in this work: the role of the state. As discussed in chapter four, going back to the origins of economic democracy specifically, and left political economy more generally, the state has been a highly divisive and contested concept. In very general ideological terms, many early anarchists and syndicalists wanted to immediately dismantle the state as part of the revolutionary process; Marxists wanted to use the state to secure working class power and then watch it wither away; mutualists and cooperativists wanted to build their own institutions and communities largely outside of state structures; radical liberals, revisionist Marxists, and social democrats wanted to preserve and democratize the state as part of a shift away from capitalism and towards forms of democratic socialism; and state socialists wanted to expand and centralize the state as part of the process of establishing and defending working class dominance over the political economic system. Similar divergences towards the state were also seen on the political right, with libertarians envisioning the state reduced to a mere guardian of market exchange and private property, conservative state capitalists looking to use state structures to subsidize and support private industry and elite private interests, and fascists seeking to bolster the power of the state to enforce corporatism and ethno-nationalist social and economic policies.

While statist ideologies and models, including social democracy, state socialism, fascism, and state capitalism, came to dominate during the 20th century, the underlying

question about the role of the state has been a recurrent and common theme in economic democracy discourse and experimentation and remains so to this day. Yugoslavia, for instance, created a form of socially owned, decentralized worker self-managed production with the explicit, yet ultimately unfounded, hope that the state would wither away according to originalist Marxist theory. Similarly, Guild Socialism was proposed specifically as an alternative to statist versions of socialism and was animated by concerns around democracy and liberty. Yet, as Hodgson (2023) observes, the lack of legal autonomy from state structures (i.e. full national or municipal ownership paired with worker participation) and the absence of independent legal mechanisms to arbitrate disputes would have possibly led to state-centric bureaucratization and centralization if the theory had ever been put into practice.

Despite the importance of this debate, and its centrality to the history of economic democracy, the existing DPO literature has, with some notable exceptions (e.g. Cumbers, 2012) been generally ambiguous on the matter of the state. This is due, in part, to the relatively "broad tent" ideological approach many DPO theorists have traditionally taken, especially while the concept has been in the early stages of conceptual development; and also partly due to the reality that most, if not all, contemporary political economic systems are hybrids that include some statist and some non-statist approaches and institutions.[78] That being said, the DPO literature yields a basic framework for how to potentially approach the question of the state. Specifically, most contemporary DPO theorists and advocates do not explicitly suggest that the immediate destruction of the state through violent revolution is viable or desirable from the perspective of advancing economic democracy. Even those DPO advocates who are sympathetic to non-state approaches usually recognize the continued existence of the state, at least in the short term (Wainwright, 2020b; Hopman, et al., 2021).[79] In accordance with this general perspective, the DPO literature often includes various proposals on how to access, navigate, leverage, include, and influence state structures while attempting to ensure genuine democratic participation and or control.

[78] For instance, state socialist systems were never able to fully implement central planning and stamp out market exchange and private property. At the same time, all variants of capitalist systems have included statist elements and approaches, including healthcare systems, pensions, transportation, courts, regulatory bodies, etc.

[79] "It is clear that the appeal to more networked, decentered and democratic forms of politics remains a lofty aspiration rather than a more sober assessment of realities," Cumbers writes. "Autonomous movements cannot avoid engagement with the state and its institutional structures" (2012, p. 138).

Importantly, however, the DPO literature is also usually explicit that democratic public enterprises can be non-statist institutions as long as they are owned and governed by all people within a geographic area – e.g. not simply narrow voluntary membership organizations, like worker cooperatives (Lawrence and Hanna, 2020). Moreover, several of the more developed DPO models explicitly envision ownership and governance models in which formal state entities and representatives operate alongside, but are largely subordinated to, other stakeholder groups. For instance, Cumbers and Hanna (2019) suggest a governing assembly model in which state representatives comprise just one-quarter of all voting representatives, with the rest being elected or appointed by residents, workers, and external stakeholder groups. Organized as such, these institutions could be considered "socialist" or "public" without necessarily being "statist" (Wright, 2019).[80]

In sum, the DPO approach to the state can be defined as being neither dogmatically statist or anti-statist, but rather context dependent and based on the specific political economic realities of place and time (Cumbers, 2012). In such an approach the state can be described as one variable (among others) and political economic systems defined as being more or less statist based on the mix of variables chosen. The state can also be recognized not necessarily as a unitary entity, but rather as a loose assembly of institutions, interests, people, and structures that are sites of both domination and contestation (Wright, 2010). Lastly, the role of the state, or lack thereof, should be determined as part of a conscious and active democratic process of designing and redesigning institutions to ensure they continually meet community needs, economically, culturally, and politically (Baiocchi, 2024).

In general, the research conducted in this thesis supports this approach and orientation. Specifically, the historical analysis, which covers wide swathes of the world over a roughly 200-year period (albeit with significant gaps), reveals no modern historical or contemporary models of large-scale, non-statist political economic systems. Moreover, to the contrary, it suggests that in the few cases such an approach was tried, or rhetorically endorsed, the effort largely was unsuccessful. Simply put, the vision of radically decentralized, democratized, and federated political economic systems advanced by anarchist theorists like Proudhon, Bakunin,

[80] Wright explains that statism is when "the means of production are owned by the state, and thus the allocation and use of resources for different social purposes is accomplished through the exercise of state power." This is contrasted to socialism, which is when "the means of production are owned collectively by the entire society and thus the allocation and use of resources for different social purposes is accomplished through the exercise of what can be termed 'social power'" (2019).

Peter Kropotkin, and, later, Murray Bookchin, as well as the "pure" anti-statist communism of early Marxists like Marx, Engels, and Lenin remains relatively theoretical and untested at larger scales. This is not to say that non-statist systems are not possible, just that from the perspective of clarifying and refining the concept of DPO there are few, if any modern examples available for the type of rigorous developmental or comparative analysis.

Relatedly, the rise of statist political economic models throughout the 20th century has largely marginalized non-statist ideologies and movements. While anarchist, mutualist, syndicalist, and non-statist Marxist groups still exist, many modern social movements – especially those operating at larger scales – have relatively blended ideological orientations and more nuanced views of the state and interacting with state structures, especially in the short-term. This is evident in the cases of the Zapatistas in Chiapas, the Cochabamba water municipalization effort, the Kerala model, and the Latin American experience more generally (Baiocchi, 2024) which, as discussed in chapter six, have integrated socialist and anarchist ideas with indigenous and anti-colonial approaches.

It can also be seen in the more recent experience of the "autonomous" cantons in Rojava (northeast Syria), which have implemented a system based on a mix of local customs as well as the ideas and ideology of the imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan, a former Marxist-Leninist turned libertarian socialist (Türk, 2024).[81] Sometimes presented in western literature as being a stateless form of direct democracy (Hassan and Staal, 2017), the reality in Rojava is much more nuanced and complex. As Galvan-Alvarez writes, "the Autonomous Administration negotiates the thin line between functioning as a de facto sovereign body with all the trappings of an unofficial state while at the same time (cl)aiming to be a stateless bottom-up democracy" (2020, p. 184).

This tension, which is exacerbated by the dangerous geopolitical realities which Rojava has to navigate, can be seen in the region's new constitution, which includes most of the institutions and arrangements found in a traditional representative democratic state combined with innovative democratic approaches (such as multi-stakeholder representation, term limits, and consensus decision making processes) that are designed to foster more direct

[81] Öcalan has advanced a doctrine of democratic confederalism. Based in part on the work of Bookchin, democratic confederalism includes libertarian democratic socialism, ecology, and jineology, a Kurdish interpretation of women's liberation and empowerment (Błaszcyk, 2022).

and bottom up participation and control (RIC, 2023; Salih, 2024).[82] It also stakes out a cautious orientation towards autonomy and sovereignty, making it clear that the region ultimately recognizes and remains part of the Syrian state. In short, evidence from contemporary examples suggests that DPO's relatively middle of the road, and context dependent approach to the question of the state is largely in keeping with the current positioning and prospects of the global left which, by and large, is operating and organizing within, and against, statist realities (Cumbers, 2012).

Lastly, the historical analysis also demonstrates that in most countries and regions mutualist non-state economic institutions (such as cooperatives) have largely remained peripheral to the overall economic system.[83] This is especially true of production cooperatives within capitalism which, as theorists like Luxemburg, Marx, the Webbs, and many others identified early on, are often incapable of reconciling the competing interests of labor and capital – especially at larger scales. Specifically, as discussed in chapters four and five, historically many production cooperatives have failed under the pressures of capitalist market dynamics, compromised on cooperative principles and or adopted capitalist ones (including using wage labor), or demutualized either to avoid failure or to financially reward the original set of worker-owners.[84]

---

[82] These include local elected councils, local appointed executives, provincial, regional executives, a regional legislative assembly, a regional executive, numerous issue or identity specific councils, a finance and accounting agency, an election commission, a Supreme Court, a military, and a police force.

[83] In making the distinction between "small socialism," based on worker cooperatives and markets, and "big socialism," based on central planning and nationalization, Hodgson writes that "both may be feasible. But big socialism, from real world evidence from Russia to Venezuela, has been shown to lack innovative capacity and be incompatible with a flourishing democracy" (2023, p. 39). However, the real-world evidence of legally autonomous worker cooperatives operating within market-based systems is equally discouraging from the perspective of transitioning towards socialism. As suggested in this chapter, legally autonomous but more broadly constituted democratic enterprises of various sizes, operating within mixed systems of markets and planning, may provide an alternative path forward that yields better results than either "small socialism" or "big socialism" has in the past.

[84] One additional example not covered in chapters four through six concerns some of the worker cooperatives established during the Spanish Civil War. In 1990, Bookchin wrote that often localists and cooperativists "end up advocating a kind of 'collective' capitalism, in which one community functions like a single entrepreneur, with a sense of proprietorship toward its resources. Such a system of cooperatives once again marks the beginnings of a market system of distribution, as cooperatives become entangled in the web of 'bourgeois rights' — that is, in contracts and bookkeeping that focus on the exact amounts a community will receive in 'exchange' for what it delivers to others. This deterioration occurred among some of the worker-controlled enterprises that functioned like capitalistic enterprises in Barcelona after the workers expropriated them in July 1936" (p. 6).

One additional aspect that is implicit in the information analyzed on cooperatives is that while they are ostensibly non-state institutions, like private companies, most rely on state support and state-enforced legal frameworks in various ways. For instance, many of the larger-scale worker ownership experiments in modern history – including the Mondragon Corporation (Basque region of Spain), the Kerala cooperatives, the "Emilian" model (Italy), and US Employee Stock Ownership Plans – have enjoyed or accessed certain forms of state support, including tax incentives, subsidies, legal codification, marketing and coordination, and public procurement contracts (Hanna and Kelly, 2021). Similarly, Cumbers notes that anti-statist commons literature often provides simplistic real-world examples that miss, or avoid, key nuances about the involvement of the state in supporting commons-based approaches and experimentation (2012).

Rather than constituting a completely new principle, the context-dependent approach to the state can be helpful in refining some of the new and existing DPO principles. In particular, it establishes that higher-level coordination does not necessarily require centralization or the use of state structures. In fact, as Hodgson (2023) suggests in his critique of Guild Socialism, these should likely be legally independent entities. At the same time, however, higher-level coordination must genuinely encompass and reflect the democratically expressed needs, goals, and objectives of the whole community, not simply the interests (or power) of one stakeholder group, class, or area. It must also include a formalized structure and set of processes that allows for effectiveness, operational efficiency, and a democratic way to mediate between and reconcile the competing interests and priorities of constituent groups and enterprises.[85]

The context-dependent approach to the state is currently most clearly articulated in the DPO principle of co-production. Co-production refers to the process of combining state-based and non-state organizations and approaches to deliver public goods and services. While the explicit term is only used in some publications (e.g. Asara, 2019; Hopman, et al., 2021; Bianchi, et al., 2022) the basic concept is relatively common in the DPO and DPO adjacent literature, often taking the form of autonomous community-based organizations operating

[85] As previously discussed, many anarchists and other anti-statists historically have proposed bottom-up democratic "federations" to deal with the need to establish structured and effective higher-level coordination. However, as some critics have observed, this approach could simply be considered a "state" by a different name. "If it looks like a state, and feels like a state, and quacks like a state, then it's a state," Harvey observed when discussing the federative approach (Springer, 2017, p. 286).

alongside democratized public enterprises to ensure transparency and accountability and enhance participation (e.g. the community-based observatory model used in the Paris water remunicipalization). Going further, some forms of co-production involve sharing ownership and or governance of the enterprise itself between state and non-state entities.

The key feature of co-production is that it does not champion nor reject the state. Rather, it seeks to implement, formalize, and codify an appropriate, context-specific balance between state and non-state (i.e. commons) approaches. As such, it seeks to both bridge and move past ideological binaries on the issue of the state and provide an actionable approach to DPO that can resonate with some of the emerging, ideologically blended left social movements. The historical analysis in this thesis reinforces the importance of co-production as a DPO principle. Specifically, for generations disagreements over the role of the state have divided and weakened movements and efforts centered around economic democracy and political economic system change. Moreover, as with Algeria and Yugoslavia, attempts to create new forms of public ownership that didn't clearly delineate a role or replacement for the state have largely failed.

However, the historical analysis also suggests some important refinements and clarifications to the principle of co-production. Specifically, like co-determination and other participatory workplace approaches, co-production should be oriented towards, and integrated into, a movement towards a systemically transformative form of economic democracy, rather than an end-goal (e.g. state and non-state entities partnering together to deliver goods and services within traditional liberal capitalist frameworks). The evidence suggests that simply adding community organizations into the operations, governance, and management of publicly owned enterprises operating in traditional political economic systems (e.g. corporate and statist versions of capitalism) is unlikely to, by itself, lead to a wider and sustainable system based on economic democracy. Moreover, absent that connection to, and embedding in, systemic change and wider social movements and organizations, co-production runs the risk of both atrophying over time (as was seen in Cochabamba) and shackling communities to existing enterprises and modes of production, thereby reducing their oppositional or radical potential (as was seen in Yugoslavia).

7.2.5 Organization

The second category of DPO principles relates to organization, defined here as how democratic public enterprises are constituted, governed, and operated. These include the principles of affected interest, democratic and participatory planning, professional management and effective organization, and transparency and accountability. These principles are relatively well-established in the DPO literature given its general orientation towards practical, rather than theoretical, development and, for some, the historical analysis in this thesis suggests few modifications or refinements. However, while the analysis does not reject the general importance of any of these principles or contradict specific tenets, it does illuminate specific ways in which they all could be slightly refined and tightened.

The principle of affected interest relates directly to how the definitional theme of broad-based democratic participation and control works in practice, and specifically how worker interests are balanced with those of other stakeholder groups. As discussed above, the existing literature is clear that DPO is not a pure workers' control approach and that all people and groups affected by a democratic public enterprise should be represented and able to participate in its governance (Cumbers and Hanna, 2019). In 2012, the prominent anarchist and anthropologist David Graeber offered an illuminating perspective on how balancing the interests of workers and the wider public might work in the real world. "How do you square the problem of one principle which says all those people engaged in a project should have say over how that project is done, and the second principle which is all those people affected by a project should have some say in how that project is done," Graeber asked. "One of them, if you take it exclusively, leads to pure workers' control, the other leads to a sort of general direct democracy on every level. Well clearly some compromise between the two principles has to be worked out, and it just seems reasonable that if there is a factory then people in the surrounding community really don't care about their vacation policy, but will probably want to have some say over what they dump in the river" (2012).

The examples and theories analyzed in this thesis, especially as it relates to Guild Socialism, the US community development experience, and some of the limitations faced by workers' control models (including in Italy, Yugoslavia, and Algeria) supports, or at least does not dispel, the importance and relevance of finding this balance between affected groups and individuals. It also suggests some important additional considerations that can help refine

the principle. Specifically, codification of the rights and responsibilities of each interest group, along with rules preventing interference in election/selection processes and corruption of representatives, are likely important to prevent capture or co-optation by one particular stakeholder group, especially where there are organizational and financial imbalances between groups. The necessity of this is suggested by the example of the post-World War II French nationalization program, where some unions initially subverted the intended multi-stakeholder governance structure by having their members run as consumer representatives (Sturmthal, 1953; Cumbers, 2012) and a subsequent "depoliticization" effort strengthened the hand of role and power of the state. It is also reinforced by the case of the reformed public water utility in Cochabamba, where unions sided with management to limit democratic participation and co-opt community representatives (Razavi, 2019). Additionally, strong accountability and enforcement mechanisms are needed to ensure compliance with these rules. As discussed further below, this should likely involve autonomous community or state-based entities (i.e. separated and insulated from the enterprise itself).

Democratic and participatory planning establishes that various stakeholder groups should have "an active input into the goals, methods, and practices of the enterprise" (Cumbers and Hanna, 2019, p. 6). The historical analysis as it relates to both the theory and practice of enterprise-level participation, along with the proposed definition of DPO that centers the transformative variant of economic democracy, suggests that by itself the phrase "be able to have an active input" is too vague to ensure genuine and sustainable democratic participation or control. In particular, multiple examples from the preceding chapters demonstrate the ineffectiveness and fragility of weak approaches to democratic and participatory planning. One potential way of strengthening this principle is to explicitly state that active input should be a guaranteed or codified right. Another way is to clarify that active input is not limited to merely consultative advice that can be ignored. Put together, the principle could be revised as such: stakeholder groups and individuals should be guaranteed the right to have an active and binding input into the goals, methods, and practices of the enterprise.

In the DPO literature, the principle of professional management and effective organization is often both implicitly and explicitly positioned as a response to critiques of economic democracy that have emerged and proliferated during the neoliberal era. This includes the charge that public organizations and enterprises are economically inefficient and

or inferior to private enterprise, as well as the belief that democratic control and accountability is incompatible with effective governance and management (e.g. Hemming and Mansoor, 1988; Miron and Bourne, 2019). While not endorsing these criticisms, the principle of professional management and effective organization establishes that ensuring that democratic public enterprises operate effectively and capably is in the public's interest, as well as in the interest of the organization itself.

The importance of this principle is reinforced throughout the preceding chapters. For instance, the ineffectiveness of Soviet public enterprises during the 1980s (including with regards to their weak models of worker participation) spurred calls for reform and were a contributing factor in the demise of the country's state communist political economic system. Similarly, in Algeria governance and management deficiencies and inconsistencies – specifically overlapping roles and the creation of multiple power centers without clear rights and responsibilities – limited the effectiveness of worker-controlled enterprises and left them vulnerable to shifting political economic circumstances. This specific learning can be translated into a new tenet for the principle of professional management and effective organization: The rights and responsibilities of various management and governance structures should be legally codified, regularly audited, and subjected to an action-oriented research and development process to both build collective knowledge about what works (and does not work) and eliminate unnecessary overlap of functions, positions, personnel, and decision-making authority.

While historical analysis supports the principle of professional management and effective organization, it also suggests one important clarification. While the principle often focuses on allowing stakeholders to democratically decide to hire professional managers to run an enterprise, it does not preclude the possibility of those stakeholders (especially workers) managing the enterprise themselves. This type of model, which combines public ownership and worker self-management, is common throughout the preceding chapters, including as it relates to Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the IWC. However, the Yugoslav experience in particular suggests that training in management tasks and techniques is critically important for such an approach to work, otherwise workers and other stakeholders will often defer to directors and technical experts, especially as it relates to complex economic and financial decision-making.

While the principle of transparency and accountability is also commonplace in the DPO literature and throughout the theories and experiences analyzed in the preceding chapters, its components, as laid out by Cumbers and Hanna (2019), are somewhat muddled and vague. In particular, they include references to internal democratization and participation that could be better infused into other DPO principles (e.g. democratic and participatory planning and internal and external democratization). Additionally, they don't explicitly reference issues related to the independence of accountability structures. As discussed in the preceding chapters, particularly in reference to both Guild Socialism and the post-World War II French nationalization effort, theory and experiential evidence suggest that enterprises and organizations regardless of ownership type cannot be expected to voluntarily self-establish, self-enforce, and self-maintain heightened democratic structures and processes. As such, the rights and interests of the wider community, including as they relate to transparency and accountability, should be reinforced and assured through the use of autonomous organizations and structures. As mentioned above with regards to co-production, many DPO publications envision these as being community-based and or cooperative organizations, rather than the traditional approach of using state-based regulatory institutions. Accordingly, the principle of transparency and accountability could be revised as such: 1) the public should be able to exercise oversight over the enterprise, ideally through autonomous and democratic structures or organizations that operate alongside or above it; 2) open meetings and records laws should be implemented and or enhanced, and new technologies utilized to facilitate and expand public oversight.

The preceding chapters also suggest two new principles of DPO that could be added to the organization category: internal and external democratization and incentivization. Regarding the first, democracy, and the process of democratization, is perhaps the most basic and common theme that runs through the DPO literature and historical examples and theories analyzed in thesis. However, it does not specifically appear as a standalone item in the Cumbers and Hanna statement of principles (2019). Rather it is infused throughout many of the other principles. This, as discussed above, can create some conceptual confusion and unnecessary overlap and redundancy. This potential new principle of internal and external democratization specifically focuses on how democratic public enterprises, and the organizations that surround and interact with them, are internally structured.

Its tenets, some of which are drawn or modified from other existing principles, could include that:

- **Democracy should be formally and legally embedded with enterprises and the organizations that oversee and interact with them.** Formal codification of democratic processes, alongside a regularized process of collecting knowledge from experience and reforming processes based on that information, is important not only to prevent co-optation and or deterioration internally, but also to help embed enterprises within the wide political economic and social system. Part of that codification should include set rules and structures to ensure that democratic processes are self-reproducing and aren't captured by elite interests. This could include both training (discussed further below) and parameters around tenure (i.e. maximum number of terms), recallability, ethics, campaigning, lobbying, etc.

- **Direct and representative approaches to democracy, participation, and agency should be deployed according to local customs and context.** Rather than mandate a mix of such approaches as the existing principle does (Cumbers and Hanna, 2019), the historical analysis, especially as it relates to Latin American approaches to economic democracy and public ownership during the neoliberal period, suggests that this likely should be left to local communities and movements to decide and may take different forms both geographically and temporally.

- **Enterprises and associated organizations – including wider societal organizations like schools, universities and colleges, and trade unions – should have a commitment to the ongoing training of stakeholders, managers, and workers in democratic practices.** While the original DPO principles address training solely in the context of effective governance, some of the theories and examples analyzed in this thesis – especially as it relates to some cooperatives, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and the theories of Mill, Dewey, Cole, and others – suggest that democratic processes within organizations require constant attention, otherwise they may atrophy or decay over time. This includes ensuring that individuals have adequate training with regards to democratic approaches and methods, especially since democratic practice in many countries has, for generations, been mostly limited to voting in semi-regular elections.

Incentivization is related to both democratization and effective organization and refers to how workers and other stakeholders are motivated to improve performance and maintain or enhance democratic processes. In worker cooperatives and other worker ownership models, incentivization usually comes in the form of financial gains tied to overall enterprise performance. In other words, worker owners receive their regular wages and benefits alongside a share of any profits the company makes and democratically decides to distribute. Additionally, some cooperatives offer extra benefits (monetary or otherwise) to workers who actively participate in community engagement and or democratic processes. As discussed in chapter five, Yugoslavia adopted a similar approach with workers' councils deciding issues related to pay, benefits, and allocation of profits. Thus, in theory, workers were incentivized not only to increase performance, but also to participate in the workers' councils.

While firm-level financial benefits are the most common form of incentivization, there is a concern – again based on the Yugoslav experience along with studies of certain worker cooperatives[86] – that these can weaken the connection of workers and other stakeholders to wider political economic goals, class formations, and social movements and detract from the goal of creating a more collective democratic ethos. In other words, they may begin to identify more with the success of their individual enterprise than with either the working class or the political economic system as a whole. However, incentivization does not necessarily need to be financial in nature and does not have to be organized purely at the firm or individual level. Management theorists have long suggested that there are multiple forms of incentives, both intrinsic and extrinsic (Pink, 2009). Moreover, some have suggested that traditional extrinsic incentives, such as the ones championed by NPM (like performance-related pay), are not necessarily that effective, especially in public organizations (Lapuente and Van de Walle, 2020). Moreover, self-determination theory suggests that people have three basic psychological needs, autonomy, competence, and relatedness (Deci and Ryan, 2012). Put together, this suggests that incentivization can, and should, include participation in management or wider political economic structures and processes, training and continuing education, and a clear sense of purpose and social benefit. When extrinsic motivations are

[86] For instance, in his study of plywood cooperatives in the US Pacific Northwest, Greenberg found that "the experience of self-management within enterprises oriented to sales in a competitive marketplace largely fails to counteract the original orientations of worker-shareholders. Indeed, in many cases, their experience seems to enhance and nurture their small-property/petit-bourgeois orientations" (1986, pp. 136-137).

employed, these could be collectively rather than individually focused. For instance, groups of workers and stakeholders in a particular organization, industry, or region could be offered various social and economic incentives if they reach democratically established targets, both with regards to enterprise performance and democratic participation. And all workers and stakeholders in society could be offered incentives if the system as a whole meets certain objectives.

7.2.6 Purpose

While the existing DPO literature gives communities wide latitude to democratically decide on the purpose of public enterprises and organizations, at the same time it often suggests options or makes recommendations based on current political economic conditions (such as the climate crisis or Covid-19 pandemic) and issues traditionally important on the political left (such as reducing or abolishing social and economic inequality). Beyond this, Cumbers and Hanna (2019) suggest the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a starting point for establishing parameters of purpose for DPO.

These 17 goals, which were included in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that was adopted by all UN member states in 2015, include: ending poverty; ending hunger by improving food security, nutrition, and sustainable agriculture; ensuring good health and wellbeing; providing inclusive, equitable, and quality education; achieving gender equality and empowering women; ensuring availability and access to water and sanitation; developing affordable and reliable clean energy; achieving full employment, decent work, and sustainable and inclusive economic growth; building resilient infrastructure and supporting innovation; reducing inequality; establishing safe and sustainable communities; developing ecological sustainability, especially as it relates to natural resources; urgently addressing climate change; conserving and sustainably managing oceans and seas; protecting and conserving natural areas, such as forests, and reversing bio-diversity loss; establishing peaceful and just societies with strong institutions; and engaging in global partnerships to implement these goals (UN, no date).

By and large, the existing DPO literature can be characterized as being mostly in alignment with the SDGs especially as it relates to social and economic equality, improved work and employment conditions, and climate change and environmental sustainability. Moreover, there is nothing in either this thesis' literature review or historical analysis to

suggest that the SDGs should not form the basis for a community's decision making on the purpose for democratic public enterprises. However, various pieces in the DPO canon do suggest goals that go beyond the SDGs in various ways. These include: challenging corporate power and concentration; advancing decommodification; resisting privatization; and opposing surveillance and protecting privacy rights.

The preceding chapters of this thesis generally support the consideration and potential inclusion of these additional goals. In particular, challenging corporate power and concentration and resisting privatization are both implicitly and explicitly ubiquitous. As discussed in chapter four, most of the foundational economic democracy theorists critiqued forms of private, capitalist enterprise and ownership on the grounds of their exploitation and subordination of workers and the working class – including as it related to their economic freedom. This was especially true of the large private industries and capital conglomerations of the time. Marx, for instance, suggested that capital would become increasingly concentrated in fewer and fewer hands and, later, Engels noted that the rise of joint stock companies had essentially ended the myth of free competition within capitalism (Foster, 2018).[87] Similarly, Proudhon and many other early anarchists and mutualists were also opposed to large-scale, privately owned industries.[88]

In the decades and centuries that followed these initial theorists, left political economy in general – including most of the economic democracy and DPO theories and experiments reviewed in this thesis – has in many ways been defined by its opposition to both large scale capitalist corporations and privatization. While many of these experiments and theories accepted pluralism and small-scale private ownership, most, if not all, envisioned public models of ownership and or control when it came to large or strategically important enterprises, services, and assets (sometimes referred to as the "commanding heights"). This includes both the Yugoslav and Algerian examples, where large enterprises were either under worker self-management or traditional state ownership; as well as theorists and practitioners

[87] "It is concentration of capitals already formed, destruction of their individual independence, expropriation of capitalist by capitalist, transformation of many small into few large capitals," Marx wrote (1906, p. 686).

[88] Importantly, however, neither Proudhon nor Marx were necessarily opposed to large-scale production when it was needed, as long as it was organized under alternative models of ownership and control. For Proudhon, this was through worker associations. "Large industry and high culture come to us by big monopoly and big property," Proudhon wrote. "It is necessary in the future to make them rise from the association" (Vincent, 1984, p. 165).

affiliated with the council movements, Guild Socialism, and workers' control, all of whom envisioned various alternative forms of ownership and control different from traditional private ownership.

Lastly, as discussed in chapter six, opposition to large private corporations and privatization have become important cornerstones of many of the modern, ideologically blended left social movements that emerged during the neoliberal era and continue to this day – including many of those that advocate for various forms of economic democracy. Specifically, much of the resistance to neoliberalism globally has been animated by the role of large transnational corporations, especially those related to global finance and resource extraction. The Cochabamba water wars, for instance, were spurred by the decision to privatize communal and public water systems and put them in the hands of a large multinational corporation. And the Zapatista uprising was driven, at least in part, by fears that Mexico's participation in NAFTA would primarily benefit large multinational corporations and further privatization, all at the expense of indigenous people and their collective rights (Godelmann, 2014). More generally, the GJM that emerged powerfully around the world in the early 2000s focused its critique heavily on the role of large corporations in furthering, and benefitting from, neoliberalism and globalization.

Like challenging corporate power and resisting privatization, decommodification is an important and relatively commonplace concept prevalent throughout the theoretical and practical history of economic democracy. It is rooted in the political left's critique of capitalism, and specifically the assertion by Marx and others that capitalism needs to continually expand and derive value from new activities and new resources (Huws, 2021) – essentially a constant process of turning labor, natural resources, services, land, assets, and human interactions into commodities that can be accumulated and bought and sold in market exchanges. Following from this critique, and often for domestic political and social reasons, decommodification was pursued in both social democratic and communist countries alike, especially following World War II. In many places universal or heavily subsidized healthcare, housing, transportation, energy, and other services were established, often provided by municipal or state-owned enterprises.

However, this trend reversed again during the neoliberal era as many of these services were "re-commodified" through privatization, deregulation, and the introduction (or re-

introduction) of market mechanisms. As previously discussed, there is an argument to be made for the necessity of markets from the perspective of the information and knowledge needed to operate a modern economy. That being said, most of those on the political left who advocate for market approaches still retain a role for certain de-commodified goods and services. Hodgson, for instance, has spoken positively about the National Health Service (NHS) in Britain during its social democratic prime (where it was free at the point of use) (Wilson, 2023). Similarly, Schweickart's model of economic democracy – which is based on collectively owned, but worker-self managed enterprises operating in a market economy – envisions an array of de-commodified services operating outside of market principles (2011).[89]

Lastly, the goal of opposing surveillance and protecting privacy rights can be thought of as a new formulation of a long-standing concern articulated repeatedly in the theories and experiments analyzed in this thesis. Specifically, most of the early theorists associated with the origins of economic democracy, including Mill, Marx, Proudhon, Owen, articulated the importance of freedom and liberty and guarding against tyranny and domination – although they often disagreed on the many of the specific details, including notions of individual freedom verse collective freedom. This continued through the early decades of the 20th century and was a common topic of discussion in syndicalism, Guild Socialism, and the post-World War I council movements. In *Guild Socialism Restated*, for instance, Cole wrote that "we want to build a new Society which will be conceived in the spirit, not of coercion, but of free service" and that such a society there would be "an indispensable safeguard of personal liberty" (1980, p. 158).

As the century progressed, the Soviet Union's devolution into centralized authoritarianism during the Stalinist era, along with critiques from the right (notably from Hayek), only reinforced the importance and centrality of the concept of freedom for many on the political left. For instance, reflecting on sit-ins and strikes associated with the movement for workers' control in the 1970s, Coates writes that "these men and women were not appealing for totalitarian controls, censorship, political psychiatry or suppression of personal

[89] "Economic Democracy," Schweickart writes, "will have learned from the experiences of those capitalist countries that have been most successful in providing their citizens with universal health care, quality child care, free education, decent retirement benefits, and the like, and will adopt, perhaps with slight modification, their programs" (2011, p. 73).

liberty. All of them rightly took for granted all the established liberal freedoms of speech, assembly, worship, and the press…if they had any criticisms of democratic institutions, those criticisms would emphasize the need for fuller, not less stringent, accountability and openness" (2003, p. 173). Another example is the new left in the US during the 1960s and 70s, which, at least in its early years, centered issues of freedom and liberty in both deed and action. An example of the former being SDS' Port Huron Statement, which starts with an endorsement of the principles of freedom and equality (SDS, 1990); and an example of the latter being the famous 1964-65 Free Speech Movement at the University of California, Berkeley.

Freedom and liberty remain central issues in economic democracy and DPO discourse. Cumbers, for instance, discusses the issue at length, ultimately arguing for the establishment of a set of "positive freedoms" that contrast with the "negative freedom of Hayek's selfish individual" (2012, p. 213). As it relates to refining the principles of DPO related to purpose, the central issue is how to translate this larger concept of freedom into specific goals for democratic public enterprises. At a basic level, democratic public enterprises should not become a tool for governments or factions within society (be they a majority or minority) to infringe on the individual and collective freedom of others. This includes internally as it relates to surveillance or coercion of the organization's workforce, as well as externally as it concerns the organization's relationships with consumers, residents, workers in other industries, and people in other regions and countries. One way of establishing this purpose, which is discussed further above related to structure, is to ensure the legal autonomy of such institutions from state structures. However, another possibility is to restrict their ability to participate in activities that imperil or violate established laws and societal norms around civil liberties and freedoms (allowing, of course, for the reality that such laws and norms vary from community to community and across time). At the same time, democratic public enterprises should endeavor to create the conditions necessary for workers and other stakeholders, both individually and collectively, to increase their autonomy and self-determination as it relates to both working and life conditions.

Table 1-7: Refined Principles of DPO[90]

Components	Critical Elements
Decentralization and subsidiarity (structure)	• Decisions should be taken at the lowest possible level of governance. • Enterprises should be organized at the smallest appropriate scale • **Appropriate scale of organizations and decision-making should be tightly linked to purpose, including specifically enhancing democratic participation and preserving liberty.** • **Enterprises should have an established degree of legal autonomy in order to prevent undue centralization and subsummation by larger entities.**
Higher-level coordination (structure)	• Local autonomy should not be disconnected from broader societal goals. • Larger-scale organization is necessary in some sectors for reasons of efficiency and coordination. • Ownership should be nested within broader multi-scalar relations. • **Affected enterprises and groups should have direct representation on higher-level coordinating bodies.** • **Higher-level coordination does not necessarily require state structures.** • **Coordination in general should include an appropriate and context dependent mix of markets**

[90] Refinements and new principles are indicated in bold font.

	and planning, with safeguards against both market supremacy and complete central planning.
Institutionalization and embeddedness (structure)	• **Democratic public enterprises should be established as a defining feature of the political economic system and integrated with other such enterprises and with social movements.** • **Democratic public enterprises should attain and retain legal codification within the political economic system.** • **DPO principles and approaches should be embedded in wider social institutions and organizations.** • **Democratic and participatory principles, approaches, and concepts should be constantly reinforced within enterprises through active training and codified structures.**
Co-production (structure)	• **A context-specific balance between state and non-state approaches and actors should be implemented, formalized, and codified.** • **Must be oriented towards, and integrated into, efforts to implement systemically transformative versions of economic democracy.**
Affected interest (organization)	• All groups and individuals affected by an enterprise should have forms of representation and participation in the governance of that enterprise. • Employees should participate in governance structures at various levels. • Publicly owned enterprises should have inclusive and expansive governance structures that involve not only

	employees, but also other groups (such as consumers and residents) in a multi-stakeholder approach. • **The rights and responsibilities of each group or individual should be formally established and codified.** • **Rules should be enacted to prevent interference in election and selection processes and bribery/corruption of representatives.** • **Strong and independent accountability and enforcement mechanisms should be established to ensure compliance with rules and processes.**
Democratic and participatory planning (organization)	• Stakeholder groups and individuals should be able to have an active input into the goals, methods, and practices of the enterprise. • A deliberative body that is broadly representative should be established to hold the enterprise's management accountable and set long-term strategies and priorities. • **The right to active input should be legally codified and guaranteed.** • **Democracy should be embedded within enterprises and the public should be able to exercise oversight over the enterprise.**
Professional management and effective organization (organization)	• Enterprises should be run by people who have the experience, skills, knowledge, and competence to do so. • Enterprises should be insulated from the day-to-day interference of politicians.

	• Enterprises should have a commitment to the ongoing training of managers, employees, **and all other stakeholders** in how to manage and govern effectively. • A mix of direct and representative approaches to participation and agency should be deployed. • Strong rights for labor should be established. • **The rights and responsibilities of various management and governance structures should be legally codified and regularly audited to eliminate unnecessary overlap of functions, positions, personnel, and decision-making authority.**
Transparency and accountability (organization)	• **The public should be able to exercise oversight over the enterprise, ideally through autonomous and democratic structures or organizations that operate alongside or above it.** • **Open meetings and records laws should be implemented and or enhanced, and new technologies utilized to facilitate and expand public oversight.**
Incentivization (organization)	• **Workers and other stakeholders should be incentivized to improve enterprise performance and maintain or enhance democratic processes.** • **Incentivization does not have to be financial in nature and does not have to be organized only at the enterprise level.**
Internal and external democratization (organization)	• **Democracy should be formally and legally embedded within enterprises and the organizations that oversee and interact with them.**

	• **Direct and representative approaches to democracy, participation, and agency should be deployed according to local customs and context.** • **Enterprises and associated organizations should have a commitment to the ongoing training of stakeholders, managers, and workers in democratic practices.**
Different values	• Enterprises should not set their own goals, independent of broader social objectives and targets. • Enterprises should recognize their broader global responsibilities to promote democratic and sustainable societies. • The UN sustainable development goals are one place to start in determining common or shared goals.
Decommodification (purpose)	• **Certain goods and services should be provided outside of market principles and market encroachment on currently decommodified sectors should be subjected to high degrees of scrutiny.** • **The excesses of marketization seen during the neoliberal era should be reversed as part of a renewed commitment to decommodification.** • **The exact mix of commodification and decommodification is contextual and will likely change over time depending on the democratically articulated needs and desires of a local population.**
Challenging corporate power and privatization (purpose)	• **While some forms of private enterprise can exist alongside democratic public enterprises, large for-profit corporations and concentrations of private capital should be opposed and challenged.**

	• **While publicly owned goods, services, assets, and enterprises can and should be democratized, privatization and outsourcing to for-profit, private sector entities should be challenged and subjected to high degrees of scrutiny.**
Liberty (purpose)	• **Enterprises should not be organized or operate in a way that violates the individual or collective freedom of others.** • **Enterprises should be autonomous from both state and factional control.** • **Legally established exceptions can be made to advance democratic established priorities.**

7.3 Theory of Change

Despite drawing from a long and rich history of economic democracy theorizing and experimentation, and although there has been an uptick of recent interest, the actual practice of DPO remains marginal in most contemporary economies. While there still exists a plethora of publicly owned enterprises, services, and assets around the world – and some of these utilize, or are incorporated into, various democratic practices – there are few that would neatly fit into the definition of DPO articulated above, especially given its emphasis on economic democracy and political economic system change. Given this reality, and since the stated goal of most DPO publications is to see the concept and approach become much more widely adopted, it is useful to suggest a theory of change as part of the conceptual refinement process. In turn, this can serve as a baseline for further research, debate, and refinement (or replacement) as the concept of DPO continues to develop in the future.

As discussed in chapter four, many early theories of change on the political left fell into the traditional binary of "reform" or "revolution" (Luxemburg, 1900). In general terms, on one side were many early Marxists, anarchists, and syndicalists who believed that socialism could only be established through a violent rupture with capitalism and the state

structures that supported it.[91] On the other side were radical liberals and social democrats who believed that a transition to socialism could be achieved peacefully, through democratically decided alterations to the capitalist system – including to models of ownership and control. By and large, this basic dichotomy guided theory of change discussions for left movements and parties around the world for much of the 20th century and remains a useful theoretical guidepost to this day.

While undoubtedly revolutionary rupture has succeeded in achieving systemic change in various instances historically (albeit mostly at the nation-state rather than international level), there is ample anecdotal evidence from the preceding chapters that the economic and social devastation wrought by, and in response to, violent revolutions and wars – and the coordination needed to execute them – often contributes to post-conflict societies adopting or maintaining more centralized, hierarchical, and opaque forms of public enterprise and economic decision-making, which is antithetical to the concept of DPO.[92] As Wright puts it, "the theory of ruptural transformation is not a plausible basis for constructing a democratic egalitarian transcendence of capitalism. While there have been revolutionary challenges to capitalism, the historical examples of ruptural transformation have never been able to sustain an extended process of democratic experimentalist institution-building…As a result, the empirical cases we have of ruptures with capitalism have resulted in state-bureaucratic forms of economic organization rather than anything approaching a democratic egalitarian alternative to capitalism" (Wright, 2019).

Examples of this include the Soviet Union, post-World War II communist states in Eastern Europe as well as North Korea, and China, (Cumbers, 2012). Likewise, while post-revolution Algeria briefly experimented with a decentralized and democratized alternative, it quickly collapsed and was replaced with a mix of traditional state and private ownership. That said, examples to the contrary exist, with Yugoslavia and the Zapatistas being two that were reviewed in this thesis (although both encountered significant difficulties in maintaining their systemic approach). However, more analysis is needed as to whether examples such as these

[91] Marx's theory of change was, as Wright explains, both deterministic and voluntaristic. For Marx, capitalism would inevitably, over time, become unsustainable and prone to crisis and decline. As this process accelerates, the working class would develop the capacity "to seize state power, create a rupture with capitalism and experimentally construct a socialist alternative" (Wright, 2019).
[92] In the US, for instance, World War II is often identified as playing a prominent role in the strengthening the federal government and creating the modern "administrative state" (Cuéllar, 2014).

are generalizable (and sustainable) beyond their very specific historical and cultural context.[93] In addition to its historic inability to result in democratic and egalitarian systems, the dream of violent revolution leading to wide-ranging socio-economic transformation itself has become significantly less viable in recent decades for various reasons (Petras and Vieux, 1994; Maisano, 2023). Accordingly, in many countries and regions it has been ideologically relegated to a small and marginal fringe of the political left.

At the same time, historical experience also does not necessarily support the reformist theory of change. Specifically, while some strong social democracies did emerge out of the reformist tradition, they have largely fallen short of what most theorists would consider non-capitalist or socialist systems based on forms of economic democracy. In fact, an argument can be made – based on the example of the post-World War I factory councils, the Meidner Plan in Sweden, as well as other attempts to advance forms of economic democracy in the 1960s and 70s – that reformist approaches reach their limits precisely when there is a genuine threat to the sanctity of private ownership or attempts are made to definitively move beyond traditional forms of control and participation. Moreover, in general the neoliberal reaction to the post-World War II economic model, global economic shifts, and the events of the 1960s and 70s has weakened and undermined social democracy both in theory and practice (Lavelle, 2016; Bandau, 2023). While many theorists, politicians, and activists still retain the hope that reform can ameliorate some of the worst excesses of capitalism, the idea that it will lead to the total replacement of capitalism with some form of socialism has, like violent revolution, become a relatively marginal theoretical position.

Given the limitations and declining viability of both reform and revolution in the contemporary context, and acknowledging the pressures and opportunities of rising socio-economic and ecological instability (especially climate change), some modern theorists have begun to suggest a third alternative – namely theories of change based on creating and scaling alternative institutions and approaches that can prefigure a democratic future society, provide immediate socio-economic and ecological benefits, and, over time, develop the institutional base and empowerment needed for social transformation and to erode or displace capitalist institutions. Examples of this approach include Erik Olin Wright's "interstitial

[93] Wright, for one, believes that they are not, stating "there have been brief episodes of such participation within attempts at the revolutionary transformation of capitalism, but they have always been short-lived and relatively isolated" (Wright, 2019).

transformations," Alperovitz's "evolutionary reconstruction," and Andre Gorz's "non-reformist reforms."[94] As can be seen in this thesis, such theories of change are not necessarily novel and have traditionally been associated with forms of mutualism, anarchism, and cooperativism, all of which envision the voluntary coordination of people and organizations leading to the establishment of an egalitarian, democratic, free, and self-reproducing political economic system and social order.

However, these newer formulations (from here on collectively referred to as "evolutionary") diverge from such traditional approaches in at least three important ways. First, neither evolutionary reconstruction nor non-reformist reforms discount or ignore the potential role of the state. In other words, while they envision creating alternative, democratized institutions, these are not necessarily only member-based voluntary associations with minimal interactions with the state, like the ones envisioned by many mutualists and cooperativists (Gorz, 1968; Alperovitz, 2017).[95] Interstitial transformation is different in that Wright specifically describes it as creating new institutions and approaches "primarily through direct action of one sort or another rather than through the state" (2010, p. 230). However, he also suggests that interstitial transformation can complement, and may even require, symbiotic transformation – defined as approaches (i.e. reforms) that strengthen social empowerment and are often institutionalized or embedded through, or in conjunction with, state structures (Wright, 2010). Collectively, these two theories of change are described as "transformation as metamorphosis" (Wright, 2010, p. 228).

Second, these theories of change usually accept the possibility, and even necessity, of some conflict or confrontation with capitalism.[96] This distinguishes them from some variants

[94] For his part, Wright suggests that interstitial transformation is one of three potential options (the others being ruptural transformation and symbiotic transformation) and states "none of these strategies is unproblematic. None of them guarantees success. All of them contain risks and dilemmas. In different times and places, one or another may be the most effective, but typically none of them is sufficient by itself" (Wright, 2019).

[95] Alperovitz specifically references public enterprise and nationalized industry as being potential institutions that could displace capitalist enterprise and build the institutional base for transformation (Alperovitz, 2017). Gorz envisions building a variety of institutions, including trade unions and cooperatives, and pairing these with electoral strategies and de-commodification efforts. While such efforts would interact with state structures in various ways, Gorz is emphatic that they could not be subordinated to the state (1968).

[96] In this aspect, they draw from the traditional Marxist theory of change which, at least in part, acknowledges the role of class conflict (amongst other factors) in systemic transformation, such as the one from feudalism to capitalism (Wood, 2002).

of reformism (both in the radical liberal and cooperativist tradition) which abhor, avoid, or seek to ignore social and political conflict. Gorz, for instance, suggests a progressive process by which successful and unsuccessful "trials of strength" – sometimes violent – would build the capacity and capability of social movements (1968, p. 112). Moreover, he also does not discount the potential need for an ultimate confrontation between the forces of capital and the working class (Engler and Engler, 2021). For his part, Wright proposes that both interstitial and symbiotic transformation will require confrontations with capitalist institutions and classes. Echoing Gorz's language, he writes that it "will be a trajectory of victories and defeats, winners and losers, not simply of compromise and cooperation between differing interests and classes" (Wright, 2010, p. 228).

This acceptance of the likelihood and necessity of conflict is based, at least in part, on the understanding, rooted in ample historical evidence, that capitalist systems, and the people and organizations that benefit from them, are unlikely to simply relinquish power willingly or be displaced by alternative institutions. It also reflects the contention that it is naïve to expect that cooperative organizations and systems will simply grow within a "sea of capitalism" to the point that they collectively supersede capitalism; or that capitalist organizations and individuals will let themselves be displaced or eclipsed by alternative, collective institutions and approaches (Alperovitz and Hanna, 2013). As discussed in chapter four, many early cooperatives, including those supported by Owen and the KOL, failed in the face of capitalist opposition. Beyond this, theorists like Luxemburg suggest that production cooperatives within capitalism are faced with an inherent structural contradiction between the interests of labor and capital, and this is at least part of the reason why many fail or are consigned to small enterprises and economic sectors (1900).[97] While confrontations or conflict with capitalism maybe both inevitable and necessary, this confrontation does not necessarily have to be violent in nature and could, possibly, occur through peaceful channels (such as legislation, trade union action, popular mobilizations and demonstrations, etc.) However, the prospect of a more or less peaceful confrontation or conflict is context dependent, with variables

[97] "The workers forming a co-operative in the field of production are thus faced with the contradictory necessity of governing themselves with the utmost absolutism," she explains. "They are obliged to take toward themselves the role of capitalist entrepreneur – a contradiction that accounts for the usual failure of production co-operatives which either become pure capitalist enterprises or, if the workers' interests continue to predominate, end by dissolving" (Luxemburg, 1900).

including both the respective balance of forces and the response of capital and the capitalist state at critical junctures.

Lastly, evolutionary theories of change are not limited to the nation-state and offer a plausible, albeit relatively untested, model of how to link local and institutional change to systemic change at the international or global level. In particular, evolutionary theories of change either implicitly or explicitly accept what Alperovitz calls a checkerboard strategy (2012). In short, local experimentation, ideas, and institutions that emerge from the cracks of existing systems can inspire other communities to adopt similar approaches, leapfrogging more recalcitrant areas until they become the dominant paradigm regionally, nationally, and internationally. This process can be accelerated by strategic and opportunistic interactions with national and international institutions – especially in the wake of large-scale economic and political crises that discredit existing systems and arrangements.

An evolutionary theory of change fits into the existing concept of DPO in various ways. First and foremost, as seen in the literature review and discussed extensively in this chapter, DPO is, at its heart, an emerging theory about how and why to build alternative, democratized institutions that can both prefigure a more egalitarian, non-capitalist society and help to achieve this vision. As such, there is little within the existing DPO literature that contradicts the viability or calls into question the applicability of an evolutionary theory of change. For instance, most DPO publications do not discuss the prospect of violent political and social revolution, let alone advocate for it. Second, some of the theorists and organizations heavily involved in the conceptual development of DPO are associated with, and have articulated support for, evolutionary approaches (e.g. Hanna and Kelly, 2021). And lastly, as reviewed in this thesis, some of the historical theories that have generatively influenced the development of DPO align with the evolutionary approach, including Guild Socialism.[98]

That being said, it is important to note that this thesis has not uncovered much in the way of historical evidence that supports an evolutionary theory of change. In cases like Russia and Algeria, democratized economic institutions were largely developed during and after the

[98] In *Guild Socialism Re-stated*, Cole wrote that while genuine systemic change would ultimately require some "revolutionary element," a preceding "evolutionary" economic and social program would not only improve chances for success, but also minimize the "amount of 'revolutionary' action required" (1980, p. 182).

revolutionary process rather than before it. In post-World War I Germany and Italy, factory councils were effectively neutralized in the early "trials of strength" and before they could build towards a successful transition away from capitalism; and a similar situation occurred in parts of Eastern Europe following World War II, with workers' councils destroyed or co-opted before they could develop into the nucleus of a more democratized alternative to the centralized state socialist model. In Yugoslavia some prominent communists identified the autonomous anti-fascist committees of the war years as the institutional building blocks from which the worker self-determination system sprung after World War II, but it remains the case that by and large worker self-managed enterprises were established after the war and almost certainly would not have emerged had it not been for the successful violent struggle against fascism in the region. In other words, like with Russia and Algeria, rupture enabled the process of building democratized institutions, rather than the other way around. One potential exception, and a case for further study, is the Zapatista uprising. In that case, the successful rebellion in 1994 and the subsequent creation of an autonomous and democratized regional system was arguably enabled by centuries of experimentation with communal and indigenous models of economic production and land ownership punctuated by regular and repeated conflicts with the forces of capitalism and colonialism.

Part of the reason that there are not many good historical examples of evolution leading to systemic change based on economic democracy is that the denominator in that equation is relatively small. In other words, for various reasons – many of which have been discussed in this thesis – there have been very few, if any, fully fledged models of system-level economic democracy ever created. As such, when considering whether an evolutionary theory of change is appropriate or viable for DPO, it will likely be necessary to consider the wider history and concept of social transformation. Specifically, some theorists, notably Alperovitz, suggest that if this broader conception is applied, transformative change can be understood as being relatively common in human history and often occurring when an idea or approach that begins in the margins of the existing system gradually becomes adopted and socialized – usually starting very slowly before hitting a certain tipping point, and then acerating more rapidly after that. Modern examples Alperovitz cites include the proliferation of social welfare programs, equal rights for women, the abolition of slavery, and the massive economic and technological changes of recent decades (Alperovitz, 2006).

7.4 Summary and Reflections

One of the strengths of an evolutionary theory of change is that it allows ample opportunity to build, strengthen, and embed alternative institutions and approaches, and support for them, within the cracks of an existing system before any large-scale, and potentially fatal confrontations with existing power structures and vested interests necessarily need to occur. In other words, as it relates to DPO such a theory of change suggests that there is plenty of space for the concept to grow and develop in the coming period. This chapter specifically, and this thesis more generally, is one part of that process, adding significantly to the DPO literature while also providing a new baseline for further research and development. It suggests, for the first time, a formal definition of DPO – one that is rooted in the historic and contemporary socio-economic and political struggle for justice, equity, and democracy. It offers a set of new and refined principles to help guide theorizing and practice around DPO, including decentralization and subsidiarity (refined), higher-level coordination (refined), institutionalization and embeddedness (new), co-production (refined), affected interest (refined), democratic and participatory planning (refined), professional management and effective organization (refined), transparency and accountability (refined), incentivization (new), internal and external democratization (new), different values (new), decommodification (new), challenging corporate power and privatization (new), and liberty (new). And it proposes a potential theory of change that is relevant and applicable to the modern political economic context and could allow DPO to grow and develop further in both theory and practice.

A useful analogy might be the framing of a house. Built on solid foundations – in this case both the existing DPO literature and the historical analysis presented in the preceding chapters of this thesis – the framing is the next critical next step which gives the structure its general shape and layout. It also provides an opportunity for the builder and inspectors to review the structure and decide whether to move to the next phase of construction or make repairs. In other words, while this chapter (and thesis) is an important conceptual advance, it is by no means the finished product or final word when it comes to the concept of DPO. As will be discussed further in the conclusion, there are many historical and contemporary theories and experiments that this thesis does not cover for various reasons – and others that could and should be evaluated in far more depth than was possible in this work. All of which

may enhance, alter, or further clarify the proposed definition, refined principles, and theory of change presented in this chapter.

Moreover, there is often a symbiotic relationship between experimentation and conceptual development, and this is especially true for a concept like DPO, which is emerging and developing in the midst of rapidly changing political and economic conditions. In other words, it seems likely that communities, governments, and movements will begin, and in some cases continue, to experiment with DPO and DPO-adjacent approaches to ownership and governance in the coming period given the difficulties and challenges facing conventional economic models and approaches; and the learnings and data from these experiences will allow future researchers to make further refinements and advancements to the definition, principles, and theory of change proposed in this chapter.

Chapter 8 - Conclusion

Work on this thesis began in 2019 and was motivated by two intersecting observations about political economic conditions and development two decades into the 21st century, especially in western capitalist countries. First, that the previously dominant, forty-year-old neoliberal economic model was faltering and mutating under the weight of economic pressures, looming environmental calamity, persistent social inequality, and associated cumulative problems. Second, that in this context interest in, and hunger for, alternative institutional approaches, especially around issues of economic ownership, were once again re-emerging in public and high-level policy discourse after years of being relatively frozen under the permafrost of neoliberalism. Based on these observations, the thesis was designed to focus on one such emerging approach, DPO, which was identified as being of interest and relevance to contemporary social movements, policymakers, and academics, but lacking conceptual clarity and identification as a distinct political economic approach.

Over the roughly five-year period of time it took to develop this thesis from concept to finished product, its subject matter has become even more relevant. The Covid-19 pandemic, in particular, opened (or re-opened) deep economic, social, and political rifts, illuminating stark socio-economic inequalities. In particular, this global socio-economic disaster exposed and reinforced many of the limitations and failures of the neoliberal model, especially as it relates to global supply chains, privatized and marketized public services, and individual verse collective, and market verse state action. In many parts of the world, the pandemic has been followed by intense international and political conflict alongside, and connected with, a period of high inflation and steep increases in the cost of living – all of which have further eroded traditional economic arrangements and political alignments.[99] At the same time, the climate crisis continues to accelerate, with extreme weather events becoming more frequent and severe, biodiversity and habitat loss increasing, and sea levels rising (EPA, no date).

[99] At the time of writing, far right political parties are ascendent in many parts of Europe, including France, Germany, Italy, and Spain; an extreme libertarian government has taken power in Argentina; both Brazil and the US recently witnesses failed insurrectionary attempts to prevent the democratic transition of power; a global proxy war between Russia and NATO is raging in Ukraine; and Israel's long-standing occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and persecution of the Palestinians, has devolved into open warfare that threatens to consume the region, leading to the death of tens of thousands of civilians and raising credible allegations of war crimes and genocide.

In other words, as discussed in the previous chapter with regards to DPO's potential theory of change, in an era when it appears that social, political, and economic conditions are becoming increasingly unstable, and traditional approaches and political formations are unable to address deepening problems, there may be an opportunity for new ideas, concepts, and institutions to emerge and grow from the cracks in the old system. By refining and clarifying the concept of DPO – which includes reviewing the existing literature, establishing a relevant methodological approach, situating it ideologically and historically, and offering a definition, revised principles, and theory of change – this thesis makes an important and novel contribution to that possibility. Even if the specific concept of DPO doesn't advance any further in the coming years, either in terms of theoretical development or real-world implementation, this thesis will, hopefully, serve as an important historical and theoretical resource for future practitioners, theorists, and movements interested in the possibility of, and impediments to, economic democracy.

8.1 Key Contributions

This work was in some ways motivated by a specific interaction. During a private discussion after the publication of my first book in 2018, a prominent academic who was well versed in DPO and economic democracy made the comment that he considered DPO a general ideal related to more accountability and participation in public organizations, rather than a specific and defined concept. As someone who was deeply involved with both the theoretical development and practical application of DPO, this perspective from a colleague was surprising and inspired me to take a step back and look at the concept more holistically and through the lens of the uninitiated. As a result of this re-evaluation, I came to believe that there was ample room and need for significant development and refinement of the DPO concept, and this realization underpins both the primary aim of this thesis and its research questions.

Following from its primary aim – to clarify and refine the concept of DPO based on a novel and detailed historical analysis – this work makes several important contributions that will be useful to academics, policymakers, and practitioners. First, it provides an historical analysis of the emergence and evolution of DPO and contributes to a firmer understanding and appreciation of the concept and what it aims to address and achieve. Specifically, it situates DPO ideologically and historically as part of the political left's long-term project of

economic democracy and identifies its modern emergence as being related to the wider renewal of interest in such ideas following the GFC of the late 2000s, including the work of theorists, movements, and policymakers invested in reversing privatization and returning assets, services, and enterprises to public control. Additionally, by centering publicly owned firms that are not necessarily organized around capitalist principles alongside both multiscalar approaches to extending democratic control over economic and organizational decision-making and multi-stakeholder models of governance, it establishes DPO as being part of the broader and more systemically focused and transformative interpretation of economic democracy, rather than the narrower industrial relations perspective that focuses primarily on the effects on, and agency of, workers in individual enterprises.

Relatedly, this thesis is thus far the most comprehensive and expansive effort to bring together and interrogate numerous geographically and temporally disparate cases and theories relevant to the concept of DPO, thus contributing to conceptual coherence. While many of these cases are referenced in other DPO publications, one of this thesis' contributions is compiling this information in a compelling narrative format and comparing, contrasting, and analyzing it for common and informative themes, as well as points of divergence, that help refine and clarify the concept of DPO. For instance, this work establishes that questions related to the role and nature of the state have not only contributed to the modern emergence of DPO, but are common across most, if not all, the compiled historical and contemporary theories and cases. Moreover, the current DPO literature has been relatively ambiguous and avoidant on this issue. Following from this analysis, a refined and clarified approach to the state is presented in chapter seven. Specifically, it suggests that DPO should not be considered, or adopt, either a rigidly statist or anti-statist approach. Rather, its approach should be context dependent, reject the notion of the state as a unitary entity, and consider the possibility that state institutions and actors can be involved, to varying degrees, in the governance and management of public enterprises without succumbing to or embracing statism as a systemic structure. The thesis also makes a similar contribution to the often-fraught discourse around markets and planning, and how DPO should be positioned in this debate. Specifically, it identifies historic deficiencies with overly centralized planning, highlights the existence and role of planning in historic and contemporary market-based systems, and suggests that while markets and market signals may provide certain economic and social benefits, they cannot be the only or primary consideration when it comes to both

systemic and organizational design and function. Additionally, DPO and economic democracy principles, especially related to embeddedness, establish that markets should be consciously and democratically designed and redesigned according to socio-economic needs and objectives.

Another contribution is the articulation and implementation of a customized methodological approach consisting of relevant fields of study, a philosophical framework, and research methodology/methods. While many publications directly or indirectly identify the broad field of political economy as the most logical for DPO research and theorizing, this work makes a unique contribution by more specifically establishing why this is the case, identifying additional relevant fields of study (economic history and institutionalism), detailing specific interpretations and themes relevant to DPO research within these fields, and highlighting points of commonality. This work is also one of the first DPO publications to directly identify and engage with a philosophical framework – specifically critical realism. Moreover, employing critical realism – especially with regards to causal and generative mechanisms, points of social, economic, and historical intersection, and the acceptance of both real structures and multiple ways of thinking about them – has significantly contributed to the process of clarifying and cohering the concept of DPO.

Lastly, this work's main contribution is the refined and clarified concept of DPO presented in chapter seven. Consisting of a novel definition, a set of refined and new principles, and a theory of change, the refined concept significantly advances the DPO literature which, previously, had not articulated a concrete definition, had not engaged directly with different theories of change, and had only minimally articulated a defined set of principles. The recommendation of an evolutionary theory of change is particularly important and impactful both because DPO remains a marginal concept, and because traditional theories of change centered around achieving systemic forms of economic democracy through either revolution or reform appear considerably less viable now than in the past. In general, chapter seven presents a refined and coherent concept of DPO that is both pragmatic and utopian. On numerous important, complex, and divisive issues the chapter attempts to outline a middle of the road approach that retains the goal of creating a dramatically more equitable, just, and democratic set of systemic arrangements; but accepts and builds from existing material realities, many of which are very far from, or antagonistic to, that goal.

8.2 Future Research Directions

This work's originality is at least partly rooted in its ambitious scope. Guided by signposts established in the literature review, it attempts to investigate, review, trace, and analyze nearly 200 years of global experimentation and theorizing related to economic democracy and DPO. However, this approach has several intersecting limitations. First and foremost, the signposts in the existing DPO literature are largely focused on experiments and theories emanating from the Global North and are written in English. Because of its methodological approach, that bias is carried through to this thesis and is exacerbated by my personal experiences and limitations as an English speaking, ethnically European researcher. When combined with the spatial and temporal limitations of the thesis, this leaves large geographic and historical gaps in the research. While identifying these gaps is useful in and of itself, as it suggests opportunities and needs for further research, they are part of the reason that this thesis should be considered a contribution to the conceptual development and refinement process, rather than the presentation of a fully articulated theory of DPO.

Furthermore, the large historical and geographical scope reduces the opportunity to deeply analyze any one specific theory or experiment. While using the literature review to establish which are most relevant and thus requiring of greater scrutiny helps to mitigate this issue, ultimately the decision on where to provide more or less detail is subjective and influenced by my personal experience as a DPO theorist, advocate, and practitioner (which is discussed further in chapter three). While this thesis arguably provides a significantly more detailed analysis of all of the historical and contemporary experiments and theories it covers than any previous piece of DPO literature, it is probable that more in-depth research and analysis of each particular case will yield additional information and insight that is not captured in these pages.

Beyond scope, another limitation of this thesis relates to scale. In particular, the most common unit of scale considered in the research and analysis is that of the nation-state and its various political subdivisions (provinces, regions, municipalities, etc.). This is partly due to the nature of economic democracy experimentation, much of which has occurred at those levels due to historical geopolitical realities, and partly due to DPO's principle of decentralization and subsidiarity (albeit, as discussed further in chapters two and seven, tempered with the need for higher level coordination). At the same time, however, the

historical and ideological tradition of economic democracy, as well as modern discourse around it, is heavily infused with internationalist perspectives, discussions, and approaches (e.g. Douglas, 1920; Cumbers, 2012).

By and large, this thesis – as well as the DPO literature that precedes it – does not address the longstanding debate about systemic change (i.e. socialism) in one country verse globally. Put another way, while the DPO literature (including this thesis) often suggests that the concept can, and should, be implemented internationally, and is adaptable to a wide variety of local cultural and social contexts, it has not yet adequately investigated how these efforts could and should be consciously linked together to transcend (or even undermine) traditional national boundaries; or how the failure to do so might undermine or weaken both the practice of DPO locally and its system changing potential globally. Moreover, while the suggested evolutionary theory of change opens the door for new institutions and approaches to scale globally, further research and analysis is needed as it relates to both historical precedent and specifics concerning international trade and law, democratic participation at scale, and cross-cultural networking, among many other issues.

As expressed numerous times in the preceding chapters, this thesis is intended to be a significant contribution to the discourse, literature, and ongoing development of DPO, rather than a final or definitive theory. The concept will undoubtedly undergo further scrutiny and refinement in the coming period. And, indeed, it must given the aforementioned gaps and limitations of this work and my own inevitable biases as a researcher. In this respect, an effort has been made in various chapters to suggest where future research is needed or could be useful. These can be roughly broken into two categories: expanding the scope to include experiments, theories, and models that need further investigation; and deepening the detail and cross-sample analysis.

Regarding the first, one of the most pressing areas for further research is Asian and African experiences with economic democracy and public ownership design. This includes historical approaches like the Ujamaa model advanced by Julius Nyerere in Tanzania during the 1960s and 70s (Nyerere, 1968). Ujamaa combined nationalization and state-led development with community-based economic organizations and social transformation (Lal, 2015); and the model inspired other community-based approaches and or alternative systemic visions internationally, especially in African diaspora (Markle, 2017; Collord, 2020). It also

includes enterprise and systemic design in China which, despite its major role in the modern global economy and claimed communist ideological orientation, is almost entirely missing from both the existing DPO literature and this thesis. At least conceptually, China encourages worker participation, especially in SOEs (Long, Nyland, and Fan, 2022; Li, 2024). Information and analysis of how this system works (or does not work) in practice, how it has changed over time and in response to national and global political economic shifts, where it is similar and different from other historical models (such as some that are reviewed in this thesis), and what its limitations and benefits are would likely help further advance the concept of DPO.

Regarding the second, continued and more detailed research attention is needed on important ongoing, contemporary case studies, especially as it relates to theories of change. This includes examples like the Zapatista movement in Chiapas, the cooperative and left government nexus in Kerala, the Paris water observatory (and related such institutions), and democratic confederalism in Rojava, all of which were discussed briefly in chapters six and seven. Many of these efforts combine alternative models of ownership and governance with various forms of left politics and goals around social and economic transformation. And all have influenced and helped inform the conceptual development of DPO. At the same time, they are all currently facing various challenges, ranging from civil war, to international drug gangs, to declining participation, to hostile national and international institutions and arrangements. How they recognize, address, and, overcome these challenges (or don't) in the coming period, and how this affects the sustainability and spread of their models and approaches, especially as it relates to democratic forms of ownership and governance, will provide invaluable additional information that can be added to some of the historical analysis conducted in this thesis to help further refine and develop the concept of DPO.

8.3 Concluding Thoughts

While somewhat apocryphal, the 19th century French novelist and poet Victor Hugo is often credited with saying that there is "nothing in the world so powerful as an idea whose time has come."[100] In a world beset with intersecting and escalating social, economic, political, and ecological challenges, and the declining ability of traditional approaches and

[100] In 1877, Hugo wrote in *Histoire d'un crime* that "one resists the invasion of armies; one does not resist the invasion of ideas" (1909, pp. 627-628). This quote may be the original source for the modern variant of this saying.

models to address them, DPO could be one such idea. It offers the possibility of a more collective and democratic alternative to the individualism, elite control, and profiteering of the neoliberal era, on the one hand; and the statism, bureaucracy, and paternalism of traditional public ownership models, on the other. Prior to this work, however, it would have been accurate to say that the vast majority of people involved with alternative models of ownership, democratic forms of governance, and system change and design had never heard of DPO. And, even among those who had, a common understanding was that DPO was simply a broad and vague collection of ideas related primarily to organizational design. This thesis has established DPO as a concrete concept with an ideological orientation, a historical background, a definition, a set of principles, a potential theory of change, and areas for further development. Hopefully, this added clarity and refinement will, in time, help to socialize and popularize the concept amongst academics, policymakers, and social movements alike, especially if, as seems likely, interest in alternative political economic approaches escalates during the coming years and decades.

At the same time, this thesis has also significantly advanced and expanded the DPO literature and made a contribution the wider discourse on the history and future of economic democracy. However, as has been stressed repeatedly throughout, it is not intended to be a definitive statement or fully-fledged theory of DPO. For DPO to realize its potential it needs significantly more theoretical, conceptual, and practical development in the coming years. This thesis makes a contribution to this task and it is my sincere hope that the information, analysis, and sources contained in these pages will inspire and aid additional development of the DPO concept specifically, and economic democracy more generally. In other words, rather than being the end or a definitive answer on the subject, hopefully it marks the beginning of a longer process of inquiry, experimentation, and iteration; one that will ultimately contribute to real-world change in the way political economic institutions and systems are organized as the century progresses. No less than it did 200 years ago, the vision of a more equitable, peaceful, and cooperative world burns brightly. However, history has demonstrated time and time again that the route forward towards that vision is neither short, nor linear. It is only through constant critique, re-appraisal, and re-design of our strategies, models, and approaches that the many obstacles can be surmounted, and detours navigated.

References[101]

Chapter 1

Adler, P.S. (2019) *The 99 Percent Economy: How Democratic Socialism Can Overcome the Crises of Capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Akuno, K. and Nangwaya, A. (eds.) (2017) *Jackson Rising: The Struggle for Economic Democracy and Black Self-Determination in Jackson, Mississippi*. Montreal: Daraja Press.

Alperovitz, G. (2013) *What Then Must We Do: Straight Talk about the Next American Revolution*. White River Junction: Chelsea Green.

Amatori, F., Millward, R., and Toninelli, P.A. (eds.) (2011) *Reappraising State-Owned Enterprise: A Comparison of the UK and Italy*. New York: Routledge.

Bernier, L., Florio, M., and Bance, P. (eds.) (2020) *The Routledge Handbook of State-Owned Enterprises*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Birley, A. and Fortune, J. (2018) *Ownership Matters: Democratic Public Ownership for the 21st Century*. London: Co-operative Party.

Bonnano, A. (2017) *The Legitimation Crisis of Neoliberalism: The State, Will-Formation, and Resistance*. New York: Palgrave.

Buller, A. and Lawrence, M. (2020) *Emergency Landing: How Public Stakes Can Secure a Sustainable Future for Aviation*. London: Common Wealth.

Burton, R. and Obel, B. (2018) 'The Science of Organizational Design: Fit Between Structure and Coordination', *Journal of Organization Design*, 7(1), pp. 1-13.

Burton, R., Obel, B., and Håkonsson, D.D. (2020) *Organizational Design: A Step-by-Step Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cambridge Dictionary (n.d.) *Theory*. Available at: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/theory (Accessed: 17 September 2021).

Carey, G. and Crammond, B. (2015) 'Systems Change for the Social Determinants of Health', *BMC Public Health*, 15(662), pp. 1-10.

Carr-Chellman, A.A. (1998) 'Systemic Change: Critically Reviewing the Literature', *Educational Research and Evaluation*, 4(4), pp. 369-394.

Cohen, D. and Mikaelian, A. (2021) *The Privatization of Everything: How the Plunder of Public Goods Transformed America and How We Can Fight Back*. New York: The New Press.

[101] References are listed according to the chapter in which they first appear.

Cole, G.D.H. (1953) ‘What is Socialism?, I’, *Political Studies*, 1(1), pp. 21-33.

Coleman, K. (1991) *Nationalisation: Beyond the Slogans*. Johannesburg: Raven Press.

Cumbers, A. (2012) *Reclaiming Public Ownership: Making Space for Economic Democracy*. London: Zed Books.

Cumbers, A. and Becker, S. (2018) ‘Making Sense of Remunicipalisation: Theoretical Reflections on and Political possibilities from Germany’s *Rekommumalisierung* Process’, *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, 11(3), pp. 503-517.

Cumbers, A. and Hanna, T.M. (2018) ‘Democratic Ownership’, in Macfarlane, L. (ed.) *New Thinking for the British Economy*. London: openDemocracy.

Cumbers, A. and Hanna, T.M. (2019) *Constructing the Democratic Public Enterprise*. Washington, D.C.: Next System Project.

Cumbers, A. and McMaster, R. (2012) ‘Revisiting Public Ownership: Knowledge, Democracy and Participation in Economic Decision Making’, *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 44(3), pp. 358-373.

Enggist, M. and Pinggera, M. (2021) ‘Radical Right Parties and their Welfare State Stances – Not So Blurry After All?’, *West European Politics*, 45(1), pp. 102-128.

Fraser, N. (2019) *The Old is Dying and the New Cannot be Born*. London: Verso.

Grant, M. (2013) ‘Water Privatization Overview: A Public Interest Perspective on For-profit, Private Sector Provision of Water and Sewer Services in the United States’, *Journal of Law in Society*, 14(1), pp. 167+.

Hall, D., Lobina, E., and de la Motte, R. (2005) ‘Public Resistance to Privatisation in Water and Energy’, *Development in Practice*, 15(3/4), pp. 286-301.

Hall, D. (2016) *Public Ownership of the UK Energy System – Benefits, Costs and Processes*. Greenwich: Public Services International Research Unit.

Hanna, T.M. (2018a) *The Crisis Next Time: Planning for Public Ownership as an Alternative to Corporate Bank Bailouts*. Washington, D.C: Next System Project.

Hanna, T.M. (2018b) *Our Common Wealth: The Return of Public Ownership in the United States*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hanna, T.M. and Guinan, J. (2013) ‘Privatisation, a very British Disease’, *openDemocracy*, 5 November. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/privatisation-very-british-disease/ (Accessed: 9 August 2021).

Hanna, T.M. and Simpson, A. (2019) ‘100 Years Ago, Farmers and Socialists Established the Country’s First Modern Public Bank’, *In These Times*, 28 July. Available at: https://inthesetimes.com/article/100-years-farmers-socialists-public-bank-of-north-dakota-nonpartisan-league (Accessed: 9 August 2021).

Hanna, T.M., et al. (2020) *Democratic Digital Infrastructure*. London: Common Wealth.

Harvey, D. (2014) *Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Johanisova, N. and Wolf, S. (2012) 'Economic Democracy: A Path for the Future?', *Futures*, 44(6), pp. 562-570.

Kenis, P. and Raab, J. (2020) 'Back to the Future: Using Organization Design Theory for Effective Organizational Networks', *Perspectives on Public Management and Governance*, 3(2), pp. 109-123.

Kishimoto, S. and Petitjean, O. (eds.) (2017) *Reclaiming Public Services: How Cities are Turning Back Privatisation*. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.

Kishimoto, S., Steinfort, L., Petitjean, O. (eds.) (2020) *The Future is Public: Towards Democratic Ownership of Public Services*. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.

Labour Party (2018) *Labour Party Consultation Paper: Democratic Public Ownership*. Available at: https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Democratic-public-ownership-consulation.pdf (Accessed: 19 October 2020).

Labour Party (2019) It's Time for Real Change: The Labour Party Manifesto 2019. Available at: https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Real-Change-Labour-Manifesto-2019.pdf (Accessed: 24 July 2021).

Lamb, P. and Docherty, J.C. (2006) *Historical Dictionary of Socialism*. Oxford: Scarecrow Press.

Lapavitsas, C. (2020) 'This Crisis Has Exposed the Absurdities of Neoliberalism. That Doesn't Mean It'll Destroy It', *Jacobin*. Available at: https://jacobinmag.com/2020/3/coronavirus-pandemic-great-recession-neoliberalism (Accessed: 19 October 2020).

Lawrence, M. and Hanna, T.M. (2020) *Ownership Futures: Towards Democratic Public Ownership in the 21st Century*. London: Common Wealth.

Malleson, T. (2014) *After Occupy: Economic Democracy for the 21st Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marois, T. (2017) *How Public Banks Can Help Finance a Green and Just Energy Transformation*. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.

McDonald, D.A. (2018a) 'Remunicipalization: The Future of Water Services?', *Geoforum*, 91, pp. 47-56.

McDonald, D.A. and Swyngedouw, E. (2019) 'The New Water Wars: Struggle for Remunicipalisation', *Water Alternatives*, 12(2), pp. 322-333.

Mears, D.P. (2022) ‘Escaping the Sisyphean Trap: Systemic Criminal Justice System Reform’, *American Journal of Criminal Justice*, 47, pp. 1030-1049.

Millward, R. (2005) *Private and Public Enterprise in Europe; Energy, Telecommunications and Transport, 1830-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

NRC (2002) *Privatization of Water Services in the United States: An Assessment of Issues and Experience*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Otjes, S., et al. (2018) ‘It's not Economic Interventionism, Stupid! Reassessing the Political Economy of Radical Right-wing Populist Parties’, *Swiss Political Science Review*, 24(3), 270-290.

Paul, M., Skandier, C.S., and Renzy, R. (2020) *The Case for Nationalizing the Fossil Fuel Industry*. Washington, D.C: People’s Policy Project.

Plehwe, D., Slobodian, Q., and Mirowski, P. (eds.) (2020) *Nine Lives of Neoliberalism*. London: Verso.

Pryke, R. (1971) *Public Enterprise in Practice: The British Experience of Nationalisation over Two Decades*. London: MacGibbon & Kee.

Pryke, R. (1981) *The Nationalised Industries: Politics and Performance since 1968*. Oxford: Martin Robertson.

Ravitch, D. (2020) *Slaying Goliath: The Passionate Resistance to Privatization and the Fight to Save America’s Public Schools*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Rugitsky, F. (2020) ‘The Decline of Neoliberalism: A Play in Three Acts’, *Brazilian Journal of Political Economy*, 40(4), pp. 587-603.

Schroering, C. (2019) ‘Water is a Human Right! Grassroots Resistance to Corporate Power’, *Journal of World-Systems Research*, *25*(1), pp. 28-34.

Schumacher, E.F. (1989) *Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered*. New York: Harper & Row.

Schweickart, D. (2011) *After Capitalism*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Stiglitz, J. (2019) ‘Neoliberalism must be pronounced dead and buried. Where next?’, *The Guardian*, 30 May. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/may/30/neoliberalism-must-be-pronouced-dead-and-buried-where-next (Accessed: 18 October 2020).

Sunkara, B. (2019) *The Socialist Manifesto: The Case for Radical Politics in an Era of Extreme Inequality*. New York: Basic Books.

Timonen, V., Foley, G., and Conlon, C. (2018) ‘Challenges When Using Grounded Theory: A Pragmatic Introduction to Doing GT Research’, *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 17, pp. 1-10.

Toninelli, P.A. (ed.) (2000) *The Rise and Fall of State-Owned Enterprise in the Western World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vernon, R. and Aharoni, Y. (1981) *State-Owned Enterprise in the Western Economies*. London: Croom Helm.

Wacker, J.G. (1998) 'A Definition of Theory: Research Guidelines for Different Theory-building Research Methods in Operations Management', *Journal of Operations Management*, 16, pp. 361-385.

Wainwright, H. (2020a) 'To Make Public Ownership Truly Democratic, We Need to Transform the State', *openDemocracy*, 13 May. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/make-public-ownership-truly-democratic-we-need-transform-state/ (Accessed: 19 October 2020).

Weghmann, V. (2020) *Taking our Public Services Back In-house*. Ferney-Voltaire Cedex: Public Services International.

We Own It (2019) *When We Own It: A Model for Public Ownership in the 21st Century*. Oxford: We Own It.

Whitfield, D. (2020) *Public Alternatives to the Privatisation of Life*. Nottingham: Spokesman.

Williamson, K. (2002) *Research Methods for Students, Academics and Professionals*. New South Wales: Center for Information Studies.

Zaslove, A., et al. (2020) 'Power to the people? Populism, democracy, and political participation: a citizen's perspective', *West European Politics*, 44(4), pp. 727-751.

Zimbalist, A. and Sherman, H.J. (1984) *Comparing Economic Systems: A Political Economic Approach*. Orlando: Academic Press, Inc.

Chapter 2

Ahmad, H., Katz, P., and Feygin, Y. (2023) *What a Municipal Bank Can Do for Los Angeles and Its People*. New York: Jain Family Institute and Berggruen Institute.

Albalate, D. and Bel, G. (2020) 'Politicians, Bureaucrats and the Public–private Choice in Public Service Delivery: Anybody There Pushing for Remunicipalization?', *Journal of Economic Policy Reform*, 24(3), pp. 361-379.

Allegretti, A. (2023) 'Keir Starmer Denies Abandoning Labour Leadership Pledges', *The Guardian*, 23 February. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/feb/23/keir-starmer-denies-abandoning-labour-leadership-pledges (Accessed: 11 April 2023).

Andrews, R. et al. (2019) 'Corporatization in the Public Sector: Explaining the Growth of Local Government Companies', *Public Administration Review*, 80(3), pp. 482-493.

Angel, J. (2017) ‘Towards an Energy Politics In-against-and-beyond the State: Berlin’s Struggle for Energy Democracy’, *Antipode* 49(3), pp. 557–576.

Angel, J. (2021) ‘New Municipalism and the State: Remunicipalising Energy in Barcelona, from Prosaics to Process’, *Antipode*, 53(2), pp. 524-545.

Archer, R. (1995) *Economic Democracy: The Politics of Feasible Socialism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Aronoff, K. (2021) ‘The Green New Dealers Propose Their Own Infrastructure Idea: Socialize Your Energy Bill’, *New Republic*, 3 June. Available at: https://newrepublic.com/article/162593/green-new-deal-cori-bush-public-electricity (Accessed: 4 August 2021).

Becker, S., Beveridge, R., and Naumann, M. (2015) ‘Remunicipalization in German Cities: Contesting Neo-liberalism and Reimagining Urban Governance?’, *Space and Polity*, 19(1), pp. 76-90.

Blakeley, G. (ed.) (2020) *Futures of Socialism: The Pandemic and the Post-Corbyn Era*. London: Verso.

Bönker, F., Libbe, J., and Wollmann, H. (2016) ‘Remunicipalisation Revisited: Long-Term Trends in the Provision of Local Public Services in Germany’, in Wollmann, H., Koprić, I., and Marcou, G. (eds.) *Public and Social Services in Europe: From Public and Municipal to Private Sector Provision*. London: Palgrave.

Brennan, M. (2021) *Constructing the Democratic Public Bank: A Governance Proposal for the Los Angeles Public Bank*. Washington, D.C: The Democracy Collaborative.

Brown, D. (2019) *Medicine for All: The Case for a Public Option in the Pharmaceutical Industry*. Washington, D.C.: The Democracy Collaborative.

Brown, M. and Stewart, H. (2022) ‘Starmer Says he Won’t be ‘Ideological’ amid Renationalisation Row’, *The Guardian*, 25 July. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/jul/25/starmer-says-he-wont-be-ideological-labour-renationalisation-row (Accessed: 11 April 2023).

Bush, C. and Bowman, J. (2021) *Public Power Resolution*. Available at: https://bush.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/bush.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/Bush%20Public%20Power%20Resolution%20FINAL.pdf (Accessed: 4 August 2021).

Carnoy, M. and Shearer, D. (1980) *Economic Democracy: The Challenge of the 1980s*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

Clifton, J., et al. (2019) ‘Re-municipalization of Public Services: Trend or Hype?’, *Journal of Economic Policy Reform*, 24(3), pp. 293-304.

Cumbers, A. (2017) *Renewing Public Ownership: Constructing a Democratic Economy in the Twenty-First Century*. London: CLASS.

Cumbers, A. (2020) *The Case for Economic Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Cumbers, A. (2024) 'The Return of Public Ownership Amidst Neoliberal Mutation', *Soundings*, 87, pp. 117-133.

Cumbers, A. and Paul, F. (2022) 'Remunicipalisation, Mutating Neoliberalism, and the Conjuncture', *Antipode*, 54(1), pp. 197-217.

Cumbers, et al. (2019) 'Reconfiguring Economic Democracy: Generating New Forms of Collective Agency, Individual Economic Freedom and Public Participation', *Work, Employment and Society*, 34(4), pp. 678-695.

Crush, P. (2021) 'Royal Mail workers set to receive share dividend', *Employee Benefits*, 30 March. Available at: https://employeebenefits.co.uk/royal-mail-workers-share-dividend/ (Accessed: 25 August 2021).

Dahl, R.A. (1985) *A Preface to Economic Democracy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

DSA (2021) *Proposed DSA Political Platform for 2021 Convention: Second Draft*. Available at: https://convention2021.dsausa.org/files/sites/23/2021/06/Democratic-Socialists-of-America-2021-Platform-Second-Draft.pdf (Accessed: 9 August 2021).

Ferry, L. et al. (2018) 'New Development: Corporatization of Local Authorities in England in the Wake of Austerity 2010–2016', *Public Money & Management*, 38(6), pp. 477–480.

Frega, R., Herzog, L., and Neuhäuser, C. (2019) 'Workplace Democracy – The Recent Debate', *Philosophy Compass*, 14(4), pp. 1-11.

Friends of the Public Bank of Oakland (2018) *Governance Structure for the Public Bank of Oakland*. Available at: https://californiapublicbankingalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/FOPB_public_bank_of_oakland_governance_proposal_040918.pdf (Accessed: 4 August 2021).

Gradus, R. and Budding, T. (2020) 'Political and institutional explanations for increasing re-municipalization', *Urban Affairs Review*, 56(2), pp. 538-564.

Guinan, J. and Hanna, T.M. (2014) *Could the postal workers take back Royal Mail?* London: Compass.

Guinan, J. and Hanna, T.M. (2016) 'Democracy and Decentralisation are their Watchwords: For Corbyn and McDonnell, it's Municipal Socialism Reinvented', *openDemocracy*, 25 March. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/democracy-and-decentralisation-are-their-watchwords-for-corbyn-and-mcdonn/ (Accessed: 18 November 2020).

Guinan, J. and O'Neill, M. (2019) *The Case for Community Wealth Building*. Cambridge: Polity.

Hanna, T.M. (2018c) 'Power to the People! McDonnell's Ambitious Agenda on Democratic Public Ownership', *New Socialist*, 25 September. Available at: https://newsocialist.org.uk/power-to-the-people/ (Accessed: 18 November 2020).

Hanna, T.M. (2018d) 'The Public Ownership Solution', *Jacobin*, 10 December. Available at: https://jacobinmag.com/2018/12/public-state-ownership-united-states-socialism (Accessed: 4 August 2021).

Hanna, T.M. and McDonald, D.A. (2021) 'From Pragmatic to Politicized? The Future of Water Remunicipalization in the United States', *Utilities Policy*, 72, pp. 1-9.

Hanna, T.M., Brett, M., and Brown, D. (2020) *Democratising Knowledge: Transforming Intellectual Property and Research and Development*. London: Common Wealth.

Hanna, T.M., et al. (2020) *Democratic Digital Infrastructure*. London: Common Wealth.

Hanna, T.M., Lawrence, M., and Peters, N. (2020) *A Common Platform: Reimagining Data and Platforms*. London: Common Wealth.

Hanna, T.M. (2023) 'Brandon Johnson Should Meet the Threat From Private Capital Head On', *Jacobin*, 5 May. Available at: https://jacobin.com/2023/05/brandon-johnson-chicago-public-bank-democratic-capital-control (Accessed: 19 September 2023).

Hasan, N., Harrington, D., and Speck, W. (2019) 'Take Back the Grid: DSA and the Fight for Energy Democracy', *Socialist Forum*, Winter. Available at: https://socialistforum.dsausa.org/issues/winter-2019/take-back-the-grid-dsa-and-the-fight-for-energy-democracy/ (Accessed: 9 August 2021).

Hobbs, C. (2020) 'The Case for Public Ownership', in Blakeley. G. (ed.) *Futures of Socialism: The Pandemic and the Post-Corbyn Era*. London: Verso.

Homsy, G. and Warner. M.E. (2020) 'Does Public Ownership of Utilities Matter for Local Government Water Policies?', *Utilities Policy*, 64, pp. 1-8.

Hopman, L., et al. (2021) *Democratic and Collective Ownership of Public Goods and Services: Exploring Public-Community Collaboration*. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.

HR&A (2023*) San Francisco Public Bank (Proposed)*. Available from: https://sfgov.org/lafco/sites/default/files/rwg021623_PublicBank-DRAFT.pdf (Accessed: 5 April 2024).

Jones, O. (2020) *This Land: The Struggle for the Left*. London: Penguin.

Kishimoto, S., Lobina, E., and Petitjean, O. (eds.) (2015) *Our Public Water Future: The Global Experience with Remunicipalisation*. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.

Labour Party (2017) *Alternative Models of Ownership*. Available at: https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Alternative-Models-of-Ownership.pdf (Accessed: 18 November 2020).

Labour Party (2018) *Labour Party Consultation Paper: Democratic Public Ownership*. Available at: https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Democratic-public-ownership-consulation.pdf (Accessed: 19 October 2020).

Labour Party (2024) *Change: Labour Party Manifesto 2024*. Available at: https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Labour-MANIFESTO-UK-2024.pdf (Accessed: 18 September 2024).

Lapavitsas, C. (2010) 'Systemic Failure of Private Banking: A Case for Public Banks', in Arestis, P. and Sawyer, M. (eds.) *21st Century Keynesian Economics*. Houndsmills: Palgrave.

Lobina, E. and Weghmann, V. (2020) 'Commentary: The Perils and Promise of Inter-paradigmatic Dialogues on Remunicipalisation', *Journal of Economic Policy Reform*, 24(2), pp. 1-7.

Lobina, E., Weghmann, V., and Marwa, M. (2019) 'Water Justice Will Not Be Televised: Moral Advocacy and the Struggle for Transformative Remunicipalisation in Jakarta', *Water Alternatives* 12(2), pp. 725–748.

Loftus, A. and McDonald, D.A. (2001) 'Of Liquid Dreams: A Political Ecology of Water Privatisation in Buenos Aires', *Environment and Urbanization*, 13(2), pp. 179–199.

Macpherson, C.B. (1942) 'The Meaning of Economic Democracy', *University of Toronto Quarterly*, 11(4), pp. 403-420.

Marois, T. (2021) *Public Banks: Decarbonisation, Definacialisation, and Democratisation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marois, T. (2022) 'A Dynamic Theory of Public Banks (and Why it Matters)', *Review of Political Economy*, 34(2), pp. 356-371.

Mazzucato, M. and Mikheeva, O. (2020) *The EIB and the New EU Missions Framework*. London: Institution for Innovation and Public Purpose.

McDonald, D.A. (2016) 'To Corporatize or Not to Corporatize (And if so How)?', *Utilities Policy,* 40, pp. 107-114.

McDonald, D.A. (2018b) 'Building a Pro-public Movement in Canada', *Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review*, 99(1), pp. 59-78.

Miller, A.N. (1997) 'Ideological Motivations of Privatization in Great Britain Versus Developing Countries', *Journal of International Affairs*, 50(2), pp. 391-407.

Moran, G. (2019) 'Publicly Owned Utilities Could Help Fight the Climate Crisis', *Teen Vogue*, 25 October. Available at: https://www.teenvogue.com/story/public-utilities-energy-grid (Accessed: 4 August 2021).

Mustchin, S. (2017) 'Public Sector Restructuring and the Re-regulation of Industrial Relations: The Three-decade Project of Privatisation, Liberalisation and Marketisation in Royal Mail', *Industrial Relations Journal*, 48(4), pp. 294-309.

Paul, F. (2020) 'Exploring the Role of "The Public" in Social Economics: Public Ownership and the Solidarity City?', *Space and Polity*, 24(3), pp. 314–316.

Pigeon, M. et al. (eds.) (2012) *Remunicipalisation: Putting Water Back in Public Hands*. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.

Planas, M. and Martínez, J. (2020) 'A New Water Culture: Catalonia's Public Co-governance Model in the Making', in Kishimoto, S., Steinfort, L., and Petitjean, O. (eds.) *The Future is Public: Towards Democratic Ownership of Public Services*. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.

Pogrund, G. and Maguire, P. (2020) *Left Out: The Inside Story of Labour Under Corbyn*. New York: Vintage.

Public Futures (2021) *International Database of De-privatised Public Services*. Available at: https://publicfutures.org/ (Accessed: 3 August 2021).

Romero, M.J. (2017) *Public Development Banks: Towards a Better Model*. Brussels: Eurodad.

Santiago Declaration (2022) *Our Future is Public: The Santiago Declaration for Public Services*. Available at: https://pop-umbrella.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/2992ff28-acc3-45a1-8ab0-6fa328df80a5_OFIP_SantiagoDeclaration_EN.pdf (Accessed: 24 January 2023).

Scherrer, C. (ed.) (2017) *Public Banks in the Age of Financialization: A Comparative Perspective*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Seymour, R. (2012) 'A Short History of Privatisation in the UK: 1979-2012,' *The Guardian*, 29 March. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/29/short-history-of-privatisation (Accessed: 15 October 2021).

Sgouros, T. (2022) *Public Bank East Bay Viability Study*. Available at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/6449b94a989ac6192a0a5a3d/t/649c9caa34a6702a52cebb6b/1687985328090/PBEB+Viability+Study+March+2022.pdf (Accessed 4 April 2024).

SFPBC (2022) *Governing a San Francisco Public Bank: Proposal for the Reinvestment Working Group*. Available at: https://www.sfpublicbank.org/uploads/1/3/9/3/139355791/governing_a_san_francisco_public_bank.pdf (Accessed: 4 April 2024).

Studlar, D.T., McAllister, I., and Ascui, A. (1990) 'Privatization and the British Electorate: Microeconomic Policies, Macroeconomic Evaluations, and Party Support', *American Journal of Political Science*, 34(4), pp. 1077-1101.

Thompson, M. (2021) 'What's So New about New Municipalism?', *Progress in Human Geography*, 45(2), pp. 317-342.

Uğurlu, E.N. and Epstein, G. (2021) 'The Public Banking Movement in the United States: Networks, Agenda, Initiatives, and Challenges', *PERI Working Paper Series*, 538.

Ulmer, R. and Gerlak, A.K. (2019) 'The Remunicipalization of Water Services in the United States'*, Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development*, 61(4), pp. 18-27.

Vieira, H. (2018) 'A New Definition of Economic Democracy – And What it Means for Inequality', *London School of Economics*, 3 March. Available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2018/03/03/a-new-definition-of-economic-democracy-and-what-it-means-for-inequality/ (Accessed: 9 September 2021).

von Mettenheim, K. and Del Tedesco Lins, M.A. (eds.) (2008). *Government Banking: New Perspectives on Sustainable Development and Social Inclusion from Europe and South America*. Rio de Janeiro and Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

von Mettenheim, K. and Butzbach, O. (2017) 'Back to the Future of Alternative Banks and Patient Capital', in Scherrer, C. (ed.) *Public Banks in the Age of Financialization: A Comparative Perspective*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Voorn, B., van Thiel, S., and van Genugten, M. (2018) 'Debate: Corporatization as More than a Recent Crisis-driven Development', *Public Money & Management*, 38(7), pp. 481–482.

Vrousalis, N. (2019) 'Workplace Democracy Implies Economic Democracy', *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 50(3), pp. 259-279.

Wagner, O. and Berlo, K. (2015) 'The Wave of Remunicipalisation of Energy Networks and Supply in Germany: The Establishment of 72 New Municipal Power Utilities', *ECEEE Summer Study Proceedings*, pp. 559-570.

Wainwright, H. (2020b) 'Transforming the State: Towards Democracy-driven Public Ownership', in Kishimoto, S., Steinfort, L., and Petitjean, O. (eds.) *The Future is Public: Towards Democratic Ownership of Public Services*. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.

Wait, I.W., and Petrie, W.A. (2017) 'Comparison of Water Pricing for Publicly and Privately Owned Water Utilities in the United States', *Water International*, 42(8), pp. 967-980.

Warner, M.E. and Aldag, A.M. (2019) 'Re-municipalization in the US: A Pragmatic Response to Contracting', *Journal of Economic Policy Reform*, 24(3), pp. 319-332.

Warner, M.E. and Hefetz, A. (2012) 'Insourcing and Outsourcing: The Dynamics of Privatization among US Municipalities 2002–2007', *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 78(3), pp. 313-327.

Warner, M.E., Zhang, X., Rivas, M.G. (2020) 'Which States and Cities Protect Residents from Water Shutoffs in the COVID-19 Pandemic?', *Utilities Policy*, 67, pp. 1-6.

Chapter 3

Al-Amoudi, I. and Willmott, H. (2011) 'Where Constructionism and Critical Realism Converge: Interrogating the Domain of Epistemological Relativism', *Organization Studies*, 32(1), pp. 27-46.

Allmark, P. and Machaczek, K. (2018) 'Realism and Pragmatism in a Mixed Methods Study', *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 74(6), pp. 1301-1309.

Archer, M. et al. (eds.) (1998) *Critical Realism: Essential Readings*. London: Routledge.

Archer, M. et al. (2016) *What is Critical Realism*. Available at: http://www.asatheory.org/current-newsletter-online/what-is-critical-realism (Accessed: 17 January 2022).

Barkanov, B. (2013) *Institutionalism*. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/institutionalism (Accessed: 17 January 2022).

Berg, B.L. and Lune, H. (2012) *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. New York: Pearson.

Bevir, M. (2009) *Key Concepts in Governance*. London: Sage.

Bhaskar, R. (1989) *Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy*. London: Verso.

Bhaskar, R. (1994) *Plato, Etc.: The Problems of Philosophy and Their Resolution*. London: Verso.

Bhaskar, R. (2016) *Enlightened Common Sense: The Philosophy of Critical Realism*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Block, F. (2001) 'Introduction', in Polanyi, K. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Block, F. (2003) 'Karl Polanyi and the Writing of The Great Transformation', *Theory and Society*, 32(3), pp. 275–306.

Block, F. (2016) 'Karl Polanyi and Twenty-first Century Socialism', *openDemocracy*, 22 May. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/karl-polanyi-and-twenty-first-century-socialism/ (Accessed: 18 January 2022).

Boland, L.A. (2012) *Economic Positivism*. Available at: http://positivists.org/blog/economic-positivism. (Accessed: 22 March 2022).

Burrell, G. and Morgan, G. (1979). *Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis: Elements of the Sociology of Corporate Life*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Cangiani, M. (2011) 'Karl Polanyi's Institutional Theory: Market Society and Its "Disembedded Economy"', *Journal of Economic Issues*, 45(1), pp. 177-197.

Carter, N., et al. (2014) The Use of Triangulation in Qualitative Research. *Oncology Nursing Forum*, 41(5), pp. 545-547.

Collier, A. (1994) *Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar's Philosophy*. London: Verso.

Collinson, S. (ed.) (2003) *Power, Livelihoods and Conflict: Case Studies in Political Economy Analysis for Humanitarian Action*. London: Humanitarian Policy Group.

Dostatler, G. (2003) 'Thorstein Veblen, Pioneer of Institutionalism', *Alternatives Economiques*, 215. Available at: https://www.veblen-institute.org/Have-read-Veblen.html (Accessed: 18 January 2022).

Dugger, W.M. and Sherman, H.J. (1994) 'Comparison of Marxism and Institutionalism', *Journal of Economic Issues*, 28(1), pp. 101-127.

Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R., and Jackson, P. (2015) *Management and Business Research (5th edition)*. London: Sage.

Elder-Vass, D. (2021) *Pragmatism and Critical Realism: Call for Papers*. Available at: https://criticalrealismnetwork.org/2021/02/10/pragmatism-and-critical-realism-call-for-papers/ (Accessed: 22 March 2022).

Estrin, S. (1991) 'Yugoslavia: The Case of Self-Managing Market Socialism', *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5(4), pp. 187-194.

Fine, B. (2006) Debating Critical Realism in Economics', *Capital & Class*, 30(2), pp. 121-129.

Finnis, J. (1980) *Natural Law and Natural Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Fleetwood, S. (2005) 'Ontology in Organization and Management Studies: A Critical Realist Perspective', *Organization*, 12(2), pp. 197-222.

Fletcher, A. (2017) 'Applying Critical Realism in Qualitative Research: Methodology Meets Method', *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 20(2), pp. 181-194.

Godden, C. (2015) 'Economic History', in Wright, J.D. (ed.) *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*. Available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/economic-history (Accessed: 17 January 2022).

Grover, V., et al. (2008) 'Contributing to Rigorous and Forward Thinking Explanatory Theory', *Journal of the Association for Information Systems*, 9(2), pp. 40-47.

Gunn, S. and Faire, L. (eds.) (2012) *Research Methods for History*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Heath, J. (1993) *Revitalizing Socialist Enterprise: A Race Against Time*. London: Verso.

Hodgson, G.M. (1999) 'Marching to the Promised Land? Some Doubts on the Policy Affinities of Critical Realism', *Journal of Critical Realism*, 2(2), pp. 2-10.

Hodgson, G.M. (2017) 'Karl Polanyi on Economy and Society: A Critical Analysis of Core Concepts', *Review of Social Economy*, 75(1), pp. 1-25.

Johnson, B. and Christensen, L. (2012) *Educational Research: Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed Approaches, 4th edition*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Keita, L.D. (1997) 'Neoclassical Economics and the Last Dogma of Positivism: Is the Normative-Positive Distinction Justified?', *Metaphilosophy*, 28(1-2), pp. 81-101.

Kordik, A. (2017/2018) 'Righting an Upside-down World', *International Socialist Review*, 107. Available at: https://isreview.org/issue/107/righting-upside-down-world/index.html (Accessed: 18 January 2022).

Lawson, T. (2003a) 'Theorizing Ontology', *Feminist Economics*, 9(1), pp. 161-169.

Lawson, T. (2003b) *Reorienting Economics*. London: Routledge.

Lawson, T. and Morgan, J. (2021) 'Cambridge Social Ontology, the Philosophical Critique of Modern Economics and Social Positioning Theory: An Interview with Tony Lawson, Part 1', *Journal of Critical Realism*, 1, pp. 72-97.

Little, D. (2016) *Karl Polanyi as a Critical Realist?* Available at: https://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2016/07/karl-polanyi-as-critical-realist.html (Accessed: 20 January 2022).

Lee, F.S. (2016) 'Critical Realism, Method of Grounded Theory, and Theory Construction', in Lee, F.S. and Cronin, B. (eds.) *Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Heterodox Economics*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Levers, M.D. (2013) 'Philosophical Paradigms, Grounded Theory, and Perspectives on Emergence', *SAGE Open*, 3(4). Available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2158244013517243#:~:text=Relativist%20ontology%20is%20the%20belief,Guba%20%26%20Lincoln%2C%202005). (Accessed: 23 March 2022).

Marx, K. (1867) *Preface to the First German Edition of Capital Volume One*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p1.htm (Accessed: 23 March 2022).

McMeekin, N., et al. (2020) 'How Methodological Frameworks are Being Developed: Evidence from a Scoping Review', *BMC Medical Research Methodology*, 20(173), pp. 1-9.

Morgan, G. (1980) ‘Paradigms, Metaphors, and Puzzle Solving in Organization Theory’, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 25(4), pp. 605-622.

Nielsen, P. (2002) ‘Reflections on Critical Realism in Political Economy’, *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 26(6), pp. 727-738.

O’Boyle, B. and McDonough, T. (2010) Critical realism, Marxism and the Critique of Neoclassical Economics’, *Capital & Class*, 35(1), pp. 3-22.

O’Grady, P. (2014) *Relativism*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Parker, E. (1995) ‘Prospects for the State-Owned Enterprise in China’s Socialist Market Economy’, *Asian Perspective*, 19(1), pp. 7-35.

Polanyi, K. (1947) ‘Our Obsolete Market Mentality: Civilization Must Find a New Thought Pattern’, *Commentary* 3, pp. 109-117.

Polanyi, K. (1957) ‘The Economy as Instituted Process’, in Polanyi, K., Arensberg, C.M., and Pearson, H.W. (eds.) *Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory*. New York and London: Free Press.

Polanyi, K. (2001) *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Postell, J. and Watson, B.C.S. (eds.) (2011) *Rediscovering Political Economy*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Reed, M.I. (2009) ‘Critical Realism: Philosophy, Method or Philosophy on Search of a Method?’, in Buchanan, D. and Bryman, A. (eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Organizational Research Methods*. London: Sage.

Rowlinson, M. (2005) ‘Historical Research Methods’, in Swanson, R. and Holton III, E.F. (eds.) *Research in Organizations: Foundations and Methods of Inquiry*. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.

Saunders, M.N.K., Lewis, P., and Thornhill, A. (2019) *Research Methods for Business Students (8th edition)*. Harlow: Pearson.

Smith, D.W. (2013) *Phenomenology*. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/ (Accessed: 23 March 2022).

Somers, M. and Block, F. (2014) ‘The Return of Karl Polanyi’, *Dissent*, Spring. Available at: https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/the-return-of-karl-polanyi (Accessed: 18 January 2022).

Stabile, D.R. (1982) ‘Thorstein Veblen and His Socialist Contemporaries: A Critical Comparison’, *Journal of Economic Issues*, 16(1), pp. 1-28.

Steinmetz, G. (1998) ‘Critical Realism and Historical Sociology: A Review Article’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40(1), pp. 170-186.

Sturgiss, E.A. and Clark, A.M. (2020) 'Using Critical Realism in Primary Care Research: An Overview of Methods', *Family Practice*, 37(1), pp. 143-145.

Tabb, W.K. (1999) *Reconstructing Political Economy: The Great Divide in Economic Thought*. London: Routledge.

Thielemann, U. (2020) 'Heterodoxy, Positivism and Economism. On the Futility of Overcoming Neoliberalism on Positive Grounds', *Real-world Economics Review*, 94, pp. 154-185.

Veblen, T. (1994) 'Why Is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?', in Veblen, T. *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization*. London: Routledge/Thoemmes Press.

White, H. (1995) 'Response to Arthur Marwick', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 30, pp. 233–246.

Wilson, M. (2005) Institutionalism, Critical Realism, and the Critique of Mainstream Economics', *Journal of Institutional Economics*, 1(2), pp. 217-231.

Wolff, R.D. and Resnick, S.A. (2012) *Contending Economic Theories: Neoclassical, Keynesian and Marxian*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Wright, G. (2015) 'Economic History, Quantitative: United States', in Wright, J.D. (ed.) *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*. Available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/economic-history (Accessed: 17 January 2022).

Chapter 4

Arnesen, E. (ed.) (2007) *Encyclopedia of U.S. Labor and Working Class History, vol. 1*. New York: Routledge.

Avrich, P.H. (1963) 'Russian Factory Committees in 1917', *Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 11(2), pp. 161-162.

Bean, J.J. (1997) 'Nikolai Bukharin and the New Economic Policy: A Middle Way', *Independent Review*, II(1), pp. 79-97.

Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R.A.W. (2006) *Governance Stories*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Baum, B. (1999) 'J.S. Mill's Conception of Economic Freedom', *History of Political Thought*, 20(3), pp. 494-530.

Booth, A.J. (1869) *Robert Owen: The Founder of Socialism in England*. London: Trubner & Co.

Bourrinet, P. (2017) *The Dutch and German Communist Left (1900–68)*. Leiden: Brill.

Brinton, M. (1970) *The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/brinton/1970/workers-control/02.htm (Accessed: 19 May 2022).

Brovkin, V. (1990) 'Workers' Unrest and the Bolsheviks' Response in 1919', *Slavic Review*, 49(3), pp. 350-373.

Burkitt, B. and Hutchinson, F. (1997) *The Political Economy of Social Credit and Guild Socialism*. London: Routledge.

Carr, E.H. (1968) *A History of Soviet Russia: The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, vol. 2*. New York: Penguin.

Chattopadhyay, P. (1998) 'Communist Manifesto and Marxian Idea of Post-Capitalist Society', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 33(32), pp. 2165-2167.

Chattopadhyay, P. (2005) 'Worlds Apart: Socialism in Marx and in early Bolshevism: A Provisional Overview', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 40(53), pp. 5629-5634.

Cibrario, D. (2021) *Public Services 2.0: Democratic Governance and Participation*. Geneva: Public Services International.

Claeys, G. (1987) 'Justice, Independence, and Industrial Democracy: The Development of John Stuart Mill's Views on Socialism', *The Journal of Politics*, 49(1), pp. 122-147.

Claeys, G. (2002) *Citizens and Saints: Politics and Anti-politics in Early British Socialism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cliff, T. (2004) *All Power to the Soviets: Lenin 1914-1917*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Colby, F.M. (ed.) (1920) *The New International Year Book: A Compendium of the World's Progress for the Year 1919*. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company.

Cole, G.D.H. (1934) *What Marx Really Meant*. London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd.

Cole, G.D.H. (1980) *Guild Socialism Restated*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.

Cumbers, A. (2016a) 'Public ownership as Economic Democracy', *Soundings: A Journal of Politics and Culture*, 64, pp. 84-88.

Cumbers, A. (2020) *The Case for Economic Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity.

Curl, J. (2009) *For All the People: Uncovering the Hidden History of Cooperation, Cooperative Movements, and Communalism in America*. Oakland: PM Press.

D'Amato, P. (2009) *The Marxist View of the State*. Available at: https://socialistworker.org/2009/03/06/marxist-view-of-the-state (Accessed: 5 July 2022).

Dardot, P. and Laval, C. (2019) *Common: On Revolution in the 21st Century*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Darlington, R. (2008) *Syndicalism and the Transition to Communism: An International Comparative Analysis*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Darlington, R. (2009) 'Syndicalism and the Influence of Anarchism in France, Italy and Spain', *Anarchist Studies*, 17(2), pp. 29+.

Dewey, J. (1920) *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. New York: Henry Holt & Company.

Dewey, J. (1931) *Individualism: Old and New*. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.

Dewey, J. (1987) 'Democracy and Educational Administration', in Boydston, J.A. (ed.) *John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953. Volume 2: 1935-1937. Essays, Reviews, Trotsky Inquiry, Miscellany, and Liberalism and Social Action*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Dewey, J. (2008) 'Ethics', in Boydston, J.A. (ed.) *John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953. Volume 7: 1932, Ethics*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Di Paola, P. (2011) 'The Factory Councils in Turin, 1919–1920: "The sole and authentic social representatives of the proletarian class"', in Ness, I. and Azzellini, D., (eds.) *Ours to Master and to Own: Workers' Control from the Commune to the Present*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Dorrien, G. (2010) *Economy, Difference, Empire: Social Ethics for Social Justice*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Dorrien, G. (2019) *The Birth of Social Democracy: From Karl Marx to Eduard Bernstein*. Available at: https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/birth-social-democracy (Accessed: 6 July 2022).

Draper, H. (1987) *The 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat' from Marx to Lenin.* New York: Monthly Review Press.

Dubofsky, M. (2000) *We Shall be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.

Dubofsky, M. (ed.) (2013) *The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Business, Labor, and Economic History, volume 1*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dunayevskaya, R. (1941) *The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a Capitalist Society*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/dunayevskaya/works/1941/ussr-capitalist.htm#f2 (Accessed: 7 July 2022).

Ellerman, D. (2009) *The Workplace in Deliberative Democratic Theory: A Note on Kant, Mill, and Dewey*. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1389875 (Accessed: 16 June 2022).

Engels, F. (1872) *On Authority*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1872/10/authority.htm (Accessed: 5 July 2022).

Engels, F. (1877) *Anti-Dühring: Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/index.htm (Accessed: 5 July 2022).

Engels, F. (1901) *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*. New York: New York Labor News Company.

Engels, F. (1990) 'Introduction to Karl Marx's The Class Struggles in France', in Engels, F. *Collected Works*, *Vol. 27*. Moscow: Progress.

Fairbairn, B. (1994) *The Meaning of Rochdale: The Rochdale Pioneers and the Co-operative Principles*. Available at: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31778/?ln=en (Accessed: 13 September 2022).

Faulkner, N. (2018) *A Radical History of the World*. London: Pluto Press

Feuer, L.S. (2010) *Ideology and the Ideologists*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Fink, L. (1985) *Workingmen's Democracy: The Knights of Labor and American Politics*. Champaign: Illini Books.

Flaherty, S. (2021) *Review of John Stuart Mill: Socialist*. Available at: https://marxandphilosophy.org.uk/reviews/19119_john-stuart-mill-socialist-by-helen-mccabe-reviewed-by-seamus-flaherty/ (Accessed: 10 June 2022).

Fletcher, R.A. (1983) 'In the Interest of Peace and Progress: Eduard Bernstein's Socialist Foreign Policy', *Review of International Studies*, 9, pp. 79-93.

George, W. (1922) 'Proudhon and Economic Federalism', *Journal of Political Economy*, 30(4), pp. 531-542.

Gerber, J. (1989) *Anton Pannekoek and the Socialism of Workers' Self Emancipation, 1873-1960*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

GIC (1930) *Fundamental Principles of Communist Production and Distribution*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/subject/left-wing/gik/1930/01.htm#h2 (Accessed: 5 July 2022).

GIC (1938) *The Origins of the Movement for Workers' Councils in Germany*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/subject/left-wing/gik/1938/workers-councils.htm (Accessed: 16 September 2022).

Gill-McLure, W. (2017) 'Adaptation, Evolution and Survival? The Political Economy of Whitleyism and Public Service Industrial Relations in the U.K 1917–Present', *Labor History*, 59(1), pp. 15-37.

Gregory, P.R. (1994) *Before Command: An Economic History of Russia from Emancipation to the First Five-Year Plan*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Goodway, D. (2016) ‘Guild Socialism’, in Ackers, P. and Reid, A.J. (eds.) *Alternatives to State-Socialism in Britain: Other Worlds of Labour in the Twentieth Century*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gourevitch, A. (2015) *From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Graham, R. (2015) *We Do Not Fear Anarchy – We Invoke It: The First International and the Origins of the Anarchist Movement*. Oakland: AK Press.

Graham, R. (no date) *The General Idea of Proudhon’s Revolution*. Available at: http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/proudhon/grahamproudhon.html (accessed: 29 February 2020).

Green, J. (1999) *Deep Democracy: Community, Diversity, and Transformation*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Hanna, T.M., Bozuwa, J., and Rao, R. (2021) *The Power of Community Utilities: Publicly Owned and Cooperative Electric Utilities as Anchors for Community Wealth Building and a Just Energy Transition*. Washington, D.C.: The Democracy Collaborative.

Harris, N. (2015) *The Mandate of Heaven: Marx and Mao in Modern China*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Harrison, B. (1994) ‘Politics’, in Harrison, B. (ed.) *The History of the University of Oxford: Volume VIII: The Twentieth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hobsbawm, E.J. (1973) *Revolutionaries: Contemporary Essays*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Hodgson, G.M. (2023) The Institutional Impossibility of Guild Socialism. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 47(1), pp. 21-43.

ICA (no date) The Co-operative Movement Today. Available at: https://www.ica.coop/en/history-co-operative-movement (Accessed: 13 September 2022).

Jensen, A., Patmore, G., and Tortia, E.C., (eds) (2015) *Cooperative Enterprises in Australia and Italy: Comparative Analysis and Theoretical Insights*. Firenze: Firenze University Press.

Jones, H.S. (2002) *The French State in Question: Public Law and Political Argument in the Third Republic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kasmir, S. (1996) *The Myth of Mondragon: Cooperatives, Politis, and Working Class Life in a Basque Town*. Albany: State University of New York.

Kendall, W. (1972) *State Ownership, Workers’ Control and Socialism*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/kendall/1972/state-ownership.htm#n6 (Accessed: 5 July 2022).

Kloppenberg, J.T. (2017) ‘John Dewey and Liberal Democracy’, in Atanassow, E. and Kahan, A.S. (eds.) *Liberal Moments: Reading Liberal Texts*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Lattarulo, G. and Ambrosoli, R. (1971) 'Il programma dell'Ordine Nuovo', *L'Ordine Nuovo*. 14 August.

Laidler, H.W. (1920) *Socialism in Thought and Action*. New York: The Macmillan Company.

Lawrence, N. (1919) 'Plumb's Plan for Public Ownership and Control of Railways in This Country', *Los Angeles Herald*, 12 August.

Leikin, S. (2005) *The Practical Utopians: American Workers and the Cooperative Movement in the Gilded Age*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Lenin, V.I. (1917) *Draft Regulations on Workers' Control*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/oct/26.htm (Accessed: 6 July 2022).

Lenin, V.I. (1918) *The State and Revolution: The Marxist Theory of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/ebooks/lenin/state-and-revolution.pdf (Accessed: 6 July 2022).

Lu, S.Y. (1922) *The Political Theories of P.J. Proudhon*. New York: Columbia University.

Luxemburg, R. (1900) *Reform of Revolution*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1900/reform-revolution/index.htm (Accessed: 22 November 2022).

Malle, S. (1985) *The Economic Organization of War Communism, 1918-1921*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, T. (1913) *Syndicalism and the State*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/mann-tom/1913/syndicalism-state.htm (Accessed: 16 September 2022).

Marx, K. (1871) *The Civil War in France*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/civil_war_france.pdf (Accessed: 4 May 2024).

Marx, K. (1891) Critique of the Gotha Programme. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/index.htm (Accessed: 5 July 2022).

Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1848) *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf (Accessed: 5 July 2022).

Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1850) *Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/communist-league/1850-ad1.htm (Accessed: 5 July 2022).

Maw, B. (2011) 'Robert Owen's Unintended Legacy: Class Conflict', in Williams, C. and Thomson, N., (eds.) *Robert Owen and His Legacy*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

McCabe, H. (2021) *John Stuart Mill: Socialist*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

McKay, I. (2010) *Syndicalism, Anarchism and Marxism*. Available at: https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/anarcho-syndicalism-anarchism-and-marxism?v=1612181569#fn2 (Accessed: 16 September 2022).

Mill, J.S. (1962) 'Tocqueville on Democracy in America (Vol. I)', in Himmelfarb, G. (ed.) *Essays on Politics and Culture*. Garden City: Doubleday.

Mill, J.S. (1978) *On Liberty*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.

Mill, J.S. (1994) *Principles of Political Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Morgan, K. (2019) 'Fabians, Guild Socialists and "Democracies of Producers": Participation and Self-government in the Social Theories of the Webbs and their Successors', in S. Berger, S., Pries, L., and Wannöffel, M., (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Workers' Participation at Plant Level*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mott, R.L. (1922) 'The Political Theory of Syndicalism', *Political Science Quarterly*, 37(1), pp. 25-40.

Neurath, O. (2005) 'A System of Socialisation', in Uuebel, T.E. and Cohen, R.S. (eds.). *Otto Neurath: Economic Writings, Selections 1904-1945*. New York: Springer Science + Business Media, Inc.

O'Neill, J. (2003) 'Socialism, Associations and the Market', *Economy and Society*, 32, pp. 184-206.

O'Neill, M. (2008) 'Three Rawlsian Routes towards Economic Democracy', *Revue de Philosophie Économique*, 9(1), pp. 29-55.

Ostergaard, G. (1961) 'Approaches to Industrial Democracy', *Anarchy*, 2, pp. 36-46.

Ostrowski, M.S. (2018) *Eduard Bernstein on Social Democracy and International Politics: Essays and Other Writings*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ostrowski, M.S. (2021) *Eduard Bernstein on Socialism Past and Present: Essays and Lectures on Ideology*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pateman, C. (1970) *Participation and Democratic Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Patmore, G. (2020) *Innovative Consumer Co-operatives: The Rise and Fall of Berkeley*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Patmore, G. and Balnave, N. (2018) *A Global History of Co-operative Business*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Peberdy, R. and Waller, P. (eds.) (2021) *A Dictionary of British and Irish History*. Hoboken: Wiley.

Persky, J. (2016) *The Political Economy of Progress: John Stuart Mill and Modern Radicalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Persky, J. and Madden, K. (2019) 'The Economic Content of G.D.H. Cole's Guild Socialism: Behavioral Assumptions, Institutional Structure, and Analytical Arguments', *European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, 26(3), pp. 427-463.

Powderly, T. (1889) *Thirty Years of Labor*. Columbus: Excelsior Publishing House.

Proudhon, P.J. (1846) *Proudhon to Marx*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/proudhon/letters/46_05_17.htm (Accessed: 18 February 2020).

Proudhon, P.J. (1979) *The Principle of Federation*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Proudhon, PJ. (2011) 'Organisation of the Social Problem', in McKay, I. (ed). *Property is Theft! A Pierre-Joseph Proudhon Anthology*. Oakland: AK Press.

Ratner, C. (2013) *Cooperation, Community, and Co-Ops in a Global Era*. New York: Springer Science + Business Media.

Resnick, S.A. and Wolff, R.D. (2002*) Class Theory and History: Capitalism and Communism in the USSR*. London: Routledge.

Ritter, A. (1969) *The Political Thought of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rogers, C. (2018) 'Robert Owen, Utopian Socialism and Social Transformation', *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 54(4), pp. 256-271.

Ross, W.G. (2017) *World War I and the American Constitution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Royle, E. (1998) *Robert Owen and the Commencement of the Millennium: A Study of the Harmony Community*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Russell, B. (2002) *Proposed Roads to Freedom*. State College: Pennsylvania State University.

Silvia, S. (2013) *Holding the Shop Together: German Industrial Relations in the Postwar Era*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Siméon, O. (2012) *Robert Owen: The Father of British Socialism*. Available at: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01574714/file/Robert_Owen_The_Father_of_British_Social.pdf (Accessed: 28 February 2020).

Sorel, G. (1901) *L'Avenir Socialiste des Syndicats*. Paris: Librarie G. Jacques & Co.

Sowell, T. (1963) 'Karl Marx and the Freedom of the Individual', Ethics, 73(2), pp. 119-125.

Sturmthal, A. (1952) 'The Structure of Nationalized Enterprise in France', *Political Science Quarterly*, 67(3), pp. 357-377.

Van der Linden, M. and Thorpe, W., (eds.) (1990) *Revolutionary Syndicalism: An International Perspective*. Aldershot: Scolar Press.

Vernon, R. (1980) 'Introduction', in Cole, G.D.H. *Guild Socialism Restated*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.

Vieta, M. (2021) *Workers' Self-Management in Argentina: Contesting Neo-Liberalism by Occupying Companies, Creating Cooperatives, and Recuperating Autogestión*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Watkins, G.S. (1919) 'The Present Status of Socialism in the United States', *Atlantic*, December. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1919/12/the-present-status-of-socialism-in-the-united-states/646679/ (Accessed: 9 June 2022).

Wilshire, G. (1913) *Syndicalism: What It Is*. Available at: http://libcom.org/library/syndicalism-what-it (Accessed: 28 February 2020).

Wright, A.W. (1978) 'Fabianism and Guild Socialism: Two Views of Democracy', *International Review of Social History*, 23(2), pp. 224-241.

Chapter 5

Alperovitz, G. (1968) 'The New Approach to Poverty', *New Generation*, 50(4), pp. 2-6.

Alperovitz, G., Gillies, A.L., and Hunter, D.R. (1972) *Memorandum to Participants*. Exploratory Project for Economic Alternatives. Author's files.

Alperovitz, G. (1978) 'The Youngstown Experience', *Challenge*, 21(3), pp. 21-24.

Arrighi, G. (1994). *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of our Times*. London: Verso.

Bałtowski, M. and Kwiatkowski, M. (2022) *State-Owned Enterprises in the Global Economy*. London: Routledge.

Barratt Brown, M. (2005). *From Tito to Milosevic: Yugoslavia , the Lost Country*. London: Merlin.

Barratt Brown, M. (2016) *The Institute for Workers' Control*. Available at: https://www.workerscontrol.net/theorists/institute-workers%E2%80%99-control (Accessed: 1 March 2020).

Bennoune, M (1976) 'Algerian Peasants and National Politics', *MERIP Reports*, 48, pp. 3-24.

Bergin, C. (2015) *'Bitter with the Past but Sweet with the Dream': Communism in the African American Imaginary*. Leiden: Brill.

Bockman, J. (2011) *Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Brogi, A. (2011) *Confronting America: The Cold War between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Byrne, J.J. (2009) 'Our Own Special Brand of Socialism: Algeria and the Contest of Modernities in the 1960s', *Diplomatic History*, 33(3), pp. 427-447.

Carson, C. (1995) *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Caughey, D., Dougal, M.C., and Schickler, E. (2020) 'Policy and Performance in the New Deal Realignment: Evidence from Old Data and New Methods', *Journal of Politics*, 82(2), pp. 494-508.

Chomsky, N. (1999) *Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order*. New York: Seven Stories Press.

Clegg, I. (1971) *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*. New York and London: Monthly Review Press.

Cliff, T. and Gluckstein, D. (2019) *The Labour Party: A Marxist History*. London: Bookmarks Publications.

Coates, K. (1971). *Essays on Industrial Democracy*. Nottingham: Spokesman Books.

Coates, K. (1981) *Work-ins, Sit-ins and Industrial Democracy*. Nottingham: Spokesman Books.

Coates, K. and Topham, T. (1973) *Catching Up With the Times: How Far the TUC Got the Message About Workers' Control*. Nottingham: Institute for Workers' Control.

Corpet, O. and Pluet, J. (1992) 'Autogestions', in Széll, G. (ed.) *Concise Encyclopaedia of Participation and Co-Management*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Cumbers, A. (2019) 'A Tale of Two Nationalisations: Experiences of Post-1945 Public Ownership in the UK and France Compared', *International Journal of Public Policy*, 15 (1/2), pp. 5-20.

Davis, J.E. (2010). *The Community Land Trust Reader*. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Davis, J.E. (2014) *Origins and Evolution of the Community Land Trust in the United States*. Available at: https://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/report-davis14.pdf (Accessed: 26 January 2021).

Derthick, M. (1974) *Between State and Nation*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Desiderio, R.J. and Sanchez, R.G. (1969) 'The Community Development Corporation', *Boston College Law Review*, 10(2)(2), pp. 217-264.

Du Bois, W.E.B. (1933) 'The Right to Work', *The Crisis,* 40(4), pp. 93-94.

Du Bois, W.E.B. (2007) *Dusk of Dawn*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Erekaini, R. (2014) *What is a Community Development Corporation?* Available at: https://www.naceda.org/index.php?option=com_dailyplanetblog&view=entry&category=bright-ideas&id=25%3Awhat-is-a-community-development-corporation-&Itemid=171 (Accessed: 6 February 2021).

Estrin, S. (1991) 'Yugoslavia: The Case of Self-Managing Market Socialism', *Journal of Economic Perspectives,* 5(4), pp. 187-194.

Frenkel, W.G. (1989) 'Soviet Legislation on Cooperatives: Private Enterprises in a Non-Market Economy', *Transnational Lawyer*, 2, pp. 25-47.

Frost, J. (2001) *"An Interracial Movement of the Poor": Community Organizing and the New Left in the 1960s*. New York: New York University Press.

Gerth, M. (2023) *Anti-Communism in Britain During the Early Cold War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ghodsee, K. and Orenstein, M.A., (eds.) (2021) *Taking Stock of Shock: Social Consequences of the 1989 Revolutions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gilcher-Holtey, I. (2018) 'Political Participation and Democratization in the 1960: The Concept of Participatory Democracy and its Repercussions', in Kurunmäki, J., Nevers, J., and te Velde, H. (eds.) *Democracy in Modern Europe: A Conceptual History*. New York: Berghahn.

GLC (1985) *London Industrial Strategy*. London: Greater London Council.

Goldman, M.I. (1988) 'Gorbachev and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union', *Eastern Economic Journal*, XIV(4), pp. 331-335.

Goldman, M.I. (2003) *The Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry*. London: Routledge.

Goodrich, C. (1975) *The Frontier of Control: A Study in British Workshop Politics*. London: Pluto Press.

Green, J. and Hanna, T.M. (2018) *Community Control of Land and Housing: Exploring Strategies for Combatting Displacement, Expanding Ownership, and Building Community Wealth*. Washington, D.C: The Democracy Collaborative.

Greenberg, E.S. (1986) *Workplace Democracy: The Political Effects of Participation*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Grounded Solutions. (no date). *Community Land Trusts*. Available at: https://groundedsolutions.org/strengthening-neighborhoods/community-land-trusts (Accessed: 14 January 2024).

Guinan, J. (2015) 'Bring Back the Institute for Workers' Control', *Renewal*, 23(5), pp. 11-36.

Guinan, J. (2019) ‘Socialising Capital: Looking Back on the Meidner Plan’, *International Journal of Public Policy*, 15(2), pp. 38-58.

Gutiérrez, J.J.G. (2003) ‘Hungarian Revolution and Workers Councils’, in Schlager, N. et. al., eds. *St. James Encyclopedia of Labor History Worldwide*.

Hanley, C.J. and Chang, J. (2008) ‘Summer of Terror: At least 100,000 said Executed by Korean Ally of US in 1950’, *Asia-Pacific Journal*, 6(7), pp. 1-11.

Hansmann, H. (1990) ‘When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy’, *Yale Law Journal*, 99(8), pp. 1749-1816.

Hanson, R.L. (1985) *The Democratic Imagination in America: Conversations with Our Past*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Harnecker, C.P. (ed.) (2013) *Cooperatives and Socialism: A View from Cuba*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Haynes, Jr., C. (2018) ‘From Philanthropic Black Capitalism to Socialism: Cooperativism in Du Bois’s Economic Thought’, *Socialism and Democracy*, 32(3), pp. 125-145.

Haynes, M. (2006) ‘Hungary: Workers’ Councils Against Russian Tanks’, *International Socialism*, 2(112). Available at: https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/haynes/2006/xx/hungary56.html (Accessed: 12 September 2024)

Hedlund, S. (2021) *Private Agriculture in the Soviet Union*. London: Routledge.

Hermassi, E. (1972) *Leadership and National Development in North Africa: A Comparative Study*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hyclak, T. (1987) ‘Worker Self-Management and Economic Reform in Poland’, *International Journal of Social Economics*, 14(7/8/9), pp. 127-135.

Jacobs, M. (1986) ‘Farewell to the Greater London Council’, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 21(30), pp. 1306-1308.

Jakopovich, D. (2012) ‘Yugoslavia’s Self-Management’, in Rhodes, A., et al. (eds.) *Keep Space for Peace*. Nottingham: Spokesman Books.

Katznelson, I. (2013) *Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Kerans, P., Drover, G., and Williams, D. (1988) *Welfare and Worker Participation: Eight Case-studies*. Houndmills: The Macmillan Press.

King, Jr., M. (1967) *Where Do We Go From Here?* Available at: https://www.plough.com/en/topics/justice/social-justice/where-do-we-go-from-here (Accessed 14 January, 2021).

Kloppenberg, J.T. (1998) *The Virtues of Liberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kochan, T.A. (2007). 'Wages and the Social Contract', *American Prospect*, 22 April. Available at: https://prospect.org/special-report/wages-social-contract/ (Accessed: 14 January 2021).

Kolaja, J. (1960) *A Polish Factory: A Case Study of Workers' Participation in Decision Making*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.

Kogan, D. (2019) *Protest and Power: The Battle for the Labour Party*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Krausz, T. (2006) *The Hungarian Workers' Councils of 1956*. Available at: https://www.workersliberty.org/story/2006-10-31/hungarian-workers-councils-1956 (Accessed: 23 September 2020).

Kruse, D. (2022) *Does Employee Ownership Improve Performance?* Available at: https://wol.iza.org/articles/does-employee-ownership-improve-performance/long#:~:text=Not%20only%20is%20employee%20ownership,employment%20stability%2C%20and%20company%20survival (Accessed: 21 January 2023).

Labour Party (1918) *1918 Labour Party General Election Manifesto*. Available at: http://labourmanifesto.com/1918/1918-labour-manifesto.shtml (Accessed: 7 December 2022).

Labour Party (1945) *1945 Labour Party Election Manifesto*. Available at: http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1945/1945-labour-manifesto.shtml (Accessed: 7 December 2022).

Lane, A. (2004) *Yugoslavia: When Ideals Collide*. Houndmills: Palgrave.

London, D. (2022) 'Building a People's Economy in London', *Tribune*. 25 September. Available at: https://tribunemag.co.uk/2022/09/glc-gleb-robin-murray-economics-socialism-london-thatcher/ (Accessed: 26 February 2023).

Luff, J. (2018) 'Labor Anticommunism in the United States of America and the United Kingdom, 1920-1940', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 53(1), pp. 109-133.

Lynd, S. (1982) *The Fight Against Shutdowns: Youngstown's Steel Mill Closings*. San Pedro: Singlejack Books.

Lynn, M.L., Mulej, M., and Jurse, K. (2002) 'Democracy without Empowerment: The Grand Vision and Demise of Yugoslav Self-Management', *Management Decision*, 40(8), pp. 797-806.

Mansbridge, J. (1983) *Beyond Adversary Democracy*. New York: Basic Books.

Millward, R. (1995) 'Industrial Organisation and Economic Factors in Nationalisation', in Millward, R. and Singleton, J. (eds.) *The Political Economy of Nationalisation in Britain, 1920-1950*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morrison, K. (2018) 'The "June Events": The 1968 Student Protests in Yugoslavia,' in McDermott, K. and Stibbe, M., (eds.) *Eastern Europe in 1968: Response to the Prague Spring and Warsaw Pact Invasion*. Cham: Palgrave.

Murray, R. (1987) 'Ownership, Control and the Market', *New Left Review*, 164, pp. 87-112.

Musić, G. (2011) 'Yugoslavia: Workers' Self-Management as State Paradigm', in Ness, I. and Azzellini, D., (eds.) *Ours to Master and to Own: Workers' Control from the Commune to the Present*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.

MW (no date) *Autogestion*. Available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autogestion (Accessed: 26 January 2021).

Nellis, J.R. (1977) 'Socialist Management in Algeria', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 15(4), pp. 529-554.

Nelson, G. (1968) *Remarks to the Community Self-Determination Symposium, December 12, 1968, Washington Hilton* Hotel. Washington, D.C.: Xerox Corporation.

Nembhard, J.G. (2015) *Thinking about a Next System with W.E.B. Du Bois and Fannie Lou Hamer*. Available at: https://thenextsystem.org/thinking-about-a-next-system-with-w-e-b-du-bois-and-fannie-lou-hamer (Accessed: 26 September 2022).

Olujić, D. (2018) *The 1968 Yugoslav Students Revolt, Interview with Dragomir Olujić*. Available at: https://www.leftvoice.org/the-1968-yugoslav-students-revolt-interview-with-dragomir-olujic (Accessed: 29 July 2020).

Ottaway, D. and Ottaway, M. (1970) *Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Palmer, J. (1986) 'Municipal Enterprise and Popular Planning', *New Left Review*, 159, pp. 117-124.

Payne, S.G. (1987) *The Franco Regime: 1936-1975*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Pencavel, J. (2001) *Worker Participation: Lessons from the Worker Co-ops of the Pacific Northwest*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Piketty, T. (2014) *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Porter, D. (2011) *Eyes to the South: French Anarchists and Algeria*. Oakland: AK Press.

Powell, Jr., L. (1971) *Attack on American Free Enterprise System*. Available at: https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/democracy/the-lewis-powell-memo-a-corporate-blueprint-to-dominate-democracy/ (Accessed: 14 January 2021).

Pravda (1988) *Zakon kooperatsii v SSSR*. Available at: http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1985-2/cooperatives/cooperatives-texts/law-on-cooperatives/ (Accessed: 29 September 2020).

Prout, C. (1985) *Market Socialism in Yugoslavia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Robertson, J. (2017) 'The Life and Death of Yugoslav Socialism', *Jacobin*, 17 July. Available at: https://jacobinmag.com/2017/07/yugoslav-socialism-tito-self-management-serbia-balkans (Accessed: 22 January 2022).

Rooney, A. (1968) 'The Aircraft Industry', in Coates, K. ed. *Can the Workers Run Industry?* London: Sphere Books.

Rusinow, D.I. (1978). *The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Sarkar, R. (2019) *Made in India: History of Post Independence Economic & Industrial Development in India*. Chennai: Notion Press.

Schiller, R. (2018) 'Mourning King: The Civil Rights Movement and the Fight for Economic Justice', *New Labor Forum*, 12, pp. 1-8.

SDS (1990) *The Port Huron Statement*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr Publishing Company.

Seibel, H.S. and Damachi, U.G. (1982) *Self-Management in Yugoslavia and the Developing World*. London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd.

Selznick, P. (1953) *TVA and the Grassroots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Shanahan, E. (1968) 'Corporations for the Poor Proposed by 26 Senators', *New York Times*, July 25.

Shavelson, J. (1990) *A Third way: Innovations in Community-Owned Enterprise*. Washington, D.C.: The National Center for Economic Alternatives.

Shearer, D.R. (1996) *Industry, State, and Society in Stalin's Russia, 1926-1934*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Shlapentokh, V. (1988) 'Workers' Involvement in the Soviet Union: From Lenin to Gorbachev', *Work and Occupations*, 15(4), pp. 449-467.

Singer, D. (2002) *Prelude to Revolution: France in May 1968*. Cambridge: South End Press.

Singleton, J. (1995) 'Labour, the Conservatives and Nationalisation', in Millward, R. and Singleton, J. (eds.) *The Political Economy of Nationalisation in Britain, 1920-1950*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Slider, D. (1986) 'Worker Participation in Socialist Systems: The Soviet Case', *Comparative Politics*, 18(4), pp. 401-418.

Smith, A. (2014). *Socially Useful Production*. Brighton: STEPS Centre.

Southgate, S.J. (2011) 'From Worker' Self-Management to State Bureaucratic Control,' in Ness, I. and Azzellini, D., (eds.) *Ours to Master and to Own: Workers' Control from the Commune to the Present*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.

SPD (1959) *Godesberg Program of the SPD*. Available at: https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3049 (Accessed: 21 December 2022).

Stepan-Norris, J. and Zeitlin, M. (2003) *Left Out: Reds and America's Industrial Unions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

TDC (2005.) *Building Wealth: The New Asset-Based Approach to Solving Social and Economic Problems*. Aspen Institute.

Thomas, J. (1984) 'Thatcher Vs. 'Red Ken': Winner to Take London', *New York Times*, 2 August.

Toninelli, P.A. (ed.) (2000) *The Rise and Fall of State-Owned Enterprise in the Western World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tuckman, A. (2011) *Ken Coates & Tony Topham*. Available at: https://www.workerscontrol.net/activists/ken-coates-tony-topham-0 (Accessed: 1 March 2020).

Unkovski-Korica, V. (2016) *The Economic Struggle for Power in Tito's Yugoslavia: From World War II to Non-Alignment*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co.

Wallerstein, I. and Zukin, S. (1989) '1968, Revolution in the World-System: Theses and Queries. *Theory and Society*', 18(4), pp. 431-449.

Ward, B. and Badger, T. (1996) *The Making of Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement*. New York: New York University Press.

Weber, I.M. (2021) *How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform Debate*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Wilkins, R. (1979) 'Reopening a Steel Plant in Ohio; Reaction to the Federal Rejection', *New York Times*, 6 April.

Williams, R., (ed.) (2018) *May Day Manifesto 1968*. London: Verso.

Williamson, A. (2016) 'The Bullock Report on Industrial Democracy and the Post-War Consensus', *Contemporary British History*, 30(1), pp. 119-149.

Wilson, H. (1974) *Let Us Work Together – Labour's Way Out of the Crisis*. Available at: http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1974/feb/1974-feb-labour-manifesto.shtml (Accessed: 1 March 2020).

Zaccaria, B. (2018) 'Learning from Yugoslavia? Western Europe and the Myth of Self-Management', in Christian, M., Kott, S., and Matějka, O., (eds.) *Planning in Cold War Europe: Competition, Cooperation, Circulations (1950s–1970s)*. Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter.

Ziegler, C.E. (1983) ‘Worker Participation and Worker Discontent in the Soviet Union’, *Political Science Quarterly*, 98(2), pp. 235-253.

Chapter 6

Ali T, A. and Sarma, A. (2021) ‘Kerala’s Communists are Showing India a Path Out of Poverty’, *Jacobin*, 1 November. Available at: https://jacobin.com/2021/11/kerala-india-communist-party-farmers-cooperatives-bds-wayanad (Accessed: 14 August 2024).

Amadae, S.M. (2003) *Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism*. Chicago and London: Chicago Press University.

Arpini, E., et al. (2023) ‘New Municipalism in South America? Developing Theory from Experiences in Argentina and Chile’, *Urban Studies*, 60(11), pp. 2290-2306.

Assies, W. (2003) ‘David versus Goliath in Cochabamba: Water Rights, Neoliberalism, and the Revival of Social Protest in Bolivia’, *Latin American Perspectives*, 30(3), pp. 14-36.

Atlas (2023). *The Network*. Available at: https://www.atlasnetwork.org/partners (Accessed: 22 September 2023).

Baiocchi, G. (2024) ‘Learning from the Pink Tide’, *Boston Review*, 17 June. Available at: https://www.bostonreview.net/forum_response/learning-from-the-pink-tide/ (Accessed: 22 June 2024).

Basualso, V., Berghoff, H., and Bucheli, M. (2021) *Big Business and Dictatorships in Latin America: A Transnational History of Profits and Repression*. Cham: Palgrave.

Bel, G. (2020) Public Versus Private Water Delivery, Remunicipalization and Water Tariffs. *Utilities Policy*, 62, pp. 1-8.

Bjerre-Poulson, N. (2014) ‘The Mont Pelerin Society and the Rise of a Postwar Classical Liberal Counter-Establishment’, in van Dongen, L., Roulin, S., and Scott-Smith, G. (eds.) *Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War*. London: Palgrave.

Boden, M. (2011) ‘Neoliberalism and Counter-Hegemony in the Global South: Reimagining the State’, in Motta, S.C. and Nilsen, A.G. (eds.) *Social Movements in the Global South: Dispossession, Development and Resistance*. New York: Palgrave.

Bonefeld, W. (2012) ‘Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism’, *New Political Economy*, 17(5), pp. 633-656.

Boyte, H.C. (2011) ‘Constructive Politics as Public Work: Organizing the Literature’, *Political Theory*, 39(5), pp. 630-660.

Bozeman, B. (2007) *Public Values and Public Interest: Counterbalancing Economic Individualism*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Broms, R., Dahlström, C., and Nistotskaya, M. (2020) 'Competition and Service Quality: Evidence from Swedish Residential Care Homes', *Governance*, 33(3), pp. 525-543.

Bryson, J.M., Crosby, B.C., and Bloomberg, L. (2014)' Public Value Governance: Moving Beyond Traditional Public Administration and the New Public Management', *Public Administration Review*, 74(4), pp. 445-456.

Campbell, J.L. (2004) *Institutional Change and Globalization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cerny, P.G. (2016) 'In the Shadow of Ordoliberalism: The Paradox of Neoliberalism in the 21st Century', *European Review of International Studies*, 3(1), pp. 78-92.

Chamberlain, J. (1983) *A Reviewers Notebook: Political Economy and Freedom*. Available at: https://fee.org/articles/a-reviewers-notebook-political-economy-and-freedom/ (Accessed: 10 October 2023).

Chong, A. and López-de-Silanes, F. (2005) 'The Truth About Privatization in Latin America', in Chong, A. and López-de-Silanes, F., (eds.) *Privatization in Latin America: Myths and Reality*. Washington, D.C: The World Bank.

Christensen, T. and Laegreid, P. (2008) 'NPM and Beyond: Structure, Culture and Demography', *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 74(1), pp. 7–23.

Cingolani, L. and Fazekas, M. (2020) 'The Role of Agencification in Achieving Value-For-Money in Public Spending', *Governance*, 33(3), pp. 545-563.

Clairmont, F.F. (2002) 'Argentina: Implosion of Neoliberalism', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 37(13), pp. 1196-1198.

Collier S.J. (2012) 'Neoliberalism as Big Leviathan, or …? A Response to Wacquant and Hilgers', *Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale*, 20(2), pp. 186-195.

Connell, R. and Dados, N. (2014) 'Where in the World does Neoliberalism Come From? The Market Agenda in Southern Perspective', *Theory and Society*, 43(2), pp. 117–138.

Cook, et al. (2007) 'Who Deliberates? Discursive Participation in America', in Rosenberg, S. (ed.) *Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can People Govern*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.

Cumbers, A. (2016b) 'Remunicipalization, the Low-Carbon Transition, and Energy Democracy', in Gardner, G., Prugh, T., Renner, M. (eds.) *Can a City Be Sustainable?* Washington, D.C: Island Press.

Cumbers, A., et al. (2024) *Building Economic Democracy in Europe: Concepts, Cases and Achieving Progressive Change*. Brussels: Foundation for European Progressive Studies.

Daley, D.M. and Vasu, M.L. (2005) 'Supervisory Perceptions of the Impact of Public Sector Personnel Practices on the Achievement of Multiple Goals: Putting the Strategic into Human Resource Management', *The American Review of Public Administration*, 35(2), pp. 157–167.

Dawson, A. and Olivera, O. (2011) 'The Cochabamba Water Wars: An Interview with Oscar Olivera', *Social Text*, 5 July. Available at: https://socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/the_cochabamba_water_wars/ (Accessed: 12 October 2023).

de la Fuente, M. (2003) 'A Personal View: The Water War in Cochabamba, Bolivia: Privatization Triggers an Uprising', *Mountain Research and Development*, 23(1), pp. 98-100.

De Sousa Santos, B. (2008) 'The World Social Forum and the Global Left', *Politics & Society*, 36(2), pp. 247-270.

Deleon, L. (2007) 'Public Management, Democracy, and Politics', in Ferlie, E., Lynn, L.E., and Pollitt, C. *The Oxford Handbook of Public Management*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

DeLeon, L. and DeLeon, P. (2002) 'The Democratic Ethos and Public Management', *Administration & Society*, 34(2), pp. 229-250.

Denhardt, J.V. and Denhardt, R.B. (2007) *The New Public Service: Serving, Not Steering*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

Denhardt, J.V. and Denhardt, R.B. (2015) 'The New Public Service Revisited', *Public Administration Review*, 75(5), pp. 664-672.

Denhardt, R.B. and Denhardt, J.V. (2000) 'The New Public Service: Serving Rather than Steering', *Public Administration Review*, 60(6), pp. 549-559.

Dollery, B. and Hamburger, P. (1995) 'The Dunleavy and Niskanen Models of Bureaucracy: The Case of the Australian Federal Budget Sector', *UNE Working Papers in Economics*, 19, pp. 1-24.

Driessen, T. (2008) 'Collective Management Strategies and Elite Resistance in Cochabamba, Bolivia', *Development*, 51(1), pp. 89-95.

Dunleavy, P., et al. (2006) 'New Public Management is Dead—Long Live Digital Era Governance', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 16(3), pp. 467–494.

Feigenbaum, H., Henig, J., and Hamnett, C., (eds.) (1998) *Shrinking the State: The Political Underpinnings of Privatization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fernández-Kelly, P. and Massey, D.S. (2007) 'Borders for Whom? The Role of NAFTA in Mexico-U.S. Migration', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 610(1), pp. 98-118.

Fischer, K. and Plehwe, D. (2017) 'Neoliberal Think Tank Networks in Latin America and Europe: Strategic Replication and Cross-National Organizing', in Salas-Porras, A. and Murray, G. (eds.) *Think Tanks and Global Politics: Key Spaces in the Structure of Power*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Flores-Macías, G. (2012) *After Neoliberalism? The Left and Economic Reforms in Latin America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Forbis, M. (2014) 'The Zapatistas at 20: Building Autonomous Community', *Solidarity*, 23 March. Available at: https://solidarity-us.org/p4135/ (Accessed: 1 June 2024).

Friedman, M. (1951) 'Neo-Liberalism and its Prospects', *Farmand*, pp. 89-93.

Galiani, S., Gertler, P., and Schargrodsky, E. (2005) 'Water for Life: The Impact of the Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality', *Journal of Political Economy*, 115(1), pp. 83-120.

Gamble, A. (2018) *Hayek: The Iron Cage of Liberty*. New York: Routledge.

Gruening, G. (2001) 'Origin and Theoretical Basis of New Public Management', *International Public Management Journal*, 4(1), pp. 1-25.

Hall S. (2011) 'The Neo-liberal Revolution', *Cultural Studies*, 25(6), pp. 705-728.

Harrison, J.S. and Freeman, R.E. (2004) 'Is Organizational Democracy Worth the Effort?', *The Academy of Management Executive*, 18(3), pp. 49-53.

Hart, O., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W. (1997) 'The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(4), pp. 1128-1161.

Harvey, D. (2005) *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hayek, F.A. (2005) *The Road to Serfdom*. London: Routledge.

Heller, et al. (2004) *Organizational Participation: Myth and Reality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Henck, N. (2017) *Insurgent Marcos: The Political-Philosophical Formation of the Zapatista Subcommander*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Hesketh, C. (2017) *Spaces of Capital/Spaces of Resistance: Mexico and the Global Political Economy*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Hien, J. (2023) *The Rise and Fall of Ordoliberalism*. Available at: https://academic.oup.com/ser/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ser/mwad018/7100859 (Accessed: 2 February 2024).

HM Treasury (no date) *Implementing Privatisation in the UK Experience*. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/symp_mar02_uk_treasury_priv_guide_e.pdf (Accessed: 10 October 2023).

Holyoke, T.T. (2021) *Interest Groups and Lobbying*. New York: Routledge.

Hood, C. (1995) 'The "New Public Management" in the Eighties', *Accounting, Organization and Society*, 20(2/3), pp. 93-109.

IMF (1998) *Bolivia: Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Policy Framework Paper, 1998–2001*. Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/np/pfp/bolivia/ (Accessed: 11 October 2023).

Irwin, D.A. and Ward, O. (2021) *What is the "Washington Consensus"*. Available at: https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/what-washington-consensus (Accessed: 10 October 2023).

Jones, D.S. (2012) *Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kaswan, M.J. (2014) 'Developing Democracy: Cooperatives and Democratic Theory', *International Journal of Urban Sustainable Development*, 6(2), pp. 190-205.

Kolev, S. (2021) 'Ordoliberalism', in Marciano, A. and Ramello, G.B. (eds.) *Encyclopedia of Law and Economics*. New York: Springer.

Kotzé, L.J. (2019) 'Editorial: Coloniality, Neoliberalism and the Anthropocene', *Journal of Human Rights and the Environment*, 10(1), pp. 1-6.

Knafo, S. (2020) 'Neoliberalism and the Origins of Public Management', *Review of International Political Economy*, 4, pp. 780-801.

Krieger, T. and Nientiedt, D. (2023) *The Renaissance of Ordoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s*. Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10602-023-09411-2 (Accessed: 2 February 2024).

Kuehn D. (2021) '"We Can Get a Coup": Warren Nutter and the Overthrow of Salvador Allende', in Fiorito, L., Scheall, S. and Suprinyak, C.E. (eds.) *Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology: Including a Selection of Papers Presented at the 2019 ALAHPE Conference*, Leeds: Emerald Publishing Limited, pp. 151-186.

Kuruvilla, B. (2019) 'Kerala's Web of Cooperatives: Advancing the Solidarity Economy', in Steinfort, L. and Kishimoto, S. (eds.) *Public Finance for the Future We Want*. Amsterdam: TNI.

Kuttner, R. (2021) 'The Agony of Social Democratic Europe', *American Prospect*, 4 August. Available at: https://prospect.org/world/agony-social-democratic-europe-trans-atlantic-left/ (Accessed: 20 August 2024).

Lapuente, V. and Van de Walle, S. (2020) 'The Effects of New Public Management on the Quality of Public Services', *Governance*, 33(3), pp. 461-475.

LeBot, Y. (1997) *El Sueño Zapatista: Entrevistas con el Subcomandante Marcos, El Mayor Moisés y el Comandante Tacho, del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*. Barcelona: Plaza y Janés.

Leland, S. and Smirnova, O. (2009) 'Reassessing Privatization Strategies 25 Years Later: Revisiting Perry and Babitsky's Comparative Performance Study of Urban Bus Transit Services', *Public Administration Review*, 69(5), pp. 855–67.

Lévy, et al., (eds.) (2022) *The Anglo-American Model of Neoliberalism of the 1980s: Construction, Development and Dissemination*. Cham: Springer Nature.

Lobina, E. and Hall, D. (2007) *Water Privatisation and Restructuring in Latin America*. Greenwich: Public Services International Research Unit.

Loureiro, P.M. (2018) 'Reformism, Class Conciliation and the Pink Tide: Material Gains and Their Limits', in Ystanes, M. and Stronen, I.A. (eds.) *The Social Life of Economic Inequalities in Contemporary Latin America*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Marquetti, A., Schonerwald da Silva, C.E., and Campbell, A. (2012) 'Participatory Economic Democracy in Action: Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre, 1989–2004', *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 44(1), pp. 62-81.

Mathiasen, D.G. (1999) 'The New Public Management and Its Critics', *International Public Management Journal*, 2(1), pp. 90-111.

McLaughlin, K., Osborne, S.P., and Ferlie, E. (eds.) (2002) *New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects*. London: Routledge.

Minogue, M., Polidano, C., and Hulme, D. (eds.) (1998) *Beyond the New Public Management: Changing Ideas and Practices in Government*. Cheltenham: Edwin Elgar.

Millet, R.L., Holmes, J.S., and Pérez, O.J., (eds.) (2015) *Latin American Democracy: Emerging Reality of Endangered Species*. New York: Routledge.

Monbiot, G. (2016) 'Neoliberalism – The Ideology at the Root of All Our Problems', *The Guardian*, 15 April. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problem-george-monbiot (Accessed: 12 May 2024).

Mora, M. (2017) *Kuxlejal Politics: Indigenous Autonomy, Race, and Decolonizing Research in Zapatista Communities*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Moynihan, D.P. (2006) 'Managing for Results in State Government: Evaluating a Decade of Reform', *Public Administration Review*, 66(1), pp. 77–89.

Niskanen, W. A. (1971) *Bureaucracy and Representative Government*. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.

OECD (2005) *Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Survey of OECD Countries*. Paris: OECD.

Olivera, O. and Lewis, T. (2004) *Cochabamba: Water War in Bolivia*. Cambridge: South End Press.

Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992) *Reinventing Government*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Osborne, S.P. (2006) 'The New Public Governance?', *Public Management Review*, 8(3), pp. 377-387.

Osborne, S.P. (ed.) (2010) *The New Public Governance? Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public Governance*. New York: Routledge.

Osborne, S.P., Radnor, Z., and Nasi, G. (2013) 'A New Theory for Public Service Management? Toward a (Public) Service-dominant Approach', *The American Review of Public Administration*, 43(2), pp. 135–158.

Palley, T. (2017) 'The General Theory at 80: Reflections on the History and Enduring Relevance of Keynes' Economics', *Investigación Económica*, 76(301), pp. 87-101.

Parker, D. (2021) *Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises*. Available at: https://oxfordre.com/business/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190224851.001.0001/acrefore-9780190224851-e-93;jsessionid=3231CD326F52F16EFFB1EDF3A867D20B (Accessed: 10 October 2023).

Perreault, T. (2008) 'Custom and Contradiction: Rural Water Governance and the Politics of Usos y Costumbres in Bolivia's Irrigators' Movement', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 98(4), pp. 834-854.

Perry, J.L., Mesch, D., and Paarlberg, L. (2006) 'Motivating Employees in a New Governance Era: The Performance Paradigm Revisited', *Public Administration Review*, 66(4), pp. 505–514.

Peters, M.A. (2023) 'The Early Origins of Neoliberalism: Colloque Walter Lippman (1938) and the Mt Pelerin Society (1947)', *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 55(14), pp. 1574-1581.

Plehwe, D. and Fischer, K. (2019) 'Continuity and Variety of Neoliberalism: Reconsidering Latin America's Pink Tide', *Leibniz Information Centre for Economics*, 13(2), pp. 166-202.

Putnam, R.D. (2000) *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Rainey, H.G. and Jung, C.S. (2010) 'Extending Goal Ambiguity Research in Government: From Organizational Goal Ambiguity to Programme Goal Ambiguity', in Walker, R.M., Boyne, G.A., Brewer, G.A. (eds.) *Public Management and Performance: Research Directions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Razavi, N.S. (2019) '"Social Control" and the Politics of Public Participation in Water Remunicipalization, Cochabamba, Bolivia', *Water*, 11(7), 1455.

Rebrii, A. (2020) 'Zapatistas: Lessons in Community Self-Organisation in Mexico', *openDemocracy*, 25 June. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/zapatistas-lecciones-de-auto-organizaci%C3%B3n-comunitaria-en/ (Accessed: 1 June 2024).

Robinson, M. (2015) *From Old Public Administration to the New Public Service: Implications for Public Sector Reform in Developing Countries*. Singapore: UNDP Global Centre for Public Service.

Rodriguez, J.P. (2021) 'The politics of Neoliberalism in Latin America: Dynamics of Resilience and Contestation', *Sociology Compass*, 15(3), pp. 1-13.

Routledge, P. and Cumbers, A. (2009) *Global Justice Networks: Geographies of Transnational Solidarity*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Saba, R.P. and Manzetti, L. (1996) 'Privatization in Argentina: The Implications for Corruption', *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 25, pp. 353-369.

Sader, E. (2008) 'The Weakest Link? Neoliberalism in Latin America', *New Left Review*, July/August, pp. 5-31.

Saith, A. (2022) *Cambridge Economics in the Post-Keynesian Era: The Eclipse of Heterodox Traditions*. Cham: Springer.

Salgado, C. and Sandrin, P. (2021) 'A "Pink Tide" Then a "Turn to the Right": Populisms and Extremism in Latin America in the Twenty-First Century'. in Guilherme, B.D.S, et al., (eds.) *Financial Crisis Management and Democracy. Lessons from Europe and South America*. Cham: Springer.

Sánchez Gómez, L. and Terhorst, P. (2005) 'Cochabamba, Bolivia: Public-Collective Partnerships after the Water War', in Balanya, B., et al., (eds.) *Reclaiming Public Water: Achievements, Struggles, and Visions from Around the World*. Amsterdam: TNI.

Selwyn, B. (2015) 'Friedrich Hayek: In Defence of Dictatorship', *openDemocracy*, 9 June. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/friedrich-hayek-dictatorship/ (Accessed: 22 September 2023).

Sheshinski, E. and López-Calva, L.F. (2003) 'Privatization and Its Benefits: Theory and Evidence', *CESifo Economic Studies*, 49(3), pp. 429-459.

Shirley, M.M. (2005) 'Why is Sector Reform so Unpopular in Latin America?', *The Independent Review,* 10(2), pp. 195-207.

Shleifer, A. (2005) 'Foreword', in Chong, A. and López-de-Silanes, F., (eds.) *Privatization in Latin America: Myths and Reality*. Washington, D.C: The World Bank.

Shughart, II. W.F. (no date) *Public Choice*. Available at: https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicChoice.html (Accessed: 29 May 2024).

Simons, H.C. (1934) *A Positive Program for Laissez Faire: Some Proposal for Liberal Economic Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Slobodian, Q. (2018) *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Spronk, S. (2007) 'Roots of Resistance to Urban Water Privatization in Bolivia: The "New Working Class," the Crisis of Neoliberalism, and Public Services', *International Labor and Working-Class History*, 71, pp. 8-28.

Spronk, S., Crespo, C., and Olivera, M. (2012) 'Struggles for Water Justice in Latin America: Public and "Social-Public Alternatives"', in McDonald, D.A. and Ruiters, G. (eds.) *Alternatives to Privatisation: Public Options for Essential Services in the Global South*. New York: Routledge.

Steger, M.B. and Roy, R.K. (2021) *Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stoker, G. (2006) 'Public Value Management: A New Narrative for Networked Governance?', *American Review of Public Administration*, 36(1), pp. 41-57.

Tanenhaus, S. (2017) 'The Architect of the Radical Right', *The Atlantic*, July/August. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/07/the-architect-of-the-radical-right/528672/ (Accessed: 11 October 2023).

Tooze, A. (2018) 'Neoliberalism's World Order', *Dissent*, Summer. Available at: https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/neoliberalism-world-order-review-quinn-slobodian-globalists/ (Accessed 27 September 2023).

Vallier, K. (2021) *Neoliberalism*. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neoliberalism/ (Accessed: 25 September 2023).

Vargas, A. (2019/20) *Alternative Participatory Planning in Zapatista Territories*. Available at: https://sites.utexas.edu/internationalplanning/case-studies/alternative-participatory-planning-in-zapatista-territories/ (Accessed: 7 March 2023).

Venugopal, R. (2015) 'Neoliberalism as Concept', *Economy and Society*, 44(2), pp. 165-187.

von Mises, L. (1985) *Liberalism: In the Classical Tradition*. Irvington-on-Hudson and San Francisco: The Foundation for Economic Education, Inc. and Cobden Press.

Wallison, P. (2004) *Ronald Reagan: The Power of Conviction and The Success of His Presidency.* Westview Press.

Ward, S.C. (2012) *Neoliberalism and the Global Restructuring of Knowledge and Education*. New York: Routledge.

Webber, J.R. (2011) *Red October: Left-Indigenous Struggles in Modern Bolivia*. Leiden: Brill.

Weibel, A., Rost, K., and Osterloh, M. (2010) 'Pay for Performance in the Public Sector—Benefits and (Hidden) Costs', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 20(2), pp. 387–412.

Wright, M.D. (1993). 'A Critique of the Public Choice Theory Case for Privatization: Rhetoric and Reality', *Ottawa Law Review*, 25(1), pp. 1-38.

Zaina, N. (2022) 'Kudumbashree: Leveraging The Transformative Potential Of Self-Help Groups For Women', *Feminism in India*, 6 July. Available at: https://feminisminindia.com/2022/07/06/kudumbashree-leveraging-the-transformative-potential-of-self-help-groups-for-women/ (Accessed: 14 August 2024).

Zamora, D. (2019) 'How Neoliberalism Reinvented Democracy: An Interview with Niklas Olsen', *Jacobin*, 6 April. Available at: https://jacobin.com/2019/04/neoliberalism-democracy-consumer-sovereignty (Accessed: 4 February 2024).

Chapter 7

Ackers, P. (2010) 'An Industrial Relations Perspective on Employee Participation', in Wilkinson, A., et al. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Participation in Organizations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Adaman, F. and Devine, P. (1996) 'The Economic Calculation Debate: Lessons for Socialists', *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 20(5), pp. 523-537.

Albert, M. (2003) *Parecon: Life After Capitalism*. London: Verso.

Alperovitz, G. (2006) *America Beyond Capitalism: Reclaiming our Wealth, Our Liberty, and Our Democracy*. Hoboken: Wiley.

Alperovitz, G. (2012) 'A Checkerboard Strategy for Regaining the Progressive Initiative', *Truthout*, 30 December. Available at: https://truthout.org/articles/a-checkerboard-strategy-for-regaining-the-progressive-initiative/ (Accessed: 14 August 2024).

Alperovitz, G. (2017) 'The Possibility of a Pluralist Commonwealth Evolutionary Reconstruction Toward a Caring and Just Political Economy', *Caring Democracy*, 4(1), pp. 1-37.

Asara, V. (2019) 'The Redefinition and Co-Production of Public Services by Urban Movements. The Can Batlló Social Innovation in Barcelona', *Partecipazione e Conflitto,* 12(2), pp. 539-565.

Bakunin, M. (1866) *National Catechism*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bakunin/works/1866/national-catechism.htm (Accessed: 19 May 2024).

Bandau, F. (2023) ‘What Explains the Electoral Crisis of Social Democracy? A Systematic Review of the Literature’, *Government and Opposition*, 58(1), pp. 183-205.

Bianchi, I. (et al.) (2022) ‘Urban Commons and the Local State: Co-production Between Enhancement and Co-optation’, *Territory, Politics, and Governance*, pp. 1-20.

Błaszcyk, C. (2022) ‘Jineology: Kurdish “Feminism” in the Doctrine of Democratic Confederalism and the Political System of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (Rojava)’, *Studia Luridica*, 90, pp. 74-98.

Bookchin, M. (1990) *The Meaning of Confederalism*. Available at: https://archive.org/details/al_Murray_Bookchin_The_Meaning_of_Confederalism_a4/mode/2up (Accessed: 16 July 2024).

Brown, T. (1943) *Principles of Syndicalism*. Available at: https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/tom-brown-principles-of-syndicalism (Accessed: 19 May 2024).

Burczak, T.A. (1996) ‘Socialism after Hayek’, *Rethinking Marxism*, 9(3), pp. 1-18.

Chalmers, D. (2022) ‘Collectivist Perspectives on Crony Capitalism’, *Academy of Management Perspectives*, 36(4), pp. 1049-1057.

Coates, K. (2023) *Workers’ Control: Another World is Possible*. Nottingham: Spokesman.

Cockshott, W.P. and Cottrell, A. (1999) *Economic Planning, Computers and Labor Values*. Available at: https://users.wfu.edu/cottrell/socialism_book/aer.pdf (Accessed: 16 July 2024).

Cuéllar, M.F. (2014) ‘Administrative War’, *George Washington Law Review*, 82(5), pp. 1343-1445.

Deci, E.L. and Ryan, R.M. (2012) ‘Self-Determination Theory’, in Van Lange, P.A.M, Kruglanski, A.W., and Tory Higgins, E. (eds.) *Theories of Social Psychology, Volume 1*. London: Sage.

Devine, P. (2002) ‘Participatory Planning Through Negotiated Coordination’, *Science & Society*, 66(1), pp. 72-93.

Engler, M. and Engler, P. (2021) ‘André Gorz’s Non-Reformist Reforms Show How We Can Transform the World Today’, *Jacobin*, 22 July. Available at: https://jacobin.com/2021/07/andre-gorz-non-reformist-reforms-revolution-political-theory (Accessed: 21 May 2024).

Foster, J.B. (2018) ‘What is Monopoly Capital?’, *Monthly Review*, 1 January. Available at: https://monthlyreview.org/2018/01/01/what-is-monopoly-capital/ (Accessed: 4 May 2024).

Fraser, N. (2013) *Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Galvan-Alvarez, E. (2020) 'Rojava: A State Subverted or Reinvented?', *Postcolonial Studies*, 23(2), pp. 182-196.

Godelmann, I.K. (2014) *The Zapatista Movement: The Fight for Indigenous Rights in Mexico*. Available at: https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/news-item/the-zapatista-movement-the-fight-for-indigenous-rights-in-mexico/ (Accessed: 24 April 2024).

Gorz, A. (1968) 'Reform and Revolution', *Socialist Register*, 5, pp. 111-143.

Graeber, D. (2012) *David Graeber and David Harvey in Conversation*. Available at: http://vimeo.com/41997338#t=4369. (Accessed: 4 May 2024).

Gramsci, A. (2010) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers.

Hanna, T.M. and Kelly, M. (2021) *Community Wealth Building: The Path towards a Democratic and Reparative Political Economic System*. Seoul: Seoul Institute.

Hassan, S. and Staal, J. (2017) 'The Rojava Revolution and the Model of Democracy Without a State', in Büllesbach, D., Cillero, M., and Stolz, L. *Shifting Baselines of Europe: New Perspectives beyond Neoliberalism and Nationalism*. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.

Hemming, R. and Mansoor, A.M. (1988) *Privatization and Public Enterprises*. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.

Hodgson, G.M. (1999) *Economics and Utopia*. London: Routledge.

Huws, U. (2021) *Decommodification in the Twenty-First Century*. Available at: https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/news/5001-decommodification-in-the-twenty-first-century (Accessed: 24 April 2024).

Kautsky, J.H. (1997) 'Centralization in the Marxist and in the Leninist Tradition', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 30(4), pp. 379-400.

Klein, P., et al. (2021) 'Capitalism, Cronyism, and Management Scholarship: A Call for Clarity', *Academy of Management Perspectives*, 36 (1), pp. 6–29.

Lavelle, A. (2016) *The Death of Social Democracy: Political Consequences in the 21st Century*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Maisano, C. (2023) 'What Does Revolution Mean in the 21st Century?: An Interview with Mark Beissinger', *Jacobin*, 10 August. Available at: https://jacobin.com/2023/08/mark-beissinger-urban-civic-revolution-politics-social-change-protest (Accessed: 21 May 2024).

Mandel, E. (1968) *The Debate on Workers' Control*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/mandel/1968/wcontrol/workontrol.htm (Accessed: 19 May 2024).

Mandel, E. (1973) *Workers' Control and Workers' Councils*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/mandel/1973/xx/wcwc.html (Accessed: 19 May 2024).

Marx, K. (1906) *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. I*. New York: The Modern Library.

Miron, J. and Bourne, R. (2019) *Democratic Socialism Is the Scenic Route to Serfdom*. Available at: https://www.cato.org/commentary/democratic-socialism-scenic-route-serfdom (Accessed: 17 July 2024).

Petitjean, O. (2015) 'Taking Stock of Remunicipalisation in Paris. A Conversation with Anne Le Strat', in Kishimoto, S., Lobina, E., and Petitjean, O. (eds.) *Our Public Water Future: The Global Experience with Remunicipalisation*. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.

Petras, J. and Vieux, S. (1994) 'The Decline of Revolutionary Politics: Capitalist Detour and the Return of Socialism', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 24(1), pp. 1-34.

Pink, D.H. (2009) *Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us*. New York: Riverhead Books.

RIC (2023) *AANES' Social Contract, 2023 Edition*. Available at: https://rojavainformationcenter.org/2023/12/aanes-social-contract-2023-edition/ (Accessed: 16 July 2024).

Salih, M.A. (2024) 'Syria's Kurdish Northeast Ratifies a New Constitution', *New Lines Magazine*, 31 January. Available at: https://newlinesmag.com/argument/syrias-kurdish-northeast-ratifies-a-new-constitution/ (Accessed: 16 July 2024).

Samothrakis, S. (2021) *Artificial Intelligence Inspired Methods for the Allocation of Common Goods and Services*. Available at: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0257399 (Accessed: 16 July 2024).

Saros, D.E. (2014) *Information Technology and Socialist Construction: The End of Capital and the Transition to Socialism*. Abingdon: Routledge

Sorg, C. (2022) 'Failing to Plan Is Planning to Fail: Toward an Expanded Notion of Democratically Planned Postcapitalism', *Critical Sociology*, 49(3), pp. 475-493.

Springer, S. (2017) 'The limits to Marx: David Harvey and the Condition of Postfraternity', *Dialogues in Human Geography*, 7(3), pp. 280-294.

Tucker, R.C., (ed.) (1978) *The Marx-Engles Reader*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Türk, H.B. (2024) '"In Search of an Identity": Öcalan's Socialism', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 29(2), pp. 273-290.

UN, no date. *The 17 Goals*. Available at: https://sdgs.un.org/goals (Accessed: 4 May 2024).

Vidal, M., (et al.) (2019) *The Oxford Handbook of Karl Marx*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vincent, K.S. (1984) *Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise of French Republican Socialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ward, C. (2004) *Anarchism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wilson, D.S. (2023) *Socialism, Capitalism, and the Third Way of National Governance: A Conversation with Geoffrey Hodgson*. Available at: https://www.prosocial.world/posts/socialism-capitalism-and-the-third-way-of-national-governance-a-conversation-with-geoffrey-hodgson (Accessed: 24 April 2024).

Wood, E.M. (2002) *The Origins of Capitalism: A Longer View*. London: Verso.

Wright, E.O. (2010) *Envisioning Real Utopias*. London: Verso.

Wright, E.O. (2019) *Compass Points: Towards a Socialist Alternative*. Available at: https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/news/4218-erik-olin-wright-compass-points-towards-a-socialist-alternative (Accessed: 4 May 2024).

Chapter 8

Collord, M. (2020) '"The Old Ideas are Collapsing": An Interview with Gar Alperovitz', *openDemocracy*, 5 June. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/old-ideas-are-collapsing-interview-gar-alperovitz/ (Accessed: 15 August 2024).

Douglas, C.H. (1920) *Economic Democracy*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe.

EPA, no date. *Impacts of Climate Change*. Available at: https://www.epa.gov/climatechange-science/impacts-climate-change (Accessed: 16 September, 2024).

Hugo, V. (1909) *The History of a Crime, Volume Two*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Lal, P. (2015) *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania: Between the Village and the World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Li, G. (2024) *Employees' Participation in Corporate Governance under the Revised Chinese Company Law*. Available at: https://www.taylorwessing.com/en/insights-and-events/insights/2024/01/employees-participation-in-corporate-governance-under-the-revised-chinese-company-law (Accessed: 15 August 2024).

Long, Y., Nyland, C., and Fan, X. (2022) 'China's Staff and Worker Representative Congress System and the Management of Teachers' Performance Pay', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 52(5), pp. 760-782.

Markle, S.M. (2017) *A Motorcycle on Hell Run: Tanzania, Black Power, and the Uncertain Future of Pan-Africanism, 1964-1974*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

Nyerere, J.K. (1968) *Essays on Socialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.